























Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 

















THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 
IN  THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS 
OF UK MULTINATIONALS
VOLUME I
A  th e s is  s u b m itte d  in  f u l f i l lm e n t  o f  
th e  re q u ire m e n ts  f o r  th e  degree o f  
D o c to r o f  P h ilo s o p h y
by
KEVIN CAMPBELL
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
D e p a rtm e n t o f  A c c o u n tin g  and F inance  
G lasgow B us iness S choo l
S eptem ber 1990
©  K e v in  C am pbe ll, 1990
ProQuest Number: 11007549
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11007549
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
T hanks are  due f i r s t  and fo re m o s t to  my s u p e rv is o r ,  D r Jo h n  
H o lla n d , f o r  th e  g e n e ra l gu idan ce  w h ic h  he p ro v id e d  and f o r  th e  
v e ry  v a lu a b le  comments w h ic h  he made on th e  v a r io u s  d ra f ts  w h ic h  
he read . I  am a lso  in d e b te d  to  h im  f o r  h is  encouragem ent and f o r  
h is  en thus iasm  a b o u t th e  s u b je c t m a tte r  o f  th e  re se a rch . T hanks  
a re  a lso  due to  P ro fe s s o r S J  G ray f o r  h is  ass is ta n ce  in  th e  e a r l ie r  
s tages o f  th e  re se a rc h  and to  a l l  th o se  who com mented on th e  
re s e a rc h  p ro p o sa ls  p re s e n te d  a t th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f  G lasgow.
I  m ust a lso  acknow ledge  th e  h e lp  p ro v id e d  by P ro fe s s o rs  I  L a p s le y  
and C W R Ward o f  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f  S t i r l in g  in  th e  la t t e r  s tages o f  
th e  re se a rch , and to  M iss J i l l  B ruce  and M iss E lis s a  E llin g s  f o r  
a ss is ta n ce  w ith  p a g in a tio n .
F in a lly ,  I  w is h  to  th a n k  my p a re n ts  and fa m ily  f o r  th e  u n s t in t in g  
s u p p o r t  w h ic h  th e y  have  g iv e n  o v e r  th e  years .
CONTENTS
PAGE
A cknow ledgem ents i
A b s tra c t  v i i
PART I  INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
INTRODUCTION 2
C h a p te r One
INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH ISSUES
1.1 THE RESEARCH ISSUES 4
1.1.1 In tro d u c t io n  4
1.1.2 M ethods o f  In te rn a t io n a l B usiness: The
H is to r ic a l C o n te x t 5
1.1.3 The Com ponents o f  In te rn a t io n a l Business
E xpans ion  6
1.1.4 T echno logy  as a C o rp o ra te  Resources 7
1.1.5 The In te rn a t io n a l B usiness D e c is io n
Process 10
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH ISSUES 12
1.2.1 O w nersh ip  and C o n tro l 12
1.2.2 The F u tu re  E n v iro n m e n t o f  In te rn a t io n a l
Business 14
1.2.3 Im p lic a t io n s  f o r  H o s t C o u n tr ie s  15
1.2.4 Im p lic a t io n s  f o r  Home C o u n tr ie s  16
1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 17
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 19
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 20
Notes and R eferences 23
C h a p te r Two
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT & THE INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION 27
2.1.1 The C oncept o f  In v e s tm e n t 27
2.1.2 In te rn a t io n a l In v e s tm e n t 28
2.2 THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 32
2.2.1 In te rn a t io n a l In v e s tm e n t Pre-1945 32
2.2.2 In te rn a t io n a l In v e s tm e n t D u rin g
1945-1970 33
2.2.3 In te rn a t io n a l In v e s tm e n t Post-1970 35
2.2.4 C o nc lu s ions 37
(ii)
PAGE
2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 38
2.3.1 G overnm ent R e g u la tio n  o f  FDI and MNCs 38
2.3.2 The G row th  o f  T ra n s n a tio n a l B ank ing  42
2.3.3 D iv e rs if ic a t io n  o f  th e  C o u n try  o f
O r ig in  o f  MNCs 45
2.3.4 Changes in  th e  T e c h n o lo g ic a l
E n v iro n m e n t 46
2.4 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MNC RE-ASSESSED 47
Notes and R efe rences 50
C h a p te r Three
FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
3.1 INTRODUCTION 53
3.2 EQUITY INVESTMENT 54
3.2.1 F o re ig n  D ire c t  In v e s tm e n t 54
3.2.2 J o in t  V e n tu re s  and C o n s o rtia  55
3.3 LICENSING AGREEMENTS 55
3.3.1 In tro d u c t io n  55
3.3.2 P a ten ts  58
3.3.3 K now -how  60
3.3.4 T radem arks 63
3.3.5 C o p y r ig h t 67
3.3.6 R e g is te re d  D esigns 68
3.3.7 C o n c lu s io n  69
3.4 OTHER FORMS OF NON-EQUITY INVESTMENT 69
3.4.1 F ra n c h is in g  Agreem ents 69
3.4.2 Management C o n tra c ts  70
3.4.3 T u rn k e y  A greem ents 71
3.4.4 S u b c o n tra c tin g  71
3.5 EXPORTING 72
3.6 STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 73
3.7 FRAMEWORKS FOR CLASSIFYING FORMS OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 75
3.7.1 In t ro d u c t io n  75
3.7.2 O w nersh ip  and C o n tro l 76
3.7.3 In te rn a t io n a l F low s 77
3.7.4 V a lue -A dded  79
3.7.5 C o n c lu s io n  80
Notes and R efe rences 81
(iii)
PAGE
PART I I  REVIEW OF EXISTING THEORY AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION 85
Notes and R eferences 87
C h a p te r F o u r
THEORIES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION 89
4.2 MANAGERIAL THEORIES 90
4.3 ORGANIZATIONAL/BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES 92
4.4 NORMATIVE THEORIES 94
4.5 INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 95
4.5.1 In tro d u c t io n  95
4.5.2 C o m pa ra tive  Cost A p p ro a ch  95
4.5.3 P ro d u c t L i fe  Cycle A p p ro ach  98
4.6 LOCATION THEORY 102
4.7 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY 104
4.7.1 In tro d u c t io n  104
4.7.2 The Hym er A p p ro ach  104
4.7.3 P os t-H ym er C o n tr ib u t io n s  105
4.8 INVESTMENT THEORY 110
4.8.1 In tro d u c t io n  110
4.8.2 Im p e rfe c t C a p ita l M a rke ts  A p p ro ach  110
4.8.3 R is k  D iv e rs if ic a t io n  A p p ro a ch  112
4.9 GENERALISED THEORIES 113
4.10 A TAXONOMY OF FDI THEORIES: THE MARKET
IMPERFECTIONS PARADIGM 115
4.10.1 In tro d u c t io n  115
4.10.2 M a rke t D is e q u ilib r iu m  Im p e rfe c tio n s  116
4.10.3 G overnm ent In duced  Im p e rfe c tio n s  117
4.10.4 M a rke t S tru c tu re  Im p e rfe c t io n s  118
4.10.5 M a rke t F a ilu re  Im p e rfe c t io n s  119
4.10.6 C o nc lu s ions  120
Notes and R eferences 121
(iv)
PAGE
C h a p te r F ive
TRANSACTION COST THEORY AND THE MNC
5.1 INTRODUCTION 126
5.2 TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE THEORY OF THE
FIRM 127
5.2.1 The R oots o f  T ra n s a c tio n  C ost T h e o ry  127
5.2.2 Recent C o n tr ib u t io n s  130
5.2.3 The M a rke t and H ie ra rc h ie s  F ram ew ork : The
Basic M odel 132
5.2.4 The C hoice o f  Econom ic O rg a n iz a tio n : M a rk e t
Costs 136
5.2.5 The C hoice o f  Econom ic O rg a n iz a tio n :
H ie ra rc h y  Costs 139
5.2.6 C om pa ra tive  In s t i t u t io n a l  A n a ly s is  141
5.3 TRANSACTION COST THEORIES OF THE MNC 143
5.3.1 In tro d u c t io n  143
5.3.2 In te rn a liz a t io n  T h e o ry  143
5.3.3 A p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  T h e o ry  147
5.3.4 The M a rke t and H ie ra rc h ie s  E x p la n a tio n  o f
th e  MNC 148
5.4 LIMITATIONS OF TRANSACTION COST THEORY 152
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 158
Notes and R eferences 160
C h a p te r S ix
THE THEORY OF LICENSING IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
6.1 INTRODUCTION 168
6.1.1 The L ite ra tu re  on In te rn a t io n a l
L ic e n s in g  168
6.1.2 F a c to rs  A f fe c t in g  th e  L ic e n s in g
D e c is ion  169
6.2 TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCT-SPECIFIC
FACTORS 170
6.2.1 Im p e rfe c tio n s  in  th e  In te rn a t io n a l
T echno logy  M a rk e t 170
6.2.2 Degree o f  C o d if ic a t io n  and D if fu s io n
o f  T echno logy  178
6.2.3 P ro d u c t C ycle S ta n d a rd is a t io n  180
6.2.4 Rate o f  T e c h n o lo g ic a l T u rn o v e r  182
6.2.5 L e n g th  o f  P a te n t L i fe  182
6.2.6 S p in -o f f  T ech no logy  183
(v)
PAGE
6.3 INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC FACTORS 184
6.3.1 L e v e l o f  In d u s try  C o n c e n tra tio n 184
6.3.2 R e c ip ro ca l Access to  T echno logy 185
6.3.3 P re -e m p tio n  o f  C o m p e titio n 187
6.3.4 C re a tio n  o f  A u x i l ia r y  Business 190
6.4 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FACTORS 192
6.4.1 Lega l C o n s id e ra tio n s 192
6.4.2 H ost M a rke t Size, V o la t i l i t y  and
G row th  P o te n t ia l 196
6.4.3 R is k  C o n s id e ra tio n s 197
6.4.4 H ost C o u n try  R e s tr ic t io n s  on FDI 198
6.4.5 H ost C o u n try  R e s tr ic t io n s  on E x p o rts 199
6.4.6 A b s o rp tiv e  C a p a c ity  in  th e  H ost
C o u n try 199
6.5 FIRM-SPECIFIC FACTORS 200
6.5.1 L e v e l o f  E xp e rience  o f  F o re ig n
O p e ra tio n s 200
6.5.2 Size 202
6.5.3 L e v e l o f  P ro d u c t D iv e rs if ic a t io n 202
6.5.4 L e v e l o f  G e o g raph ica l D iv e rs if ic a t io n 203
6.5.5 Access to  E x te rn a l R esources 204
6.5.6 O rg a n iz a tio n a l S tru c tu re 204
6.5.7 D iffe re n c e s  in  D is c o u n t Rates 207
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 208
Notes and R eferences 210
C h a p te r Seven
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION 223
7.2 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
RESEARCH PROBLEM 223
7.2.1 R e le va n t T h e o ry 223
7.2.2 E c le c tic  A pproaches 226
7.2.3 M odels o f  th e  M a rk e t-S e rv ic in g
D e c is ion 231
7.2.4 T ra n s a c tio n  C osts in  In te rn a t io n a l
M a rke ts 239
7.2.5 Business S tra te g y  C o n s id e ra tio n s 242
7.3 CONCLUSIONS 243
Notes and R eferences 247
(vi)
ABSTRACT
T h is  th e s is  e xp lo re s  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  
a c t iv i t ie s  o f  UK-based m u lt in a t io n a l com panies (MNCs). I t  is  
conce rned  w ith  th e  o u tw a rd  lic e n s in g  o f  te c h n o lo g y , in  th e  fo rm  o f  
p a te n ts  and know -how , and i t  assesses th e  r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  o f  a 
num ber o f  v a r ia b le s  th a t  m o tiv a te  MNCs to  lic e n s e  t h e ir  te c h n o lo g y  
to  overseas com panies ra th e r  th a n  to  use th e  more common m ethods 
o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness , fo re ig n  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t (FDI) and 
e x p o rt in g .
The th e s is  ana lyses th e  e x te n t o f  in te r n a t io n a l lic e n s in g  
a c t iv i t y  among UK-based MNCs, and i t s  s ig n if ic a n c e  in  re la t io n  to  
th e  o th e r  tw o  m a jo r in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  m ethods. I t  a lso  
de sc rib e s  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s e d  and o f  th e  
MNCs in v o lv e d  in  lic e n s in g , and te s ts  a num ber o f  hypo theses  a b o u t 
these  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  th a t  are  d raw n  fro m  a v a r ie ty  o f  sources in  
th e  l i te ra tu r e s  on th e  th e  MNC, FDI, in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g , 
te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  and t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry .
The resea rch  is  b ro a d ly  d e d u c tiv e  in  n a tu re  as i t  assesses th e  
v a l id i t y  o f  v a r io u s  e x p la n a tio n s  fo u n d  in  th e  above l i te ra tu re s .  
M ost o f  th e  da ta  was c o lle c te d  by  means o f  a m a iled  q u e s tio n n a ire  
d ire c te d  a t a c a re fu lly  se lec te d  s u rv e y  p o p u la t io n  o f  322 UK-based 
MNCs in  1984, fro m  w h ich  86 useab le  responses w ere re ce ive d . The 
s ta t is t ic a l  a n a ly s is  u t i l is e s  m a in ly  n o n -p a ra m e tr ic  p ro ce d u re s  as 
m ost o f  th e  d a ta  is  o f  an o rd in a l n a tu re , a lth o u g h  p a ra m e tr ic  
p ro ce d u re s  are  a lso  used.
The a n a ly s is  o f  gove rnm en t s ta t is t ic s  on FDI, e x p o rts  and 
ro y a lt ie s  o v e r th e  p e r io d  1964 to  1984 re v e a le d  th a t  th e  p ro p o r t io n s  
o f  th e  UK's t o ta l  fo re ig n  sa les w h ic h  arose fro m  lic e n s in g  w ere 
c o n s is te n tly  lo w e r th a n  th o se  w h ic h  a rose  fro m  FDI and e x p o rts , b u t  
w ere n e v e rth e le s s  s u f f ic ie n t ly  la rg e  (6.7 p e r ce n t in  1984) to  m e r it  
s e r io u s  a tte n t io n .
(v ii)
The a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  
u s in g  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  d a ta  re ve a le d  th a t  lic e n s in g  was 
v ie w ed  by  th e  v a s t m a jo r ity  o f  UK MNCs as a 's t ra te g ic ' d e c is io n , in  
th e  sense th a t  i t  was more o fte n  th a n  n o t e v a lu a te d  a g a in s t FDI and 
e x p o rt in g . G o ve rn m e n t-c re a te d  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  were fo u n d  to  
be im p o r ta n t reasons b e h in d  th e  d e c is io n  to  o p t f o r  lic e n s in g  a t 
th e  expense o f  FDI o r  e x p o rt in g .
The in te rc o r re la t io n s  be tw een th e  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  w ere su b je c te d  to  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  to  d e te rm ine  
w h e th e r a s m a lle r g ro u p  o f  key  fa c to rs  c o u ld  be used to  a ccou n t f o r  
th e  d e c is io n  o f  UK MNCs to  a d o p t lic e n s in g , and th is  e xe rc ise  was 
su c c e s s fu l in  is o la t in g  a num ber o f  such fa c to rs .  The te c h n iq u e  o f  
m u lt ip le  l in e a r  re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  was a lso  em ployed to  de te rm ine  
th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  n in e  key  c o rp o ra te  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  were
a ssoc ia ted  w ith  th e  le v e l o f  l ic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  o f  th e  sam ple o f  UK
MNCs.
The in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  c o n te n t o f  th e  lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
possessed by  th e  sam ple w ere ana lysed  u s in g  s ta n d a rd  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  
te s ts  to  d e te rm ine  i f  t h e i r  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  d i f fe re d  a cco rd in g  to  
w h e th e r th e  agreem ents were w ith  u n re la te d  o r  re la te d  overseas 
com panies. I t  was a n t ic ip a te d  th a t  d iffe re n c e s  w o u ld  e x is t  due to  
th e  g re a te r  t ra n s a c tio n  cos ts  th a t  are  assumed to  a r is e  in  u n re la te d
agreem ents. The re s u lts  w ere  g e n e ra lly  c o n s is te n t w ith
e x p e c ta tio n s .
In  summary, th e  ke y  c o n tr ib u t io n s  to  know le dge  made by  th is  
s tu d y  a re  as fo llo w s : f i r s t l y ,  i t  p ro v id e s  ev idence  th a t  th e  lic e n s in g  
d e c is io n  is  n o t s im p ly  a b y -p ro d u c t  o f  th e  FDI and e x p o rt in g  
d e c is io n s  b u t  is  o f te n  a f i r s t - b e s t  cho ice ; secon d ly , i t  p ro v id e s  
in s ig h ts  in to  th e  fa c to rs  w h ic h  in f lu e n c e  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  and 
th e ir  r e la t iv e  w e ig h tin g s ; and, t h i r d ly ,  i t  p roduces ev idence  w h ic h  is  
b ro a d ly  s u p p o r t iv e  o f  th e  tra n s a c t io n  cos t s ch o o l o f  th o u g h t 
th ro u g h  i t s  e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
(v iii)
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
INTRODUCTION
The fo u r te e n  c h a p te rs  o f  th e  th e s is  a re  o rgan ized  in to  th re e  p a r ts . 
The f i r s t  th re e  c h a p te rs  make up P a rt I, w h ic h  p ro v id e s  an 
in t r o d u c t io n  to  th e  re se a rch  issues  and g ives  b a c kg ro u n d  d e ta ils  on 
th e  e v o lu t io n  o f  th e  UK's in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t, th e  g e n e ra l 
n a tu re  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l b u s iness  e n v iro n m e n t fa c in g  UK 
com panies, and th e  fo rm s o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  in  w h ic h  th e y  
can become in v o lv e d .
The re v ie w  o f  th e  re le v a n t th e o re t ic a l and e m p ir ic a l l i te r a tu r e  
is  c o n ta in e d  in  P a rt I I ,  w h ic h  spans C h ap te rs  F o u r to  Seven 
in c lu s iv e .  The re m a in in g  ch a p te rs  make up P a rt I I I ,  w h ic h  d e scrib es  
th e  e m p ir ic a l s tu d y  w h ic h  was u n d e rta k e n  and re p o r ts  th e  re s u lts  
w h ic h  w ere o b ta in e d  fro m  i t .
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CHAPTER ONE -  INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH ISSUES
1.1 THE RESEARCH ISSUES
1.1.1 In tro d u c t io n
T h is  th e s is  is  conce rned  w ith  U K -based m u lt in a t io n a l com panies 
(MNCs) th a t  lic e n s e  te c h n o lo g y  to  overseas com panies. The fo cu s  o f  
a t te n t io n  is  th e re fo re  on o u tw a rd  lic e n s in g  ( lic e n s in g -o u t)  ra th e r  
th a n  on in w a rd  lic e n s in g  ( lic e n s in g - in ) .  The b a s ic  re se a rc h  q u e s tio n  
w h ic h  is  ta c k le d  is  th e  fo llo w in g :  u n d e r w h a t c ircum sta nces  is  
o u tw a rd  lic e n s in g  p re fe r re d  o v e r th e  tw o  m ain a lte rn a t iv e  m ethods 
o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness , fo re ig n  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t (FDI) and 
e x p o rtin g ?
F o u r m ain s tra n d s  o f  in te r - r e la te d  l i te r a tu r e  w ere  u t i l is e d  in  
d e ve lo p in g  th e  th e o re t ic a l fra m e w o rk  f o r  th e  re se a rch : th e
l i te ra tu r e s  on FDI, MNCs, lic e n s in g  and t ra n s a c tio n  c o s t th e o ry . A 
num ber o f  hypo theses w ere deve loped  fro m  th e  re v ie w  o f  these 
l i te ra tu re s ,  and were te s te d  u s in g  d a ta  d e r iv e d  fro m  a q u e s tio n n a ire  
s u rv e y  o f  UK MNCs and fro m  o th e r  sources.
The re se a rch  focuses  on com panies th a t  have  a lre a d y  become 
m u lt in a t io n a l th ro u g h  p re v io u s  FDI, and a tte m p ts  to  e x p la in  w hy 
these  com panies choose to  e x p lo it  t h e ir  te c h n o lo g y  in  some overseas 
m a rke ts  v ia  lic e n s in g  ra th e r  th a n  by  f u r th e r  FDI o r  by e x p o rt in g . 
I t  a lso  exam ines th e  re la t iv e  s ta n d in g  o f  lic e n s in g  com pared to  th e  
m ain a lte rn a t iv e  m ethods o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness , and i t  id e n t if ie s  
th e  ty p ic a l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  com panies w h ic h  engage in  lic e n s in g .
The n a tu re  o f  th e  te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s e d  by UK MNCs a lso  comes 
u n d e r s c ru t in y  in  th e  th e s is . The d i f fe r in g  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  
p a te n ts  and kn o w -h o w  are  used to  d eve lop  hypo theses , in  accordance 
w ith  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry , a b o u t th e  r e la t iv e  p ro p o r t io n s  o f  these  
fo rm s o f  te c h n o lo g y  l i k e ly  to  be p re s e n t in  d i f fe r e n t  types  o f  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents. These hypo the ses  are th e n  te s te d  u s in g  da ta  
fro m  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  su rv e y .
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1.1.2 M ethods o f  In te rn a t io n a l Business: The H is to r ic a l C o n te x t
A lth o u g h  e x p o rt in g  and FDI a re  th e  dom in an t fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  today , th e re  have been s igns  th a t  th is  dom inance is  
le ssen ing . D u rin g  th e  1970s th e re  was an in c re a se  in  th e  in c id e n ce  
o f  w h a t have  become know n  v a r io u s ly  as 'n o n -e q u ity ',  'c o n tra c tu a l' 
o r  ’new ’ fo rm s  o f  fo re ig n  in v o lv e m e n t. T h is  s e c tio n  b r ie f ly  
desc rib e s  th e  h is to r ic a l e v o lu t io n  o f  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  and th e  'new ' 
fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness .
U n t i l  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  m ost in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  
t ra n s a c tio n s  to o k  th e  fo rm  o f  e x p o r t in g . The in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  
o f  p ro d u c tio n  began in  th e  la t t e r  h a l f  o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  and 
c o n tin u e d  a t a s te a d y  pace so th a t  by  th e  o u tb re a k  o f  W orld  War I I  
(WWII) m ost o f  to d a y 's  le a d in g  MNCs had fo rm e d  overseas 
s u b s id ia r ie s  [D u n n in g  (1972, p l l ) ] .  H owever, i t  was n o t u n t i l  th e  
post-W W II p e r io d  th a t  w o rld w id e  FDI r e a l ly  g a th e re d  pace. A 
p ro sp e ro u s  econom ic c lim a te  com bined w ith  te c h n o lo g ic a l advances 
and ra d ic a l im provem ents  in  th e  e f f ic ie n c y  o f  com m un ica tions  and 
t ra n s p o r ta t io n  a l l  made i t  fe a s ib le  f o r  a p a re n t com pany to  keep 
c lose  c o n tro l o v e r a s u b s id ia ry  lo c a te d  in  a d is ta n t  c o u n try , th u s  
h e lp in g  to  e s ta b lis h  th e  MNC as th e  p re -e m in e n t fo rc e  in  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l economy.
By th e  end o f  th e  1960s th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  th e  w h o lly -o w n e d  
fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  had come to  be re g a rded  as th e  c la s s ic  a rch e typ e  
o f  fo re ig n  expans ion . The 1970s, how ever, w itn e sse d  a s h i f t  in  th e  
m anner in  w h ich  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  to o k  p lace : th e  t r a d i t io n a l  
m ethod o f  in te rn a t io n a l expa ns io n , 100 p e r cen t e q u ity  in v e s tm e n t, 
d e c lin e d  r e la t iv e  to  o th e r  fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  [OECD 
(1981, p33)]. J o in t  v e n tu re s  and n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l
p a r t ic ip a t io n ,  in c lu d in g  lic e n s in g , became r e la t iv e ly  more p o p u la r  as 
means o f  p e n e tra t in g  fo re ig n  m a rke ts .
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1.1.3 The Com ponents o f  In te rn a t io n a l Business E xp ans ion
The overseas expa ns io n  o f  bus iness  o p e ra tio n s  by  means o f  FDI has 
t r a d i t io n a l ly  in v o lv e d  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  a b u n d le  o f  c o rp o ra te  assets 
c o n s is t in g  o f  f in a n c ia l c a p ita l,  te c h n o lo g y  and management s k i l ls .^  
The d is t in g u is h in g  fe a tu re  o f  n o n -e q u ity  m ethods o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  is  th a t  th e y  e n ta i l  th e  u n b u n d lin g  o f  th e  FDI package. 
Resources are  t ra n s fe r re d  in d iv id u a l ly ,  o r  in  a d u a l co m b in a tio n , 
ra th e r  th a n  in  th e  fo rm  o f  a com ple te  package. Thus, f in a n c ia l 
c a p ita l is  t ra n s fe r re d  v ia  lo ans , te c h n o lo g y  v ia  lic e n s in g  agreem ents, 
management s k i l ls  th ro u g h  management c o n tra c ts , te c h n o lo g y  and 
management s k i l ls  th ro u g h  tu rn k e y  p ro je c ts , and in te rm e d ia te  
p ro d u c ts  th ro u g h  s u b c o n tra c t in g .
These a lte rn a t iv e  fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  have been 
d e sc rib e d  as ''new" fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t [Oman (1981, 
1984, 1988)]. T h is  la b e l is  p o te n t ia l ly  m is le a d in g , how ever, f o r  m ost 
o f  these  types  o f  in te r n a t io n a l bus iness  a rrangem ent have been in  
e x is te n ce  f o r  many years . W hat is  new is  th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  th e y  
have been u t i l is e d  by  MNCs, e s p e c ia lly  in  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n try  
m arke ts .
The a b i l i t y  o f  a com pany to  engage in  n o n -e q u ity  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  is , o f  course , dependen t upon  i t  possess ing  a t le a s t one o f  
th e  tw o  assets w h ic h  com prise  th e  n o n - f in a n c ia l com ponent o f  th e  
FDI package, ie  te c h n o lo g y  and management s k i l ls .  The la t t e r  a re  
u s u a lly  a cq u ire d  o v e r a lo n g  p e r io d  o f  tim e , and are  m ost o f te n  
fo u n d  in  la rg e  com panies w ith  d iv e rs e  o p e ra tio n s ; th e  fo rm e r r e s u lt  
fro m  in v e s tm e n t in  re s e a rc h  and deve lopm en t (R&D). I t  is  n o t 
s u rp r is in g ,  th e re fo re , th a t  MNCs are  m ost h e a v ily  in v o lv e d  in  n o n ­
e q u ity  bus iness.
T h is  th e s is  is  conce rned  w ith  th e  way in  w h ic h  th e  te c h n o lo g y  
com ponent o f  th e  FDI package can be e x p lo ite d  on i t s  own by  means 
o f  in te rn a t io n a l l ic e n s in g  agreem ents. I t  is  necessary, th e re fo re , to  
d e fin e  w h a t is  m eant by  th e  te rm  te c h n o lo g y , and to  d e fin e  th e  ty p e  
o f  te c h n o lo g y  th a t  is  t ra n s fe r re d  by  means o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
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1.1.4 T echno logy  as a C o rp o ra te  R esource
T echno logy  is  an i l l - d e f in e d  concep t w h ic h  can ta k e  on a v a r ie ty  o f  
m eanings acco rd in g  to  th e  c o n te x t in  w h ic h  i t  is  used. A re v ie w  o f  
v a r io u s  d e f in it io n s  o f  te c h n o lo g y  can be fo u n d  in  D unn ing  (1982a), 
who h ig h lig h te d  d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  scope and c o m p le x ity  o f  these  
d e f in it io n s .  D unn ing  h im s e lf  p ropo sed  th e  b ro a d e s t p o s s ib le  
c o n c e p tio n  o f  te ch n o lo g y , d e fin e d  as fo llo w s :
"A  re so u rce  w h ic h  com prises know le dge  a p p lie d  to  
im p ro v in g  th e  e f f ic ie n c y  o f  th e  p ro d u c tio n  and 
m a rk e tin g  o f  e x is t in g  goods and s e rv ic e s  and o f  
th e  c re a tio n  o f  new goods and s e rv ic e s ”
T h is  d e f in i t io n  d raw s a d is t in c t io n  be tw een in n o v a t io n  
te c h n o lo g y  ( te ch n o lo g y  w h ic h  enables th e  c re a t io n  o f  new goods and 
se rv ice s ) and p ro d u c tio n  te c h n o lo g y  (te c h n o lo g y  w h ic h  im p roves  th e  
e f f ic ie n c y  o f  p ro d u c in g  and m a rk e tin g  e x is t in g  goods and se rv ice s ). 
H ow ever, i t  is  n o t s u f f ic ie n t ly  d e ta ile d  to  id e n t i f y  th e  v a r io u s  fo rm s 
w h ic h  te c h n o lo g y  may ta k e , a p a r t fro m  n o t in g  th a t  i t  com prises 
know ledge .
Id e n t if ic a t io n  o f  th e  v a r io u s  fo rm s w h ich  te c h n o lo g y  may ta k e  
is  im p o r ta n t, because lic e n s in g  is  u s u a lly  o n ly  used f o r  t ra n s fe r r in g  
a p a r t ic u la r  c lass o f  te c h n o lo g y , re fe r re d  to  as in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty .  The n a tu re  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  w i l l  now be d e sc rib e d , 
and th is  w i l l  be fo llo w e d  by  a p ropo sed  c la s s if ic a t io n  o f  d i f fe r e n t  
typ e s  o f  te ch n o lo g y , in c lu d in g  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty .
The concep t o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  is  n o t open to  easy 
d e f in it io n ,  la rg e ly  because th e  pace o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l change has 
caused th e  b o u n d a rie s  o f  th e  concep t to  change o v e r th e  years . 
N e ve rthe less , th e re  are  common a t t r ib u te s  possessed by a l l  fo rm s  o f  
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  w h ic h  enab le  th e  concep t to  be d e fin e d .
A t  i t s  s im p le s t, in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  can be d e sc rib e d  as an 
o r ig in a l id ea  w h ic h  is  capab le  o f  be ing  re c o rd e d  and d e fin e d  in  some 
way. However, once an id e a  has been re n d e re d  in to  some ta n g ib le  
fo rm , i t  is  capab le  o f  be ing  cop ied  by  o th e rs . To p ro te c t a g a in s t
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u n a u th o r is e d  copy ing , ideas are  ass igned  le g a lly  p ro te c te d  p ro p e r ty  
r ig h ts ,  in  re tu rn  f o r  f u l l  p u b lic  d is c lo s u re  o f  th e  ideas. These 
r ig h ts  la s t  f o r  a l im ite d  p e r io d  o f  tim e , d u r in g  w h ic h  th e  ow ners o f  
th e  r ig h ts  have a m onopo ly  to  e x p lo i t  them.
In te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  does n o t  th e re fo re  e x is t  in  a p h y s ic a l 
sense. I f  a company chooses to  s e l l i t s  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty ,  i t  
does n o t s e l l a p h y s ic a l o b je c t; r a th e r  i t  s e lls  th e  r ig h t  to  u t i l is e  
c e r ta in  ideas. Because i t  has th is  in c o rp o re a l q u a li ty ,  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  is  o fte n  re fe r re d  to  as an 'in ta n g ib le  a s s e t1. I t  s h o u ld  be 
no te d , how ever, th a t  th e  ideas  w h ic h  g iv e  r is e  to  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  m ust be capab le  o f  be in g  tu rn e d  in to  some ta n g ib le  fo rm , 
o th e rw is e  th e y  w o u ld  n o t be capab le  o f  be ing  cop ied . There  is  no 
p ro te c t io n  a v a ila b le  to  mere ideas. The v a r io u s  types  o f 
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  a re  d e s c rib e d  in  d e ta i l in  C h a p te r Three.
R a th e r th a n  tra d e  in  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty ,  com panies may 
choose in s te a d  to  use t h e ir  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  to  c re a te  p ro d u c ts , 
w h ic h  may th e n  be s o ld  to  o th e r  com panies. I t  is  th e re fo re  u s e fu l 
to  d is t in g u is h  be tw een th e  v a r io u s  fo rm s  th a t  te c h n o lo g y  can ta k e  
when i t  is  t ra n s fe r re d  be tw een com panies.
A p roposed  c la s s if ic a t io n  o f  fo rm s  o f  te c h n o lo g y  is  g ive n  in  
F ig u re  1-1. I t  is  based, in  p a r t ,  upon  th e  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  te c h n o lo g y  









[SOURCE: A u th o r]
The c la s s if ic a t io n  in  F ig u re  1-1 re p re s e n ts  a h ie ra rc h y  o f  fo rm s  
o f  te ch n o lo g y , ra n g in g  fro m  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  a t th e  bo ttom , to  
tu rn k e y  p la n t  a t th e  to p . S ta r t in g  a t th e  bo tto m  o f  th e  h ie ra rc h y , 
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  may be tra d e d  betw een com panies, eg in  th e  
fo rm  o f  a p a te n t, o r  i t  may be used in  th e  m a n u fa c tu re  o f  a p ro d u c t, 
w h ic h  may th e n  be tra d e d . Such a p ro d u c t w o u ld  be c la s s if ie d  as 
naked  te ch n o lo g y , an exam ple o f  w h ic h  w o u ld  be a se m icon duc to r. I f  
naked  te c h n o lo g y  is  in  tu rn  used as p a r t  o f  a n o th e r p ro d u c t, such 
as a com pute r, th e n  th a t  p ro d u c t w o u ld  be c la s s if ie d  as em bodied 
te ch n o lo g y . F in a lly ,  a num ber o f  em bodied te c h n o lo g ie s  may be s o ld  
as p a r t  o f  a package w h ich  in v o lv e s  th e  c o n tru c t io n  o f  a f u l l y -  
fu n c t io n in g  p ro d u c tio n  f a c i l i t y ,  in  w h ich  case te c h n o lo g y  is  
t ra n s fe r re d  in  th e  fo rm  o f  a tu rn k e y  p la n t.
T h is  c la s s if ic a t io n  is  n o t th e  o n ly  p o s s ib le  fra m e w o rk  w h ic h  
can be used to  d is t in g u is h  be tw een d i f fe r e n t  types  o f  te ch n o lo g y . 
F o r exam ple, D unn ing  (1982a, p l l )  w e n t on to  expand h is  b ro a d  
d e f in i t io n  o f  te c h n o lo g y  by d is t in g u is h in g  betw een th re e  d if fe r e n t
3
types  o f  te ch n o lo g y : human, m a te r ia l and know ledge  tech n o lo g y .
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Two o f  these  ca te g o rie s  are  covered  by  th e  c la s s if ic a t io n  
scheme in  F ig u re  1-1. M a te r ia l te c h n o lo g y  c a p tu re s  th e  f i r s t  th re e  
c a te g o rie s  in  th e  p ropo sed  h ie ra rc h y  (ie  tu rn k e y  p la n t,  em bodied 
te c h n o lo g y  and naked  te c h n o lo g y ) w h ile  know ledge  te c h n o lo g y  
co rre spond s  b ro a d ly  to  th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  ca tego ry .
D unn ing 's  t h i r d  ca te g o ry , hum an te ch n o lo g y , re fe rs  to  hum an 
c a p ita l em bodied in  th e  lik e s  o f  m anagers, s c ie n t is ts  and la b o ra to ry  
te c h n ic ia n s . A lth o u g h  i t  is  n o t e x p l ic i t ly  in c o rp o ra te d  w ith in  th e  
c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme in  F ig u re  1-1, hum an te c h n o lo g y  is  v e ry  o fte n  
t ra n s fe r re d  a long  w ith  m a te r ia l and know ledge  te c h n o lo g y . The 
e x te n t to  w h ich  hum an te c h n o lo g y  w i l l  fo rm  a p a r t  o f  th e  to ta l  
te c h n o lo g y  package w i l l  depend upon  th e  a b i l i t ie s  o f  th e  em ployees 
in  th e  company w h ic h  re ce ive s  th e  te ch n o lo g y . In  a d d it io n , hum an 
te c h n o lo g y  w i l l  te n d  to  be a more s ig n if ic a n t  p a r t  o f  th e  o v e ra l l 
te c h n o lo g y  package i f  th e  te c h n o lo g y  be ing  t ra n s fe r re d  is  know le dge  
te c h n o lo g y  ra th e r  th a n  m a te r ia l te ch n o lo g y .
1.1.5 The In te rn a t io n a l Business D e c is io n  Process
T h is  s tu d y  co n c e n tra te s  on one p a r t ic u la r  ty p e  o f  n o n -e q u ity  
t ra n s a c tio n , th e  lic e n s in g  agreem ent. T h is  o p t io n  is  p o te n t ia l ly  
a v a ila b le  to  com panies w h ic h  devo te  e x p e n d itu re  to  R&D, th e re b y  
c re a tin g  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty .  T h is  typ e  o f  p ro p e r ty  is  o f te n  
re fe r re d  to  in  th e  l i te r a tu r e  on MNCs as p ro p r ie ta r y  ( ie  f i r m -  
s p e c if ic )  know ledge.
T h is  know ledge  can be e x p lo ite d  in  e ith e r  o f  tw o  ways: i t  can 
be used by th e  com pany i t s e l f  to  c re a te  i t s  own p ro d u c ts  o r  i t  can 
be lic e n s e d  to  in d e p e n d e n t p ro d u c e rs . The cho ice  is  th u s  be tw een a 
m a rke t tra n s a c tio n  ( lic e n s in g )  and one o rgan ized  in te r n a l ly  by  th e  
com pany. C hoosing  th e  la t t e r  e n ta ils  a n o th e r d e c is io n : w h e th e r to  
s e rv ic e  fo re ig n  m a rke ts  by  e x p o rts , w h ic h  e n ta ils  s e ll in g  in  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c t m a rke t, o r  by  FDI, w h ich  n e ce ss ita te s  t ra d in g  
in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l fa c to r  m a rke t ( fo r  la b o u r, raw  m a te r ia ls  and 
o th e r  p ro d u c tio n  in p u ts ) .
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The tw o -s ta g e  n a tu re  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  d e c is io n  
p rocess fa c in g  th e  k n o w le d g e -a b u n d a n t MNC is  i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  
1- 2.
FIGURE 1-2
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E xp o rt o r  Produce Abroad D e c is io n
[SOURCE: A u th o r]
P ro p r ie ta ry  know le dge  o b ta in e d  by  c o rp o ra te  in v e s tm e n t in  R&D 
( re fe r re d  to  h e re a fte r  as in d u s t r ia l  p ro p e r ty )  u s u a lly  c o n s is ts  o f  
p a te n ts  o r  kn o w -h o w . O th e r fo rm s  o f know ledge  (n o t n e c e s s a r ily  
f irm -s p e c if ic  o r  th e  p ro d u c t o f  R&D) are  t y p ic a l ly  possessed by  th e  
MNC and can be used to  gen e ra te  income. The m anag e ria l and 
m a rk e tin g  e x p e rt is e  o f  em ployees, f o r  exam ple, can be so ld  by  means 
o f m anagement c o n tra c ts . The sa le  o f management s k i l ls  may 
som etim es be l in k e d  to  th e  sa le  o f  o th e r  assets, as in  th e  tu rn k e y  
agreem ent w here  b o th  em bodied te c h n o lo g y  and management a re  
tra d e d .
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The th e s is  is  c o n fin e d  to  an a n a ly s is  o f  th a t  segm ent o f  th e  
m a rke t f o r  te c h n o lo g y  w h ic h  is  com prised  o f  p a te n t and kn o w -h o w  
licence s . Past su rve ys  o f  th e  c o n te n t o f  te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents re v e a l th a t  these  tw o  c a te g o rie s  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
a re  p re s e n t in  th e  b u lk  o f  agreem ents.^ The e x te n t to  w h ic h  
tra d e m a rks  fo rm  a p a r t  o f  l ic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv in g  p a te n ts  
and kn o w -h o w  is  a lso  e xp lo re d .
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH ISSUES
1.2.1 O w nersh ip  and C o n tro l
In  common w ith  o th e r  fo rm s  o f  n o n -e q u ity  bus iness , th e  use o f  
lic e n s in g  im p lie s  th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f  o w n e rsh ip  fro m  c o n tro l.  Oman 
(1981) a llu d e d  to  th is  s e p a ra tio n  when w r i t in g  a b o u t th e  p ro b a b le  
consequences o f  th e  a p p a re n t s h i f t  away fro m  th e  use o f  FDI. He 
s ta te d  th a t  new fo rm s o f  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t "may re v o lu t io n iz e  
in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t in  much th e  same way as th e  jo in t  s to c k  
com pany d id  on a n a t io n a l sca le " (1981, p l3 ).
W h ile  th e  to n e  o f  th is  p re d ic t io n  may be r a th e r  s tro n g , i t  is  
n o t un rea sonab le  to  a rgue  th a t  MNCs w i l l  be u n a b le  to  e x e rc ise  th e  
same degree o f  c o n tro l o v e r th e ir  fo re ig n  license es  as th e y  w o u ld  
be ab le  to  e xe rc ise  o v e r t h e ir  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s , and th a t  a 
p re fe re n ce  f o r  l ic e n s in g  o v e r f u r t h e r  FDI w i l l  th e re fo re  l im i t  t h e ir  
a b i l i t y  to  m axim ise p r o f i t s  on a g lo b a l scale. F o r exam ple, MNCs 
w i l l  be una b le  to  use fo re ig n  license es  as a base th ro u g h  w h ic h  to  
move fu n d s  f o r  th e  p u rp o se  o f  m in im is in g  ta x a t io n  v ia  th e  use o f  
t ra n s fe r  p r ic e s .
In  a s im ila r  v e in , G a b r ie l (1977) h ig h lig h te d  th e  lo ss  o f  c o n tro l 
in v o lv e d  in  th e  a p p a re n t t re n d  away fro m  FDI. He p o s tu la te d  th a t  
"new in s t i t u t io n a l  a rrangem en ts  .... are re n d e rin g  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  
mode o f  fo re ig n  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t p ro g re s s iv e ly  ir r e le v a n t  
to g e th e r  w ith  i t s  e s s e n tia l assum ptio ns : com ple te , lo n g - te rm  c o n tro l;  
th e  freedom  to  lo c a te  f a c i l i t ie s  and a c t iv i t ie s  w h e re ve r m ost
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c o n v e n ie n t; th e  a b i l i t y  to  ta k e  f u l l  advan tage  o f  in te r c o u n tr y  cos t, 
ta x , m a rk e t-p r ic e  and c u rre n c y  d i f fe r e n t ia ls . "  (1977, p30).
G a b rie l a rgued  th a t  th e  p e rs is te n c e  o f  th is  t re n d  w o u ld  le a d  to  
an in c re a s in g  am ount o f  th e  d e c is io n -m a k in g  p o w e r g o v e rn in g  
in te rn a t io n a l re so u rce  f lo w s  pass ing  fro m  MNCs to  gove rnm en ts ; 
m a rke t-b a se d  c r i t e r ia  w o u ld  be in c re a s in g ly  tra n sce n d e d  by  
p o l i t ic a l  c r i t e r ia  in  th e  fo rm u la t io n  o f  c o rp o ra te  p o lic y .  He w e n t on 
to  conc lude  th a t  th e  ro le  o f  com panies in  th e  in te r n a t io n a l a rena  
was s h i f t in g  fro m  " th e  p u r s u i t  o f  p r iv a te ly  d e te rm in e d  p u rpo se  to  
th e  management o f  p u b lic  in te re s ts  d e fin e d  n o t by  th e  ' in v is ib le  
hand  o f  th e  m a rk e t', much less  by  m u lt in a t io n a l c o rp o ra te  o f f ic ia ls ,  
b u t  b y  n a t io n a l p o l i t ic a l  w i l l  expressed  th ro u g h  gove rn m en t a c t io n "  
(1977, P30).
In  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  p re s e n t s tu d y , G a b r ie l's  p re d ic t io n  
h ig h l ig h ts  th e  need to  f in d  o u t w h e th e r MNCs have  o p ted  f o r  
l ic e n s in g  to  com ply w ith  th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f  h o s t gove rnm en ts  o r  
w h e th e r th e y  have chosen lic e n s in g  on th e ir  own in i t ia t iv e .  The 
need f o r  such an in v e s t ig a t io n  was a lso  id e n t i f ie d  by  Grosse (1981), 
who made th e  fo llo w in g  o b s e rv a tio n : "one tre n d  th a t  has been 
fo re c a s t f o r  th e  1980s is  a d e c lin e  in  th e  ra te  o f  g ro w th  o f  FDI and 
a r is e  in  o th e r  fo rm s  o f  fo re ig n  in v o lv e m e n t ... because o f  in c re a se d  
p u b lic  d is t r u s t  o f  th e  com panies and consequen t in c re a se d  
gove rnm en t re g u la t io n .  T h is  p ro s p e c tiv e  fu tu re  .... needs to  be 
s u b s ta n tia te d  by  some c a re fu l e m p ir ic a l o b s e rv a tio n "  (1981, p37).
W hether o r  n o t th is  p ro s p e c tiv e  fu tu re  is  l i k e ly  to  be in d u ce d  
by  h o s t gove rnm en t le g is la t io n ,  o r  to  be a c t iv e ly  p u rs u e d  by  MNCs, 
th e  consequences o f  lo s in g  o w n e rsh ip  o v e r th e ir  p ro p r ie ta r y  assets 
may n o t be as dam aging to  th e  pe rfo rm an ce  o f  MNCs as some 
com m enta tors  have  con tended . John  D u nn ing  (1979, 1981, 1982a, 1982b) 
has le d  th e  way in  p o in t in g  o u t th a t  th e  loss  o f  o w n e rsh ip  o v e r 
in te r n a t io n a l ly - t r a n s fe r re d  assets need n o t n e c e s s a r ily  e n ta i l a 
com ple te  lo ss  o f  c o n t ro l o v e r th e  way in  w h ic h  th o se  assets a re  
u t i l is e d .
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Since lic e n s in g  is  f a c i l i t a te d  by  th e  use o f  c o n tra c ts , w h ic h  
o u t l in e  th e  o b lig a t io n s  o f  b o th  p a r t ie s , th e  MNC may have  s u f f ic ie n t  
le ve ra g e  in  n e g o tia t io n s  w ith  h o s t c o u n try  f irm s  to  enab le  i t  to  
have c lauses w r it te n  in to  i t s  c o n tra c ts  w h ic h  g ive  i t  some degree o f  
in f lu e n c e  o v e r th e  subsequen t use o f  th e  assets w h ic h  i t  is  
lic e n s in g . Indeed, th e  b a rg a in in g  pow er o f  th e  MNC v is - a - v is  th e  
lice n se e  may be such th a t  i t  is  ab le  to  e x tra c t  concess ions w h ic h  
g iv e  i t  a degree o f  c o n tro l a p p ro a ch in g  th a t  w h ic h  i t  w o u ld  have 
o v e r a w h o lly -o w n e d  s u b s id ia ry . In  such a case, th e  lice n se e  w o u ld  
e f fe c t iv e ly  be in te g ra te d  w ith  th e  re s t  o f  th e  MNC's o p e ra tio n s .
A c c o rd in g  to  D unn ing  (1979), th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  lo cu s  o f  
c o n tro l,  and how  these  v a ry  w ith  th e  m o d a lity  o f  re so u rce  t ra n s fe r ,  
is  an u n d e r-re s e a rc h e d  to p ic .  I t  is  a t le a s t a rg u a b le , " th a t  
p ro d u c tio n  in  w h ic h  th e re  is  no FDI, y e t o ve r w h ic h  th e re  is  a de 
fa c to  c o n t ro l by  a fo re ig n  f irm  is  as 'in te rn a t io n a l ' as th a t  f in a n c e d  
by FDI b u t o v e r w h ic h  th e re  is  l i t t l e  o r  no such c o n tro l"  (1979, p5).
1.2.2 The F u tu re  E n v iro n m e n t o f  In te rn a t io n a l Business
Some com m enta tors  have  exp ressed  th e  v ie w  th a t  c o n tra c tu a l fo rm s  
o f  in te rn a t io n a l re so u rce  t ra n s fe r  are  l ik e ly  to  become a more 
im p o r ta n t fe a tu re  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness e n v iro n m e n t in  th e  
fo rs e e a b le  fu tu re .  F o r exam ple, D unn ing  (1978) expressed  th e  
o p in io n  th a t  " th e  t r a d i t io n a l  ro le  o f  MNCs, as p ro v id e rs  o f  
e n tre p re n e u r ia l c a p ita l,  may have passed i t s  z e n ith . In s te a d , t h e ir  
fu tu re  is  l i k e ly  to  re s t  in  th e  p ro v is io n  o f te c h n ic a l and m anag e ria l 
s e rv ice s  b u n d le d  to g e th e r  in  a v a r ie ty  o f  ways, th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f  
w h ich  w i l l  be in c re a s in g ly  d e te rm in e d  by  c o n tra c t o r  b y  gove rnm en t 
f ia t "  (1978, pp2-3).
Some ev idence  f o r  th is  a s s e r t io n  is  c o n ta in e d  in  a s tu d y  by  
M cGreevy (1978) on th e  e ffe c ts  o f  e n v iro n m e n ta l changes on th e  
s tra te g ic  p la n n in g  o f  US-based MNCs. M cGreevy g a th e re d  da ta , v ia  a 
q u e s tio n n a ire , on th e  p a r t ic u la r  overseas expans ion  s tra te g ie s  w h ic h  
h is  sam ple o f  MNCs c u r re n t ly  em ployed, and on those  s tra te g ie s  
w h ich  th e y  expec ted  to  a d o p t in  th e  fu tu re .^  The aim was to  f in d
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o u t th e  m ethods w h ich  were used m ost in  deve loped  c o u n tr ie s  
(DCs) and less  deve loped  c o u n tr ie s  (LDCs) d u r in g  th e  1970s, and th e  
m ethods w h ic h  were expec ted  to  be used m ost in  b o th  these
c a te g o rie s  o f  c o u n try  in  th e  1980s.
The respon den ts  ra n ke d  FDI as th e  m ost used m ethod in  b o th
DCs and LDCs d u r in g  th e  1970s. However, in  th e  1980s th e  use o f
FDI in  b o th  DCs and LDCs was expected  to  ra n k  be low  a l l  o th e r  
m ethods o f  expans ion , w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f management c o n tra c ts . 
The m ost n o ta b le  change in  ra n k in g  was in  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g , 
w h ic h  in  th e  1970s was p laced  ju s t  one ra n k  above management 
c o n tra c ts  in  b o th  DCs and LDCs. In  th e  1980s, how eve r, i t  was 
ra n k e d  as th e  m ethod o f  expa ns io n  expected  to  be used m ost in  DCs 
and a lso , w i th  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  e x p o rts , in  LDCs.
T h is  s tu d y  e x p lo re s  p a s t and c u r re n t  fo rm s  o f  overseas 
expa ns io n  used by UK MNCs, and a lso  a n t ic ip a te d  fu tu re
deve lopm ents . G overnm ent s ta t is t ic s  are  used to  d e te rm ine  th e  
h is to r ic  b reakdow n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness be tw een FDI, e x p o rts  
and lic e n s in g  (C h a p te r N ine), w h ile  d a ta  fro m  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  
s u rv e y  are  used to  de te rm in e  th e  r e la t iv e  p re va le n ce  o f  th e  m ain 
fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  and o f  l i k e ly  changes in  th e  fu tu re  
(C h a p te r Ten).
1.2.3 Im p lic a t io n s  F o r H o s t C o u n tr ie s
The e x is te n ce  o f  a tre n d  away fro m  FDI to w a rd s  n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s  o f  
in v e s tm e n t g e n e ra lly , and lic e n s in g  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  has im p o r ta n t 
im p lic a t io n s  f o r  th e  econom ies o f  b o th  home and h o s t c o u n tr ie s . 
A lth o u g h  th is  s tu d y  does n o t assess th e  e f fe c t  o f  UK lic e n s in g  
a c t iv i t y  on th e  UK economy o r  on ‘h o s t econom ies, i t  is  im p o r ta n t to  
u n d e rs ta n d  w h a t these  e ffe c ts  are  l ik e ly  to  be.
F o r h o s t c o u n tr ie s , th e  dom estic  econom ic re p e rc u s s io n s  o f  
o b ta in in g  te c h n o lo g y  by  lic e n c e  ra th e r  th a n  as p a r t  o f  a com ple te  
package w i l l  be la rg e ly  de te rm in e d  by  th e  p r ic e  th a t  th e y  have to  
pay f o r  i t .  The search  f o r  econom ic in te rd e p e n d e n ce  and s e l f ­
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d e te rm in a tio n  may w e ll m o tiv a te  h o s t c o u n tr ie s  to  demand th a t  MNCs 
lic e n c e  th e ir  te ch n o lo g y , b u t i f  th e  p r ic e  is  to o  h ig h  th e n  th e  
b e n e fits  o f  g re a te r  s o v e re ig n ty  may be sw a llow ed  up.
From  th e  MNC's p o in t  o f  v ie w , lic e n s in g  does have  a num ber o f  
advan tages, eg th e  p o l i t ic a l  r is k  is  lo w e r. H ow ever, th e  advan tages 
have to  be co n s id e re d  a lo n g s id e  th e  syne rgy  w h ic h  is  c re a te d  when 
te c h n o lo g y  is  b u n d le d -u p  w ith  o th e r  resou rces  in  th e  FDI package. 
M anag e ria l e x p e rtis e , f o r  in s ta n c e , is  o fte n  dependen t upon  a 
d e lic a te  m ix  o f  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s u p p o r t fa c to rs  w h ic h  ca n n o t be 
t ra n s fe r re d  e f f ic ie n t ly  v ia  lic e n s in g  agreem ents. In  many in s ta n ce s  
th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l in f r a s t r u c tu r e  in  h o s t econom ies is  such th a t  
lic e n s e d  te c h n o lo g y  ca n n o t be used e f f ic ie n t ly ,  eg due to  a la c k  o f  
s k i l le d  m anpower. M ost o b v io u s  o f  a l l ,  econom ies o f  sca le  ca n n o t be 
s o ld  o r  t ra n s fe r re d  in  sm a ll bu n d le s  s ince , by  d e f in it io n ,  th e y  
re q u ire  la rg e -s c a le  o p e ra tio n s .
D e sp ite  these  hand icaps , MNCs may be more l i k e ly  to  lic e n c e  
te c h n o lo g y  i f  th e  ba lance  o f  b a rg a in in g  pow er be tw een h o s t 
c o u n tr ie s  and MNCs sw ings to w a rd s  th e  h o s t c o u n tr ie s . D unn ing  
(1978, p6) suggested th a t  such a sw ing  has o c c u rre d  due to  th e
g ro w th  o f  MNCs fro m  c o u n tr ie s  o th e r  th a n  th e  US and th e  UK, w h ic h  
has w idened  th e  cho ice  a v a ila b le  to  h o s t c o u n tr ie s . L ic e n s in g  may 
a lso  be more l ik e ly  to  ta k e  p lace  i f  h o s t c o u n tr ie s  a re  more w i l l in g  
to  pay a p r ic e  h ig h  enough to  app roach  th e  re tu rn s  on FDI.
1.2.4 Im p lic a t io n s  F o r Home C o u n tr ie s
The e ffe c ts  o f  any change in  m ethods o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  on 
th e  econom ies o f  home c o u n tr ie s  w i l l  be dependent on th e  degree to  
w h ic h  th e  a lte rn a t iv e  m ethods a re  e ith e r  com plem ents to , o r  
s u b s t itu te s  fo r ,  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  m echanism  o f FDI. I f  l ic e n s in g  is  a 
s u b s t itu te  f o r  FDI th e n , c e te r is  p a r ib u s , one m ig h t expe c t th e re  to  
be an in c rea se  in  th e  fu n d s  a v a ila b le  f o r  e ith e r  dom estic  c a p ita l 
fo rm a tio n  o r  p o r t fo l io  in v e s tm e n t. I f  i t  is  m ere ly  a com plem ent th e n  
th e re  is  no reason  to  assume th a t  th e re  w i l l  be any change in  these  
tw o  v a r ia b le s .
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F o llo w in g  any s w itc h  to w a rd s  lic e n s in g  th e  economy o f  th e  home 
c o u n try  w i l l  e xpe rience , a f te r  a tim e  la g , an in c rea se  in  c o m p e tit io n  
fro m  h o s t c o u n tr ie s , assum ing th a t  th e  te c h n o lo g y  w h ic h  these  
c o u n tr ie s  o b ta in  is  e f fe c t iv e ly  u t i l is e d .  E x p o rts  fro m  th e  home 
c o u n try  may be d is p la c e d  by in c re a se d  p ro d u c tio n  fro m  th e  h o s t 
c o u n try , o r  dom estic  p ro d u c tio n  f o r  th e  home m a rk e t may be 
re p la ce d  by  im p o rts  p ro d u ce d  w ith  th e  a id  o f  lic e n s e d  te ch n o lo g y . 
These e ffe c ts  w i l l  th ro w  an a d ju s tm e n t b u rd e n  on th e  dom estic  
economy; resou rces  in  th e  a ffe c te d  in d u s tr ie s  w i l l  become 
unem ployed o r  have  to  accep t lo w e r fa c to r  re tu rn s ,  o r  be 
t ra n s fe r re d  in to  o th e r  m ore c o m p e tit iv e  in d u s tr ie s .
T h is  lo ss  to  th e  g ro u p  o f  d is p la c e d  fa c to rs  w i l l ,  o f  course , be 
o f fs e t  by  th e  f in a n c ia l re tu rn s  w h ic h  accrue  to  th e  home c o u n try  
lic e n s o rs . I t  is  im p o s s ib le  to  t e l l  a p r io r i  w h e th e r th e  ga ins  made 
by  th is  la t t e r  g ro u p  w i l l  o u tw e ig h  th e  losses s u s ta in e d  by  th e
a ffe c te d  in d u s tr ie s . A l l  th a t  is  c e r ta in  is  th a t  i f  th e  g a in e rs  and 
th e  lo s e rs  are  d i f fe r e n t  g roup s  in  th e  economy th e n  a c o n f l ic t  o v e r 
in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  p o lic y  is  in e v ita b le .
1.3 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
In  p u rs u in g  th e  re se a rch  agenda th e  s tu d y  focuses  on th e
in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t ie s  o f  U K-based MNCs. The e x te n t to  
w h ich  th is  can be re g a rd e d  as d e tra c t in g  fro m  th e  g e n e ra lis a b i l i ty  
o f  th e  re s u lts  to  non U K -based MNCs depends upon  th e  p a r t ic u la r  
d e f in i t io n  o f  c o rp o ra te  m u lt in a t io n a l i t y  w h ic h  one chooses to  adop t.
The m ost b a s ic  d e f in i t io n  o n ly  re q u ire s  th a t  s e rv ic e  o r
p ro d u c tio n  fa c i l i t ie s  be lo c a te d  in  more th a n  one c o u n try . T h is  
b road  d e f in i t io n  has been adop ted  by th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  to  ensu re  
th a t  no aspect o f  th e  phenom enon is  a r b i t r a r i ly  e xc lu d e d  fro m  th e  
s tu d ie s  th a t  i t  r e g u la r ly  com m issions. I t  is , how ever, cons ide red  to o  
loose  a d e f in i t io n  by  many o th e r  re se a rch  in s t i tu t io n s ,  m ost o f  whom 
g e n e ra lly  p re fe r  to  d e fin e  m u lt in a t io n a ls  in  accordance w ith  some 
fo rm  o f  p e rfo rm an ce  y a rd s t ic k ;  u s u a lly  a c e r ta in  pe rcen tage  o f
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overseas sa les, assets, e a rn ings , em ployees o r  some c o m b in a tio n  o f  
these .
D e f in it io n s  o f  th is  s o r t  ta k e  accou n t o f  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  
o w n e rsh ip  o f  a v a s t num ber o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  a ro u n d  th e  g lobe  is  
co n c e n tra te d  in  th e  hands o f  a few  m a jo r com panies. By 1978, f o r  
exam ple, i t  was c a lc u la te d  th a t  less  th a n  5 p e r ce n t o f  a l l  MNCs 
accoun ted  f o r  a t  le a s t th re e  q u a rte rs  o f  a l l  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  
w o rld w id e , and a b o u t th e  same percen tage  o f  fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t 
[S to p fo rd  e t a l (1973, p l4 ) ] .
In  i t s  1973 R e p o rt t i t le d  M u lt in a t io n a l C o rp o ra tio n s  In  W orld  
D eve lopm ent, th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  no te d  th a t  a ke y  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  
MNCs was th e  predom inance  o f  la rg e  f irm s , w h ich  was c lo s e ly  re la te d  
to  t h e i r  p re d o m in a n tly  o l ig o p o lis t ic  c h a ra c te r. The re p o r t  n o te d  th a t  
th e  m a rke ts  in  w h ich  MNCs ope ra te  are  ty p ic a l ly  d om in a ted  by a few  
s e lle rs  o r  buye rs  and th a t  th e y  are  a lso  f re q u e n t ly  c h a ra c te r is e d  by  
" th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  new te c h n o lo g ie s , o r  o f  s p e c ia l s k i l ls ,  o r  o f  
p ro d u c t d i f fe r e n t ia t io n  and heavy a d v e r t is in g , w h ic h  s u s ta in s  o r  
re in fo rc e s  th e ir  o l ig o p o lis t ic  n a tu re "  (1973, p6).
A t h i r d  c r i te r io n  f o r  id e n t ify in g  MNCs, c lo s e ly  re la te d  to  th is  
o l ig o p o lis t ic  e n v iro n m e n t, is  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re .  On th e  bas is  
o f  t h e ir  m anagement's o r ie n ta t io n ,  com panies w h ic h  have g lo b a l 
o p e ra tio n s  may be re fe r re d  to  as 'e th n o c e n tr ic ' (h o m e -c o u n try  
o r ie n te d ), 'p o ly c e n tr ic ' (h o s t-c o u n try  o r ie n te d ) o r  'g e o c e n tr ic ' (w o r ld -  
o r ie n te d ). Some a u th o r i t ie s  re g a rd  o n ly  th is  la t t e r  c a te g o ry  o f  
com pany as be ing  t r u ly  m u lt in a t io n a l,  s ince  th e y  aim  to  m axim ise 
p r o f i t s  on a g lo b a l sca le , and th e re fo re  have no p re fe re n c e  f o r  any 
p a r t ic u la r  c o u n try . D e fin e d  in  th is  way th e  n a t io n a l i ty  o f  th e  p a re n t 
com pany does n o t have a m a jo r im p a c t upon th e  s tra te g ie s  p u rsu e d  
by MNCs. The UK, i t  can th e re fo re  be argued, p ro v id e s  as good 
exam ples o f  such com panies as any c o u n try .
No m a tte r  w h ich  d e f in i t io n  one chooses to  ad o p t, i t  is  beyond 
d is p u te  th a t  UK MNCs are  im p o r ta n t a c to rs  in  th e  w o r ld  economy. 
The UK is  second o n ly  to  th e  US in  i t s  o w n e rsh ip  o f  c a p ita l in v e s te d
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overseas, a p o s it io n  i t  has h e ld  th ro u g h o u t th e  post-W W II p e r io d .^  
The f in d in g s  o f th is  s tu d y  o f  UK MNCs s h o u ld  th e re fo re  be o f  
in te re s t  o u tw ith  th e  UK.
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  a m a iled  q u e s tio n n a ire  c o n s t itu te d  th e  
m a jo r p a r t  o f  th e  re se a rch  e f fo r t .  I t  was des igned  to  d is c o v e r, 
in te r  a lia , th e  r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  o f  a num ber o f  v a r ia b le s  in  
p ro m o tin g  lic e n s in g  ra th e r  th a n  o th e r  fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness . The re v ie w  o f  th e  th e o re t ic a l and e m p ir ic a l l i te r a tu r e  
co n ta in e d  in  P a rt I I  o f  th e  th e s is  id e n t if ie s  th e  p o te n t ia l 
e x p la n a to ry  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  were in c lu d e d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire .
Two key  l im ita t io n s  o f  th e  re se a rch  are w o r th  n o t in g  a t th is  
stage. F ir s t ly ,  th e  l i t e r a tu r e  w h ic h  is  re v ie w e d , p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  
e m p ir ic a l l i te ra tu r e ,  is  h e a v ily  U S -o rie n te d , and th is  may th e re fo re  
have in tro d u c e d  a n a t io n a l i t y  b ia s  in to  th e  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  w ere 
se lec te d  f o r  in c lu s io n  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . Second ly, th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  da ta  i t s e l f  is  o f  a c ro s s -s e c tio n a l n a tu re  and may 
th e re fo re  f a i l  to  re v e a l th e  e ffe c ts  o f  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  change o v e r 
tim e.
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The b u lk  o f  th e  d a ta  ana lysed  in  th e  s tu d y  w ere c o lle c te d  by  means 
o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  o f  a sam ple o f  U K-based MNCs. The 
q u e s tio n n a ire  app roach  was n e c e s s ita te d  in  p a r t  b y  th e  s p a rs ity  o f  
p u b lic ly -a v a ila b le  d a ta  on in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  by  UK 
com panies. A lth o u g h  gove rn m en t d a ta  was ana lysed  to  p ro v id e  
es tim a tes  o f  th e  e x te n t o f  such  a c t iv i ty ,  th e  co n c lu s io n s  d raw n  fro m  
th is  e xe rc ise  can o n ly  be co n s id e re d  as te n ta t iv e .  T h e re fo re , in  
a d d it io n  to  the  a n a ly s is  o f  th is  d a ta  th e  s tu d y  a lso  ana lyses 
p r im a ry  d a ta  genera ted  fro m  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  su rve y .
The re sea rch  can be c h a ra c te r is e d  as b ro a d ly  d e d u c tiv e  in  
n a tu re . As th e  p r im a ry  o b je c t iv e  was th e  te s t in g  o f  hypo theses , th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  app roach  to  d a ta  c o l le c t io n  was se le c te d  ra th e r  th a n
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th e  case s tu d y  app roach  because o f  th e  g re a te r  am ount o f  d a ta  
gen e ra te d  by  q u e s tio n n a ire s  and th e  co n s e q u e n tly  g re a te r  chance o f  
o b ta in in g  s ta t is t ic a l ly  v a l id  re s u lts  fro m  them . H ow ever, in  a d d it io n  
to  te s t in g  hypo theses d raw n  fro m  e x is t in g  th e o r ie s , a p a r t  o f  th e  
a n a ly s is  a lso  in v o lv e d  in d u c t iv e  re se a rch  as i t  a tte m p te d  to  reduce  
th e  num ber o f  v a r ia b le s  re q u ire d  to  e x p la in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  by  u s in g  th e  te c h n iq u e  o f  fa c to r  a n a ly s is .
G iven th e  o r d in a l i ty  o f  much o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  da ta , m ost 
o f  th e  a n a ly s is  was cond uc te d  u s in g  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  s t a t is t ic a l  
p ro ce d u re s . H owever, w here  p a ra m e tr ic  p ro ce d u re s  c o u ld  be 
ju s t i f ie d  these  were a lso  em ployed. D e ta ils  o f  th e  g roun ds  upon  
w h ic h  th e  s ta t is t ic a l p ro ce d u re s  were se lec te d  can be fo u n d  in  
C h a p te r E ig h t, w h ich  d iscusses th e  re se a rch  m e th odo logy  in  d e ta i l.
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
F o llo w in g  th is  in t r o d u c to r y  c h a p te r, C h a p te r Two c h ro n ic le s  th e  
h is to r ic a l e v o lu t io n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t (b ro a d ly  d e fin e d ) 
and co n s id e rs  th e  ro le  o f  th e  MNC in  th e  co n te m p o ra ry  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  e n v iro nm en t.
C h a p te r Three c o n ta in s  o f  a b r ie f  d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  p o s s ib le  
fo rm s  w h ic h  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  may ta k e : fro m  FDI, jo in t
v e n tu re s  and c o n s o rt ia , th ro u g h  fra n c h is in g , lic e n s in g  and 
management c o n tra c ts  to  tu rn k e y  agreem ents, s u b c o n tra c t in g  and 
e x p o rt in g . Two c la s s if ic a to r y  fra m e w o rks  are  th e n  o u t lin e d : one
p laces each o f  these  modes on d i f fe r e n t  p a r ts  o f  a spec trum , 
depend ing  on th e  degrees o f  o w n e rsh ip  and c o n t ro l w h ic h  th e y  
in v o lv e ; th e  o th e r  fra m e w o rk  c la s s if ie s  in te rn a t io n a l t ra n s a c tio n s  
a cco rd in g  to  th e  f lo w s  o f  c a p ita l,  know ledge  and p ro d u c ts  w h ic h  
th e y  g iv e  r is e  to .
C h a p te r F o u r c o n ta in s  a s u rv e y  o f  FDI th e o r ie s . B o th  
p o s it iv e ,  n o rm a tiv e  and o rg a n iz a t io n a l/b e h a v io u ra l th e o r ie s  are  
co ns ide red . These th e o r ie s  are  th e n  c la s s if ie d  in to  fo u r  d i f fe r e n t
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ca te g o rie s  in  accordance w ith  th e  m a rk e t im p e rfe c tio n s  pa rad igm , as 
in te rp re te d  by  C a lve t (1981).
C h a p te r F ive  co n s id e rs  a se t o f  th e o r ie s  w h ic h  fo c u s  on th e  
in te r n a l o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  f irm s  ra th e r  th a n  on th e  fu n c t io n in g  o f  
m arke ts . The ro o ts  o f  th is  th e o re t ic a l app roach  are  tra c e d  back  to  
th e  concep t o f  t ra n s a c tio n  costs , as f i r s t  a r t ic u la te d  b y  Coase (1937) 
in  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  f irm . The subsequen t 
a p p lic a t io n s  o f  th is  concep t to  th e  phenom enon o f  c o rp o ra te  
m u lt in a t io n a l i t y  a re  th e n  exam ined, ie  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  and i t s  
d e r iv a t iv e ,  a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  th e o ry , and th e  M a rke ts  and H ie ra rc h ie s  
fra m e w o rk  o f  W illiam so n  (1975).
C h a p te r S ix  p roposes a fra m e w o rk  f o r  d e s c r ib in g  th e  th e o ry  o f  
lic e n s in g  in  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness . T h is  d raw s upon  th re e  m ain 
l i te ra tu r e s :  th e  in te rn a t io n a l l ic e n s in g  l i te r a tu r e ,  th e  te c h n o lo g y
tra n s fe r  l i te r a tu r e  and th e  l i te r a tu r e  on th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  MNC.
C h a p te r Seven sum m arises th e  th e o re t ic a l and e m p ir ic a l 
l i t e r a tu r e  con s id e re d  in  th e  p re v io u s  th re e  c h a p te rs  and p roposes 
an a n a ly t ic a l fra m e w o rk  f o r  a n a ly s in g  th e  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  
d e c is io n .
C h a p te r E ig h t se ts  o u t in  d e ta i l  th e  re se a rch  m e thodo logy  
em ployed. I t  desc rib es  th e  p ro c e d u re  used to  s e le c t th e  p o p u la tio n  
o f  com panies f o r  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rve y , th e  a d m in is tra t io n  o f  th e  
s u rv e y  i t s e l f ,  and th e  s ta t is t ic a l  m ethods em ployed to  ana lyse  th e  
d a ta  o b ta in e d  fro m  i t .
C h a p te r N ine c o n s is ts  o f  an a n a ly s is  o f  o f f i c ia l  UK d a ta  on 
e x p o rts , ro y a lty  re c e ip ts  and d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t, p rodu ced  by  th e  
G overnm ent S ta t is t ic a l S e rv ice  o v e r th e  p e r io d  1964 to  1984. The 
a n a ly s is  id e n t if ie s  tre n d s  in  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  UK in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  modes o v e r tim e  and across in d u s t r ia l  s e c to rs  and fo re ig n  
m arke ts .
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C h a p te r Ten describes  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  sam ple o f 
com panies w h ich  responded to  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , w h ic h  p ro v id e s  a 
c o n te x t f o r  th e  a n a ly s is  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  subse quen t ch a p te rs . 
C h a p te r E leven ana lyses th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g  d e c is io n . I t  re p o r ts  th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  lic e n s in g  was 
e v a lu a te d  by  th e  com panies a g a in s t th e  ke y  a lte rn a t iv e s  o f  
e x p o r t in g  and FDI, and i t  a lso  assesses th e  r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  
a tta c h e d  by th e  com panies to  a num ber o f  v a r ia b le s  d raw n  fro m  th e  
l i te r a tu r e  rev iew .
C h a p te r Tw elve assesses th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  c e r ta in  c o rp o ra te  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  w ere assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t ie s  o f  th e  
com pany sample. From  th e  l i te r a tu r e  re v ie w  n in e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
were id e n t if ie d ,  and th e  e x te n t o f  a s s o c ia tio n  be tw een these  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  and th e  le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  was te s te d  u s in g  
m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  a n a lys is . C h a p te r T h ir te e n  is  concerned  w ith  
th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  c o n te n t o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents, and te s ts  
a num ber o f  hypo theses  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t l i te r a tu r e .
C h a p te r F o u rte e n  sum m arises th e  re s u lts  o f  th e  re se a rch  and 
draw s o u t i t s  key  im p lic a t io n s , as w e ll as p ro p o s in g  some d ire c t io n s  





1. Nowadays, m ost o f  th e  f in a n c ia l c a p ita l com ponent o f  th e  FDI 
package c o n s is ts  o f  th e  re - in v e s tm e n t o f  p r o f i t s  re a lis e d  in  th e  
h o s t m a rke t and o f  money ra is e d  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l 
m a rke t, r a th e r  th a n  c a p ita l t ra n s fe r re d  fro m  th e  h o s t c o u n try  
(OECD, 1981).
2. D unn ing , 1982a, plO.
3. D u n n in g 's  c la s s if ic a t io n  is  e s s e n tia lly  a re -s ta te m e n t o f  th e  
d is t in c t io n  d raw n  by  Johnson  (1970) betw een m a te r ia l c a p ita l,  
know ledge  c a p ita l and hum an c a p ita l.
4. C o n tra c to r  (1985, p6) sum m arised th e  re s u lts  o f  th e se  su rveys .
5. M cG reevy's q u e s tio n n a ire  was sen t to  e x e c u tiv e s  se lec te d  fro m  
th o se  com panies in  F o rtu n e  m agazine's l i s t  o f  th e  la rg e s t 500 
in d u s t r ia l  c o rp o ra t io n s  and th e  second la rg e s t  500 in d u s t r ia l  
c o rp o ra t io n s . O f th e  550 q u e s tio n n a ire s  w h ic h  he d is t r ib u te d ,  121 
w ere  re tu rn e d , and o f  these  o n ly  100 were co n s id e re d  com ple te  
enough to  be o f  use in  s ta t is t ic a l  a n a lys is . T h is  e f fe c t iv e  
response  ra te  o f  18 p e r ce n t was, how ever, deemed h ig h  enough 
by  th e  a u th o r  to  g iv e  v a l id i t y  to  h is  re s u lts .
6. In  1978 th e  s to c k  o f  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n ts  h e ld  ab roa d  by UK f irm s  
am ounted to  11 p e r cen t o f  th e  w o rld  to ta l  ( th e  US accoun ted  f o r  
45 p e r  cent). [S to p fo rd  e t a l (1980, p !5 ) ].
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CHAPTER TWO -  INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT & THE INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
T h is  c h a p te r describes  th e  e v o lu t io n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t, th e  
r is e  o f  th e  MNC, and th e  g ro w th  o f  n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s  o f  in v e s tm e n t, 
in c lu d in g  lic e n s in g . I t  a lso  d e scrib es  th e  fo rc e s  w h ic h  have been 
m ost in f lu e n t ia l  in  re c e n t yea rs  in  shap ing  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  e n v iro nm en t. I t  th e re fo re  p ro v id e s  a b a c k d ro p  a g a in s t 
w h ic h  th e  c u r re n t  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t ie s  o f UK MNCs may be 
u n d e rs to o d .
The c h a p te r beg ins w ith  an e x p lo ra t io n  o f th e  way in  w h ic h  th e  
te rm  'in v e s tm e n t' is  in te rp re te d ,  b o th  a t a dom estic  and a t an 
in te rn a t io n a l le v e l.  T h is  d is c u s s io n  h ig h l ig h ts  th e  range o f 
d e f in it io n s  w h ich  are a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  te rm  in v e s tm e n t, and i t  
focuses  upon a b ro a d  d e f in i t io n  w h ich  in c o rp o ra te s  n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s  
o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness. The h is to r ic a l e v o lu t io n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
in v e s tm e n t, b ro a d ly  d e fin e d , is  th e n  o u t lin e d .
The e n v iro n m e n t in  w h ic h  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  ta ke s  p lace  is  
th e n  d iscussed . Three m ain deve lopm en ts  are  h ig h lig h te d ,  a long  
w ith  t h e ir  l i k e ly  consequences. The c h a p te r c loses w ith  a re ­
assessm ent o f  th e  fu n c t io n s  o f  th e  MNC in  th e  l ig h t  o f  th e  in c re a se d  
use o f  n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness in v o lv e m e n t.
2.1.1 The C oncept o f  In v e s tm e n t
In v e s tm e n t is  g e n e ra lly  u n d e rs to o d  as th e  u n d e r ta k in g  o f  any 
com m itm ent w h ic h  in v o lv e s  an in i t i a l  s a c r if ic e  fo llo w e d  by 
subsequen t b e n e fits . When econom ists  use th e  te rm  i t  can have tw o  
m eanings, depend ing  upon  w h e th e r a 'm ic ro ' o r  a 'm acro ' p e rs p e c tiv e  
is  ado p te d  (Gray, 1979). As used by  m ic roecon om is ts , in v e s tm e n t 
means th e  a c q u is it io n  o f  an asse t w h ic h  in v o lv e s  th e  c o n v e rs io n  o f  
m one ta ry  resou rces  in to  i l l i q u id  re so u rce s  (e ith e r  c a p ita l goods used 
d i r e c t ly  in  a p ro d u c tiv e  p rocess, o r  s e c u r it ie s  re p re s e n tin g  c la im s 
upon these  assets). Possession o f  th e  fo rm e r is  re fe r re d  to  as 
d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t, ie  in v e s tm e n t in  're a l' assets, w h ile  o w n e rsh ip  o f
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th e  la t t e r  is  re fe r re d  to  as in d ir e c t  o r  f in a n c ia l in v e s tm e n t.
When econom ists ado p t a m acroeconom ic p e rs p e c tiv e  th e y  use 
th e  w o rd  in v e s tm e n t to  s ig n ify  an a d d it io n  to  th e  c a p ita l s to c k  o f  
s o c ie ty  ( re a l o r  f in a n c ia l) .  Thus th e  sa le  o f  s e c u r it ie s  by  one 
member o f  s o c ie ty  to  a n o th e r cann o t be con s id e re d  as an in v e s tm e n t 
s ince  i t  does n o t in c rea se  th e  num ber o f  s e c u r it ie s  in  th e  economy. 
From  th e  in d iv id u a l 's  p o in t  o f  v ie w  an in v e s tm e n t has been made, 
b u t  fro m  a m acroeconom ist's  v ie w p o in t n o th in g  has changed. The 
bas is  f o r  th is  d iffe re n c e  in  m eaning is  th u s  th e  size o f  th e  
re fe re n c e  g roup . In  e ith e r  sense in v e s tm e n t means th e  a c q u is it io n  
o f  an asset fro m  o u ts id e  th e  re fe re n c e  g ro u p , b u t  in  th e  
m acroeconom is t's  sense th e  g ro u p  is  so la rg e  th a t  th e  o n ly  way 
in v e s tm e n t can o ccu r is  f o r  a new asset to  be c re a te d .
Ir re s p e c t iv e  o f  th e  econom ic v ie w p o in t  w h ic h  one adop ts , th e  
d is t in c t io n  between in v e s tm e n t in  re a l assets and in v e s tm e n t in  
f in a n c ia l assets rem a ins. The ke y  d iffe re n c e  be tw een these  tw o  
types  o f  in v e s tm e n t concerns th e  degree o f  c o n tro l w h ic h  in v e s to rs  
are  ab le  to  exe rc ise  o v e r t h e ir  assets. E n tre p re n e u rs  who in v e s t  
d ir e c t ly  in  c a p ita l equ ipm en t a u to m a tic a lly  ga in  c o n t ro l o v e r th e  
d e c is io n -m a k in g  p rocess g o v e rn in g  th e  use o f  t h e i r  assets. In  
deve loped  m a rke t econom ies, how ever, th e  d o m in a n t fo rm  o f  
c o rp o ra te  e n te rp r is e  is  th e  p u b lic  company, and in v e s tm e n t dec is io ns  
are  th e re fo re  ta k e n  by g roup s  o f  m anagers who e a rn  t h e ir  l iv in g  by 
o p e ra tin g  businesses on b e h a lf  o f  th e  s e c u r ity  h o ld e rs .1
2.1.2 In te rn a t io n a l In v e s tm e n t
In te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t can be re g a rd e d  as s im p ly  th e  fo re ig n  
e x te n s io n  o f  dom estic  in v e s tm e n t. Thus, overseas in v e s tm e n t in  
f in a n c ia l assets ( p o r t fo l io  in v e s tm e n t) occu rs  when f irm s , f in a n c ia l 
in s t i tu t io n s  o r  in d iv id u a ls  a c q u ire  an asse t th a t  is  th e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  a 
fo re ig n e r .  They may do th is  by  p u rc h a s in g  th e  s e c u r it ie s  o f  f irm s  
w h ic h  are  in c o rp o ra te d  in  a fo re ig n  c o u n try , o r  by  p u rc h a s in g  
bonds denom ina ted  in  a fo re ig n  c u rre n c y .
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FDI re fe rs  to  th e  s e tt in g -u p , e x te n s io n , o r  a c q u is it io n  o f  
overseas p ro d u c tio n  o r  s e rv ic e  f a c i l i t ie s  ( re a l assets). There are  
tw o  m ain  fe a tu re s  o f  FDI w h ich  d is t in g u is h  i t  fro m  p o r t fo l io  
in v e s tm e n t. F ir s t ly ,  th e  f irm  w h ic h  makes a d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t 
overseas purchases th e  pow er to  e x e r t c o n tro l o v e r d e c is io n  m aking  
in  th e  s u b s id ia ry  w h ich  i t  e ith e r  c rea tes  o r  a cq u ire s . D unn ing  
(1981) id e n t i f ie d  tw o  m o tives  w h ich  e x p la in  th e  d e s ire  o f  p a re n t 
com panies to  c o n tro l th e  dec is io ns  made by th e ir  s u b s id ia r ie s : th e y
may e ith e r  p e rce ive  th e ir  own management to  be m ore e f f ic ie n t  in  
t h e ir  d e c is io n  m aking  th a n  s u b s id ia ry  management, o r  th e  goa ls  o f  
th e  p a re n t company may d iv e rg e  fro m  those  o f  i t s  in d iv id u a l 
s u b s id ia r ie s . In  th is  case c o n tro l is  exe rc ise d  f o r  reasons th a t  
have n o th in g  to  do w ith  m anage ria l sh o rtcom ings , b u t  ra th e r  because 
d e c is io n s  ta k e n  by s u b s id ia r ie s  w i l l  n o t a lw ays be in  th e  in te re s ts  
o f  th e  MNC o f  w h ich  th e y  are  a p a r t .  T h is  s ce n a rio  is  p a r t ic u la r ly
l i k e ly  in  th e  case o f  MNCs th a t  p u rsue  g lo b a l p ro d u c tio n  and
m a rk e tin g  s tra te g ie s .
The second d is t in g u is h in g  fe a tu re  o f  FDI is  th a t  i t  u s u a lly  
in v o lv e s  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  a com ple te  package o f  re sou rces  (ie  
te c h n o lo g y  and management s k i l ls ,  as w e ll as f in a n c ia l c a p ita l) .  
E xce p tio n s  may o ccu r w here a f irm  chooses to  expand ab road  by 
a c q u ir in g  an e x is t in g  fo re ig n  f irm . From a p u re ly  g lo b a l 
m acroeconom ic p e rs p e c tiv e , FDI by a c q u is it io n  w o u ld  n o t be 
c la s s if ie d  as an in v e s tm e n t s ince  i t  w o u ld  n o t re p re s e n t an a d d it io n  
to  th e  w o r ld 's  t o ta l  c a p ita l s to c k ; o n ly  th e  o w n e rsh ip , n o t th e  
m agn itude , o f  re a l assets w o u ld  have changed. H ow ever, fro m  th e  
c o rp o ra te  v ie w p o in t,  o w n e rsh ip  o f  re a l assets ab road , no m a tte r  how 
o b ta in e d , re p re s e n ts  an in ve s tm e n t.
I t  is  th e o re t ic a l ly  p o s s ib le , how eve r, f o r  f irm s  w h ic h  expand 
ab road  v ia  th e  a c q u is it io n  ro u te  to  do so w ith o u t  t ra n s fe r r in g  any 
o f  t h e ir  own resou rces  overseas. They c o u ld  u t i l is e  th e  te c h n o lo g y  
o f  th e  f irm  ta k e n  o ve r, as w e ll as th e  s k i l ls  o f  th e  incum b en t 
management. I t  is  a lso  p o s s ib le  f o r  a c q u ir in g  f irm s  to  ra is e  some o r  
a l l  o f  th e  c a p ita l used to  f in a n c e  such ta k e o v e rs  on th e  
in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l m a rke t, o r  in  th e  c o u n try  in  w h ich  th e
a c q u is it io n  is  be ing  made, as an a lte rn a t iv e  to  u s in g  th e ir  own
29
CHAPTER 2
in te r n a l cash rese rves . Such cases are  ra re , how ever; m ost FDI 
ta ke s  th e  fo rm  o f  g re e n fie ld  in v e s tm e n t, ie  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  f re s h  
o p e ra tin g  ca pa c ity .
The key  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  FDI, th e n , is  th a t  i t  in v o lv e s  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l t ra n s fe r  o f  know ledge  w ith in  th e  f irm ,  accom panied by  
c o n tro l o v e r d e c is io n -m a k in g . I t  is  p o s s ib le , how ever, f o r  a f irm 's  
p ro p r ie ta r y  (ie  u n iq u e ) know ledge  to  be t ra n s fe r re d  ab road  to  
in d e p e n d e n t f irm s  as in d iv id u a l fa c to r  in p u ts ,  r a th e r  th a n  as an 
in te g ra te d  package in c o rp o ra t in g  c o n tro l o v e r d e c is io n -m a k in g . 
These 'n o n -e q u ity ' t ra n s fe rs  are  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  concep t o f  
in v e s tm e n t, f o r  MNCs w h ic h  e n te r  in to  n o n -e q u ity  a rrangem ents  ea rn  
a r e tu rn  fro m  do in g  so in  th e  same way as th e y  ea rn  p r o f i t s  fro m  
e q u ity  in ve s tm e n t. These re tu rn s  com pensate th e  p ro v id o rs  o f  
p ro p r ie ta r y  know ledge  fo r  th e  s a c r if ic e  in v o lv e d  in  m ak ing  i t  
a v a ila b le  to  p o te n t ia l c o m p e tito rs .
A lth o u g h  these  fo rm s o f  in te rn a t io n a l exchange do n o t r e s u lt  in  
re a l asse t fo rm a tio n  in  th e  re c ip ie n t  n a tio n , th e y  do in c re a se  th e  
'kno w ledge  c a p ita l' o f  th a t  n a t io n , w h e th e r i t  be in  th e  fo rm  o f  
hum an c a p ita l ( ie  management) o r  te c h n o lo g ic a l c a p ita l.  FDI can 
th u s  be rega rded  as an aggrega ted  fo rm  o f  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t, 
accom p lished  in te r n a l ly  ( ie  w ith in  th e  f irm ) ,  w h ile  n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s  
o f  re so u rce  t ra n s fe r  can be re g a rd e d  as d is c re te  fo rm s  o f  
in te rn a t io n a l in ve s tm e n t, u n d e rta k e n  e x te rn a lly  ( ie  in  th e  a rm 's - 
le n g th  m arke t).
N o n -e q u ity  fo rm s  o f  in v e s tm e n t may, how ever, enab le  th e  
s u p p lie r  to  exe rc ise  some degree o f  c o n tro l o v e r th e  o p e ra tio n s  o f  
th e  re c ip ie n t.  Many lic e n s in g  agreem ents, f o r  exam ple, c o n ta in  
c lauses w h ic h  r e s t r ic t  th e  e x p o rt in g  p o te n t ia l o f  th e  lice n se e  in  
o rd e r  to  l im i t  c o m p e tit io n  w ith  th e  lic e n s o r  in  i t s  e s ta b lis h e d  
m arke ts . A n o th e r c lause  ty p ic a l o f  many lic e n s in g  agreem ents is  a 
t ie d  pu rchase  p ro v is io n  o b lig in g  license es  to  pu rcha se  in te rm e d ia te  
p ro d u c ts , c a p ita l goods o r  spa re  p a r ts  fro m  th e  lic e n s o r.
A ke y  fe a tu re  o f  n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s  o f in te rn a t io n a l bus iness , 
th e n , is  th a t  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  e f fe c t iv e  c o n tro l need n o t c o in c id e
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w ith  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  r is k  among th e  p a r t ie s  in v o lv e d . T h is  
p o in t  is  made by Oman (1984) in  h is  e v a lu a tio n  o f  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
o f  n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness . He argues th a t  i t  is  
th e  a b i l i t y  o f  s u p p lie rs  to  e xe rc ise  c o n tro l o v e r th e  o p e ra tio n s  o f  
re c ip ie n ts  th a t  d is t in g u is h e s  n o n -e q u ity  modes fro m  sa les 
o p e ra tio n s , and th u s  a llo w s  them  to  be c la s s if ie d  as fo rm s  o f  
in te rn a t io n a l in ve s tm e n t.
Oman e x p la in s  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th is  c h a ra c te r is t ic  as fo llo w s : 
"w hereas an in v e s tm e n t is  n o rm a lly  u n d e rta k e n  by th e  in v e s to r  w ith  
th e  in te n t io n  o f  in c re a s in g  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  re so u rce  (c a p ita l)  he 
c o n tro ls ,  th a t  is , w ith  th e  in te n t io n  o f  u s in g  th e  re so u rce  he 
s u p p lie s  to  c rea te  and a p p ro p r ia te  new v a lu e  ( 'v a lu e -a d d e d ') , a sa le  
is  n o rm a lly  c a r r ie d  o u t to  re a lis e  (m onetise) v a lu e  a lre a d y  c rea ted . 
W hether o r  n o t a g ive n  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  o p e ra tio n  in v o lv e s  a t 
le a s t an e lem ent o f  in v e s tm e n t fro m  th e  s ta n d p o in t o f  th e  f ir m  
s u p p ly in g  th e  re so u rce  th u s  depends ... on w h e th e r o r  n o t th e  
s u p p ly in g  f irm  seeks to  use th e  re so u rce  to  g a in  access to , and 
c o n tro l a t le a s t p a r t  o f, th e  new v a lu e  to  be c re a te d  in  th e  h o s t 
c o u n try  w ith  th a t  re so u rce " (1984, p l9 ).
Thus, acco rd in g  to  Oman, th e  ke y  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  n o n -e q u ity  
modes w h ich  a llo w  them  to  be re g a rd e d  as fo rm s o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
in v e s tm e n t is  th a t  th e  s u p p lie r 's  p r o f i t  is  d e r iv e d , a t  le a s t in  p a r t ,  
fro m  th e  v a lu e  c re a te d  by  th e  re c ip ie n t .  In  th e  case o f  te c h n o lo g y  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents, f o r  exam ple, paym ents are  o f te n  based upon  
th e  sa les vo lum e gen e ra te d  by  th e  lice n se e ; th e y  do n o t depend upon  
th e  m a rg in a l cos t o f  p ro d u c in g  th e  te c h n o lo g y  f o r  th e  license e , as 
w o u ld  be th e  case in  an a rm 's - le n g th  sa le  u n d e r c o m p e tit iv e  m a rk e t 
c o n d it io n s .
MNCs c o n s id e r in g  th e  use o f  n o n -e q u ity  modes m ust, how ever, 
ta k e  accou n t o f  th e  lo n g - te rm  im p lic a t io n s  o f  t h e ir  a d o p tio n , f o r  
a lth o u g h  th e  r ig h ts  o f  c o n t ro l ass igned  to  a s u p p lie r  by  th e
re c ip ie n t  may n o t in  p ra c t ic e  be v e ry  d if fe r e n t  fro m  those  w h ic h
o c cu r in  a d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t, th e  la t t e r  fo rm  o f  re so u rce  t ra n s fe r
does have  th e  m e rit  o f  la s t in g  f o r  as lo n g  as th e  f irm  w ishes i t  to ,
w hereas c o n tra c ts  are  u s u a lly  f o r  a l im ite d  p e r io d  o f  tim e.
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The v a r io u s  fo rm s o f  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t w h ic h  in v o lv e  
l i t t l e  o r  no e q u ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n  a re  id e n t if ie d  and d e sc rib e d  in  th e  
fo llo w in g  ch a p te r. F o r th e  moment i t  is  s u f f ic ie n t  to  n o te  th a t  th e y  
c o n s t itu te  an a lte rn a t iv e  to  th e  tw o  t r a d i t io n a l  and m ost w idesp read  
means o f  s e rv ic in g  fo re ig n  m a rke ts : e x p o r t in g  and FDI.
2.2 THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
2.2.1 In te rn a t io n a l In v e s tm e n t Pre-1945
The co n te m p o ra ry  MNC has i t s  ro o ts  in  th e  B r it is h ,  D u tch  and 
F rench  m erchan t com panies o f  th e  s ix te e n th  and se ve n te e n th  
c e n tu r ie s . However, these  com panies were e s s e n tia lly  t ra d in g  ra th e r  
th a n  m a n u fa c tu r in g  o rg a n iz a tio n s , w ith  r e la t iv e ly  few  overseas 
in v e s tm e n ts  in  m a n u fa c tu r in g  f a c i l i t ie s ,  and t h e ir  a c t iv i t ie s  were 
l im ite d  to  th e  c o lo n ia l em pires o f  th e ir  m o th e r c o u n try . The 
in te rn a t io n a l expans ion  o f  p ro d u c tio n  d id  n o t ta k e  o f f  u n t i l  th e  
la t t e r  h a l f  o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry , s h o r t ly  a f te r  th e  emergence o f  
th e  jo in t - s to c k  com pany had v a s t ly  in c re a se d  th e  am ount o f  c a p ita l 
a v a ila b le  to  UK f irm s .
The h a l f  c e n tu ry  up to  1914 has been c a lle d  th e  "go lden  age" o f  
in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l m ovem ents, d u r in g  w h ich  tim e  th e  UK was th e  
m ost im p o r ta n t c re d ito r  n a t io n , in v e s t in g  ab road  up to  seven p e r 
c en t o f  i t s  GNP [OECD (1981, p5 )]. Indeed, th e  UK's a n n u a l
in v e s tm e n ts  ab road  began to  exceed h e r  n e t c a p ita l fo rm a tio n  a t 
home a f te r  1870 and c o n tin u e d  to  do so u n t i l  1914 [S to p fo rd  (1974, 
p314)]. M ost o f  th is ,  how ever, c o n s is te d  o f  p o r t fo l io  in ve s tm e n t; in  
1914, 90 p e r cen t o f  a l l  in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l m ovem ents to o k  th is
fo rm  [D u n n in g  (1972, p lO )].
The in te r -w a r  yea rs  w itn e sse d  a s teady  in c re a se  in  th e  g lo b a l 
s to c k  o f  FDI, p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  1930s when p ro te c t io n is t  p o lic ie s  
s p u rre d  f irm s  to  jum p tra d e  b a r r ie rs  by  re p la c in g  e x p o rts  w ith  
fo re ig n  p ro d u c tio n . N e ve rth e le ss , FDI s t i l l  lagged  b e h in d  p o r t fo l io  
in v e s tm e n t as th e  d o m in a n t fo rm  o f  in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l movement. 
T h is  s itu a t io n  was re v e rs e d  a f te r  1945. A p p ro x im a te ly  90 p e rce n t o f
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a l l  p r iv a te  c a p ita l f lo w s  betw een 1951 and 1964 to o k  th e  fo rm  o f  
d ire c t  in ve s tm e n ts  [H ood and Young (1979, p l2 ) ] .
2.2.2 In te rn a t io n a l In ve s tm e n t D u rin g  1945-1970
T h is  p o s t-w a r  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  in  th e  p a t te rn  o f  in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l 
f lo w s  is  g e n e ra lly  a t t r ib u te d  to  tw o  m ain fa c to rs .  The f i r s t  o f  
these  is  th e  re v o lu t io n  w h ic h  to o k  p lace  in  th e  f ie ld  o f  
com m un ica tions te chno logy . The a d ve n t o f  th e  e ra  o f  cheap 
passenger a i r  t r a v e l and th e  deve lopm en t o f  th e  com pu te r p ro v id e d  
th e  means by w h ich  a f irm 's  h e a d q u a rte rs  c o u ld  m a in ta in  a 
m e a n in g fu l degree o f  c o n tro l o v e r i t s  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s . 
Subsequent s c ie n t i f ic  advances in  th e  1970s ( th e  a r r iv a l  o f  
s u p e rs o n ic  a ir  t ra v e l,  the  deve lopm en t o f  th e  m ic ro p ro ce sso r-b a se d  
com pute r, and th e  use o f  s a te l l i te  te c h n o lo g y  f o r  com m un ica tions) 
se rved  to  reduce  s t i l l  f u r th e r  th e  p rob lem s o f  o rg a n iz in g  la rg e  f irm s  
o v e r g re a t d is tances .
The o th e r  m a jo r im pe tus  to  th e  p o s t-w a r  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  
p ro d u c tio n  was p ro v id e d  by th e  fa v o u ra b le  econom ic c o n d it io n s  
w h ic h  p re v a ile d  in  th e  1950s and 1960s. D u rin g  these  tw o  decades 
a lm os t a l l  o f  th e  in d u s t r ia l is e d  c o u n tr ie s  and many o f  th e  less 
deve loped  c o u n tr ie s  expe rienced  u np re ceden ted  ra te s  o f  su s ta in e d  
econom ic g ro w th . In  th is  p e r io d  o f  v i r t u a l l y  u n in te r ru p te d  
e xpa ns io n  o f  o u tp u t  and tra d e , fo re ig n  f irm s  e xpe rienced  l i t t l e  
o p p o s it io n  when p e n e tra t in g  and d e v e lo p in g  new overseas m arke ts . 
T h is  s itu a t io n  changed in  th e  1970s w ith  th e  onse t o f  p e rs is te n t  
's ta g f la t io n ' in  advanced in d u s t r ia l  econom ies. The re s u lt in g  
c o n tra c t io n  in  th e  ra te  o f  g ro w th  o f  o u tp u t  and in te rn a t io n a l tra d e  
p rom p te d  h o s t c o u n tr ie s , e s p e c ia lly  th e  less deve loped  ones, to  
s e r io u s ly  q u e s tio n  th e  a p p ro p ria te n e s s  o f  FDI to  t h e ir  p a r t ic u la r  
needs. By th a t  s tage, how ever, MNCs had a lre a d y  e s ta b lis h e d  an 
in d e lib le  presence in  m ost c o u n tr ie s .
M ost FDI in  th e  e a r ly  p o s tw a r yea rs  o r ig in a te d  fro m  th e  U n ite d  
S ta tes. T h is  was due, in  p a r t ,  to  th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  th e  M a rs h a ll A id  
scheme fo r  p o s tw a r re c o n s tru c t io n , in a u g u ra te d  in  1948. T h is  p la n , 
w h ic h  e n ta ile d  m assive t ra n s fe rs  o f  US gove rnm en t fu n d s  in  th e
33
CHAPTER 2
fo rm  o f  g ra n ts  and loans  to  th e  European econom ies, fa v o u re d  US 
f irm s  in  t h e ir  e f fo r ts  to  ga in  access to  re c ip ie n t  c o u n tr ie s . The US 
soon became th e  p r in c ip a l source  o f  p r iv a te  f lo w s  o f  d ire c t  c a p ita l 
in v e s tm e n t to  th e  re c o v e r in g  econom ies, w ith  E u rope  th e  m a jo r 
re c ip ie n t .
The dom inan t p o s it io n  a tta in e d  by US f irm s  in  th e  im m ed ia te  
p o s tw a r e ra  is  a lso  p a r t ly  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l le ad  
w h ic h  th e y  had b u i l t  up d u r in g  th e  w a r years , and a lso  to  t h e i r  
s u p e r io r  management and o rg a n iz a t io n a l e x p e rt is e . These la t t e r  
advan tages were p ro d u c ts  o f  th e  more c o m p e tit iv e  e n v iro n m e n t in  
th e  U n ite d  S ta tes, and o f  th e  US's lo n g e r e xpe rience  w ith  la rg e -s c a le  
f irm s .
In  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  US was th e  b ir th p la c e  o f  w h a t has been 
d e s c rib e d  by W illiam so n  (1981) as " th e  m ost s ig n if ic a n t  o rg a n iz a t io n a l 
in n o v a t io n  o f  th e  tw e n t ie th  c e n tu ry " , ie  th e  c re a t io n  o f  th e  
m u lt id iv is io n a l (o r  M -fo rm ) s tru c tu re .  C rea ted  by  P ie r re  Du P on t and 
A lf re d  S loan in  th e  e a r ly  1920s, th is  new c o rp o ra te  management 
s t ru c tu re  in v o lv e d  th e  c re a tio n  o f  sem i-au tonom ous o p e ra tin g  
d iv is io n s  o rgan ized  a long  p ro d u c t, b rand , o r  g e o g ra p h ic  lin e s . I t  
superceded th e  t r a d i t io n a l  u n i ta r y  (o r  U -fo rm ) s t ru c tu re ,  u n d e r 
w h ic h  d e c is io n -m a k in g  f o r  a l l  dep a rtm en ts  o f  a f irm  was c e n tra lis e d .
A lth o u g h  th is  new c o rp o ra te  s t ru c tu re  was im ita te d  s lo w ly  a t 
f i r s t ,  a d o p tio n  by  US f irm s  p roceeded ra p id ly  d u r in g  th e  1945-1960 
p e r io d . In  c o n tra s t,  m ost la rg e  European f irm s  a d m in is te re d  t h e ir  
dom estic  o p e ra tio n s  th ro u g h  U -fo rm  s tru c tu re s  u n t i l  th e  la te  1960s. 
S ince th e  possess ion  o f  an M -fo rm  c a p a b il i ty  made i t  e a s ie r f o r  
f irm s  to  e x tend  asset management fro m  a dom estic  base to  in c lu d e  
fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s , W illia m so n  (1981) has suggested th a t  t h e ir  e a r ly  
a d o p tio n  o f  th e  M -fo rm  s t ru c tu re  gave US f irm s  them  th e  a b i l i t y  to  
engage in  FDI a t an e a r l ie r  stage.
FDI c o n tin u e d  to  expand th ro u g h o u t th e  1950s, w ith  re s o u rc e - 
based in v e s tm e n ts  (raw  m a te r ia ls  and o i l)  a c c o u n tin g  f o r  th e  b u lk  o f  
th e  in v e s tm e n t. The ra te  o f  g ro w th  o f  FDI w o u ld  have been even 
fa s te r  in  th is  p e r io d  w ere i t  n o t f o r  th e  e x is te n ce  o f  c o n tro ls  on
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c a p ita l m ovem ents, in  p a r t ic u la r  th e  la c k  o f  c o n v e r t ib i l i t y  betw een 
m a jo r c u rre n c ie s . The g ra d u a l re d u c t io n  o f  these  re s t r ic t io n s  
to w a rd s  th e  end o f  th e  1950s he lped  c o n tr ib u te  to w a rd s  an 
a c c e le ra tio n  in  th e  g ro w th  o f  FDI. Much o f  th is  g ro w th  re p re se n te d  
th e  response  o f  US f irm s  to  th e  th re a t  posed to  t h e ir  m arke ts , 
p re v io u s ly  deve loped  th ro u g h  in te rn a t io n a l tra d e , by  th e  E uropean 
custom  u n io n s  (th e  EEC and EFTA). There  was th u s  an e v o lu t io n  
to w a rd s  im p o r t -s u b s t i tu t in g  m a n u fa c tu rin g  in v e s tm e n t, w ith  W estern 
Europe  th e  m a jo r re c ip ie n t.
2.2.3 In te rn a t io n a l In ve s tm e n t Post-1970
The p o s it io n  o f  th e  US as th e  le a d in g  e x p o r te r  o f  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t 
c a p ita l began to  be cha lle n g e d  in  th e  1960s by  E uropean c o u n tr ie s  
o th e r  th a n  th e  UK, and by  Japan. I t  was o n ly  in  th e  1970s, how ever, 
th a t  European and Japanese com panies s ta r te d  to  s ig n if ic a n t ly  erode 
th e  le ad  e s ta b lis h e d  by th e  US. Between 1971 and 1978 th e  share  o f  
th e  t o ta l  FDI s to c k  o f  th e  deve loped  m a rke t econom ies h e ld  by  th e  
US f e l l  fro m  49.3 p e r cen t to  45.5 p e r cen t, w h ile  th a t  o f  Germany, 
Japan, th e  N e th e rla n d s  and France rose  fro m  19.4 p e r cen t to  26.3 
p e r cen t. The UK's share  d ropp ed  3 p e r cen t d u r in g  th is  p e r io d  
[S to p fo rd , H a be rich  and D unn ing  (1980, p l5 ) ] .
T h is  change in  g e o g ra p h ic  d is t r ib u t io n  re f le c te d  th e  in c re a s in g  
f in a n c ia l s tre n g th  and te c h n o lo g ic a l s p o h is t ic a t io n  o f  non-US f irm s . 
In  a d d it io n ,  e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to rs  were n o t as fa v o u ra b le  to  US 
f irm s  as th e y  had been in  th e  pas t. F o r exam ple, h ig h e r  E uropean 
la b o u r  cos ts  made th e  o p t io n  o f  e x p o r t in g  m ore a t t r a c t iv e  f o r  US 
f irm s .
The p o s tw a r tre n d  o f  expa ns io n  in  w o rld w id e  FDI, w h ic h  
g a th e re d  pace d u r in g  th e  1960s, c o n tin u e d  on cou rse  u n t i l  th e  m id - 
1970s. S ince then , how ever, th e  g ro w th  o f  FDI among th e  OECD 
c o u n tr ie s  (ie  th e  deve loped  m a rke t econom ies) has s low ed down 
s h a rp ly  in  re a l te rm s. The average a n n u a l g ro w th  ra te  o f FDI fro m  
13 OECD c o u n tr ie s  in  th e  1974-79 p e r io d  was s l ig h t ly  less  th a n  th a t  
in  th e  1960-73 p e r io d  (11.9% in s te a d  o f  12.6%). G iven th e  n o ta b ly  
h ig h e r  ra te  o f  in f la t io n  d u r in g  th e  la t t e r  p e r io d  (9.1% a n n u a lly
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com pared w ith  4.0% p re v io u s ly )  th is  re p re se n te d  a sh a rp  d e c e le ra tio n  
in  re a l te rm s [OECD (1981, p p l l- 1 2 ) ] .
T h is  s low dow n in  FDI g ro w th  o ccu rre d  s im u lta n e o u s ly  w ith  a 
ge n e ra l w eaken ing  o f  dom estic  in ve s tm e n t in  m ost OECD c o u n tr ie s . 
In  fa c t,  FDI rem a ined more b u o ya n t th a n  dom estic  in v e s tm e n t, 
su g g e s tin g  th a t  MNCs a d ju s te d  b e t te r  to  th e  le ss  fa v o u ra b le  
econom ic c ircum stances . However, th e  m ost s ig n if ic a n t  change th a t  
has ta k e n  p lace  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t scene s in ce  th e  m id - 
1970s has n o t been th e  d rop  in  the  aggregate ra te  o f  re a l g ro w th  o f  
FDI, b u t  ra th e r  th e  way in  w h ich  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t is  now 
c a r r ie d  o u t. A cco rd in g  to  th e  OECD's 1981 re p o r t  R ecent
In te rn a t io n a l D ire c t In ve s tm e n t T re n d s :
" In te rn a t io n a l d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t th ro u g h  w h o lly -  
owned s u b s id ia r ie s  can no lo n g e r  be th o u g h t o f  as 
th e  ty p ic a l way o f  engaging in  in te r n a t io n a l 
bus iness .
The OECD re p o r t  suggested th a t  th e  era  o f  th e  MNC as a m a jo r 
t ra n s p o r te r  o f  f in a n c ia l c a p ita l may have ended. I t  re p o r te d  th a t  
m ost MNCs o b ta in e d  f in a n c in g  fo r  FDI v ia  th e  in te r n a l cash f lo w s  o f  
t h e ir  a lre a d y  e s ta b lis h e d  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s . Funds b o rro w e d
lo c a lly  and on th e  in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l m a rke t re p re s e n te d  th e
second m ost im p o r ta n t source  o f  fin a n ce . P a ra lle lin g  th is
deve lopm en t, f irm s  had become more in v o lv e d  in  fo rm s  o f
in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  th a t  in v o lv e  a le ssen ing  o f  t h e ir  o w n e rsh ip
r ig h ts  o v e r th e  resou rces  w h ic h  th e y  t ra n s fe r  abroad .
Thus, th e  ro le  p e rfo rm e d  by th e  MNC in  th e  la te  1970s w o u ld
appear to  have changed fro m  th a t  w h ich  i t  p e rfo rm e d  in  th e  1960s
and e a r ly  1970s. The s ta t is t ic s  com p iled  by  th e  OECD appeared to  
c o n firm  th e  c o n te n tio n  o f  G a b rie l (1977) th a t :
" The b a s ic  fu n c t io n  o f  th e  MNC is  s h i f t in g  fro m  
th e  m o b il is a t io n  o f  c a p ita l,  in  w h ic h  th e  
com pany's re w a rd  is  an e n tre p re n e u r ia l one f o r  
r is k s  ta k e n , to  th e  sa le  o f  i t 's  c o rp o ra te  
a b i l i t ie s ,  in  w h ic h  i t s  re w a rd  is  a m anag e ria l 
one f o r  s e rv ic e s  re n d e re d .'
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2.2.4 C o nc lu s ions
In  re v ie w in g  th e  h is to r y  o f  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t one can id e n t i f y  
a num ber o f  d is t in c t  e v o lu t io n a ry  phases. The f i r s t  phase began 
w ith  th e  In d u s t r ia l  R e v o lu tio n  and la s te d  th ro u g h o u t th e  n in e te e n th  
c e n tu ry . D u rin g  th is  era  m ost resou rces  were t ra n s fe r re d  across 
n a t io n a l b o u n d a rie s  as sepa ra te  and in depe nden t fa c to r  in p u ts ,  t h e ir  
p r ic e s  be ing  de te rm ined  a t a rm 's - le n g th  between b u ye rs  and s e lle rs . 
F in a n c ia l c a p ita l f lo w s  were th e  dom inan t fo rm  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
re so u rce  t ra n s fe r  in  th is  p e r io d . Human c a p ita l was t ra n s fe r re d  
ab road  v ia  p o p u la tio n  m ig ra tio n , w h ile  te c h n o lo g y  (p re d o m in a n tly  
em bodied in  th e  fo rm  o f  p la n t  and m ach inery) was e x p o rte d . The 
exchange o f  these  resou rces  was accom panied by  a t ra n s fe r  o f  
o w n e rsh ip  and c o n tro l fro m  b u ye r to  s e lle r .
In  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  f irm s  were g e n e ra lly  sm a ll and 
u n in c o rp o ra te d  and because o f t ra n s p o r t  and com m un ica tions  
c o n s tra in ts  th e y  o n ly  ra re ly  v e n tu re d  in to  overseas m a rke ts . On th e  
o th e r  hand, th e  p re d o m in a n tly  la is s e z  fa ir e ' app roach  to  
in te rn a t io n a l tra d e  in  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  se rved  to  p rom ote  
in te r - f i r m  tra d e . W hile  th e re  were th u s  in a d e q u a te  mechanisms f o r  
th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  resou rces  w ith in  f irm s , th e  in te rn a t io n a l t ra d in g  
e n v iro n m e n t ensured  th a t  th e re  were few  b a r r ie rs  to  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l t ra n s fe r  o f  resou rces  betw een firm s .
The tw e n t ie th  c e n tu ry  w itn essed  th e  s ta r t  o f  a new phase as 
th e  g ra d u a l movement to w a rd s  p ro te c tio n is m  in  in te rn a t io n a l tra d e  
fo rc e d  many f irm s  to  c o n s id e r th e  in t r a - f i r m  ro u te  o f  re so u rce  
t ra n s fe r .  I t  was in  th e  post-W W II p e r io d , how ever, th a t  th e  in t r a ­
f irm  ro u te  came in to  i t s  own, as d ra m a tic  im provem ents  in  
t ra n s p o r ta t io n  and com m un ica tions made th e  t e r r i t o r ia l  expa ns io n  o f  
bus iness  a p ra c t ic a b le  p ro p o s it io n .
The decades o f  th e  1950s and 1960s w itn essed  a p e r io d  in  w h ic h  
FDI grew  ra p id ly ,  spaw n ing  th e  m odern MNC in  th e  p rocess. T h is  so - 
c a lle d  "honeym oon p e r io d "  came to  an end in  th e  e a r ly  1970s as th e  
ra te  o f  g ro w th  o f  FDI s low ed down and "new" modes o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
re so u rce  t ra n s fe r  began to  emerge. The in c re a s in g  use o f n on ­
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e q u ity  m ethods o f  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t p rom p ted  D u nn ing  (1978, 
p8) to  comment th a t  " th e  w hee l o f  h is to r y  is  tu rn in g  f u l l  c irc le " .
P o ss ib le  e x p la n a tio n s  f o r  th is  s h i f t  in  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  MNCs 
can be fo u n d  in  changes w h ic h  have o c cu rre d  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  e n v iro nm en t. These are now cons ide red .
2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
In  th e  1970s and 1980s m a jo r changes o ccu rre d  in  th e  econom ic, 
s o c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  e n v iro nm en ts  w ith in  w h ich  MNCs ope ra te . The 
im p lic a t io n s  o f  fo u r  o f  th e  key  deve lopm ents f o r  th e  m o d a lity  o f  
in te rn a t io n a l bus iness are  now exam ined.
2.3.1 G overnm ent R e g u la tio n  o f  FDI and MNCs
D u rin g  th e  1970s many h o s t governm ents, e s p e c ia lly  th o se  fro m  LDCs, 
became in c re a s in g ly  aw are o f  th e  fa c t  th a t  MNC s tra te g ie s  w h ic h  
focussed  on re g io n a l o r  g lo b a l o b je c tiv e s  o fte n  c o n f l ic te d  w ith  t h e ir  
n a t io n a l o b je c tiv e s . H ost c o u n try  in d u s tr ie s  w h ich  a re  dom ina ted  
by  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  te n d  to  have few  l in k s  w ith  lo c a l in d u s tr ie s  
s ince  th e y  are lo c k e d  in to  th e  g lo b a l p ro d u c tio n  n e tw o rk  o f  th e  
MNC. The te n s io n  betw een MNCs and governm ents a lso  d e r iv e s  fro m  
th e  tenden cy  o f  MNCs to  c e n tra lis e  th e ir  te c h n o lo g y -c re a tin g  (ie  
R&D) a c t iv i t ie s  in  th e  home c o u n try , and fro m  th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  use 
t h e ir  in te rn a l a c co u n tin g  system s to  t ra n s fe r  incom e o u t o f  
c o u n tr ie s , th e re b y  re d u c in g  lo c a l va lu e -a d d e d .
T h ro u g h o u t th e  1970s these  a n x ie t ie s  began to  express 
them se lves more and m ore in  le g is la t iv e  and re g u la to ry  measures. In  
v i r t u a l l y  a l l  h o s t c o u n tr ie s  c e r ta in  se c to rs  became c losed  to  FDI. 
A lth o u g h  such re s t r ic t io n s  have been in  ex is te n ce  f o r  many yea rs  in  
th e  de fence and com m un ica tions  in d u s tr ie s  o f  m ost c o u n tr ie s , a 
num ber o f  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  ex tended  them  to  co ve r o th e r  
se c to rs ; n o ta b ly  pow er g e n e ra tio n , r e ta i l in g ,  and c e r ta in  bas ic  
in d u s tr ie s  (eg p e tro c h e m ic a ls  in  M exico). In  many o th e r  se c to rs , 
d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  o n ly  p e rm it a l im ite d  am ount o f  FDI, a lth o u g h
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s e v e ra l do a llo w  h ig h e r  degrees o f  fo re ig n  c a p ita l p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  
p r io r i t y  o r  'p io n e e r' in d u s tr ie s ,  and in  in d u s tr ie s  w h ic h  are  e x p o rt  
o r ie n te d  and w h ic h  m a nu fac tu re  p ro d u c ts  w ith  a h ig h  degree o f  
va lu e -a d d e d .
In d u s tr ie s  fro m  w h ic h  FDI is  exc luded  may, n e v e rth e le s s , be 
dependen t upon MNCs i f  lo c a l f irm s  have to  re s o r t  to  n o n -e q u ity  
a rrangem ents  in  o rd e r  to  pu rchase  th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l o r  m anag e ria l 
e x p e r t is e  w h ich  th e y  la ck . In  c o u n tr ie s  w here th e  assets o f  MNCs 
have  been e x p ro p r ia te d  th e re  are many in s ta n ce s  o f  c o n t in u in g  
in v o lv e m e n t w ith  th e  n a tio n a lis e d  com panies th ro u g h  th e  use o f  
c o n tra c tu a l arrangem ents.
In  many h o s t c o u n tr ie s , in c lu d in g  some deve loped  c o u n tr ie s , 
in v e s tm e n t p ro p o sa ls  by MNCs are in c re a s in g ly  screened by  
gove rn m en t agencies. F o llo w in g  such screen ing  th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  
e n try  a re  d e fin e d , eg th e  e x te n t o f  im p o r t s u b s t i tu t io n  o r  e x p o r t  
o r ie n ta t io n .  I f  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  f a i l  to  meet th e  pe rfo rm an ce  
c r i t e r ia  la id  down f o r  them , th e y  may be l ia b le  to  e x p ro p r ia t io n .
As w e ll as seek ing  to  ensure  th a t  th e  c o n tro l w h ic h  MNCs are 
a llo w e d  to  e xe rc ise  is  c o n s is te n t w ith  n a t io n a l p r io r i t ie s ,  many h o s t 
gove rnm en ts  have begun to  a c t iv e ly  seek fo re ig n  resou rces  w ith o u t  
a c q u ir in g  fo re ig n  c o n tro l o v e r th e  use o f  those  resou rces . 
A t te n t io n  has th u s  been focused  upon th e  ta s k  o f  l im i t in g  th e  
e q u ity  s ta ke  o f  in com ing  FDI and o f  'u n b u n d lin g ' th e  re sou rces  
w h ic h  th e y  p ro v id e .
Some d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  o n ly  p e rm it MNCs to  e n te r t h e ir  
c o u n try  i f  th e y  do so by  fo rm in g  a jo in t  v e n tu re  w ith  a dom estic  
p a r tn e r .  In  1974, f o r  exam ple, In d o n e s ia  announced th a t  a l l  new 
fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t w o u ld  re q u ire  51% lo c a l e q u ity . In d ia  g e n e ra lly  
l im its  fo re ig n  o w n e rsh ip  to  40%, a lth o u g h  com panies engaged in  
c e r ta in  p r io r i t y  se c to rs  are  p re m itte d  m a jo r ity  fo re ig n  p a r t ic ip a t io n .  
S im ila r  e q u ity  r e s t r ic t io n s  on fo re ig n  f irm s  have been im posed by 
many o th e r  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , eg M exico (49%), N ig e r ia  (40%), 
M a lays ia  (49%) [U n ite d  N a tio n s  (1978)].
39
CHAPTER 2
J o in t  v e n tu re s  are som etim es fa v o u re d  by h o s t c o u n tr ie s  as 
th e y  are  b e lie v e d  to  p ro v id e  m ost o f  th e  b e n e fits  o f  FDI, w h ile  
p e rm it t in g  shared  d e c is io n -m a k in g . The fo re ig n  p a r tn e r  n o rm a lly  
c o n tr ib u te s  te c h n o lo g y  and in i t i a l  management e x p e rt is e , w h ile  th e  
dom estic  p a r tn e r  p ro v id e s  s p e c ia lis e d  know ledge  o f  dom estic  m a rke t 
c o n d it io n s , le g a l re q u ire m e n ts , la b o u r  management and o th e r  lo c a l 
fa c to rs .
In  a d d it io n  to  s t ip u la t in g  th a t  MNCs engage in  jo in t  v e n tu re s  
when e n te r in g  t h e ir  c o u n tr ie s , some h o s t n a tio n s  (m ost n o ta b ly  
In d ia , N ig e r ia  and Ghana) have enacted le g is la t io n  to  reduce  th e  
pe rcen tage  o f  e x is t in g  fo re ig n  sh a re h o ld in g s  to  s t ip u la te d  le v e ls  
w i th in  a p re s c r ib e d  t im e - l im it ,  depend ing  on th e  n a tu re  and 
c h a ra c te r  o f  t h e ir  a c t iv i t ie s .  O the rs  such as M exico, In d o n e s ia  and 
th e  Andean Pact c o u n tr ie s  have a p p lie d  ow ne rsh ip  re q u ire m e n ts  o n ly  
to  new in ve s tm e n ts , w h ile  M a lays ia  se t i t s e l f  an o v e ra l l ta rg e t  o f  70 
p e r ce n t dom estic  and 30 p e r cen t fo re ig n  o w n e rsh ip  by  th e  ye a r 
1990.
The d e s ire  f o r  n a t io n a l o w n e rsh ip  and c o n tro l has le d  many 
d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  to  accord  in c re a s in g  em phasis n o t ju s t  to  jo in t  
v e n tu re s , b u t a lso  to  a rrangem ents w ith  MNCs w h ich  do n o t in v o lv e  
any fo re ig n  e q u ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n .  Some c o u n tr ie s  have fo rm u la te d  
p o lic ie s  designed to  screen fo re ig n  te c h n o lo g y  in f lo w  and to  deve lop  
in d ig e n o u s  te c h n o lo g ic a l c a p a c ity . G overnm enta l agencies in  
c o u n tr ie s  such as A rg e n tin a , B ra z il and M exico aim to  ensure  th a t  
th e  te rm s and c o n d it io n s  o f  te c h n o lo g y  licence s  e n te re d  in to  by  
dom estic  e n te rp r is e s  are  n o t u n d u ly  r e s t r ic t iv e .
In te rn a t io n a l tra d e  in  te c h n o lo g y 4 has r is e n  r a p id ly  in  re c e n t 
years  fro m  a round  $2,700 m il l io n  in  1965 to  o v e r $11,000 m il l io n  in  
1975 [U n ite d  N a tions  (1978)]. T h is  g ro w th  ra te  exceeds by a w ide  
m arg in  th a t  o f  FDI o v e r th e  same p e r io d . H owever, m ost o f  th is  
tra d e , in  th e  fo rm  o f  lum p sum paym ents, ro y a lt ie s  and fees, to o k  
p lace  among deve loped  c o u n tr ie s  and w ith in  MNCs. In  1975 
d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  accoun ted  f o r  o n ly  a sm a ll p o r t io n  (less th a n  
te n  p e r cent) o f  t o ta l  te c h n o lo g y  paym ents. N e ve rthe less , a lth o u g h  
th e y  are  sm a ll in  g lo b a l te rm s, th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l fees p a id  by
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d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  are la rg e  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e ir  econom ies, 
and th e y  c o n s t itu te  a s u b s ta n t ia l f ig u re  when com pared w ith  
e x p o rts .
H idden  w ith in  th e  aggregate s ta t is t ic s  d e ta i l in g  the  ra p id  
g ro w th  o f  le g is la t io n  fro m  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , th e re  e x is ts  a w ide  
range  o f  p o lic y  responses to w a rd s  th e  MNC. The a t t i tu d e s  o f  
p a r t ic u la r  c o u n tr ie s  are in e v ita b ly  a r e f le c t io n  o f  th e ir  u n iq u e  
p o l i t ic a l  and c u l tu r a l com plex ions, t h e ir  re sou rce  endowm ents and 
t h e ir  le v e ls  o f  econom ic a c t iv i ty .  C o u n tr ie s  r ic h  in  resou rces , f o r  
exam ple, te n d  to  be more s e le c tiv e  when d e a lin g  w ith  MNCs th a n  do 
th o se  w h ic h  are less w e ll endowed. C o u n tr ie s  w h ic h  have undergone 
s ig n if ic a n t  le v e ls  o f  in d u s t r ia l is a t io n  tend , s im ila r ly ,  to  have 
d i f fe r e n t  a t t i tu d e s  to w a rd s  MNC in v o lv e m e n t in  t h e ir  econom ies th a n  
do c o u n tr ie s  w h ich  have no t.
In  many in s ta n ce s  th e  in c re a s in g  re g u la t io n  o f  MNCs stems fro m  
conce rn  o v e r t h e ir  im pac t on n a t io n a l c u ltu re  ra th e r  th a n  on 
n a t io n a l econom ic w e lfa re . The p e rv a s iv e  in f lu e n c e  o f  MNCs o v e r 
th e  cho ice  o f  p ro d u c ts , consu m p tion  p a tte rn s  and l i fe s ty le s  o f 
in d ig e n o u s  p o p u la tio n s  is  p e rc e iv e d  by many h o s t n a tio n s  to  
c o n s t itu te  an e ro s io n  o f  n a t io n a l id e n t ity .  The h o s t i le  a t t i tu d e s  o f  
many d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  have a lso  been n u r tu re d  by  th e  sense o f  
common purpose  w h ich  these  c o u n tr ie s  have b u i l t  up th ro u g h  
s u p ra n a tio n a l o rg a n is a tio n s , p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  U n ite d  N a tions .
T h is  s o l id a r i ty  f i r s t  began to  exp ress i t s e l f  in  th e  e a r ly  1970s 
when, o v e r s tro n g  p ro te s ts  fro m  th e  deve loped  c o u n tr ie s , a 4 0 -n a tio n  
w o rk in g  g roup  u n d e r th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  C onfe rence  on Trade and 
D eve lopm ent (UNCTAD) fo rm u la te d  a se t o f  p ro p o s a ls  w h ich  so u g h t 
r e d is t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  w o r ld 's  w e a lth . T h e ir  p ro p o s a ls  were 
deve loped  in to  a re s o lu t io n  e n t it le d  "The C h a rte r  o f  Econom ic R ig h ts  
and D u tie s  o f S ta tes", and was adop ted  by th e  G enera l Assem bly in  
1974. 120 n a tio n s  v o te d  f o r  th e  re s o lu t io n ,  te n  a b s ta in e d  and o n ly
s ix  v o te d  a g a in s t ( th e  US, th e  UK, th e  German F e d e ra l R e pub lic , 
Denm ark, Be lg ium  and Luxem bourg).
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Among o th e r  th in g s , th e  re s o lu t io n  recogn ised  th e  r ig h t  o f  h o s t 
n a t io n s  to  ab rog a te  any agreem ents p ro te c t in g  th e  in te re s ts  o f  
fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  w henever such a c tio n  was deemed to  be in  th e ir  
own in te re s ts .  The re s o lu t io n  re f le c ts  th e  search  f o r  a s o -c a lle d  
"new in te rn a t io n a l econom ic o rd e r"  (NIEO), an id e a l w h ich  has 
c o n tin u e d  to  exe rc ise  th e  im a g in a tio n  o f  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , a ided  
by  p u b lic a t io n s  such as th e  B ra n d t C om m ission's r e p o r t  (1980) and 
i t s  sequ e l (1983).
2.3.2 The G row th  o f  T ra n s n a tio n a l B ank ing
The sp read  o f  n o n -e q u ity  a rrangem ents in  th e  la te  S even ties and 
E ig h tie s  was g re a t ly  fa c i l i t a te d  by  th e  g ro w th  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
le n d in g  by  t ra n s n a t io n a l banks (TNBs).^ T h is  e xpa ns io n  o r ig in a te d  
w ith  th e  q u a d ru p lin g  o f  w o r ld  o i l  p r ic e s  in  1973/74. S ince th e n , th e  
m a jo r W estern banks have been th e  c o n d u it  th ro u g h  w h ich  OPEC 
c o u n tr ie s  have ch a n n e lle d  th e ir  la rg e  s u rp lu s e s  in to  th e  w o r ld 's  
f in a n c ia l m arke ts . In  th e  years  im m e d ia te ly  fo l lo w in g  th is  f i r s t  " o i l  
shock " th e  b u lk  o f  these  s u rp lu s  fu n d s  w ere made a v a ila b le  th ro u g h  
th e  m edium o f  th e  E u ro d o lla r  m arke t. The m ost needy re c ip ie n ts  o f  
these  fu n d s  were th e  non-OPEC d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , who w ent 
h e a v ily  in to  deb t in  1973 and have s tayed  th e re  s ince .
U n lik e  th e  deve loped  m a rke t econom ies, th e  non-OPEC LDCs d id  
n o t f in d  i t  so easy to  c o u n te r th e  f i r s t  ro u n d  o f  o i l - p r ic e  inc reases  
by  expa n d in g  t h e ir  e x p o r t  vo lum es and in c re a s in g  th e ir  e x p o r t 
p r ic e s ; th e y  had to  re s o r t  to  th e  in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l m a rke t in  
o rd e r  to  f in a n c e  th e ir  c u r re n t  accou n t d e fe c its . H ow ever n o t a l l  
d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  had equa l success in  se c u rin g  fu n d s  from  th is  
source . The 'm id d le -in co m e ' o i l- im p o r t in g  c o u n tr ie s  (w h ich  com prise  
m a in ly  th e  'n e w ly  in d u s t r ia l is in g  c o u n tr ie s ')  fo u n d  in te rn a t io n a l 
banks m ore w i l l in g  to  f in a n c e  th e ir  paym ent im ba lances th a n  d id  th e  
'lo w -in co m e ' o i l- im p o r te rs .  T h is  la t t e r  g ro u p  had to  r e ly  more on 
loans  fro m  o f f i c ia l  in te r -g o v e rn m e n ta l agencies -  p r in c ip a l ly  th e  
W orld  Bank and th e  In te rn a t io n a l M one ta ry  Fund. The o i l- e x p o r t in g  
c o u n tr ie s , w ith  t h e ir  im p ro ve d  in te rn a t io n a l c re d it  s ta n d in g , 




The to ta l  deb t o f  a l l  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  to  com m erc ia l banks 
g rew  fro m  $43 b i l l io n  in  1973 to  $117 b i l l io n  in  1977 and $331 b i l l io n  
in  1981 [B la ke  (1983, p l8 ) ] .  As o f 1981, more th a n  fo u r  f i f t h s  o f  th e  
d e b t was co n ce n tra te d  in  tw e n ty  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , m ost o f  w h ich  
w ere e ith e r  o i l-e x p o r te rs  o r  'm idd le -in com e ' o i l  im p o rte rs . The 
a n n u a l ra te  o f  TNB le n d in g  to  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  a lso  c o n s id e ra b ly  
exceeded th e  annua l in f lo w  o f FDI to  these c o u n tr ie s  a t th e  
b e g in n in g  o f  th e  1980s.
In  th e  1970s bank  le n d in g  in c rea sed  a t a fa s te r  ra te  th a n  
te c h n o lo g y  tra n s a c tio n s  o r  FDI; th e  la t t e r  a c tu a lly  d e c lin e d  by  one 
p e r  ce n t in  c o n s ta n t te rm s [G irv a n  (1982, p7)]. In  1970-72, e q u ity  
f in a n c in g  am ounted to  31 p e r cen t o f  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s ' agg regate  
b o rro w in g ; by 1978-80 i t  had fa lle n  to  22 p e r cen t [Voss and S to l l 
(1982, p48)]. In  p a ra l le l w ith  th is  d e c lin e  in  th e  r e la t iv e  use o f
e q u ity ,  th e  assets o f  th e  m a jo r banks in c rea sed  d ra m a tic a lly  o v e r 
th e  1970s; as o f  the  e a r ly  1980s, th e  to p  100 TNBs had com bined 
assets o f  $4.4 t r i l l i o n ,  e q u iv a le n t to  h a l f  th e  g lo b a l g ross dom estic  
p ro d u c t [C avanaugh and C la irm o n te  (1983, p l9 ) ] .  T h is  g ro w th  o f 
in te rn a t io n a l le n d in g  had th e  e ffe c t o f  in c re a s in g  th e  o p p o r tu n it ie s  
f o r  p ro v id in g  th e  'c a p ita l' com ponent o f  th e  FDI package 
in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  th e  o th e r  elem ents, th u s  fa c i l i t a t in g  th e  spread  o f 
n o n -e q u ity  in ves tm en t.
T h is  d isp lacem ent o f  FDI by p r iv a te  le n d in g  n o t t ie d  to  th e  
o w n e rs h ip  o f  p ro d u c tio n  fa c i l i t ie s  in  th e  b o rro w in g  c o u n tr ie s  was 
h a ile d  by  G irva n  (1982, p34) as ''one o f  th e  m ost im p o r ta n t 
deve lopm en ts  in  th e  1970's re la te d  to  th e  ro le  o f  t ra n s n a t io n a l 
c o rp o ra t io n s  in  th e  w o r ld  economy." He a rgued  th a t  i t  had a lte re d  
th e  e s ta b lis h e d  s t ru c tu re  o f pow er re la t io n s h ip s  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
economy, e ro d in g  th e  dom inan t p o s it io n  o f  MNCs. S ince many 
d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  were now more dependent on b an k  f in a n c in g  
th a n  on fo re ig n  e q u ity , G irva n  a rgued  th a t  th e  lo c a t io n  o f d e c is io n ­
m ak ing  had e f fe c t iv e ly  s h if te d  fro m  MNCs to  TNBs.
T h is  s h i f t  was n o t to  be perm anen t, how ever. The in te rn a t io n a l 
econom ic c lim a te  p re v a il in g  in  th e  e a r ly  1980s, c h a ra c te r is e d  by  
s lo w in g  in f la t io n  and w o rld w id e  recess io n , e f fe c t iv e ly  se rved  to
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erode th e  a b i l i t y  o f  d e ve lo p in g  n a tio n s  to  s e rv ice  t h e ir  huge d eb t 
b u rd e n , amassed in  th e  1970s on the  assum ption  th a t  in f la t io n  w o u ld  
erode i t s  re a l v a lu e  as g ro w th  genera ted  the  revenues to  pay i t  o f f .  
As a num ber o f  advanced d e ve lo p in g  n a tio n s  (n o ta b ly  A rg e n tin a , 
B ra z il and M exico) were fo rc e d  to  have th e ir  deb ts  resched u led , a 
new p h rase  was co ined  by com m enta tors to  d esc rib e  th e  s itu a t io n :  
th e  "d e b t c r is is " .
A la rm ed  by th e  g ro w in g  num ber o f deb t re s c h e d u lin g s , TNBs 
su b s e q u e n tly  e xe rc ise d  more c a u tio n  in  e x te n d in g  new loans  and 
th e re  has been a gen e ra l s low dow n in  in te rn a t io n a l le n d in g  by  TNBs 
s ince  1982. In  these  c ircum stances e q u ity  f in a n c in g  grew  in  
r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  once aga in  in  th e  1980s, re v e rs in g  th e  tre n d  o f  
th e  1970s, as d e ve lo p in g  n a tio n s  so u g h t a lte rn a t iv e  avenues o f  
fin a n c e .
The re p o r te d  response o f  MNCs to  th e  h a rs h e r c o n d it io n s  fa c in g  
th e ir  s u b s id ia r ie s  in  LDCs suggests th a t  e q u ity  w i l l  in deed  p la y  a 
more p ro m in e n t ro le  in  th e  1990s. Some MNCs have s tepped  up th e ir  
e x is t in g  sh a re h o ld in g s  in  jo in t  v e n tu re s  in  LDCs by c o n v e r t in g  th e ir  
s u b s id ia r ie s ' d eb t to  e q u ity , th e re b y  overcom ing  tw o  o f  th e  m a jo r 
ob s ta c le s  w h ich  th e  d eb t c r is is  has th ro w n  up: exchange c o n tro ls
and c u rre n c y  shortages . The sh o rta g e  o f  c u rre n c y  is  so severe in  
some d e v e lo p in g  n a tio n s  th a t  some MNCs have re s o r te d  to  b a r te r  in  
o rd e r  to  s e l l p ro d u c ts  and m a in ta in  m a rke t share. F o r exam ple in  
th e  e a r ly  1980s th e  West German m u lt in a t io n a l V o lksw agen was 
re p o r te d  to  have ta k e n  paym ent in  co ffe e  fo r  lo c a l c a r sa les in  
M exico and th e n  so ld  th e  co ffe e  in  West Germany to  o b ta in  
D eu tschem arks .0
The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  e q u ity  f in a n c in g  p la y in g  a r e la t iv e ly  more 
im p o r ta n t ro le  in  LDCs was d e scrib ed  by the  B ra n d t Com m ission 's 
(1983) re p o r t  as a p o te n t ia l ly  "d e s ira b le "  deve lopm en t (p82). I f  FDI 
f lo w s  do become r e la t iv e ly  more im p o r ta n t in  response  to  w o r ld  
econom ic c o n d it io n s , th e n  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  d e v e lo p in g  n a tio n s  to  
p a r t ic ip a te  in  n o n -e q u ity  a rrangem ents  may be d im in is h e d , f o r  th e y  
w i l l  have  to  f in d  a lte rn a t iv e  sources o f  fu n d in g  to  enab le  them  to  
pu rchase  s e p a ra te ly  th e  n o n - f in a n c ia l com ponents o f  th e  FDI
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package, ie  te ch n o lo g y  and m anageria l e xp e rtise .
2.3.3 D iv e rs if ic a t io n  o f  th e  C o u n try  o f  O r ig in  o f  MNCs
A m a jo r fe a tu re  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness e n v iro n m e n t in  th e  
1970s was th e  re la t iv e  d e c lin e  o f th e  US, and to  a le s s e r e x te n t o f  
th e  UK, as sources o f FDI. T h e ir  dom inan t p o s it io n s  were e roded 
by th e  ra p id  in te rn a t io n a l expans ion  o f Japanese and c o n t in e n ta l -  
E u ropean f irm s . T h is  geog raph ic  d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  o f  h o s t c o u n try  
o r ig in  has im p o r ta n t im p lic a t io n s  f o r  the  m o d a lity  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
re so u rce  tra n s fe r ,  f o r  many o f  th e  new MNCs have show n a g re a te r  
w ill in g n e s s  to  con tem p la te  n o n -e q u ity  in v e s tm e n t and jo in t  v e n tu re s  
th a n  have  th e  e s ta b lis h e d  MNCs. Japanese f irm s , f o r  exam ple, have 
t r a d i t io n a l ly  been more in c lin e d  to  accept m in o r ity  o w n e rsh ip  in  
overseas v e n tu re s , e s p e c ia lly  in  LDCs.
A lth o u g h  th e  b u lk  o f  FDI is  s t i l l  accoun ted  f o r  by  a sm a ll 
num ber o f  c o u n tr ie s , many new c o u n tr ie s  have emerged as sources o f  
FDI, in c lu d in g  a few  o i l  e x p o rt in g  c o u n tr ie s  such as Saudi A ra b ia , 
L ib y a  and K u w a it. M ost FDI fro m  these  la t t e r  n a tio n s  has tended  to  
f lo w  in to  W estern Europe and th e  U n ite d  S ta tes, and has m ost o fte n  
ta k e n  th e  fo rm  o f  m in o r ity  e q u ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  e x is t in g  f irm s  o r  
th e  a c q u is it io n  o f  com m ercia l p ro p e rty . F a r more s ig n if ic a n t  has 
been th e  e n trance  in to  the  in te rn a t io n a l in v e s tm e n t scene o f  f irm s  
fro m  LDCs. A lth o u g h  s t i l l  o f  m in o r im p o rta n ce  in  te rm s o f  th e  
w o r ld 's  s to c k  o f  FDI, s o -c a lle d  "T h ird  W orld  m u lt in a t io n a ls "  (based 
p re d o m in a n tly  in  new ly  in d u s t r ia l is in g  c o u n tr ie s )  have g row n a t a 
ra p id  pace. F o r ty  o f  th e  500 la rg e s t com panies o u ts id e  th e  US in  
F o rtu n e 's  1982 l i s t  had th e ir  h e a d q u a rte rs  in  LDCs, com pared w ith  
o n ly  s ix te e n  in  1975.
As a consequence o f  th e  g ro w in g  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  f irm s  
fro m  LDCs, MNCs based in  deve loped  c o u n tr ie s  can expec t to  face  
g ro w in g  le v e ls  o f  c o m p e tit io n , p a r t ic u la r ly  in  LDC m arke ts . The 
g ro w in g  num ber o f  new m u lt in a t io n a l e n tra n ts  fro m  LDCs w i l l  a lso  
serve  to  in c rea se  th e  p o te n t ia l f o r  c o m p e tit io n  in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
m a rke t p lace . As a re s u lt ,  LDCs are l ik e ly  to  f in d  th e  ba lance o f  
b a rg a in in g  pow er sw in g in g  to w a rd s  them , th u s  in c re a s in g  th e ir
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a b i l i t y  to  demand th a t  MNCs from  th e  deve loped c o u n tr ie s  t ra n s fe r  
t h e ir  re so u rce s  s e p a ra te ly , ra th e r  th a n  as a package.
2.3.4 Changes in  th e  T e ch n o lo g ica l E n v ironm en t
The 1970s and 1980s have w itnessed  a num ber o f  m a jo r changes in  
th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l env iro nm en t. These have in c re a se d  th e  r is k s  
a sso c ia te d  w ith  te c h n o lo g y  p ro d u c tio n , w h ich  has in  tu r n  in c re a se d  
th e  a ttra c t iv e n e s s  o f  n o n -e q u ity  bus iness v e n tu re s .
A  num ber o f  in d u s tr ie s  have been c h a ra c te r is e d  by  ra p id  
te c h n o lo g ic a l change; sem iconducto rs  and com pute rs are  o b v io u s  
exam ples. E sc a la tin g  R&D costs  in  such in d u s tr ie s  have been 
e xa ce rb a te d  by  s h r in k in g  p ro d u c t l i f e  cycles, re d u c in g  th e  tim e  o v e r 
w h ic h  these  costs  can be am ortized. The c ro s s - lic e n s in g  o f 
te c h n o lo g y  is  one response to  th is  s itu a t io n  as i t  enab les com panies 
to  g a in  access to  em erging te ch n o lo g ie s  and to  th e  t e r r i t o r ia l  r ig h ts  
w h ic h  accom pany them  [C o n tra c to r  and Lorange (1988, p l3 ) ] .
The more ra p id  pace o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l change has been 
accom panied by an in c rea se  in  the  num ber o f  te c h n o lo g y  s u p p lie rs  
and a co rre s p o n d in g  in c rea se  in  th e  le v e l o f  c o m p e tit io n . An 
in d ic a to r  o f  th is  g lo b a l tre n d  is  th e  d e c lin in g  US share  o f  w o r ld  
p a te n ts  and th e  in c rea sed  num ber o f  fo re ig n  (p a r t ic u la r ly  Japanese) 
com panies f i l i n g  p a te n ts  in  th e  US. In  1987, f o r  exam ple, Japanese 
com panies occup ied  th e  to p  th re e  p laces f o r  th e  num ber o f  new 
p a te n ts  issu e d  in  th e  US.^ The in c rea sed  c o m p e tit io n  in  th e  s u p p ly  
o f  te c h n o lo g y  and th e  much h ig h e r  r is k  o f  fa i lu r e  has made i t  more 
a p p e a lin g  f o r  com panies to  co -o p e ra te  th ro u g h  c ro s s - lic e n s in g  
agreem ents, jo in t  v e n tu re s  o r  o th e r  fo rm s o f  c o lla b o ra t iv e  v e n tu re s .
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2.4 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MNC RE-ASSESSED
The a p p a re n t emergence o f  a w o rld w id e  tre n d  away fro m  FDI as a 
m ethod o f  s e rv ic in g  fo re ig n  m arke ts  tow a rds  v a r io u s  n o n -e q u ity  
modes o f  in v o lv e m e n t has prom pted  a re c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  ro le  
th a t  has t r a d i t io n a l ly  been assigned to  MNCs. The co n ce p tio n  o f  th e  
MNC as e x c lu s iv e ly  a tra n s p o r te r  o f  f in a n c ia l c a p ita l,  te c h n o lo g y  
and m anage ria l e x p e rt is e  in  a s in g le  package is  no lo n g e r 
a p p ro p r ia te ,  s ince  MNCs a lso  p ro v id e  te c h n o lo g ic a l o r  m anag e ria l 
s k i l ls  w ith o u t  any e q u ity  in vo lve m en t.
I t  is  im p o rta n t, th e re fo re , th a t  th e  ro le  o f  MNCs as p ro v id o rs  
o f  re so u rce s  on a n o n -e q u ity  bas is  is  recogn ised  in  d e f in it io n s  o f 
th e  MNC. The m ost commonly used d e f in it io n  o f  th e  MNC fa i ls  to  
ta k e  accou n t o f  th is  ro le . The UN's G roup o f  E m inent Persons, f o r  
exam ple, d e fin e d  MNCs as:
"E n te rp r is e s  w h ic h  own o r  c o n tro l p ro d u c tio n  o r  
s e rv ic e  fa c i l i t ie s  o u ts id e  th e  c o u n try  in  w h ic h  
th e y  are  based."
The need to  p ro v id e  a new d e f in it io n  o f th e  MNC th a t  ta ke s  
a cco u n t o f  th e  g ro w in g  ro le  o f  n o n -e q u ity  in v e s tm e n t was 
acknow ledged  by C o n tra c to r  and Lorange (1988). They a rgued  th a t  
th e  t r a d i t io n a l  "s te re o ty p e " o f  th e  MNC as a "m o n o lith ic  e n t ity ,  
c o n t ro l l in g  o r  ow n ing  i t s  in p u ts  and o u tp u ts , and expand ing  a lone  
in to  fo re ig n  m a rke ts " was o u td a te d  and th a t  th e  MNC sh o u ld  be 
v ie w e d  in s te a d  as a " c o a lit io n  o f  in te r lo c k e d , q u a s i-a rm 's - le n g th  
re la t io n s h ip s "  (Op c it ,  pp 4-5).
T h is  need to  p ro v id e  a more u p - to -d a te  d e f in i t io n  o f  th e  MNC 
was a lso  acknow ledged in  an e a r l ie r  paper by B ille rb e c k  and Y a sug i 
(1979). In  t h e ir  re v ie w  o f the  chang ing  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  FDI in  
d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s , th e  a u th o rs  s ta te d  th a t  " t r a d it io n a l 
d e f in it io n s  based on e q u ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n  now te n d  to  u n d e re s tim a te  
a c tu a l fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t a c t iv i t y  in  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s . I f  th e  
tre n d s  c o n tin u e , fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t s ta t is t ic a l se rie s  based on 
e q u ity  d e f in it io n s  w i l l  no lo n g e r r e f le c t  th e  econom ic r e a l i t ie s  o f 
fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t f lo w s  un less th e y  are  com bined w ith  f in a n c ia l
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f lo w s  and in fo rm a tio n  abo u t th e  new types o f  a rrangem ents" (1979,
PP 7-8).
The fo llo w in g  fo u r  m o d if ic a tio n s  were suggested by  B il le rb e c k  
and Y asug i:
( i)  The p r in c ip a l c r i te r io n  o f  t r a d it io n a l FDI, e q u ity  
p a r t ic ip a t io n ,  sh o u ld  be m a in ta ined  as a p re c o n d it io n , b u t  
w ith  a lo w e r l im it .
( i i )  The second c r ite r io n ,  an e ffe c t iv e  vo ice  in  th e  management o f  
an e n te rp r is e , s h o u ld  be ex tended to  a llo w  f o r  th e  a tta in m e n t 
o f  th is  in f lu e n c e  n o t o n ly  th ro u g h  e q u ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n ,  b u t  
a lso  th ro u g h  c o n tra c tu a l arrangem ents.
( i i i )  Loans and s u p p lie r  c re d its  from  o th e r  fo re ig n  p a r t ie s  s h o u ld  
be rega rded  as fo re ig n  in ve s tm e n t because th e y  are  u s u a lly  
in duced , and o fte n  guaran teed , by e q u ity  in v e s to rs .
( iv )  O th e r fo rm s o f  c o -o p e ra tio n  between f irm s  in  h o s t and home 
c o u n tr ie s  s h o u ld  be ta ke n  in to  accoun t i f  th e y  e s ta b lis h  a 
la s t in g  in te re s t  th ro u g h  te c h n ic a l ass is tance  agreem ents o r  
lo n g - te rm  s u p p ly  c o n tra c ts .
W ith  these  a lte ra t io n s ,  th e  a u th o rs  argue th a t  FDI co u ld  th e n  
be lo o s e ly  d e fin e d  as fo llo w s :
"A  fo rm  o f  in te n s iv e  c o o p e ra tio n  be tw een 
e n te rp r is e s  in  home and h o s t c o u n tr ie s  w h ic h  
in v o lv e  e q u ity  and management p a r t ic ip a t io n ."
Such a d e f in i t io n  w o u ld  a p p ly  re g a rd le ss  o f  w h e th e r th e re  was 
o n ly  one fo re ig n  p a r ty  (the  p a re n t) in v o lv e d , o r  a m u lt ip a r t i te  jo in t  
v e n tu re  w ith  v a r io u s  fo re ig n  p a r t ie s  p ro v id in g  d i f fe r e n t  f in a n c ia l o r  
n o n - f in a n c ia l e lem ents o f  a 'package'. A lth o u g h  B ille rb e c k  and 
Y a su g i's  r e - d e f in i t io n  o f  FDI, and th e re fo re  o f  th e  fu n c t io n s  o f 
MNCs, a c c u ra te ly  re f le c ts  th e  g re a te r  v a r ie ty  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  tra n s a c tio n s  w h ic h  now ta k e  p lace, a s im p le r (and no less 
a ccu ra te ) r e -d e f in i t io n  o f  c o rp o ra te  m u lt in a t io n a l i ty  can be ach ieved
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i f  o n ly  a s l ig h t  a lte ra t io n  is  made to  th e  w o rd in g  o f  th e  w id e ly -  
used UN d e f in i t io n  quo ted  e a r lie r .  S u b s titu t in g  th e  ph rase  "incom e- 
g e n e ra tin g  assets" f o r  the  ph rase  "p ro d u c tio n  o r  s e rv ic e  f a c i l i t ie s "  
in  th is  d e f in i t io n  takes  accoun t o f  th e  v a r io u s  types  o f  tra n s a c tio n  
now u n d e rta k e n  by MNCs; th e  te rm  " in com e -g ene ra ting  assets" can 
r e fe r  to  c a p ita l,  te c h n o lo g y  and management s k i l ls  in  e ith e r  t h e ir  
'u n b u n d le d ' fo rm  o r  in  some 'b u n d le d ' fo rm a t.
A m ore a p p ro p r ia te  d e f in it io n  o f the  MNC w o u ld  th u s  read  as 
fo llo w s :
"E n te rp r is e s  w h ich  own o r  c o n tro l incom e- 
g e n e ra tin g  assets o u ts id e  th e  c o u n try  in  w h ic h  
th e y  axe based."
T h is  d e f in i t io n  recogn ises th e  fa c t  th a t  MNCs may o b ta in  
revenu e  by  t ra n s fe r r in g  abroad  in com e -g ene ra ting  assets in  the  fo rm  
o f  in d iv id u a l fa c to r  in p u ts , o r  in  some com b in a tion  th a t  does n o t 
e n ta i l  100 p e r cen t e q u ity  in vo lve m e n t. The essence o f  th is  
t ra n s fo rm a tio n  was c o n c ise ly  sum m arised by G a b rie l (1977) as 
fo llo w s :
"The bas ic  fu n c t io n  o f  th e  MNC is  s h if t in g  fro m  
th e  m o b ilis a t io n  o f  c a p ita l,  in  w h ich  th e  
com pany's re w a rd  is  an e n tre p re n e u r ia l one f o r  
r is k s  ta k e n , to  th e  sa le  o f  i t s  c o rp o ra te  a b i l i t ie s ,  
in  w h ic h  i t s  re w a rd  is  a m anageria l one f o r  





1. H ow ever, acco rd in g  to  M ichae l Jensen (1989) th e  days o f  th e
p u b lic  company are  num bered in  many se c to rs  o f  th e  US
economy. T h is  p re d ic t io n  is  based upon th e  changes in  th e  
o w n e rsh ip  s t ru c tu re  o f companies fo llo w in g  th e  ju n k -b o n d  
fin a n c e d  LBO boom in  the  US in  th e  la te  1980s. H owever, th e
sh a rp  d o w n tu rn  in  LBO a c t iv i t y  in  1989 and 1990 suggests th a t
th is  p ro g n o s is  is  p rem atu re .
2. OECD, 1981, p33.
3. G a b rie l, 1977, p28.
4. D e fin e d  in  th e  w id e s t sense to  embrace th e  s k i l ls  and
re so u rce s  needed to  c rea te  and s u s ta in  an e f f ic ie n t ,  c o m p e tit iv e  
bus iness . See U n ite d  N a tions (1978, p69).
5. The ph rase  has been co ined  by th e  U n ite d  N a tions  C en tre  on 
T ra n s n a tio n a l C o rp o ra tio n s .
6. B usiness Week, J u ly  25 1983, pp 52-54.
7. E conom ist, O c tobe r 8 1988, p83.
8. B i l le rb e c k  and Y asug i, 1979, p8.
9. G a b rie l, 1977, p28.
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CHAPTER THREE -  FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
T h is  c h a p te r  describes  th e  m ain fe a tu re s  o f  each o f  th e  p o s s ib le
fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness in  w h ich  com panies can become
in v o lv e d . L ic e n s in g  is  ana lysed in  more d e ta i l th a n  th e  o th e r
m ethods s ince  i t  fo rm s th e  c e n tra l focus  o f th e  th e s is .
I t  is  p o s s ib le  to  c la s s ify  fo rm s o f in te rn a t io n a l bus iness
a c t iv i t y  in to  e ig h t b road  ca tego ries :
TABLE 3-1 
FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
(1) F o re ig n  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t
(2) J o in t  v e n tu re s  and c o n s o rt ia
(3) F ranch ise  agreem ents
(4) L ic e n s in g  agreem ents
(5) Management c o n tra c ts
(6) T u rn k e y  Agreem ents
(7) S u b c o n tra c tin g
(8) E x p o rt in g
[SOURCE: A u th o r ]
A lth o u g h  each o f  these  fo rm s is  p resen ted  as a d is c re te  
a l te rn a t iv e  to  each o f  th e  o th e rs , any g ive n  p ro je c t  o r  e n te rp r is e  
may s im u lta n e o u s ly  in v o lv e  tw o  o r  more o f  them. T u rn k e y  c o n tra c ts , 
f o r  exam ple, a re  more o fte n  th a n  n o t accom panied by  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents.
A new te rm  has emerged in  th e  l i te r a tu r e  in  th e  1980s to  
d e sc rib e  fo rm s o f in te rn a t io n a l bus iness w h ich  in v o lv e  some fo rm  o f 
c o lla b o ra t io n  betw een tw o  o r  more com panies: 's t ra te g ic  a llia n c e s '. 
A v a r ie ty  o f  o th e r  te rm s are a lso  used to  de sc rib e  th e  same types  o f 
c o lla b o ra t iv e  v e n tu re s : te rm s such as 'c o o p e ra tiv e  a rrangem ents ,
'c o a li t io n s ' and 's t ra te g ic  p a r tn e rs h ip s ' are com m only em ployed. F o r 




The te rm  does n o t describe  a new fo rm  o f bus iness w h ich  has 
em erged in  th e  1980s; ra th e r , i t  is  s im p ly  a ge n e ra l te rm  w h ic h  
encompasses a l l  fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l business w h ich  f a l l  betw een 
FDI and e x p o rt in g  in  Tab le  3-1, ie  ca tegories  (2) to  (7) in c lu s iv e . 
Thus, s tra te g ic  a llia n c e s  may be regarded  as com b in ing  n o n -e q u ity  
fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l business, ca tego ries  (3) to  (7) in c lu s iv e , w ith  
e q u ity  jo in t  v e n tu re s  and co n s o rtia , ca tego ry  (2).
H ow ever, th e  te rm  s tra te g ic  a llia n ce s  is  a lso used to  d e sc rib e  
a d d it io n a l n o n -e q u ity  agreem ents o ve r and above those  in d ic a te d  in  
Tab le  3-1, e s p e c ia lly  agreements w h ich  are n o t re la te d  to  th e  
s e rv ic in g  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  m arke t. F o r example, agreem ents be tw een 
tw o  com panies f o r  th e  lo n g -te rm  s u p p ly  o f  raw  m a te ria ls , o r  
agreem ents p ro v id in g  f o r  th e  p o o lin g  o f  R&D (v e ry  common among 
c o m p u te r com panies) are  b o th  regarded  as s tra te g ic  a llia n c e s .
The to p ic  o f  s tra te g ic  a llia n ce s  is  d e a lt w ith  in  more d e ta i l in  
S e c tio n  3.6, and th e  c h a p te r concludes by o u t l in in g  p o s s ib le  
fra m e w o rk s  w h ic h  may be used to  c la s s ify  a l l  o f  th e  fo rm s  o f  
in te r n a t io n a l bus iness  l is te d  in  Tab le 3-1.
3.2 EQUITY INVESTMENT
3.2.1 F o re ig n  D ire c t In ve s tm e n t
FDI in v o lv e s  a t ra n s fe r  o f  c a p ita l th a t  crea tes, adds to , o r  a cq u ire s  
a c o n t r o l l in g  in te re s t  in  a fo re ig n  e n te rp r is e . C o n tro l is  th e  key  
fe a tu re  w h ic h  d is t in g u is h e s  th is  fo rm  o f  in ve s tm e n t fro m  fo re ig n  
p o r t fo l io  in ve s tm e n t. T h is  c o n tro l is  u s u a lly  accom panied b y  th e  
t r a n s fe r  o f  resou rces  o th e r  th a n  s im p ly  f in a n c e  c a p ita l,  ie  
management, te c h n o lo g y  etc.
The m ost c le a r -c u t  exam ple o f FDI occurs when a com pany 
c o n s tru c ts  a new fa c to ry  overseas (g re e n fie ld  in ve s tm e n t). FDI may 
a lso  o c cu r v ia  th e  ta k e -o v e r  o f  e x is t in g  fo re ig n  com panies o r
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dom estic  com panies w ith  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s .
3.2.2 J o in t  V e n tu re s  and C o n s o rtia
J o in t  v e n tu re s  e x is t  when com panies are owned by more th a n  one 
o rg a n iz a tio n , and are u s u a lly  re fe rre d  to  as c o n s o rt ia  when more 
th a n  tw o  o rg a n iz a tio n s  p a r t ic ip a te . O rgan iza tions  may in c lu d e  b o th  
com panies and governm ents. The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  shares in  a 
jo in t  v e n tu re  may be de te rm ined  acco rd ing  to  each p a r tn e r 's  
f in a n c ia l c o n tr ib u t io n ,  o r  i t  may be based on o th e r  fo rm s  o f  
c o n t r ib u t io n  such as th e  p ro v is io n  o f tech n o lo g y  and management.
The e s s e n tia l fe a tu re  o f a jo in t  v e n tu re  is  th a t  no 
one p a r t ic ip a n t  h o ld s  a s u f f ic ie n t  sh a re h o ld in g  to  e xe rc ise  e f fe c t iv e  
m a n a g e ria l c o n tro l.  I f  th is  la t t e r  case does a rise , th e n  th e  v e n tu re  
ta k e s  on many o f th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  an in depe nden t o p e ra tio n  
f o r  th e  dom inan t p a r tn e r , and becomes la rg e ly  a p o r t fo l io  in v e s tm e n t 
f o r  th e  o th e r  p a rtn e r(s ).
A p a r t ic u la r  fo rm  o f  jo in t  v e n tu re  is  the  'fa d e -o u t ' agreem ent. 
T h is  g e n e ra lly  in v o lv e s  an in i t i a l  e q u ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n  by th e  fo re ig n  
in v e s to r  o f  more th a n  f i f t y  p e r cen t fo llo w e d  by a g ra d u a l 
t ra n s fe r re n c e  o f  ow ne rsh ip  to  one o r  more lo c a l p a r t ie s . Once th e  
fa d e -o u t  process has been com pleted, the  fo re ig n  in v e s to r  may 
re ta in  m in o r ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o r  no e q u ity  w ha tsoever. Even in  th is  
la t t e r  case, how ever, th e  fo re ig n  in v e s to r  may re ta in  a d ire c t  
in te re s t  in  o r  even c o n tro l o v e r c e r ta in  aspects o f  th e  bus iness , eg 
in te rn a t io n a l m a rke tin g .
3.3 LICENSING AGREEMENTS
3.3.1 In tro d u c t io n
A s u rv e y  o f  th e  l i te r a tu r e  on lic e n s in g  re ve a ls  th a t  th e re  is  no 
com m only accepted d e f in i t io n  o f th e  term . T h is  a m b ig u ity  is  due, in  
p a r t ,  to  th e  fa c t  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  o fte n  p a r t  o f  a la rg e r  c o n tra c tu a l 
package. D iscuss ion  o f  th e  p ros  and cons o f  v a r io u s  d e f in it io n s  o f
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l ic e n s in g  can be fo u n d  in  C o n tra c to r  (1985) and B u ck ley  (1985).
Perhaps th e  m ost bas ic  d e f in it io n  o f lic e n s in g  is  th a t  i t  
re p re s e n ts  a covenan t n o t to  sue."^ Th is  le g a l co n ce p tio n  o f  
lic e n s in g  d e r iv e s  fro m  th e  fa c t  th a t  i t  u s u a lly  in v o lv e s  a com pany 
g ra n t in g  a n o th e r pe rm iss io n  to  use i t s  le g a lly -p ro te c te d  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty ,  such as p a te n ts  o r  tradem arks. However, lic e n s in g  
agreem ents may a lso  g ra n t pe rm iss ion  fo r  the  use o f  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  th a t  has no s ta tu to ry  p ro te c tio n , ie  know -how . In  a d d it io n , 
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents o fte n  in v o lv e  the  t ra n s fe r  o f  re la te d  m a rk e tin g  
and m anagement se rv ice s . These se rv ices  are u s u a lly  t ra n s fe r re d  v ia  
th e  s u p p ly  o f  pe rso n n e l to  th e  licensee , o fte n  w ith  th e  in te n t io n  o f  
t r a in in g  th e  lice n se e 's  pe rsonne l.
I f  re la te d  m a rk e tin g  and management se rv ices  are  in c lu d e d  
w i th in  th e  d e f in it io n  o f  know -how , then  lic e n s in g  may be d e fin e d  as 
fo llo w s :
"a  c o n tra c tu a l agreem ent w hereby a company 
p ro v id e s  a n o th e r w ith  th e  r ig h t  to  use i t s  
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  in  re tu rn  f o r  some fo rm  o f  
re m u n e ra tio n ."
T h is  d e f in i t io n  o f  lic e n s in g  is  w id e r th a n  some d e f in it io n s .  F o r 
exam ple, Business In te rn a t io n a l (1977) id e n t if ie s  lic e n s in g  w ith  o n ly  
a su b se t o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty . However i t  is  a lso  n a rro w e r th a n  
some o th e r  d e f in it io n s .  F o r exam ple, Rugman e t a l (1985) v ie w  
l ic e n s in g  as a more g e n e ra l te rm  co ve rin g  a num ber o f  n o n -e q u ity  
modes o f  bus iness.^
In  lic e n s in g  te rm in o lo g y , th e  company p ro v id in g  th e  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  is  know n as th e  lic e n s o r, and the  company o b ta in in g  th e  
r ig h t  to  u t i l is e  th a t  p ro p e r ty  is  re fe r re d  to  as th e  licensee . When 
a com pany acts  as a lic e n s o r  i t  is  engaging in  th e  bus iness o f  
'l ic e n s in g -o u t ' o r  'o u tw a rd  lic e n s in g '.  C onverse ly , when i t  acts  as a 
lice n se e  i t  is  in v o lv e d  in  'l ic e n s in g - in ' o r  'in w a rd  lic e n s in g  .
The re m u n e ra tio n  re ce ive d  in  lic e n s in g  agreem ents may ta k e  a 
num ber o f  fo rm s: an in i t i a l  lum p-sum  fee, a percen tage  o f sa les, a 
s h a re h o ld in g  in  th e  license e  (and hence a share o f  p ro f its ) ,  goods
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b o u g h t fro m  the  licensee  a t a d isco u n t, o r  re c ip ro c a l access to  th e  
lic e n s e e 's  techno logy .
A ke y  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents is  th a t  th e  
o w n e rs h ip  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  rem ains w ith  th e  lic e n s o r. The
lice n se e  is  o n ly  g ive n  c a re fu lly  d e fin e d  r ig h ts  o f  access to  and use 
o f  th e  lic e n s o r 's  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty . The use o f th e  te rm  
"te c h n o lo g y  sa le ", w h ich  is  sometimes used to  d esc rib e  lic e n s in g , is  
th e re fo re  m is lead ing . As Oman (1985, p l5 ) p o in ts  o u t, a sa le im p lie s  
th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts  fro m  th e  s e lle r  to  th e  buye r. In  a 
lic e n s in g  agreem ent, these  r ig h ts  are  re ta in e d  by th e  lic e n s o r.
A s im ila r  p o in t  was made by D unn ing  (1982, plO) in  th e  m ore 
g e n e ra l c o n te x t o f  te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r .  He que s tio n e d  th e
s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  w o rd  t ra n s fe r  in  the  te rm  'te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r ',  
on th e  g roun ds  th a t  d ic t io n a ry  d e f in it io n s  o f the  w o rd  suggest th a t  
th e  t r a n s fe ro r  loses w h a t is  be ing  tra n s fe r re d . D unn ing  suggests  
th a t  th e  w o rd  't ra n s m it ' is  more a p p ro p ria te  as i t  focuses on th e  
com m u n ica tion  aspect o f  th e  a c q u is it io n  process.
G iven  th e  above d e f in i t io n  o f  lic e n s in g , any c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  
th e  range  o f  p o s s ib le  lic e n s in g  agreem ents m ust n e c e s s a rily  in v o lv e  
a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  types  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  w h ich  com panies 
m ig h t possess.
TABLE 3-2 
TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
. P a ten ts  
. K now -how  
. T radem arks 
. C o p y rig h t 
. R e g is te re d  Designs
[SOURCE: A u th o r ]
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The types  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  w h ich  are  am enable to  
lic e n s in g  are l is te d  in  Tab le  3-2. Each o f them  w i l l  now be 
c o n s id e re d  in  tu rn .
3.3.2 P a te n ts
A p a te n t is  a docum ent issued  by a governm ent w h ich  g ive s
s ta tu to r y  p ro te c t io n  f o r  a l im ite d  p e r io d  to  a te c h n ic a l concept. To 
secure  a p a te n t in  m ost c o u n tr ie s , a te c h n ic a l concep t m ust pass
th re e  te s ts :^
1) i t  m ust be p a te n ta b le ;
2) i t  m ust be new;
3) i t  m ust be in v e n t iv e  in  re la t io n  to  w ha t is  a lre a d y  know n.
To pass th e  f i r s t  o f  these te s ts , i t  m ust be dem ons tra ted  th a t  a 
te c h n ic a l concep t is  capable  o f in d u s t r ia l  e x p lo ita t io n .  To pass th e  
second te s t,  th e  concep t m ust n o t have been d isc lo se d  anyw here  in  
th e  w o r ld  p r io r  to  th e  a p p lic a tio n  f o r  a p a te n t. T h is  te s t  has 
become o f  in c re a s in g  im po rtance  in  v ie w  o f th e  tendency  f o r  
conce p ts  to  be su b je c te d  to  " te s t sa les" to  de te rm ine  i f  th e re  is  a 
m a rk e t f o r  them  [B a i l l ie  (1984, p73)j. In  many c o u n tr ie s , th is  
c o n s t itu te s  p r io r  d is c lo s u re  and w o u ld  p re v e n t th e  concep t fro m  
o b ta in in g  a p a te n t. The t h i r d  te s t  in v o lv e s  d e te rm in in g  w h e th e r o r  
n o t a concep t re p re se n ts  a s ig n if ic a n t  deve lopm ent o v e r th e  e x is t in g  
s ta te  o f  know ledge.
A ny d is p u te s  w h ich  a rise  in  th e  g ra n tin g  o f p a te n ts  are s e t t le d  
in  th e  la w  c o u rts . Each c o u n try  th e re fo re  possesses a body o f  case 
la w  a r is in g  fro m  these  d isp u te s . Those in v o lv e d  in  th e  f i l i n g  o f  
p a te n t a p p lic a tio n s  can c o n s u lt th is  case law  to  assess t h e ir  
chances o f  success i f  th e re  is  a l ik e l ih o o d  o f a d is p u te  a r is in g .
A lth o u g h  many seem ing ly  w o rth le s s  in v e n tio n s  ach ieve  p a te n te d  
s ta tu s  e ve ry  year, th e re  are some s ig n if ic a n t  areas o f know ledge  
w h ic h  have fa ile d  to  become p a te n te d  in  many c o u n tr ie s . Perhaps 
th e  tw o  m ost w e ll-k n o w n  are com pu te r s o ftw a re  and th e  m ic ro ­
o rgan ism s p roduced  by g e n e tic  e n g ine e ring . D evelopm ent o f an area 
o f  te c h n o lo g y  w h ich  is  in h e re n t ly  u n p a te n ta b le  can have im p o r ta n t
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consequences fo r  th e  mode o f bus iness em ployed to  e x p lo it  th a t  
te c h n o lo g y  s ince  p a te n ts  are a fte n  th e  "peg" on w h ich  many 
lic e n s in g  agreem ents are hung [Low e and C ra w fo rd  (1984, p9)].
The le g a l p ro te c t io n  a ffo rd e d  by a p a te n t la s ts  f o r  a l im ite d  
p e r io d  o f  tim e. In  m ost European c o u n tr ie s , in c lu d in g  th e  UK, th e  
tim e  span is  20 years ( in  th e  US i t  is  17 years). P a ten ts  are g ra n te d  
by  in d iv id u a l c o u n tr ie s . To ensure  adequate p a te n t p ro te c t io n  on an 
in te r n a t io n a l bas is , com panies m ust f i le  p a te n t a p p lic a tio n s  in  each 
c o u n try  w here  th e y  w ish  t h e ir  p a te n ts  to  ope ra te . T h is  ta s k  has 
been made e a s ie r by  th e  e x is ten ce  o f a num ber o f  in te rn a t io n a l
c o n v e n tio n s  and t re a t ie s  w h ich  have fo s te re d  in te rn a t io n a l
agreem ent and c o -o p e ra tio n  on p a te n t p ro te c tio n .
The f i r s t  o f  these  agreem ents to  be s igned  was th e  P a ris
C o n v e n tio n  f o r  th e  P ro te c tio n  o f In d u s t r ia l P ro p e rty , w h ich  da tes
fro m  M arch 1883. The co n v e n tio n  com m its member s ta te s  to  e n s u rin g  
th a t  th e  same p ro te c t io n  is  accorded to  the  in d u s t r ia l  p ro p e r ty  
em ana ting  fro m  o th e r  member s ta te s  as is  accorded to  th a t  p rodu ced  
by  t h e i r  own n a tio n a ls . U nder th e  c o n v e n tio n  in v e n to rs  are  
g e n e ra lly  g ive n  a 12-m onth p e r io d  fro m  th e  tim e  o f  f i l i n g  in  the  
o r ig in a l c o u n try  in  w h ich  to  f i le  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s . A p a te n t may 
th e re fo re  be issu ed  in  the  home c o u n try  w ith o u t  i t  be ing  in v a lid a te d  
in  a n o th e r  c o u n try  on th e  g rounds th a t  th e  n o v e lty  o f  th e  p a te n t 
had  been p re v io u s ly  d isc lose d .
The P a ris  C o n ve n tio n  has been re v is e d  on s e v e ra l ocassions 
s in ce  1883, th e  la s t  re v is io n  o c c u rin g  in  1967. The num ber o f  s ta te s  
w h ic h  have jo in e d  th e  P a ris  U n ion , th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  se t up by  th e  
P a ris  C o nven tio n , has s te a d ily  in c rea sed  o v e r tim e  fro m  th e  o r ig in a l 
11 fo u n d in g  s ta te s .^  As o f M arch 1983 some 92 s ta te s  were members 
o f  th e  P a ris  U n ion  [WIPO (1983, p l5 ) ] .
The m ain ach ievem ent o f  th e  P a ris  C o n ve n tio n  was th a t  i t  
e s ta b lis h e d  a se t o f  v e ry  e lem e n ta ry  ru le s , w h ich  subsequen t 
agreem ents have b u i l t  upon  [M add ison  (1981, p6)]. Perhaps th e  tw o  
m ost s ig n if ic a n t  o f  these  la te r  agreem ents are th e  P a ten t Co­
o p e ra tio n  T re a ty  (PCT) and th e  European P a ten t C o nven tio n  (EPC).
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The PCT, s igned  in  1970, reduced the  co m p lic a tio n  o f  a p p ly in g  f o r  
p a te n ts  in  a num ber o f  d i f fe re n t  c o u n tr ie s  by e n a b ling  p a te n ts  to  be 
f i le d  on a m u lt ip le  bas is . The EPC, s igned in  1973, was th e  f i r s t  
agreem ent to  e f fe c t iv e ly  c rea te  a s u p ra n a tio n a l p a te n t, co v e rin g  th e  
e leven  s ta te s  w h ich  were s ig n a to r ie s  to  th e  co n v e n tio n .
P a te n t p ro te c t io n  does n o t come cheap. The co s t o f  ta k in g  o u t 
a p a te n t on a w o rld w id e  bas is  has been es tim a ted  a t a sum "o fte n  in  
excess o f  £30,000" [Low e and C ra w fo rd  (1984, p8)]. F irm s m ust
th e re fo re  de te rm ine  w h e th e r th e  b e n e fits  d e r iv e d  fro m  p a te n t 
p ro te c t io n  are  w o rth  th e  costs. In  some in d u s tr ie s  p a te n t 
p ro te c t io n  may be th e  o n ly  p ro te c t io n  a v a ila b le . In  th e  m echan ica l 
e n g in e e rin g  in d u s try ,  f o r  example, d is c lo s u re  o f  a m echan ica l system  
v e ry  o f te n  in v o lv e s  d is c lo s u re  o f  a l l  o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  in v o lv e d . 
P a te n t p ro te c t io n  is  th e re fo re  the  o n ly  p ra c t ic a l means o f  
p ro te c t io n .
A  k e y  d e te rm in a n t o f  w h e th e r o r  n o t a n o ve l te c h n ic a l concep t 
is  p a te n te d  is  th e  s tre n g th  o f p ro te c t io n  a ffo rd e d . I f  a company 
b e lie v e s  th a t  i t  is  n o t go ing  to  o b ta in  adequate p ro te c t io n , i t  may 
d e lib e ra te ly  keep i t s  know ledge a secre t. T h is  know ledge  w o u ld  
th e n  be c la s s if ie d  u n d e r th a t  ca te g o ry  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
r e fe r re d  to  as know -how .
3.3.3 Know-how
T here  e x is t  a num ber o f d i f fe r e n t  d e f in it io n s  o f  know -how , 
r e f le c t in g  th e  fa c t  th a t  i t  is  an " in h e re n t ly  im p rec ise  te rm " [D T I 
(1986, p27)].
A s u c c in c t d e f in i t io n  o f  th e  te rm  was p ro v id e d  by  the  Banks 
C om m ittee, w h ich  re p o r te d  in  1970 on th e  UK p a te n t system  and 
p a te n t law . I t  d e fin e d  know -h ow  as:
"... a l l c o n f id e n t ia l (sec re t) te c h n ic a l in fo rm a tio n  
h a v in g  in d u s t r ia l  s ig n if ic a n c e ."  3
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T e c h n ic a l in fo rm a tio n  may be k e p t secre t e ith e r  because i t  
ca n n o t be pa ten ted , o r  because the  p ro p r ie to r  o f  th e  in fo rm a tio n  
w ishes  i t  to  rem a in  c o n f id e n t ia l.  These tw o  reasons are  re f le c te d  in  
th e  d e f in i t io n  o f  know -how  adopted by UNIDO (1979):
” ... in fo rm a tio n  th a t  is  e ith e r  u n p a te n ta b le  ( ie  
la c k s  th e  le g a l d e f in it io n  o f  n o v e lty )  o r  is  
p u rp o s e ly  le f t  unpa ten ted ." 6
The in fo rm a tio n  th a t  c o n s titu te s  know -how  may be capab le  o f 
b e in g  em bodied in  ta n g ib le  ob jec ts . Examples o f  such in fo rm a tio n  
w o u ld  in c lu d e  m anuals f o r  p la n t o p e ra tin g  in s tru c t io n s ,  fo rm u la e  fo r  
ch e m ica l processes and b lu e p r in ts  o f  fa c to ry  la y o u ts . N o t a l l  
in fo rm a tio n ,  how ever, is  capable o f be ing  rende red  in to  a ta n g ib le
fo rm . Some may o n ly  be im p a rte d  by means o f p e rs o n a l in s t r u c t io n
and d e m o n s tra tio n . Examples o f th is  type  o f in fo rm a tio n  w o u ld  
in c lu d e  te ch n iq u e s  used in  the  p ro d u c tio n  p rocess (such as 
la b o ra to ry  p ra c tic e ) and the  sales and m a rke tin g  m ethods used to  
p ro m o te  f in a l  p ro d u c ts .
The d is t in c t io n  between these tw o  ca tego ries  o f  in fo rm a tio n  
( ta n g ib le  and in ta n g ib le )  is  re fle c te d  in  the  d e f in it io n  o f  know -h ow  
a d o p te d  b y  Creed and Bangs (1960):
” ... in v e n tio n s , processes, fo rm u la e  o r  des igns 
w h ic h  are e ith e r  u np a te n ted  o r  u n p a te n ta b le ; i t  
may be ev idenced by  some fo rm  o f  p h y s ic a l 
m a tte r  such as b lu e p r in ts ,  s p e c if ic a t io n s  o r
d ra w in g s ; ... and i t  may in v o lv e  accum ula ted  
te c h n ic a l expe rience  and s k i l ls  w h ich  can bes t, 
o r  pe rhaps  o n ly  be com m unicated th ro u g h  th e  
m edium  o f  p e rso n a l se rv ice ."
Some a u th o r it ie s  have fo rm a lis e d  th is  d is t in c t io n  betw een 
ta n g ib le  and in ta n g ib le  know -h ow  by d e fin in g  a sepa ra te  c a te g o ry  o f  
u n p a te n te d  in fo rm a tio n , know n as 'tra d e  secre ts '. A lth o u g h  th e  te rm  
is  used lo o s e ly  by  d i f fe r e n t  a u th o rs  in  d i f fe r e n t  ways, i t  is  
g e n e ra lly  em ployed when re fe r r in g  to  s p e c if ic  item s o f in fo rm a tio n  
th a t  can be expressed in  a ta n g ib le  fo rm , such as a se t o f  
in s t r u c t io n s  o r  a m anual. A cco rd ing  to  UNIDO (1979, p !2 ) f o r
exam ple, a tra d e  sec re t is  "any fo rm u la , p a tte rn , dev ice  o r  
c o m p ila t io n  o f  in fo rm a tio n " . U npa ten ted  in fo rm a tio n  w h ich  cann o t
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be d e fin e d  in  th e  fo rm  o f a document, b u t w h ich  res ide s  in  th e  
kn ow le dge  o f  in d iv id u a ls ,  is  th e re fo re  ca tego rised  as know -how .
T h is  a b i l i t y  to  c la s s ify  s p e c if ic  item s o f u n p a te n te d  in fo rm a tio n  
as tra d e  secre ts  can have im p o rta n t consequences f o r  com panies, 
because many c o u n tr ie s  have laws w h ich  recogn ise  th e  ex is te n ce  o f  
tra d e  se c re ts  (o r  in d u s t r ia l secre ts , as th e y  are som etim es re fe r re d  
to ). F o r exam ple, M exico 's pena l code con ta ins  a c h a p te r on th e  
d is c lo s u re  o f  tra d e  secre ts  [UNIDO (1979, p l2 ) ] .
A lth o u g h  tra d e  secre ts  are sometimes d is t in g u is h e d  as a 
se p a ra te  ca te g o ry  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty , i t  is  more common to  f in d  
k n o w -h o w  used to  re fe r  to  th e  w hole  f ie ld  o f  u n p a te n te d  
in fo rm a tio n ,  w h e th e r em bodied in  people  o r  ta n g ib le  ob je c ts . T h is  
m ore g e n e ra l d e f in i t io n  w i l l  th e re fo re  be adopted here.
No m a tte r  w h a t d e f in it io n  o f know -how  is  adopted, th e  common 
fa c to r  in  a l l  o f  them  is  secrecy. I t  is  secrecy w h ich  makes k n o w ­
how  a v a lu a b le  asset. However, because know -h ow  rem a ins 
u n d is c lo s e d  i t  is  n o t g e n e ra lly  a ffo rd e d  th e  le g a l p ro te c t io n  w h ich  
is  a u to m a tic a lly  g ive n  to  o th e r  fo rm s o f in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty . 
U n less kn o w -h o w  can be a r t ic u la te d  in  a fo rm  w h ich  enables i t  to  be 
p ro te c te d  by  le g is la t io n  g o ve rn in g  tra d e  secre ts , i t s  ow ner has no 
le g a l re c o u rs e  to  p re v e n t t h i r d  p a r t ie s  from  u t i l is in g  i t .
In  th e  UK th e  P a ten ts  A c t 1977, th e  Trade M arks A c t 1938 and 
th e  C o p y r ig h t A c t 1956 d e fin e  pa te n ts , trad em a rks  and c o p y r ig h t as 
p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts  w h ic h  are a ffo rd e d  le g a l p ro te c tio n . There is  no 
e q u iv a le n t a c t c o v e rin g  know -how , and no le g a l p ro v is io n  fo r  th e  
p ro te c t io n  o f  tra d e  secre ts . N everthe less, know -how  is  tre a te d  fo r  
ta x  pu rposes  in  th e  same m anner as o th e r  fo rm s o f  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  (ie  incom e re ce ive d  from  know -how  is  ta xe d  as t ra d in g  
incom e ra th e r  th a n  as a c a p ita l re c e ip t) .
In  fa c t,  th e  o n ly  item  o f  UK le g is la t io n  in  w h ich  a d e f in i t io n  o f 
k n o w -h o w  can be fo u n d  is  th e  Income and C o rp o ra tio n  Taxes A c t 
1970. T h is  A c t d e fin e s  know -h ow  as:
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any in d u s t r ia l  in fo rm a tio n  and te ch n iq u e s  
l i k e ly  to  a s s is t in  th e  m anu fac tu re  o r  p rocess ing  
o f  goods o r  m a te ria ls  ..." °
D e sp ite  th e  fa c t  th a t  know -how  is  n o t s p e c if ic a l ly  recogn ised  in  
la w  as a p ro p e r ty  r ig h t ,  i t  is  neve rthe less  p o ss ib le  to  o b ta in  le g a l 
re d re s s  f o r  know -h ow  th a t  has been d isc losed  a g a in s t th e  w i l l  o f  
th e  p ro p r ie to r .  T h is  is  due to  th e  fa c t  th a t  know -h ow  is  
t ra n s fe r re d  by  means o f a le g a l c o n tra c t w h ich  d e fin e s  the  n a tu re  
and c o n te n t o f  th e  know -how  in  que s tion . Any suspected b reach  o f  
co n fid e n c e  can th e re fo re  be the  s u b je c t o f a common la w  a c tio n  to  
o b ta in  com pensa tion .
Com m enting on th e  s tre n g th  o f th e  p ro te c t io n  a ffo rd e d  by 
E n g lis h  common law , Hearn (1987, p l48) s ta te d  th a t  th e  owners o f  
k n o w -h o w  are "w e ll-p ro te c te d  aga ins t in fr in g e m e n t o f  t h e ir  
p ro p e r ty " .  He a lso  no ted  th a t  th e  "same p ro te c t io n  is  a ffo rd e d  in  
many o th e r  c o u n tr ie s , b u t n o t a ll. "
I t  is  u n u s u a l to  f in d  know -how  license d  on i t s  own, ju s t  as i t  
is  a lso  uncommon to  f in d  p a ten ts  license d  in  is o la t io n .  M ost 
lic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv e  some com b ina tion  o f p a te n ts  and kn o w ­
how. C o n tra c to r  (1985, p6) re p o r ts  the  re s u lts  o f  a num ber o f
su rv e y s  o f  th e  c o n te n t o f  lic e n s in g  agreements w h ich  p ro v id e  
ev idence  o f  th is .  The reason fo r  th is  p a tte rn  is  th a t  th e  
in fo rm a t io n  c o n ta in e d  in  a 'ba re ' p a te n t is  o fte n  n o t s u f f ic ie n t  to  
p ro d u ce  a m a rke ta b le  p ro d u c t. I t  is  th e re fo re  necessary to  o b ta in  
a d d it io n a l know -h ow , ie  th a t  "body o f in fo rm a tio n  w h ich  emerges 
fro m  th e  p ra c t ic a l expe rience  o f w o rk in g  th e  p a te n t"  [UNIDO (1979, 
P H )].
3.3.4 T radem arks
U n lik e  kn o w -h o w , th e re  is  l i t t l e  d isagreem ent a b o u t w h a t c o n s t itu te s  
a tra d e m a rk . The fo llo w in g  d e s c r ip tio n , fro m  UNIDO (1979) p ro v id e s  
a s u ita b le  d e f in it io n :
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d is t in c t iv e  v is u a l and sometimes a u ra l 
dev ices , w o rds o r  emblems (symbols), o r  a 
co m b in a tio n  o f  them, th a t  a f irm  app lies  to  th e  
goods i t  tra d e s  in , o r  the  se rv ices  i t  pe rfo rm s, 
to  in d ic a te  to  th e  p u b lic  th a t  th e y  are th e  
f irm 's  goods o r  se rv ices .'1 9
L ik e  p a te n ts , trad em a rks  c o n s titu te  le g a lly  p ro te c te d  p ro p e r ty  
r ig h ts .  In  m ost c o u n tr ie s , a trad em a rk  is  e s ta b lish e d  when i t  is  
accep ted  by th e  governm ent a u th o r ity  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  th e  
r e g is t r a t io n  o f  trad em a rks . I t  is  then  en te red  on an o f f i c ia l  
r e g is te r  w h ic h  c o n ta in s  l is ts  o f  e x is tin g  trad em a rks  (c la s s if ie d  
a c c o rd in g  to  th e  goods o r  se rv ices to  w h ich  th e y  re la te )  and th e  
p ro p r ie to r s  o f  these  tradem arks .
P ro te c t io n  o f  trad em a rks  on an in te rn a t io n a l bas is  is  p ro v id e d  
b y  th e  P a ris  C onven tion , w h ich  covers trad em a rks  as w e ll as 
p a te n ts . The co n v e n tio n  a llow s  fo r  tradem arks  to  be g ra n te d  a s ix  
m on th  p r io r i t y  p e r io d  a f te r  re g is tra t io n  in  the  home c o u n try , so 
th a t  r e g is t r a t io n  can be repea ted  in  any co n ve n tio n  c o u n try . The 
c o n v e n tio n  a lso  g ives  p ro te c tio n  fo r  w hat are d e fin e d  as "w e ll-  
know n  tra d e  m arks" [H earn  (1987, p l9 0 )]. I f  a f irm  can o b ta in  a 
c e r t i f ic a te  in  i t s  home c o u n try  s ta tin g  th a t  i t s  tra d e m a rk  meets th is  
d e s c r ip t io n ,  th e n  i t  w i l l  be e n t it le d  to  p ro te c t io n  a g a in s t 
in fr in g e m e n t in  a c o n ve n tio n  c o u n try , a lth o u g h  n o t re g is te re d .
In  a d d it io n  to  th e  P a ris  C onven tion , some 25 c o u n tr ie s  
(e x c lu d in g  th e  UK) are  s ig n a to r ie s  o f th e  M adrid  Agreem ent w h ic h  
p ro v id e s  f a c i l i t ie s  f o r  tradem arks  to  be re g is te re d  on an 
'in te rn a t io n a l ' bas is , ie  in  a l l  o f  th e  member s ta tes . A lth o u g h  th e  
UK is  n o t a s ig n a to ry  o f  th e  agreement, s u b s id ia r ie s  o f  UK MNCs 
w h ic h  a re  lo c a te d  in  any o f the  member s ta te s  can a p p ly  f o r  
' in te rn a t io n a l ' r e g is t ra t io n  und e r th e  agreement.
I t  is  in te re s t in g  to  no te  th a t  up u n t i l  1984 th e  UK was o u t o f  
l in e  w ith  many o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  in  n o t ha v in g  any le g a l p ro te c t io n  
f o r  se rv ic e s , such as bank ing . U n t i l  then , o n ly  goods were 
p ro te c te d  by  trad em a rks . T h is  s itu a t io n  changed when the  Trade 
M arks (Amendment) A c t 1984 was passed. T h is  ac t c rea ted  a new 
c lass  o f  m ark, th e  s e rv ic e  m ark, w h ich  extended th e  p ro te c t io n
64
CHAPTER 3
a ffo rd e d  to  goods in  th e  o r ig in a l 1938 A c t to  se rv ices.
The p ro te c t io n  a ffo rd e d  to  tradem arks by  le g is la t io n  is  
supp lem en ted  in  many c o u n tr ie s  by u n fa ir  t ra d in g  law s. In  th e  UK, 
f o r  exam ple, f irm s  w h ich  a tte m p t to  tra d e  u n fa ir ly  on a re p u ta t io n  
p re v io u s ly  e s ta b lis h e d  by o th e rs  can be the  s u b je c t o f  a common la w  
a c t io n  f o r  'pass ing  o f f '  t h e ir  goods as those  o f  a n o th e r f irm . 
Common la w  s u its  f o r  'pass ing  o f f ' are o fte n  b ro u g h t a longs ide  th o se  
f o r  tra d e m a rk  in fr in g e m e n t, on the  grounds th a t  i f  one fa i ls  th e  
o th e r  may succeed.
A c c o rd in g  to  Hearn (1987, p l90) u n fa ir  t ra d in g  law s in  m ost 
d eve lop ed  c o u n tr ie s  p ro v id e  p ro te c tio n  w h ich  is  ''la rg e ly  e f fe c t iv e " ,  
a lth o u g h  th e re  are  c o u n tr ie s  "w h ich  o f fe r  co n s ide rab le  scope to  th e  
in f r in g e r " .  R e ly ing  on u n fa ir  tra d in g  laws is , how ever, much r is k ie r  
and m ore tim e -consum ing  th a n  re ly in g  on s ta tu to r i ly  re g is te re d  
tra d e m a rk s . As G a lla fe n t e t a l (1981, p35) p o in t o u t, th e  b u rd e n  o f  
p ro o f  in  'pass ing  o f f '  cases re s ts  w ith  the  p la in t i f f .  They m ust 
p ro v e  th a t  any u n re g is te re d  tradem arks  had been used by them  and 
th a t  th e y  had a cq u ire d  a re p u ta t io n  as a re s u lt .  Not o n ly  is  th is  a 
d i f f i c u l t  case to  p ro ve , b u t in  a tte m p tin g  to  do so i t  may be 
necessary  to  re v e a l t ra d in g  in fo rm a tio n  th a t  w ou ld  be o f b e n e fit  to  
c o m p e tito rs .
The UK G overnm ent's  Green Paper In te lle c tu a l P ro p e rty  R ig h ts  
and In n o v a t io n  made th e  fo llo w in g  com parison between common la w  
p ro te c t io n  and tra d e m a rk  p ro te c tio n : "R e ly ing  on common law  in  th e  
e ve n t o f  one bus iness pass ing  o f f  i t s  se rv ices as those  o f a n o th e r 
does n o t  o f fe r  s u f f ic ie n t  p ro te c tio n . T ak ing  such a c tio n  is  
exp e n s ive  and d i f f i c u l t  when compared w ith  e n fo rc in g  a c le a r ly  
re g is te re d  p ro p e r ty  r ig h t .  Common la w  has n o t been co n s ide red  
s u f f ic ie n t  p ro te c t io n  f o r  goods, hence the  ex is tence  o f  tra d e m a rks  
[HMSO (1983, p l9 ) ] .
The su rv e y  evidence on the  co n te n t o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents, 
sum m arised by C o n tra c to r  (1985, p6) revea ls  th a t  trad em a rks  are  v e ry  
seldom  lice n se d  in  is o la t io n ,  b u t are o fte n  p a r t  o f  agreem ents th a t  
in v o lv e  th e  lic e n s in g  o f p a te n ts  a n d /o r know -how . D esp ite  th is
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a p p a re n t ly  m in o r ro le , the  v a lu e  o f tradem arks in  com pos ite  
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents may o fte n  be s u b s ta n tia l. T h is  is  la rg e ly  due 
to  th e  fa c t  th a t ,  whereas p a ten ts  have a f in i t e  l i f e ,  th e re  is  
g e n e ra lly  no s ta tu to ry  l im ita t io n  on th e  l i f e  o f a tra d e m a rk , so lo n g  
as th e  p r o p r ie to r  keeps i t  in  fo rc e  by m aking use o f  i t  and by 
p a y in g  p e r io d ic  renew a l fees. Know-how  also has, in  th e o ry , an 
in f in i t e  l i f e  span because i t  is  n o t a p ro p e rty  r ig h t .  T h is  is , 
ho w eve r, dependent upon the  know -how  be ing  k e p t c o n f id e n t ia l.  
Once i t  becomes p u b lic  know ledge i t  loses i t s  va lue . T radem arks, on 
th e  o th e r  hand, re ta in  th e ir  va lu e  as long  as th e y  rem a in  re g is te re d .
T radem arks  may sometimes be in c lu d e d  in  com posite  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents w ith  p a te n ts  a n d /o r know -how  in  o rd e r to  p ro lo n g  t h e ir  
l i f e .  F o r  exam ple, when a p a te n t has a s h o r t u n e x p ire d  l i f e  (say 
th re e  yea rs ) i t s  lic e n s o r  may be able to  extend  i t s  l i f e  a r t i f i c ia l l y  
by  l in k in g  i t  w ith  a tra d e m a rk  in  a com posite  agreem ent c o v e rin g  a 
lo n g e r  p e r io d  [UNIDO (1979, p35)]. Even when th e  p a te n t has
e x p ire d , i f  th e  goods p roduced  by the  p a te n t come to  be id e n t i f ie d  
in  th e  p u b lic  m ind by  means o f a tradem ark , th e n  consum ers w i l l  
c o n tin u e  to  p re fe r  th a t  good to  com peting p ro d u c ts  w h ic h  m ust be 
s o ld  u n d e r d i f fe r e n t  tradem arks .
I t  is  th is  a b i l i t y  o f  tradem arks  to  d if fe re n t ia te  p ro d u c ts  w h ic h  
makes them  v a lu a b le . As S ke lto n  (1984, p6) p u ts  i t ,  tra d e m a rks  are  
th e  means w hereby  th e  owners o f a p a r t ic u la r  te c h n o lo g y  are  ab le  to  
d is t in g u is h  th e  p ro d u c ts  o f th a t  techno logy . They enable  consum ers 
to  d is t in g u is h  between d if fe re n t  p ro d u c ts  and th u s  come to  
re co g n ise  those  p ro d u c ts  th a t  are c o n s is te n tly  o f  a c e r ta in  q u a lity .
Because th e  v a lu e  o f  trad em a rks  is  dependent upon th e ir  
r e p u ta t io n  as a g u a ra n to r  o f  q u a lity ,  th e  exe rc ise  o f  q u a li ty  c o n tro l 
o v e r th e  o u tp u t  o f  licensees is  a key c o n s t itu e n t o f  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents in v o lv in g  tradem arks . The p ro v is io n  o f  q u a li ty  c o n tro l 
by  l ic e n s o rs  is , in  fa c t,  w r it te n  in to  th e  tra d e m a rk  law s o f  many 
c o u n tr ie s  [UNIDO (1979, p34)]. The o b je c tiv e  o f  these  p ro v is io n s  is  
to  ensu re  th a t  th e  goods p roduced  by licensees are  o f  th e  same 
q u a l i ty  as those  em anating from  lic e n s o rs , and th a t  th e  re p u ta t io n  




T h is  fo rm  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  g ives p ro te c tio n  to  w ha t may be 
d e s c r ib e d  as o r ig in a l " l i te ra r y ,  d ram a tic , a r t is t ic  and m us ica l" w o rks  
[M ad d iso n  (1981, p4)]. These w o rks  can take  a v a r ie ty  o f  fo rm s, eg 
n o v e ls , p a in t in g s , m usic, s c u lp tu re s , pho tog ra phs , o r  some 
c o m b in a tio n  o f  these  fo rm s.
L ik e  p a te n ts  and trad em a rks , c o p y r ig h t is  a le g a lly  p ro te c te d  
p ro p e r ty  r ig h t .  There is , how ever, one im p o rta n t d iffe re n c e  betw een 
c o p y r ig h t  and these  o th e r  tw o  ca tego ries  o f p ro p e r ty  r ig h t .  W hereas 
p a te n ts  and tra d e m a rks  are v o lu n ta ry  in  n a tu re  (ie  th e y  o n ly  e x is t  
i f  someone chooses to  a p p ly  f o r  them) c o p y r ig h t e x is ts  a u to m a tic a lly  
w h eneve r m a te r ia l th a t  can be co p y r ig h te d  is  crea ted .
In  many c o u n tr ie s  ( in c lu d in g  th e  UK) th e  d u ra t io n  o f c o p y r ig h t 
p ro te c t io n  is  l im ite d  to  50 years a f te r  the  dea th  o f  th e  o rg in a to r ,  
a lth o u g h  e xce p tio n s  e x is t  f o r  c e r ta in  k in d s  o f w o rks . P ro te c t io n  is  
p ro v id e d  f o r  c o p y r ig h t on an in te rn a t io n a l bas is  th ro u g h  th e  
e x is te n c e  o f  a num ber o f  in te rn a t io n a l tre a tie s , th e  m ost im p o r ta n t 
b e in g  th e  Berne C o nven tio n , w h ich  dates from  1886.
Because c o p y r ig h t is  concerned w ith  the  p ro te c t io n  o f l i t e r a r y  
and a r t i s t i c  p ro p e r ty  i t  is  n o t u s u a lly  c la s s if ie d  as a fo rm  o f  
in d u s t r ia l  p ro p e r ty  (eg WIPO, 1983). N everthe less, in  a few  c o u n tr ie s  
(n o ta b ly  th e  UK) c o p y r ig h t p ro te c t io n  is  a ffo rd e d  to  designs w h ic h  
are  capab le  o f  in d u s t r ia l  e x p lo ita t io n .  Th is  fo rm  o f c o p y r ig h t 
p ro te c t io n  has come to  be te rm ed 'des ign  c o p y r ig h t '.
In  th e  UK design  c o p y r ig h t came in to  ex is tence  w ith  th e  D esign 
C o p y r ig h t A c t 1968. P r io r  to  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f  th is  A ct, i t  was 
n o t p o s s ib le  to  sue f o r  in fr in g e m e n t o f  c o p y r ig h t r e la t in g  to  des igns 
u n d e r th e  C o p y rig h t A c t 1956 because th e re  a lre a d y  e x is te d  an a c t 
w h ic h  p ro te c te d  in d u s t r ia l  designs, nam ely the  R eg is te red  Designs 
A c t 1949. T h is  ac t, d iscussed  in  more d e ta il below , c rea ted  a new 
c lass  o f  le g a lly  p ro te c te d  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty , know n as a 
re g is te re d  design. I f  a. des ign  was re g is te re d , o r  was capable  o f 
be in g  re g is te re d  u n d e r th is  A c t, th e n  i t  was n o t e lig ib le  f o r
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c o p y r ig h t  p ro te c tio n .
A l l  th is  changed w ith  th e  in tro d u c t io n  o f th e  D esign C o p y rig h t 
A c t 1968 w h ic h  ex tended c o p y r ig h t p ro te c tio n  to  designs ir re s p e c t iv e  
o f  t h e i r  s ta tu s , o r  p o te n t ia l s ta tu s , as re g is te re d  designs. The 
d u ra t io n  o f  p ro te c t io n  und e r th is  ac t is  15 years fo r  any 
re p ro d u c t io n  o f  des ign  d raw ings in  a m a te ria l fo rm , and th e  f u l l  50 
yea rs  f o r  any copy ing  o f  th e  design d raw ings them selves.
3.3.6 R e g is te re d  Designs
T h is  c a te g o ry  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  is  com prised o f  designs w h ic h  
a re  capab le  o f  in d u s t r ia l  e x p lo ita t io n . To be e l ig ib le  f o r  le g a l 
p ro te c t io n  designs m ust be new o r  o r ig in a l and m ust be re g is te re d  
in  a gove rnm en t o f f ic e .
In  th e  UK in d u s t r ia l  designs are d e fin e d  by th e  R e g is te red  
D esigns A c t 1949 as " fe a tu re s  o f  shape, c o n fig u ra tio n , p a t te rn  o r  
o rnam en t a p p lie d  to  an a r t ic le  by any in d u s t r ia l p rocess o r  means 
b e in g  fe a tu re s  w h ich , in  th e  f in is h e d  a r t ic le ,  appeal to  and are 
ju d g e d  s o le ly  by th e  eye" [G a lla fe n t e t a l (1981, p26)]. P ro te c t io n  
f o r  re g is te re d  designs la s ts  f o r  15 years in  the  UK, as i t  does in  
m ost o th e r  c o u n tr ie s . A t an in te rn a t io n a l le v e l, in d u s t r ia l  des igns 
a re  co ve re d  by th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  P a ris  C onven tion .
D e sp ite  th e  fa c t  th a t  designs are a u to m a tic a lly  p ro te c te d  by  
c o p y r ig h t  le g is la t io n  in  the  UK, th e re  is  s t i l l  an advantage to  be 
g a ined  by  re g is te r in g  a design. T h is  advantage a rise s  fro m  th e  fa c t  
th a t  a re g is te re d  des ign  is  in fr in g e d  i f  someone p roduces an a r t ic le  
lo o k in g  th e  same, w h e th e r o r  n o t copy ing  has ta ke n  p lace. There  is  
th u s  no n e ce ss ity  to  p ro ve  th a t  copy ing  has ta ke n  p lace  i f  a des ign  
is  re g is te re d . I f  a des ign  is  p ro te c te d  s o le ly  by  c o p y r ig h t th e n  




T h is  s e c tio n  has described  th e  d if fe re n t  types o f  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  w h ic h  may be tra n s fe r re d  by means o f  a lic e n s in g  
agreem ent. I t  is  common fo r  more th a n  one typ e  o f  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  to  be t ra n s fe r re d  in  a lic e n s in g  package; know -how , f o r  
exam ple, is  o fte n  lice n se d  a long w ith  pa ten ts . These tw o  ca te g o rie s  
o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty , a long w ith  tradem arks , p ro v id e d  th e  fo cu s  
f o r  th e  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  tech n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  by UK MNCs w h ic h  is  
re p o r te d  in  th e  th e s is .
The lic e n s in g  o f  c o p y r ig h t and re g is te re d  designs is  n o t 
e x p lo re d  in  th e  th e s is . However, i t  sh o u ld  be no ted  th a t  th e  
in d u s t r ia l  p ro p e r ty  w h ich  is  p ro te c te d  by these tw o  p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts ,  
d es ign  d ra w in g s , o fte n  fo rm s a p a r t  o f  th e  know -h ow  package. 
Indeed , c o p y r ig h t and re g is te re d  designs have in  th e  p a s t been o f  
" le ss  im p o rta n ce  th a n  know -how " [Lowe and C ra w fo rd  (1984, p lO )].
3.4 OTHER FORMS OF NON-EQUITY INVESTMENT
3.4.1 F ra n c h is in g  Agreem ents
F ra n c h is in g  is  a fo rm  o f  bus iness a rrangem ent w h ich  in v o lv e s  one 
com pany (th e  f ra n c h is o r)  p ro v id in g  a n o th e r company (the  fra n c h is e e ) 
w ith  a s ta n d a rd  package o f com ponents o r  in g re d ie n ts  to g e th e r  w ith  
management and m a rk e tin g  se rv ices . Th is  type  o f  agreem ent e n ta ils  
a g re a te r  degree o f  c o n tro l th a n  lic e n s in g . In  re tu rn ,  th e  
fra n c h is e e  p ro v id e s  c a p ita l and u s u a lly  some m arke t know ledge, and 
w i l l  pay  some fo rm  o f  ro y a lty .
T h is  ty p e  o f t ra n s a c tio n  is  com monly en te red  in to  by com panies 
w h ic h  own p ro d u c ts  th a t  are n o t p a te n ta b le . P eps i-C o la , f o r  
exam ple, r e ly  h e a v ily  on fra n c h is in g . T h e ir  fra n c h is e  h o ld e rs  own 
th e  b o t t l in g  p la n ts , em ploy lo c a l s ta f f ,  and c o n tro l th e ir  own 
a d v e r t is in g  budgets. P eps i-C o la  In te rn a t io n a l s e lls  th e  P e ps i-C o la  
c o n c e n tra te  to  these  b o t t l in g  p la n ts , who are den ied  access to  th e  
s y ru p 's  fo rm u la . T h roug h  th e  p r ic in g  o f  th e  sy ru p  and th e
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f ra n c h is in g  fee  charged fo r  the  use o f i t 's  tra d e m a rk  th e  company is  
ab le  to  c a p tu re  i t s  econom ic re n t.
3.4.2 Management C o n tra c ts
M anagement c o n tra c ts  are  agreements w h ich  enable com panies to  use 
p a r t  o f  t h e ir  management pe rson ne l to  a ss is t o th e r  companies in  
r e tu rn  f o r  a fee  o r  a share  in  the  company's p ro f its .
T h is  ty p e  o f  bus iness agreement is  common in  s e rv ic e  
in d u s t r ie s ,  such as th e  h o te l in d u s try . A ty p ic a l exam ple is  
p ro v id e d  by  H ilto n  In te rn a tio n a l.  Th is  company has management 
c o n tra c ts  w ith  h o te ls  abroad, e na b ling  fees to  be earned f o r  
c o n s u lt in g  and management se rv ices  w ith  l i t t l e  o r  no e q u ity  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  [D u n n in g  (1981, p20)].
A c o n tra c tu a l a rrangem ent w h ich  is  s im ila r  to  th e  management 
c o n tra c t  is  th e  " te c h n ic a l ass is tance  c o n tra c t"  [UNIDO (1979, pp 5 -7 )]. 
T h is  enab les a company to  s e ll the  te c h n ic a l e x p e rt is e  o f i t s  
p e rs o n n e l to  o th e r  com panies. I t  is  sometimes m is ta k e n ly  la b e lle d  
as a k n o w -h o w  c o n tra c t,  s ince  b o th  in v o lv e  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  packages 
o f  te c h n ic a l in fo rm a tio n  needed fo r  c a rry in g  o u t a p ro je c t. The 
bas is  f o r  d is t in g u is h in g  between them  lie s  in  th e  fa c t  th a t  a 
s u b s ta n t ia l p o r t io n  o f  th e  te c h n ic a l in fo rm a tio n  co n ta in e d  in  a 
k n o w -h o w  agreem ent is  h e ld  in  secre t. The in fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e d  v ia  
a te c h n ic a l ass is tance  agreem ent, on the  o th e r  hand, may be w e ll-  
know n  o r  f u l l y  a v a ila b le  in  th e  p u b lic  dom ain [UNIDO (1979, p l4 ) ] .
The v a lu e  o f  te c h n ic a l ass is tance  th e re fo re  lie s  in  th e  
e x p e rt is e  o f  i t s  s u p p lie r  in  a s p e c if ic  p ro d u c tio n  area, whereas th e  
v a lu e  o f  o b ta in in g  in fo rm a tio n  fro m  a s u p p lie r  o f  know -h ow  is  th a t  
i t  g iv e s  i t s  possessor some advantage o v e r those  u s in g  in fo rm a tio n  
th a t  is  n o t sec re t. Seen in  th is  manner, te c h n ic a l ass is tance  is  a 
se p a ra te  b u t com plem enta ry s e rv ic e  to  know -how , even th o u g h  th e  
s u p p lie r  o f  b o th  may be th e  same.
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3.4.3 T u rn k e y  Agreem ents
T u rn k e y  agreem ents e x is t  when tw o o r more p a r t ie s  e n te r in to  a 
c o n tra c t  f o r  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f o p e ra tin g  fa c i l i t ie s  th a t  are  
t ra n s fe r re d  to  th e  custom er when the  fa c i l i t ie s  are ready  to  
commence o p e ra tio n s . Thus th e  owners o n ly  have to  'tu rn  th e  key '.
These agreem ents f i r s t  appeared in  the  1960s and in i t i a l l y  
in v o lv e d  W estern companies c o n s tru c tin g  m a n u fa c tu rin g  fa c i l i t ie s  f o r  
E a s te rn  b lo c  custom ers. By the  end o f  the  1960s th e y  were a lso  
be in g  used  by a num ber o f deve lop ing  c o u n tr ie s . The re c y c lin g  o f 
p e t ro -d o lla r s  in  th e  1970s, th ro u g h  m u lt i-m il l io n  d o l la r  c o n tra c ts  to  
d e ve lo p  in d u s t ry  and in fra s t ru c tu re  in  OPEC c o u n tr ie s , caused an 
u p su rg e  in  demand fo r  th is  type  o f co n tra c t. Payment f o r  tu rn k e y  
p ro je c ts  is  u s u a lly  in  stages, as c o n s tru c tio n  deve lops.
In  d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  many o f these agreem ents in v o lv e  a 
p a r t ic u la r  fo rm  o f  tu rn k e y  agreement, know n e ith e r  as " t r i la t e r a l  
c o -o p e ra t io n "  o r  " t r ip a r t i t e  in d u s t r ia l c o -o p e ra tio n " [Oman (1981, 
p l5 ) ] .  These agreem ents in v o lv e  the  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  a t le a s t th re e  
com pan ies o r  o rg a n iza tio n s : one o r more dom ic ile d  in  a c e n tra lly  
p la n n e d  economy o f  E aste rn  Europe, a t le a s t one in  th e  OECD b lo c , 
and one o r  more in  the  "S ou th " (a deve lop ing  economy o f  A fr ic a ,  
A s ia  o r  L a t in  Am erica).
3.4.4 S u b c o n tra c tin g
A s u b c o n tra c t in g  re la t io n s h ip  e x is ts  when a company (the  'p r in c ip a l')  
p laces  an o rd e r  w ith  a n o th e r company (the  's u b c o n tra c to r ')  f o r  th e  
m a n u fa c tu re  o f  com ponents o r  the  assembly o f  f in is h e d  p ro d u c ts  
w ith  in p u ts  p ro v id e d  by th e  p r in c ip a l.  S u b c o n tra c tin g  w i l l  
th e re fo re  be in te rn a tio n a liz e d  when e ith e r  th e  p r in c ip a l and th e  
s u b c o n tra c to r  are lo c a te d  in  d i f fe re n t  c o u n tr ie s , o r  when th e  
p r in c ip a l is  lo c a te d  in  th e  same c o u n try  as th e  s u b c o n tra c to r  b u t is  
o f  fo re ig n  o r ig in .  T h is  la t t e r  fo rm  o f bus iness is  sometimes 
re fe r re d  to  as 'o ffs h o re ' p ro d u c tio n  o r  assembly.
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A lth o u g h  in te rn a t io n a l su b c o n tra c tin g  (ISC) e n ta ils  th e  t ra d in g  
o f  p ro d u c ts  (u s u a lly  in te rm e d ia te  p rodu c ts ) i t  is  c la s s if ie d  
s e p a ra te ly  fro m  d ire c t  e x p o rt in g  as a fo rm  o f m arke t s e rv ic in g  
because th e  p r in c ip a l re ta in s  f u l l  c o n tro l ove r th e  d is t r ib u t io n  and 
m a rk e tin g  o f  th e  f in a l  p ro d u c t, w h ich  is  sometimes so ld  in  i t s  home 
m a rke t and som etimes in  th ird -c o u n t r y  m arkets. ISC th u s  re lie v e s  
e x p o rte rs  o f  th e  prob lem s o f  m a rke ting  and d is tr ib u t io n .
S h a rp s to n  (1975, p l l9 )  p o in ts  o u t th a t  the  scale o f  in ve s tm e n t 
re q u ire d  in  overseas m a rke tin g  and d is t r ib u t io n  fa c i l i t ie s  is  o fte n  
f a r  beyond th e  c a p a b il it ie s  o f many deve lop ing  n a tio n s , and th a t  ISC 
th e re fo re  b e n e fits  these  n a tio n s  by p e rm itt in g  them  access to  
m a rke ts  w h ic h  w o u ld  n o t o th e rw ise  be a v a ila b le  to  them . A n o th e r 
fe a tu re  w h ic h  d is tin g u is h e s  ISC from  d ire c t e x p o rt in g  is  th e  fa c t  
th a t  th e  p ro d u c ts  m anu fac tu red  by the  s u b c o n tra c to r  are in te n d e d  
fo r  a d e f in ite  custom er (the  p r in c ip a l) .  As a r e s u lt  th e  goods 
p ro d u ce d  b y  th e  s u b c o n tra c to r  are v e ry  o fte n  re q u ire d  to  con fo rm  to  
s p e c if ic a t io n s  w h ic h  make i t  v e ry  d i f f ic u l t  o r  im p o ss ib le  to  s e l l 
them  to  o th e r  custom ers. M icha le t (1980, p41) ch a ra c te r is e s  th is  
bond be tw een s u p p ly  and demand w h ich  lin k s  s u b c o n tra c to rs  and 
p r in c ip a ls  as be ing  "o u t o f  m arke t".
Some a u th o rs  tra c e  th e  g row ing  im portance  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
s u b c o n tra c t in g  to  th e  ex is tence  o f  t a r i f f  re g u la t io n s  in  th e  
d eve lop ed  c o u n tr ie s  and to  the  ra p id  p ro l i fe ra t io n  o f  'f re e - t ra d e  
zones' in  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  [eg see Oman (1984, p l7 ) ] .
3.5 EXPORTING
E x p o rt in g  in v o lv e s  th e  sa le  o f p ro d u c ts  across n a t io n a l bou n d a rie s  
and is  u s u a lly  c la s s if ie d  in to  tw o ca tegories : d ire c t  and in d ir e c t  
e x p o r t in g . I t  is  accom plished in d ir e c t ly  i f  in depe nden t e x p o r t 
agents  o r  m e rch a n tin g  houses ac t as pu rchase rs  fo r  fo re ig n  buye rs . 
A lte rn a t iv e ly ,  a company may s e ll i t s  p ro d u c ts  d ir e c t ly  to  an 
im p o r te r  o r  b u y e r lo ca te d  in  a fo re ig n  m arke t.
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In  th e  case o f  in d ire c t  e x p o rt in g  the  m a n u fa c tu re r does n o t 
have d ir e c t  c o n tro l ove r th e  e x p o rt o f h is  p ro d u c ts  and t h e ir  
m a rk e tin g  and d is t r ib u t io n .  Most MNCs have th e ir  own e x p o rt 
d e p a rtm e n ts  o r  e x p o rt sales s u b s id ia r ie s  and th e re fo re  do n o t 
g e n e ra lly  re s o r t  to  th is  m ethod o f e xp o rtin g . I t  is  p re d o m in a n tly  
sm a ll and m ed ium -sized companies, p a r t ic u la r ly  those  ju s t  s ta r t in g  
to  e x p o r t ,  w h ic h  use th e  in d ire c t  approach.
E x p o r t in g  may ta k e  p lace between independen t p a r t ie s  a t a rm s- 
le n g th  p r ic e s , o r  i t  may occu r between s u b s id ia r ie s  o f  th e  same 
com pany, in  w h ic h  case p rice s  w i l l  be la rg e ly  de te rm ined  by th e  
a c c o u n tin g  p ro ce d u re s  o f th e  MNC in  the  fo rm  o f t ra n s fe r  p r ice s . In  
th e  fo rm e r  case f u l l  ow ne rsh ip  and c o n tro l is  t ra n s fe r re d  fro m  th e  
s e l le r  to  th e  b u ye r a t th e  p o in t o f  exchange, w h ile  in  the  la t t e r  
case n e ith e r  is  re lin q u is h e d .
E x p o r t in g  may in v o lv e  the  sa le o f e ith e r  f in a l  o r  in te rm e d ia te  
p ro d u c ts . Where th e  e x p o rt o f  in te rm e d ia te  p ro d u c ts  in v o lv e s  some 
k in d  o f  s u b c o n tra c t in g  re la t io n s h ip , i t  cannot be rega rded  as a fo rm  
o f  e x p o r t in g . In te rn a t io n a l s u b c o n tra c tin g  excepted, e x p o rt in g  is  
m ost e a s ily  d is t in g u is h a b le  from  a lte rn a tiv e  m ethods o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
bu s in e ss  b y  th e  fa c t  th a t  p ro d u c tio n  takes p lace o u ts id e  the  c o u n try  
o f  con su m p tio n . (A lth o u g h  i t  is  poss ib le  fo r  th is  to  occu r w ith  
lic e n s in g , ie  a fo re ig n  company may be licensed  to  serve  a n o th e r 
m a rke t, th is  is  n o t v e ry  common).
3.6 STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
As s ta te d  a t th e  b e g in n in g  o f  th e  chap te r, a s tra te g ic  a llia n c e  may 
be re g a rd e d  as a c o lle c t iv e  te rm  to  describe  a num ber o f  
in te r n a t io n a l bus iness  a c t iv i t ie s  w h ich  f a l l  somewhere betw een 
e x p o r t in g  and 100 p e r cen t e q u ity  in ves tm en t. An e xa m in a tio n  o f  
v a r io u s  d e f in it io n s  o f  s tra te g ic  a llia n c e s  su p p o rts  th is  v iew .
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F o r exam ple R oot (1988, p69) de fines a s tra te g ic  a llia n c e  as:
"any fo rm  o f  lo n g -te rm  coope ra tion  between tw o 
o r  m ore in depe nden t f irm s  headqua rte red  in  tw o 
o r  m ore c o u n tr ie s  th a t  undertakes o r  su p p o rts  a 
bu s in e ss  a c t iv i t y  f o r  m u tu a l economic ga in ." ^
S tra te g ic  a llia n c e s  are de fin ed  by P o rte r and F u lle r  (1986, p315)
as:
" fo rm a l, lo n g - te rm  a llia n ce s  between f irm s  th a t  
l i n k  aspects  o f  t h e ir  businesses b u t f a l l  s h o r t  
o f  m erger."
The a u th o rs  go on to  l i s t  jo in t  ven tu res , lic e n s in g  agreem ents, 
and s u p p ly  agreem ents as examples o f s tra te g ic  a llia n ce s .
H a rr ig a n  (1988, p205) de fines  s tra te g ic  a llia n ce s  as:
"p a r tn e rs h ip s  among f irm s  th a t  w o rk  to g e th e r to  
a t ta in  some s tra te g ic  o b je c tive ."
The a u th o r  goes on to  d is t in g u is h  between s tra te g ic  a llia n c e s  
w h ic h  c re a te  a " jo in t ly  owned e n t ity "  (ie  jo in t  ve n tu re s ) and those  
w h ic h  in v o lv e  n o n -e q u ity  fo rm s o f coopera tion .
A lth o u g h  th e  fo rm s o f in te rn a tio n a l business a c t iv i t y  w h ic h  
c o l le c t iv e ly  com prise  s tra te g ic  a lliances  are n o t new, th e re  are  a 
num ber o f  fe a tu re s  o f  more re ce n t c o lla b o ra tiv e  arrangem ents w h ich  
are  n o t ic e a b ly  d i f fe r e n t  from  those w h ich  have o ccu rre d  in  th e  pa s t 
and w h ic h  have p rom pted  the  g ro w th  o f the  l i te ra tu r e  on s tra te g ic  
a llia n c e s  in  th e  1980s. These fe a tu re s  can th e re fo re  be used to  
d i f fe r e n t ia te  betw een s tra te g ic  a llia n ce s  and w hat m ig h t be c a lle d  
th e  m ore 't r a d i t io n a l '  fo rm s o f in te rn a t io n a l coop e ra tion .
The f i r s t  o f  these  fe a tu re s  is  the  fa c t th a t,  whereas th e  more 
t r a d i t io n a l  fo rm s  o f  co o p e ra tio n  ty p ic a l ly  take  p lace between 
com pan ies o f  u n e qua l s tre n g th s  and resources, s tra te g ic  a llia n c e s  
te n d  to  ta k e  p lace  between companies o f  com parable s tre n g th s  and 
re s o u rc e s  [Y oung  e t a l (1989, p273)]. As a consequence, th e y
g e n e ra lly  in v o lv e  a more ba lanced c o n tr ib u t io n  o f resources fro m
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each o f  th e  p a r t ie s . A n o th e r d if fe re n t ia t in g  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  
s t ra te g ic  a llia n c e s  is  th a t  th e y  o fte n  take  place between p a r tn e rs  
w h ic h  a re  in  d ire c t  c o m p e titio n  w ith  one ano the r; in  more 
t r a d i t io n a l  in te rn a t io n a l business re la tio n s h ip s  th e re  is  l i t t l e  o r  no 
d ire c t  c o m p e tit io n  between the  p a rtie s .
T h is  fe a tu re  is  c lo s e ly  re la te d  to  w hat is  perhaps th e  m ost 
im p o r ta n t  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  s tra te g ic  a lliances , nam ely th a t  th e y  
appea r to  be m o tiv a te d  by co n s id e ra tio n s  o f a 's tra te g ic ' n a tu re , eg 
th e  d e s ire  to  reduce  c o m p e tit io n  th ro u g h  c o llu s io n  w ith  co m p e tito rs . 
P o r te r  and F u l le r  (1986, p315) argue th a t  s tra te g ic  a llia n c e s  serve  
th e  p u rp o s e  o f  " l in k in g  m ajor com pe tito rs  to g e th e r to  compete 
w o r ld w id e " , and th e y  c o n tra s t th is  w ith  th e  more t r a d it io n a l 
a rrangem en ts  w h ic h  "w ere o fte n  ta c t ic a l,  in v o lv in g  t ie -u p s  w ith  lo c a l 
f irm s  to  g a in  m a rke t access o r  to  tra n s fe r  techno logy  p a s s iv e ly  to  
re g io n s  w here  a f irm  d id  n o t w ant to  compete d ire c t ly " .  The 
a u th o rs  go on to  deve lop  s ix  generic  ca tegories  o f  s tra te g ic  
a llia n c e , based upon th e  d if fe re n t  m o tiv a tio n s  b eh ind  them  [see 
P o r te r  and F u l le r  (1986, pp330-338)].
3.7 FRAMEWORKS FOR CLASSIFYING FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS
3.7.1 Introduction
The g ro w th  in  th e  use o f n o n -e q u ity  methods o f in te rn a t io n a l 
b u s iness  p rom p te d  th e  UN to  recommend in  i t s  1978 re p o r t  
T ra n s n a tio n a l C o rp o ra tio n s  In  W orld Development: A R e -E xam ina tion  
th a t  th e  "s o -c a lle d  a lte rn a tiv e s  to  the  tra n s n a tio n a l c o rp o ra t io n  
to g e th e r  w ith  e q u ity  in ves tm en ts , shou ld  be regarded  as c o l le c t iv e ly  
d e f in in g  th e  spectrum  o f  poss ib le  ways in  w h ich  e n te rp r is e s  in v o lv e  
them se lves  across n a t io n a l b o rd e rs " (p68).
In  th e  re m a in d e r o f  th e  ch a p te r th re e  schemes are p roposed  
f o r  c la s s ify in g  th e  "spec trum " o f in te rn a t io n a l bus iness tra n s a c tio n s . 
These schemes h ig h l ig h t  p ro p e rt ie s  common to  each o f  th e  modes o f 
in te r n a t io n a l bus iness d iscussed in  the  chap te r, th u s  fo c u s in g  
a t te n t io n  on th e  key  d iffe re n c e s  between them.
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3.7.2 O w n e rsh ip  and C o n tro l
The f i r s t  c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme employs the  concepts o f ow nersh ip  
and c o n t ro l to  c o n s tru c t a tw o -d im en s iona l framework, w ith in  w h ich  
fo rm s o f  in te r n a t io n a l business are placed. The fram ew ork  is  
i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  3-1.
C om ple te  o w n e rsh ip  and c o n tro l is  embodied in  the  w h o lly  
owned s u b s id ia ry  a t th e  top  r ig h t  hand end o f the  diagram. The 
absence o f  any o w n e rsh ip  o r  c o n tro l by the  t ra n s fe ro r  once a 
tra n s a c tio n  has been com ple ted  is  represented by e x p o rtin g  a t th e  
o p p o s ite  end. The in te rv e n in g  modes o f in te rn a tio n a l business 
in v o lv e  v a ry in g  degrees o f  p o s t- tra n s a c tio n a l ow nersh ip  and c o n tro l.
FIGURE 3-1
FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CLASSIFIED 


















[S ource : A d a p te d  fro m  Mason (1981, p31)]
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I t  s h o u ld  be no te d  th a t  th is  scheme is  n o t in te n d e d  to  im p ly  a 
d ire c t  fu n c t io n a l re la t io n s h ip  between ow nersh ip  and c o n tro l. I t  
m ere ly  suggests  th a t  in te rn a t io n a l business m igh t be considered  as a 
m a tr ix  in  w h ic h  each c e ll rep resen ts  a com bina tion  o f degrees o f 
c o n tro l and e q u ity  in v o lv e m e n t rang ing  from  h ig h /h ig h  th ro u g h  
lo w /lo w  to  zero /zero .
3.7.3 In te rn a t io n a l F low s
Modes o f  in te r n a t io n a l bus iness can also be c la s s if ie d  acco rd ing  to  
th e  f lo w s  o f  c a p ita l,  know ledge and p rodu c ts  w h ich  th e y  ty p ic a l ly  
g ive  r is e  to . Such a c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme is  shown in  Table 3-3.
I t  is  e v id e n t fro m  th is  ta b le  th a t  lic e n s in g  agreements and 
m anagement c o n tra c ts  have a common c h a ra c te r is t ic ,  in  th a t  th e y  
b o th  e n ta i l  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  know ledge, in  some fo rm  o r  o th e r. One 
can th e re fo re  ca te g o ris e  these  modes o f business und e r th e  head ing  
o f 'kn o w le d g e  tra n s fe rs '.  S im ila r ly , the  modes o f s u b c o n tra c tin g  and 
d ire c t  e x p o r t in g  can b o th  be la b e lle d  as 'p ro d u c t sa les' s ince th e y  
e n ta i l th e  sa le  o f  t ie d  and f in a l  p rodu c ts  re s p e c tiv e ly . (T ied 
p ro d u c ts  a re  th o se  p ro d u c ts  th a t  are so ld  su b jec t to  the  c o n d it io n  
th a t  th e  v e n d o r re ta in s  a degree o f  c o n tro l ove r th e  use to  w h ich  
th e  p ro d u c ts  a re  su b se q u e n tly  p u t. Much o f the  tra d e  in  t ie d  
p ro d u c ts  is  in  in te rm e d ia te  goods).
F ra n c h is in g  and tu rn k e y  agreements f a l l  somewhere between 
these  tw o  as b o th  e n ta i l th e  sa le o f  p ro d u c ts  ( t ie d  and f in a l)  and 
m a n a g e ria l e x p e rt is e , th o u g h  th e  la t t e r  is  o n ly  p ro v id e d  f o r  a 
l im ite d  p e r io d  o f  tim e . The rem a in ing  tw o methods o f in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness , FDI and jo in t  v e n tu re s , in v o lv e  the  t ra n s fe r  o f  a l l  th re e  
fo rm s o f  c o rp o ra te  re so u rce  w ith in  th e  f irm , ra th e r  th a n  th ro u g h  
th e  e x te rn a l m a rke t. They cannot th e re fo re  be sa id  to  g ive  r is e  
d ir e c t ly  to  p ro d u c t sa les o r  know ledge tra n s fe rs , and are bes t 
d e sc rib e d  c o l le c t iv e ly  by th e  te rm  "e q u ity  inves tm en ts  since b o th  
in v o lv e  a f lo w  o f  e q u ity .
From  th e  fo re g o in g  an a lys is , one can c o n s tru c t th re e  b road  




(a) E q u ity  in ves tm en ts
(b) Know ledge tra n s fe rs
(c) P ro d u c t sales.
3.7.4 V a lu e -A d d e d
The co n ce p t o f  th e  "va lu e  cha in " [P o r te r  (1985)] can be used to  
c o n s tru c t a t h i r d  scheme fo r  c la s s ify in g  form s o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness . T h is  concep t was advanced by P o rte r as a means o f  
id e n t i f in g  a com pany's sources o f  co m p e titive  advantage. I t  in v o lv e s  
d is a g g re g a tin g  a company in to  the  series o f d is c re te  v a lu e -a d d in g  
a c t iv i t ie s  w h ic h  i t  pe rfo rm s: R&D, p ro d u c tio n , m a rke tin g ,
d is t r ib u t io n ,  e tc.
A c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme based upon a ty p ic a l v a lu e  cha in  is  
show n in  Tab le  3-4. The row s o f  the  ta b le  de fin e  th e  a c t iv i t ie s  in  
th e  v a lu e  ch a in , w h ile  the  columns c la s s ify  the  typ e  o f  ow nersh ip  
a c c o rd in g  to  w h e th e r o r  n o t e q u ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n  is  in v o lv e d . Each 
o f th e  num bers in  th e  ta b le  re p re se n t a 'c e ll ' w h ich  combines one o f 
th e  o w n e rs h ip  typ e s  w ith  one o f the  lin k s  in  the  v a lu e  cha in .
TABLE 3-4
FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CLASSIFIED BY 
LIN K  IN  THE VALUE CHAIN AND BY OWNERSHIP
VALUE CHAIN OWNERSHIP 











[S ou rce : A d ap ted  fro m  R oot (1988, p71)]
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Each fo rm  o f  in te rn a t io n a l business can be regarded  as 
co m b in ing  one o f  th e  ow nersh ip  types w ith  one o r more lin k s  in  th e  
v a lu e  c h a in . Tab le  3-4 can th e re fo re  be used to  d e fin e  a p a r t ic u la r  
fo rm  o f  in te r n a t io n a l business by ow nersh ip  and by the  lo c a tio n  on 
th e  v a lu e  c h a in  o f  th e  resources ob ta ined  by one o f th e  
p a r t ic ip a n ts .  A ty p ic a l lic e n s in g  agreement, fo r  example, w o u ld  
occupy c e lls  3,5,7 and 9 fo r  the  lice n so r, s ince the  a c t iv i t ie s  
asso c ia te d  w ith  these  ce lls  are c a rr ie d  o u t on i t s  b e h a lf by th e  
license e . The license e , on the  o th e r hand, w ou ld  occupy c e ll 1 s ince  
i t  g a in s  th e  r ig h t  to  use th e  techno logy re s u lt in g  from  th e  
lic e n s o r 's  R&D.
In te rn a t io n a l s u b c o n tra c tin g  w ou ld  ty p ic a l ly  occupy ce lls  3 and 
5 f o r  th e  f i r m  c o n tra c t in g  o u t p ro d u c tio n . J o in t  ve n tu re s  w o u ld  
occupy some co m b in a tio n  o f  ce lls  2,4,6,8 and 10 depending upon th e  
r e la t iv e  c o n tr ib u t io n s  o f  th e  p a rtie s ; f o r  example, a MNC w h ich  
o b ta in in g  m a rk e tin g  and d is t r ib u t io n  s k i l ls  from  a jo in t  v e n tu re  
p a r tn e r  w o u ld  occupy c e lls  8 and 10. Both FDI and e x p o rt in g  w o u ld  
occupy c e lls  2,4,6,8, and 10 s ince a l l  o f  th e  va lu e -a d d in g  a c t iv i t ie s  
are c a r r ie d  o u t  b y  one company.,
3.7.5 Conclusion
G iven th e  v a r ie ty  o f  ways in  w h ich  in te rn a tio n a l business can be 
cond uc te d , th e  c la s s if ic a t io n  schemes o u tlin e d  here  are h e lp fu l in  
th a t  th e y  h ig h l ig h t  ke y  fa c to rs  w h ich  companies sh o u ld  cons ide r in  
d e te rm in in g  th e  m ethod w h ich  s u its  them best.
Com panies s h o u ld  th u s  con s id e r w hat le v e l o f c o n tro l th e y  w ish  
to  e x e rc is e  o v e r t h e ir  resources  w h ich  th e y  tra n s fe r  abroad, and 
a lso  how  m uch o w n e rsh ip  is  necessary to  achieve th is  g iven  le v e l 
o f  c o n tro l.  In  a d d it io n , th e y  sh o u ld  examine the  a c t iv it ie s  w h ich  
com prise  t h e i r  v a lu e  ch a in  and o n ly  c a rry  o u t those  a c t iv it ie s  w h ich  





1. T h is  q u o te  o r ig in a te d  in  a book by Finnegan (1976), and was 
s u b s e q u e n tly  re fe rre d  to  by Prasad (1981) and B uck ley  (1985). I t  
can a lso  be fo und , u n a ttr ib u te d , in  Business In te rn a t io n a l
2. B us iness  In te rn a t io n a l (1977, p20) de fines lic e n s in g  as a fo rm  
o f  b u s iness  w h ich  is  concerned w ith  p a ten ts , tradem arks  and 
kn o w -h o w . Rugman e t a l (1985, p94) d e fin e  lic e n s in g  as a 
g e n e r ic  te rm  w h ich  also covers management c o n tra c ts , 
f ra n c h is in g  and s u b co n tra c tin g . The la t te r  o f  these bus iness 
modes is  d e scrib ed  as c o n tra c t m anu fac tu ring  by Rugman e t a l.
3. B a il l ie ,  1984, p73.
4. The P a ris  C o nven tio n  is  adm in is te red  by the  W orld In te lle c tu a l 
P ro p e r ty  O rg a n is a tio n  (WIPO), a UN agency based in  Geneva.
5. Banks R e p o rt (1970, Cmnd. 4407, Para 493) as quo ted  by  C aw th ra  
(1986, p l40).
6. UNIDO, 1979, p l l .
7. C reed and Bangs (1960, p93) as quo ted by C aw thra  (1986, p l40).
8. Incom e and C o rp o ra tio n  Taxes A c t (1970, s386(7)) as quo ted  by 
G a lla fe n t a t a l (1981, p l l5 ) .
9. UNIDO, 1979, p34.
10. R o o t uses th e  te rm  'in te rn a tio n a l co o p e ra tive  a rrangem ent' 
r a th e r  th a n  th e  te rm  'in te rn a tio n a l s tra te g ic  a llia n c e '. The 
la t t e r  te rm  is  used th ro u g h o u t th is  chap te r in  o rd e r to  ensure  
c o n s is te n c y  o f  te rm in o lo g y . A lso note  th a t  " lo n g -te rm ” in  
R o o t's  d e f in i t io n  does n o t re fe r  to  a s p e c if ic  p e r io d  o f  tim e, 
b u t ,  ra th e r ,  to  a d u ra t io n  exceeding th a t  needed to  com plete 
a rm 's - le n g th , ope n -m arke t tra n sa c tio n s .
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REVIEW OF EXISTING THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The fo llo w in g  fo u r  chap te rs  rev iew  the  th e o re t ic a l and e m p ir ic a l 
l i te r a tu r e  w h ich  is  re le v a n t to  th e  aims o f the  th e s is  se t o u t in  
C h a p te r One. C hap te r F ou r con ta ins  a rev iew  o f th e o rie s  o f FDI. 
A lth o u g h  th e  th e s is  is  n o t concerned w ith  FDI pe r se, b u t w ith  
lic e n s in g , i t  is  necessary to  rev iew  the  FDI l i te ra tu r e  due to  th e  
fa c t  th a t  lic e n s in g  and FDI are a lte rn a tiv e  methods o f s e rv ic in g  a 
fo re ig n  m a rke t. In  a sense, when we have a th e o ry  o f  FDI we a lso 
have a th e o ry  o f lic e n s in g  since the  absence o f fa c to rs  w h ich  
p rom o te  FDI are  l ik e ly  to  lead to  lice n s in g  be ing  chosen as th e  
m a rke t s e rv ic in g  m ethod, o r  e x p o rtin g  i f  c o n d itio n s  p rom o ting  fre e  
tra d e  w ere  to  h o ld . In  th e  words o f Rugman (1982) "once the  reasons 
f o r  MNE's [ ie  FD I] are e xp la ined  th e n  the  a lte rn a tiv e s  o f  e x p o rt in g  
and lic e n s in g  are them selves exp la ined  (as re dun dan t cases). No 
sepa ra te  th e o ry  is  re q u ire d "  (p l6).
A common theme ru n n in g  th ro u g h  many o f the  th e o rie s  o f FDI 
is  th a t  f irm s  make th e  dec is io n  to  in v e s t abroad as a re s u lt  o f  
im p e rfe c tio n s  w h ich  e x is t  in  w o rld  p ro d u c t and fa c to r  m arkets. The 
m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  concept has been suggested as a u n ify in g  
pa rad igm  f o r  th e  v a r io u s  e xp la n a tio n s  found  in  th e  FDI l i te ra tu re .  
C h a p te r F o u r th e re fo re  concludes w ith  a d e s c r ip tio n  o f  fo u r  classes 
o f  m a rk e t im p e rfe c tio n , suggested by C a lve t (1981), w h ich  embrace 
e x is t in g  th e o r ie s  o f FDI.
C h a p te r F ive  rev iew s  th e  l i te ra tu re  w h ich  extends the  'th e o ry  
o f  th e  f ir m ' to  th e  m u lt in a t io n a l s e ttin g . This l i te ra tu r e  is  founded  
upon th e  ideas o f  Ronald  Coase (1937) who exp la ined  th e  ex is tence  
o f f irm s  in  te rm s o f  tra n s a c tio n  costs. The subsequent deve lopm ent 
o f  w h a t is  com monly te rm ed the  'Coasian th e o ry  o f th e  f irm  by 
W illia m so n  (1975) in  a dom estic  co n te x t, and it s  ex te n s io n  to  the  MNC 
by B u c k le y  and Casson (1976), among o the rs , is  described  in  th is  
c h a p te r.
I t  is  a p p ro p r ia te  a t th is  stage to  e xp la in  why the  FDI 
l i te r a tu r e  (C hap te r F ou r) and th e  l i te ra tu r e  on th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  
MNC (C h a p te r F ive ) have been rev iew ed  sepa ra te ly , g iven  th a t  th e re
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is  some o v e r la p  in  th e ir  re sp e c tive  contents. In  a sense th is
o v e rla p  is  o n ly  to  be expected since FDI is  the  process w hereby 
MNC s a re  c rea ted . Indeed, in  many a r t ic le s  one tends to  f in d  the  
term s ’FD I th e o ry ’ and 'th e o ry  o f  th e  MNC’ used in te rcha ngeab ly .
The reason  f o r  d is t in g u is h in g  between the  tw o li te ra tu re s  is
th a t  th e re  are  m a jo r d iffe re n c e s  in  the  emphases w h ich  they  adopt. 
The th e o ry  o f  th e  MNC is  concerned w ith  the  fa c to rs  w h ich  lead to  
the  c re a t io n  o f  f irm s  spann ing  n a tio n a l boundaries, ra th e r  than  w ith  
the  fa c to rs  w h ic h  prom ote  FDI. I t  emphasises the  ro le  o f  one 
p a r t ic u la r  c lass  o f  m arke t im p e rfe c tio n , namely m arke t fa i lu re ,  
whereas FDI th e o ry  p laces more emphasis on m arke t s tru c tu re
im p e rfe c tio n s . In  th e  w ords o f  D unning (1979) the  s h i f t  in  emphasis
w h ich  o c c u rre d  w ith  th e  renew a l o f  in te re s t in  the  Coasian th e o ry  
o f  th e  f i r m  in  th e  1970's re fle c te d  "a sw itch  in  a t te n tio n  from  the  
ac t o f  fo re ig n  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t ... to  the  in s t i tu t io n  m aking the  
in v e s tm e n t"  (P274).1
C h a p te r S ix  re v ie w s  th e  l i te ra tu r e  on in te rn a tio n a l lic e n s in g . 
D esp ite  Rugman's a rgum ent th a t  no separate th e o ry  is  re q u ire d  to  
e x p la in  l ic e n s in g  (op c it )  th e re  e x is ts  an id e n t if ia b le ,  i f  d isp a ra te , 
l i te r a tu r e  on th e  su b je c t. F o u r sets o f fa c to rs  are id e n t if ie d  from  
th is  l i t e r a tu r e  as key  in flu e n c e s  on the  lice n s in g  dec is ion , and 
these a re  th e n  used as ca tego ries  under w h ich the  v a r io u s  th e o rie s  
and e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  are d iscussed. The fa c to rs  id e n t if ie d  are as 
fo llo w s : te c h n o lo g y  and p ro d u c t-s p e c if ic  fa c to rs , in d u s try -s p e c if ic
fa c to rs , c o u n try -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs  and f irm -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs .
C h a p te r Seven draw s to g e th e r the  va rio u s  th e o rie s  w h ich  have 
been d iscussed  and proposes an a n a ly tic a l fram ew ork  w ith in  w h ich  
the  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  can be unders tood . This fram ew ork  in c lu d e s  
in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry , tra n s a c tio n  cost th e o ry  and lo c a tio n  
th e o ry , and is  a r t ic u la te d  by D unning (1977) in  h is  e c le c tic  
parad igm  o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n , la te r  re fin e d  (1988) in to  the  
'fa c to r  endow m ents /m arke t fa i lu re ' paradigm . In  a d d itio n , th e  
c h a p te r h ig h l ig h ts  a num ber o f the  problem s in v o lv e d  in  te s tin g  the  
v a l id i t y  o f  th e  parad igm  and i t  o u tlin e s  some ways in  w h ich  the  
m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  may be modelled.
86
NOTES
1. As q u o te d  by  C a lve t, 1981, p48.
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CHAPTER FOUR THEORIES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The re v ie w  o f  FDI th e o r ie s  w h ich  fo llo w s  w i l l  be based upon the  
c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme shown below.
FIGURE 4-1
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1) INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY
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b) product life cycle approach
2) LOCATION THEORY
3) IN D U STR IAL ORGANIZATION THEORY
4) INVESTMENT THEORY
a) imperfect capital markets approach
b) risk diversification approach
[SOURCE: Author]
T h is  c la s s if ic a t io n  was c o n s tru c te d  from  a num ber o f the  
c a tego ries  suggested  by  Grosse (1981) and K ou tsoy iann is  (1982). The 
's t r i c t l y  econom ic ' th e o r ie s  cons ide r o n ly  economic fa c to rs  as 
d e te rm in a n ts  o f  FDI, whereas 's t r ic t ly  s u b je c tive ' th e o rie s  emphasize 
the  a t t i tu d e s  o f  management. The la t te r  group o f th e o rie s  a^e
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b roken  dow n in to  o rg a n iz a tio n a l/b e h a v io u ra l theo rie s  and m anageria l 
th e o rie s .
The re m a in d e r o f  th is  ch a p te r p rov ides a d e s c r ip tio n  o f th e  
types o f  th e o r ie s  co n ta ined  w ith in  each category. The s t r ic t ly  
s u b je c t iv e  th e o r ie s  and the  genera lised theo ries  are o n ly  b r ie f ly  
d e sc rib ed  s in ce  i t  is  th e  economic exp lana tions o f FDI w h ich  are o f 
d ire c t re le v a n c e  to  th e  aims o f the  thes is . Of the  tw o ca tegories  o f 
econom ic e x p la n a tio n s , n o rm a tive  th e o rie s  are on ly  surveyed v e ry  
b r ie f ly  s in ce  we are  more concerned w ith  the  in s ig h t w h ich  p o s it iv e  
th e o r ie s  o f  FDI have  f o r  the  m arke t se rv ic in g  dec is ion . The c h a p te r 
then  co n c lude s  w ith  a d e s c r ip tio n  o f the  m arke t im p e rfe c tio n s  
parad igm , w h ic h  ca p tu re s  a l l  o f  the  (p o s itive ) economic th e o r ie s  
p re v io u s ly  d e sc rib e d .
4.2 MANAGERIAL THEORIES
M anageria l th e o r ie s  o f  th e  f irm  are based on the  se p a ra tio n  o f 
o w ne rsh ip  fro m  c o n tro l w h ich  e x is ts  in  the  ty p ic a l m odem  f irm . 
The consequences o f  th is  se p a ra tio n  were f i r s t  no ted  by Adam Sm ith  
in  h is  b o o k  The W ea lth  o f  N a tions (1776), a lthough  i t  was a n o th e r 
157 ye a rs  b e fo re  th e  issu e  gained prom inence. Th is  occu rred  w ith  
the  p u b lic a t io n  o f  B e rle  and Means’s book The Modern C o rp o ra tio n  
and P r iv a te  P ro p e rty  (1932). They h ig h lig h te d  the  fa c t  th a t  economic 
pow er was becom ing conce n tra ted  in  a few la rg e  m a n u fa c tu rin g  
f irm s , and th a t  d e c is io n -m a k in g  power in  these f irm s  had s h if te d  
from  s h a re h o ld e rs  to  a sm a ll s e lf-p e rp e tu a tin g  groups o f 
p ro fe s s io n a l m anagers. Since ow nersh ip  o f companies was d if fu s e d  
among a range  o f  d i f fe re n t  shareho lde rs, managers had th e  
o p p o r tu n ity  to  m axim ise th e ir  own in te re s ts  a t the  expense o f th e ir  
s h a re h o ld e rs ' in te re s ts .
T h is  d i f fu s io n  o f  share ow nersh ip  is , however, a necessary b u t 
n o t a s u f f ic ie n t  c o n d it io n  fo r  th e  ex is tence  o f m anageria l d is c re tio n , 
s ince m anagers may be fo rc e d  to  m axim ise sh a reh o lde r w e a lth  und e r 
p re ssu re  fro m  c a p ita l and p ro d u c t m arkets. M anageria l th e o rie s  are 
th e re fo re  based upon th e  p resum ption  o f im p e rfe c tio n s  in  these
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m arke ts  w h ic h  a llo w  managers to  d ive rge  from  the  o b je c tiv e  o f 
m ax im is ing  sh a re h o ld e rs ' w e a lth .
In  c a p ita l m arke ts , im p e rfe c tio n s  take  the  fo rm  o f m o n ito r in g  
costs  and en fo rcem ent costs. The fo rm er are expended by 
s h a re h o ld e rs  in  m o n ito r in g  th e  perform ance o f managers; th e  la t t e r  
are in c u r re d  i f  sh a re h o ld e rs  make any a ttem pt to  sanc tio n  managers. 
Bo th  cos ts  in s u re  th a t  's h a re h o ld e r in e r t ia ' tends to  p redom ina te  in  
th e  c a p ita l m a rke t. When com bined w ith  the  absence o f c o m p e tit iv e  
p ressu res  fro m  th e  p ro d u c t m arket, these im p e rfe c tio n s  a llo w  
managers to  p u rsu e  a lte rn a t iv e  goals, such as sales m ax im isa tion , as 
suggested by  Baumol (1959), o r  g ro w th  m axim isa tion , suggested by 
M a rr is  (1964), o r  th e  m ax im isa tion  o f m u lt ip le  o b jec tives . F o r 
exam ple, W illia m so n  (1964) proposed th a t  managers seek to  m axim ise 
a u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n  whose components are sa la ry , s e c u r ity , s ta tu s , 
pow er, p re s t ig e  and p ro fe s s io n a l excellence.
S ubsequen t c o n tr ib u t io n s  to  the  m anageria l l i te ra tu r e  have 
d e riv e d  th e i r  in s p ir a t io n  from  the  p ionee ring  w o rk  o f Coase (1937) 
who p ro v id e d  a ra t io n a le  fo r  the  existence o f the  f irm . The ideas 
o f Coase are  d e sc rib e d  in  d e ta il in  the  fo llo w in g  chap te r, a long w ith  
the  la te r  in s ig h ts  p ro v id e d  by A lch ia n  and Demsetz (1972), Jensen 
and M e c k lin g  (1976) and Fama (1980). What these c o n tr ib u tio n s  have 
in  common is  t h e ir  id e n t if ic a t io n  o f the  re le v a n t costs and b e n e fits  
w h ich  r e s u lt  fro m  th e  u t i l i t y  m axim is ing  beh a v io u r o f  management.
The assum ptions  upon w h ich  m anageria l th e o rie s  o f the  f irm  
re s t a re  c le a r ly  a p p lic a b le  to  MNCs, since such firm s  ty p ic a l ly  have 
a degree o f  m onopo ly  pow er in  th e ir  p ro d u c t m arkets, and most are 
la rg e  enough to  enable  managers to  re s is t  sha reh o lde r p ressures. 
D esp ite  th e  re le va n ce  o f  such th e o rie s  to  MNCs l i t t l e  w o rk  has been 
done to  d ir e c t ly  te s t  th e  e x te n t o f th e ir  a p p lic a b il ity  in  a 
m u lt in a t io n a l s e tt in g , eg th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t FDI may be m o tiva te d  
by th e  d e s ire  o f  m anagers to  m axim ise g row th , o r  to  enhance th e ir  
s ta tu s  w i th in  th e  f irm . More e f fo r t  has been expended in  a p p ly in g  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l/b e h a v io u ra l th e o r ie s  o f the  f irm  to  the  m u lt in a tio n a l 




These th e o r ie s  d i f f e r  more fundam en ta lly  from  t r a d it io n a l 
n e o c la s s ic a l th e o ry  th a n  do m anageria l th e o rie s  since th e y  d ispense 
w ith  th e  a ssu m p tio n  th a t  f irm s  m axim ise any th ing , even u t i l i t y .  The 
b e h a v io u ra lis ts  re je c t  th e  n o tio n  th a t  the  in d iv id u a l has a w e ll 
d e fin e d  se t o f  p re fe re n ce s  and a w illin g n e ss  to  choose the  bes t 
a l te rn a t iv e  a v a ila b le . T h e ir  o n ly  assum ption is  th a t  the  in d iv id u a l 
has e x p e c ta tio n s  a b o u t w ha t is  s a t is fa c to ry  and th a t  he accepts th e  
f i r s t  a l te rn a t iv e  w h ic h  s a t is f ie s  h is  expecta tions. A cco rd ing  to  th e  
phrase co in e d  b y  Simon (1957), in d iv id u a ls  are n o t op tim ise rs  b u t 
s a t is f ic e rs .
S im on 's p io n e e rin g  w o rk  on in d iv id u a l b e h a v io u r was extended 
by C y e rt and M arch (1963), who analysed group b e h a v io u r w ith in  a 
f irm . T h e ir  f in d in g s  c a lle d  in to  q ue s tion  the  t ra d it io n a l b e lie f  th a t  
f irm s  can be lo o k e d  upon  as h av ing  one m ajor dec is ion -m aker. They 
fo u n d  f irm s  to  be com plex 'o rg a n iz a tio n a l c o a lit io n s ' ope ra ted  by 
groups (m anagers, d ire c to rs ,  sha reho lde rs  etc.) who, a lth o u g h  h a v in g  
a common in te re s t  in  th e  s u rv iv a l o f the  f irm  and a consequent 
w ill in g n e s s  to  co -o p e ra te , neve rthe less  pursue th e ir  separa te  
in te re s ts  once s u rv iv a l is  assured. The f in a l goals o f  the  f irm  are 
thus  a r r iv e d  a t v ia  an in fo rm a l b a rg a in in g  process w h ich  re s u lts  in  
a com prom ise s o lu t io n .  T h is  compromise w i l l  n e a rly  always p roduce  
s u b -o p tim a l e f f ic ie n c y  w ith in  the  f irm . The 'o rg a n iz a tio n a l s la c k  
w h ich  e x is ts  enables excess payments ( in  cash o r  k in d ) to  be 
d is t r ib u te d  among th e  c o a lit io n  members, thus  ensu ring  acquiesence.
A b a s ic  fe a tu re  o f  f irm  behav iou r, th e re fo re , is  i t s  
u n p re d ic ta b i l i ty ,  s ince  changes in  the  power s tru c tu re  o f  th e  
c o a lit io n  w i l l  in e v ita b ly  p roduce  v a r ia t io n s  in  the  f irm  s o b je c tive s . 
N eve rthe less , i t  w i l l  o fte n  be reasonable , in  the  s h o r t run , to  ta ke  
many o f  th e  goa ls  o f  th e  f irm  as g iven . I f  the  v a r ia b le s  th a t  a f fe c t  
the  d e c is io n  p rocess can th e n  be id e n t if ie d ,  te s ta b le  p re d ic tio n s  
abou t th e  c o n d u c t o f  f irm s  can be made.
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J u s t  such  a s p e c if ic a t io n  o f va r ia b le s  was produced by C ye rt 
and M arch who o u tlin e d , in  The B ehav iou ra l Theory o f the  F irm , 
t h e ir  g o a ls -e x p e c ta tio n s -c h o ic e  tr ic h o to m y  ( lin k e d  to g e th e r by th e ir  
assoc ia ted  re la t io n a l concepts) to  e xp la in  c o a lit io n  behav iou r. Upon 
th is  b a s ic  fra m e w o rk  a com puter s im u la tio n  o f the  p r ic e  and o u tp u t 
d ec is io ns  o f  a la rg e  r e ta i l  departm ent s to re  was cons truc te d , and i t  
p e rfo rm e d  re m a rk a b ly  w e ll in  p re d ic tin g  company behav iou r. The 
a u th o rs  came to  th e  co n c lu s io n  th a t  decis ions are m a in ly  de te rm ined  
by th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f  'ru le s  o f thum b' and s tanda rd  o p e ra tin g  
p roced u re s . S ubsequent e m p ir ic a l s tud ies  have achieved s im ila r ly  
s a t is fa c to ry  r e s u lts  w ith  th is  model.
Hood and Young (1979) have o u tlin e d  some ways in  w h ich  an 
MNC may behave as a 'C y e rt and March f irm '.  A s h i f t  in  the  balance 
o f p ow e r be tw een c o a lit io n  members in  the  p a re n t company, fo r  
exam ple, may le a d  to  an expansion o r c o n tra c tio n  o f fo re ig n  
in ve s tm e n t. A t th e  s u b s id ia ry  le v e l, d if fe re n t  pow er s tru c tu re s  
may le a d  to  com prom ises th a t  produce num erous types o f 
o rg a n iz a t io n a l s la ck .
The b e h a v io u ra l approach to  the  s tudy  o f co rp o ra te  d e c is io n ­
m aking was s p e c if ic a l ly  a p p lie d  to  MNCs in  a s tu d y  by A h a ro n i 
(1966). He ana lysed  38 companies th a t  had considered d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t in  Is ra e l and came to  the  conc lus ion  th a t,  c o n tra ry  to  
the  p r o f i t  m a x im is in g  model, these f irm s  d id  n o t compare se ve ra l 
c o u n tr ie s  in  se ek ing  th e  bes t investm en t, b u t made dec is ions in  
term s o f  a s p e c if ic  p ro je c t in  a s p e c ific  co u n try . Th is  re s u lt  
su p p o rts  C y e rt and M arch 's concept o f 'p rob lem a tic  search , w h ich  
ho lds  th a t  th e  s o lu t io n  to  a prob lem  is  ty p ic a l ly  sough t in  the  area 
o f th e  p ro b le m  i t s e l f  and in  th e  area o f th e  most obv ious  
a lte rn a tiv e .
The fo re ig n  in ve s tm e n t dec is io n  process was ch a rac te rised  by 
A h a ro n i as a sequence o f  s teps, namely: the  dec is ion  to  lo o k  abroad, 
the  in v e s t ig a t io n  p rocess, the  com mitm ent to  in v e s t, and fo llo w  up 
rev iew s  and re fin e m e n ts . He argued th a t  the  s tre n g th  o f commitment 
to  p roceed  depended more on the  s tre n g th  o f the  in i t ia t in g  fo r  
(such as th e  th re a t  o f  lo s in g  an e x p o rt m arke t o r the  d r iv e  o f a to p
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e x e c u tiv e ) th a n  on h a rd  in fo rm a tio n  abou t p r o f i t  and m arke t g ro w th  
p ro sp e c ts . The f i r s t  s tep is  th u s  the  most c r i t ic a l stage in  th e  
process.
A h a ro n i tra c e d  th e  dec is io n  process th ro u g h  to  com ple tion , 
n o t in g  how  in fo rm a tio n  passed w ith in  the  f irm  was o fte n  d is to r te d  
to  se rve  th e  goa ls  o f  th e  sender, and how percep tions o f the  p ro je c t 
changed o v e r  tim e  and a t d if fe re n t  le ve ls  o f  the  m anageria l 
h ie ra rc h y . He conc luded  th a t  th e  dec is ion  to  in v e s t abroad, i f  
repea ted , was o fte n  in s t i tu t io n a l is e d  in  an in te rn a tio n a l d iv is io n  
w ith in  th e  f irm .  T h is  was a s ig n if ic a n t  developm ent in  c re a tin g  
b o th  e x p e r t is e  and a ve s te d  in te re s t  in  fu r th e r  fo re ig n  investm en ts.
The w o rk  o f  A h a ro n i dem onstra tes th a t  th e o rie s  o f FDI d e rive d  
from  th e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l/b e h a v io u ra l schoo l o f th o u g h t can p ro v id e  
im p o r ta n t in s ig h ts  when we are s tu d y in g  the  com plex d e c is io n ­
m aking p rocesses o f  MNCs since th e y  b u ild  models o f c o rp o ra te  
b e h a v io u r  u s in g  v a r ia b le s  and re la tio n s h ip s  ob ta ined  th ro u g h  th e  
o b s e rv a tio n  o f  a c tu a l dec is io n -m a k in g  behav iou r.
4.4 NORMATIVE THEORIES
N o rm a tive  th e o r ie s  seek to  gu ide  f irm s  in  th e ir  ana lys is  o f  th e  
u n iq u e  aspects  o f  th e  FDI dec is ion . In  genera l, th e y  are concerned 
w ith  th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f  dom estic  c a p ita l budge ting  techn iques to  the  
more com plex in te rn a t io n a l sphere in  o rd e r to  take  account o f  
p o l i t ic a l  and fo re ig n  c u rre n c y  r is k s  and p a re n t-s u b s id ia ry  
re la t io n s h ip s .  They th e re fo re  tend  to  be found  in  te x tb o o ks  on 
in te rn a t io n a l f in a n c ia l management. Such th e o rie s  o f fe r  o p in ions  on 
how f irm s  o u g h t to  make FDI dec is ions : f o r  example, w he the r the  
p a re n t o r  th e  s u b s id ia ry 's  cash flo w s  shou ld  be regarded as re le v a n t 
o r, i f  a d is c o u n te d  cash f lo w  te ch n iq u e  is  to  be used, whose cost o f  
c a p ita l s h o u ld  be em ployed.
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N o rm a tive  th e o r ie s  o f FDI are n o t d ire c t ly  re le v a n t to  the  
aims o f  th e  th e s is  s ince  th e y  are n o t concerned w ith  e xp la in in g  why 
firm s  engage in  FDI. They are n o t th e re fo re  considered any fu r th e r .  
We tu r n  now to  c o n s id e r p o s it iv e  th e o rie s  o f FDI, w h ich  are 
concerned w ith  e x p la in in g  why FDI takes place ra th e r  th a n  how 
fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n ts  o u g h t to  be eva luated.
F ig u re  4-1 d e fin e s  fo u r  main branches o f p o s it iv e  th e o ry , a l l  
o f them  d ra w n  fro m  the  e x is t in g  body o f economic l i te ra tu re ,  namely: 
in te rn a t io n a l tra d e  th e o ry , lo c a tio n  theo ry , in d u s tr ia l o rg a n iza tio n  
th e o ry  and in v e s tm e n t th e o ry . Each o f these is  now considered, 
a long w ith  th e  re s u lts  o f  e m p ir ica l te s ts  w h ich  have been c a rr ie d  
ou t, so th a t  t h e ir  re s p e c tiv e  e xp la n a to ry  powers can be compared.
4.5 INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY
4.5.1 In t r o d u c t io n
In te rn a t io n a l tra d e  th e o ry  can be d iv id e d  in to  tw o separa te  
v ie w p o in ts , each o f  w h ich  p ro v id e  exp lana tions  fo r  th e  ex is tence  o f 
FDI [G rosse  (1981, p lO )]. F irs t ly ,  th e re  is  the  'com para tive  cos t 
v ie w ', w h ic h  focuses on the  supp ly  side and has a macroeconomic 
o r ie n ta t io n ,  and second ly  th e re  is  a 'p ro d u c t l i f e  cycle v ie w ', w h ich  
focuses on th e  demand s ide  and is  more d e s c r ip tiv e  in  i t s  approach. 
Each o f  these  is  now considered.
4.5.2 C o m p a ra tive  C ost A pproach
Th is  app ro ach  e x p la in s  FDI by e lim in a tin g  th e  assum ption o f 
in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l im m o b ility  from  the  H ecksher/O hlin /Sam uelson 
model o f  in te rn a t io n a l tra d e . I t  proposes th a t, in  the  presence o f 
tra d e  r e s t r ic t io n s  between co u n tr ie s , c a p ita l w i l l  f lo w  between 
c o u n tr ie s  and e f fe c t iv e ly  act as a s u b s titu te  fo r  f in a l p ro d u c t 
f lo w s  (e x p o rts ) . F o r example, f irm s  from  c a p ita l abundant c o u n tr ie s  
w o u ld  f in d  i t  p r o f i ta b le  to  e x p o rt c a p ita l in  o rd e r to  ta ke  
advantage o f  th e  h ig h e r  re tu rn s  a v a ila b le  abroad (re s u lt in g  from  the  
re la t iv e  d e fic ie n c y  o f  c a p ita l in  fo re ig n  m arkets). Th is t ra n s fe r
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w ould  have  th e  e f fe c t  o f  ra is in g  the  p rice  o f c a p ita l in  the  donor 
co u n try , th u s  c o n t r ib u t in g  tow ards  the  equa liza tion  o f in te re s t ra tes  
and th e  r e s to ra t io n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l e q u ilib r iu m .
C a p ita l w i l l  move in te rn a tio n a lly ,  th e re fo re , so long as i t s  
m arg ina l p ro d u c t d i f fe r s  from  c o u n try  to  coun try . G iven th a t  the  
usua l c r i t e r io n  o f  c a p ita l p ro d u c t iv ity  is  the  dom estic in te re s t ra te , 
're a l' in te r n a t io n a l in te re s t  ra te  d if fe re n t ia ls  can be regarded as the  
most im p o r ta n t  s t im u lu s  to  fo re ig n  investm ent, accord ing to  th is  
v ie w p o in t.
T h is  a p p ro a ch  does no t, however, p rov id e  a v e ry  conv inc ing  
e x p la n a tio n  o f  FDI, f o r  as w e ll as la c k in g  genera l e m p irica l su p p o rt 
i t  has s e v e ra l th e o re t ic a l de fic ie n c ie s . A lth ough  i t  d iscards one o f 
the a ssum p tio ns  o f  n e o c la ss ica l in te rn a tio n a l tra d e  th e o ry  (c a p ita l 
im m o b ility )  i t  re ta in s  a l l  th e  o the rs . Inc luded  among these are th e  
p ro p o s it io n s  th a t  in fo rm a tio n  is  f re e ly  a va ila b le  and th a t  p e rfe c t 
c o m p e tit io n  p re v a ils .  The presumed existence o f trad e  b a rr ie rs  
makes th e  la t t e r  o f  these assum ptions suspect, w h ile  the  
in tro d u c t io n  o f  in fo rm a tio n  costs and the  existence o f  in te re s t ra te  
r is k  makes th e  c a lc u la t io n  o f  equa l in te re s t ra tes  d i f f ic u l t .  In  
a d d it io n , any v a r ia t io n s  in  r is k  pre ferences w i l l  make in te re s t ra te s  
u n s u ita b le  f o r  p re d ic t in g  c a p ita l movements, fo r  in v e s to rs  w ith  
d i f fe r in g  r is k  p re fe re n ce s  and in fo rm a tio n  needs may be in d if fe re n t  
to  a w ide  range  o f  p re v a il in g  in te re s t ra tes, o r  th e y  may re a c t 
d i f fe re n t ly .
As o u t l in e d  above, th e  com para tive  cost model p ro v id e s  a 
th e o re t ic a l s t ru c tu re  f o r  e x p la in in g  in te rn a tio n a l c a p ita l flo w s , b u t 
i t  f a i ls  to  d is t in g u is h  c o n c e p tu a lly  between d ire c t in ves tm en t and 
p o r t fo l io  in v e s tm e n t. I t  does n o t acknowledge th a t  FDI in v o lv e s  the  
tra n s fe r  o f  a package o f  resources w h ich  in c lud es  techno logy  and 
management as w e ll as e q u ity  c a p ita l. In  a d d itio n , i t  is  unable  to  
e xp la in  th e  obse rve d  p a t te rn  o f FDI w h ich  is  concen tra ted  in  a few  
c o u n tr ie s  and in d u s tr ie s .
S e ve ra l e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  conducted in  the  US [eg Kwack (1972)] 
have fo u n d  th a t  a c tu a l in te re s t  ra te  d if fe re n t ia ls  between home an
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host c o u n tr ie s  a re  sm a ll, and th a t no s ig n if ic a n t re la tio n s h ip  e x is ts  
between fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t f lo w s  and in te re s t ra tes. O ther s tud ies  
have a tte m p te d  to  te s t  f o r  a re la t io n s h ip  between trade  b a rr ie rs  and 
ca p ita l f lo w s , b u t  have  produced  c o n flic t in g  resu lts . Balassa (1967) 
and S ca pe rlan da  & M auer (1969) a ttem pted to  measure the  im pact o f 
t a r i f f  d is c r im in a t io n  b y  th e  EEC on US FDI in to  the  reg ion ; n e ith e r 
s tudy show ed a p o s it iv e  re la t io n s h ip  between t a r i f f s  and FDI. 
N everthe less, D u n n in g  (1958) and H o rs t (1972) d id  f in d  a p o s it iv e  
c o r re la t io n  f o r  US in ve s tm e n t flo w s  in to  the  U n ited Kingdom and 
Canada re s p e c t iv e ly .
R ecent c o n t r ib u t io n s  to  the  th e o ry  o f in te rn a tio n a l trad e  have 
addressed th em se lve s  to  th e  c r it ic is m s  le ve lle d  a t neoclass ica l tra d e  
th e o ry  b y  L e o n t ie f  (1953). By app ly ing  in p u t-o u tp u t ana lys is to  US 
trade  d a ta  f o r  1947, L e o n tie f  found  th a t US expo rts  re q u ire d  a 
h ig h e r p r o p o r t io n  o f  la b o u r to  c a p ita l than  the  p ro d u c tio n  o f 
im p o rt-c o m p e tin g  goods. The data  thus  appeared to  show th a t the  
US was a c a p i ta l- d e f ic ie n t  c o u n try  which specia lised  in  la b o u r 
in te n s iv e  p ro d u c tio n .
L e o n t ie f  e x p la in e d  away th is  apparent paradox by suggesting a 
number o f  a lte ra t io n s  to  t ra d it io n a l theory . He dispensed w ith  the  
assum ption  th a t  s im ila r  consum ption p a tte rn s  p re v a il a t d if fe re n t  
income le v e ls .  The h ig h e r  p r ic e  o f c a p ita l in  the  US, in  s p ite  o f  
re la t iv e  c a p ita l abundance, cou ld  th e re fo re  be exp la ined  by a 
s tro n g e r demand f o r  c a p ita l in  the  US than  in  o th e r co un trie s . In  
p a r t ic u la r ,  L e o n t ie f  c r i t ic is e d  neoc lass ica l theo ry 's  re lia n ce  on o n ly  
two fa c to rs  o f  p ro d u c tio n  (c a p ita l and labour). A more re a lis t ic  
model o f  in te r n a t io n a l tra d e  w ou ld  have to  in co rp o ra te  fa c to rs  such
3-s hum an c a p ita l endowm ents, n a tu ra l resources and te ch n o lo g ica l
s o p h is t ic a t io n .
M u lt i - fa c to r  m odels o f  in te rn a tio n a l trad e  were subsequen tly  
deve loped a lo n g  th e  lin e s  o u tlin e d  by L e o n tie f. Two basic types o f 
th e o ry  em erged: 'n e o - fa c to r ' trad e  theo rie s , w h ich  focused on the
ro le  o f  hum an c a p ita l and n a tu ra l resources in  de te rm in ing  
com para tive  advan tage ; and 'neo -techno logy ' trade  theo rie s , w h ich  
co n ce n tra te d  on th e  ro le  o f te c h n o lo g ica l advantages and economies
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o f sca le .
As these  th e o re t ic a l in n o v a tio n s  moved in te rn a tio n a l tra d e  
th e o ry  c lo s e r  to  th e  re a li t ie s  o f the  in te rn a tio n a l t ra d in g  
e n v iro n m e n t, so tra d e  th e o ry  began to  ove rlap  w ith  FDI th e o ry . The 
v a r ia b le s  in v o lv e d  in  n e o - fa c to r  theo rie s , fo r  example, have many 
s im ila r i t ie s  w ith  w h a t FDI th e o r is ts  term  'lo c a t io n -s p e c if ic 1 
endowm ents. S im ila r ly ,  th e  developm ent o f neo—techno logy  th e o r ie s  
p a ra lle le d  th e  use o f  o w n e rs h ip -s p e c if ic ' assets as e x p la n a to ry  
v a r ia b le s  f o r  FDI.
4.5.3 P ro d u c t L i fe  C ycle  A pproach
Th is  second s tra n d  o f  in te rn a t io n a l trad e  th e o ry  rep resen ts  a more 
ra d ic a l d e p a rtu re  fro m  th e  t ra d it io n a l H ecksher/O hlin /Sam uelson 
a n a lys is  s in ce  i t  ta ke s  a d if fe re n t  v iew  o f th e  key fa c to rs  
d e te rm in in g  b o th  tra d e  and FDI. As f i r s t  p resen ted  and 
su b s e q u e n tly  e la b o ra te d  by Vernon (1966, 1971), th is  th e o ry  describes 
a num ber o f  d is t in c t  stages in  a p ro d u c t's  l i f e  (new, m ature and 
s ta n d a rd ise d ) and re la te s  these stages to  the  lo c a tio n a l dec is ions  
made by  f irm s  and to  th e  choice between expo rts  and overseas 
p ro d u c tio n .
The s ta r t in g  p o in t  o f  Vernon 's th e o ry  is  th a t f irm s  e s ta b lish e d  
in  th e  w e s te rn  deve loped  economies have a s tro n g  in c e n tiv e  to  
a cq u ire  a te c h n o lo g ic a l advantage ove r p roducers in  less deve loped 
m arke ts . S ince f irm s  o p e ra tin g  in  advanced economies ty p ic a l ly  have 
access to  a m ore abu ndan t s u p p ly  o f ca p ita l, b u t in c u r  h ig h e r  
la b o u r cos ts , th e y  w i l l  f in d  i t  advantageous to  deve lop p ro d u c ts  and 
processes w h ic h  are  r e la t iv e ly  more c a p ita l in te n s ive . In  a d d it io n , 
the  e x is te n c e  o f  h ig h e r  p e r c a p ita  incomes in  such m arkets crea tes a 
demand f o r  new er and b e t te r  p ro d u c ts  w h ich  firm s  w i l l  respond to  
by in c re a s in g  t h e ir  R&D e xp e n d itu re . Thus, w h ile  many FDI th e o r is ts  
assume th a t  m u lt in a t io n a ls  have an o w n e rs h ip -s p e c if ic  advantage, 
Vernon e x p la in s  th e o re t ic a l ly ,  on the  basis o f these m arke t 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  how  th is  advantage is  acqu ired .
Once a s p e c if ic  advantage ( in  the  fo rm  o f a new p ro d u c t o r
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process) is  a c q u ire d  i t s  e x p lo ita t io n  commences in  th re e  separa te  
stages, a l l  o f  them  re la te d  to  se qu en tia l developments in  the  home 
m arke t. In  th e  f i r s t  phase o f a p ro d u c t's  l i f e  cycle, the  in n o v a tin g  
f irm  w i l l  e s ta b lis h  p ro d u c tio n  fa c i l i t ie s  in  i t s  o r ig in a l home m arke t. 
Cost d if fe re n c e s  betw een lo c a tio n s  w i l l  be re la t iv e ly  u n im p o rta n t a t 
th is  e a r ly  s tage  because the  p r ic e  e la s t ic ity  o f demand in  the  h ig h -  
income, home m a rke t w i l l  tend  to  be f a i r ly  low. Th is  g ives a degree 
o f m onopo ly  pow er to  th e  f irm , w h ich  can pass on th e  h ig h e r i n i t i a l  
costs o f  p ro d u c tio n  to  buye rs  by charg ing  a h ig h  p rice . In  a d d it io n , 
th e  in n o v a t in g  f irm  w i l l  w ant to  keep in  close con tac t w ith  
custom ers and s u p p lie rs  a t th is  e a r ly  stage to  iro n  o u t te e th in g  
tro u b le s  w ith  th e  p ro d u c t, o r  to  change p ro d u c t s p e c ific a tio n s .
In  th e  second stage o f  th e  l i f e  cycle the  new p ro d u c t (o r  
p rocess) becomes 'm a tu re ' as i t  becomes w id e ly  accepted, and demand 
in  th e  in n o v a t in g  m a rke t expands ra p id ly . As p ro d u c tio n  techn iques  
become in c re a s in g ly  s tanda rd ised , te ch n ica l economies o f scale are 
ach ieved  and hence u n i t  costs are lowered. Th is cost advantage w i l l  
tend  to  be o f fs e t ,  how ever, by a re d u c tio n  in  the  f irm 's  m onopoly 
pow er as c o m p e tito rs  deve lop  s u b s titu te s  and buyers become more 
p r ic e -re s p o n s iv e . D u rin g  th is  stage the  f irm  w i l l  s a t is fy  fo re ig n  
demand by  e x p o rts , b u t as i t s  share o f fo re ig n  m arke ts grows i t  may 
en co u n te r cha lle n g e s  fro m  lo c a l p roducers (o r face governm ent tra d e  
re s t r ic t io n s )  and so i t  may beg in  to  recons ide r i t s  in i t i a l  p ro d u c tio n  
lo c a tio n  d e c is io n .
In  th e  la s t  s tage o f  th is  model the  p ro d u c t becomes com p le te ly  
's ta n d a rd is e d ' as th e  in n o v a tin g  f irm  f in a l ly  loses i t s  co m p e tit iv e  
advantage. C o m pa ra tive  costs now become th e  o v e r - r id in g  
d e te rm in a n t o f  p ro d u c tio n  lo c a tio n . Overseas m arke ts w i l l  be 
s e rv ic e d  b y  e x p o rts  o n ly  i f  m a rg ina l p ro d u c tio n  costs a t home p lu s  
t ra n s p o r t  co s ts  and t a r i f f s  are h ig h e r than  average lo c a l p ro d u c tio n  
costs. F o re ig n  in v e s tm e n t is  th u s  seen as a fu n c t io n  o f economies 
o f sca le  and g ro w th  in  lo c a l m arke ts.
V e rnon  deve loped  h is  p ro d u c t l i f e  cycle th e o ry  to  e x p la in  the  
p a tte rn  o f  e a r ly  p o s t-w a r  m a n u fa c tu rin g  inves tm en t by US companies 
in  Europe. A lth o u g h  h is  th e o ry  may s t i l l  have some a p p lic a b il i ty
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fo r  f irm s  exp a n d in g  abroad fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e, i t  is  less a p p ro p ria te  
fo r  e x p la in in g  th e  b e h a v io u r o f es tab lished  MNCs, w h ich  ty p ic a l ly  
o pe ra te  in  segm ented m arke ts  and aim to  maxim ise g lo b a l p ro f i ts .  
R e a lis in g  th is ,  V e rnon  upda ted  h is  model (1974, 1977) to  accomodate 
the  o l ig o p o l is t ic  b e h a v io u r o f  MNCs.
V e rn o n  d e sc rib e d  a v a r ie ty  o f e n try  b a rr ie rs  th a t  f irm s  in  
v a r io u s  s tages o f  th e  p ro d u c t cycle may create  to  in s u la te  
them se lves fro m  co m p e tit io n . In  the  f i r s t  stage o f the  cycle th e re  
is  s t i l l  a s tro n g  econom ic in c e n tiv e  fo r  'ne w -p roduc t' f irm s  to  lo c a te  
p ro d u c tio n  in  t h e ir  home m arke t. 'M a tu rin g -p ro d u c t' f irm s , how ever, 
w i l l  be m ore re s p o n s ive  to  m arke t s tru c tu re  and w i l l  base t h e ir  
lo c a tio n  s tra te g y  p r im a r i ly  upon the  ac tions and re a c tio n s  o f o th e r  
MNCs. In  o rd e r  to  reduce the  r is k  o f lo s in g  m arke t shares 
w o rld w id e  th e y  w i l l  seek to  e rec t e n try  b a rr ie rs  ( fo r  example, v ia  
p ro d u c t d i f fe r e n t ia t io n ) .
The b e h a v io u r  o f  MNCs a t th is  stage o f the  cycle  p ro v id e s  an 
e x p la n a tio n  f o r  th e  phenom enon o f the  'm u lt in a tio n a l fa d ', observed 
in  some in d u s tr ie s .  T h is  te rm  re fe rs  to  'im ita t iv e ' FDI, un d e rta ke n  
by f irm s  w h ic h  te n d  to  v ie w  th e ir  share o f the  m arke t in  g lo b a l 
term s, and th e re fo re  in v e s t abroad because they  b e lie ve  th a t  th e y  
are lo s in g  g ro u n d  to  c o m p e tito rs  w h ich  have und e rtaken  FDI. (Th is  
e x p la n a tio n  is  deve loped  in  more d e ta il in  Section 4.7).
In  th e  f in a l  's ta n d a rd is e d  p ro d u c t' stage o f  the  cyc le , 
c o m p e tit iv e  p re ssu re s  are assumed to  re-emerge as b a rr ie rs  to  e n try  
weaken. P ro d u c tio n  lo c a tio n s  are then  more c lo se ly  de term ined by 
cost d i f fe r e n t ia ls  th a n  by o l ig o p o lis t ic  reac tions . MNCs w i l l  lo c a te  
th e ir  m a n u fa c tu r in g  p la n ts  a t the  lo w e s t-co s t su p p ly  p o in ts  (o fte n  
less d e ve lo p e d  c o u n tr ie s )  and w i l l  d iv e s t from  lo c a tio n s  th a t  become 
u n c o m p e titiv e .
V e rn o n 's  m odel p ro v id e s  an im p o rta n t c o n tr ib u t io n  to  the  s tu d y  
o f th e  FDI d e c is io n  f o r  th re e  p r in c ip a l reasons. F irs t ly ,  i t  
h ig h l ig h ts  th e  c lose  l in k s  between tra d e , FDI and the  g row th  o f the  
firm . FD I is  seen as th e  successor to  fo re ig n  trad e  and is  
u n d e rta k e n  to  p ro te c t  th e  share a tta in e d  in  a fo re ig n  m arke t by
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e x p o rts . T h is  sequence is  seen as in e v ita b le  in  the  l i f e  cycle  o f  a 
p ro d u c t and ca n n o t be reversed . Secondly, Vernon's model e xp la in s  
how th e  in v e s t in g  f irm  acqu ires  a s p e c ific  advantage ove r p rodu ce rs  
in  a fo re ig n  m a rke t. And f in a l ly ,  the  model is  s ig n if ic a n t because i t  
in tro d u c e s  tim e  c o n s id e ra tio n s  in to  s ta t ic  in te rn a tio n a l tra d e  th e o ry , 
th u s  re n d e r in g  i t  dynam ic.
The p ro d u c t l i f e  cyc le  approach has no t, however, been 
c o n c lu s iv e ly  v e r i f ie d  by  e m p ir ic a l s tud ies . An e a r ly  in v e s t ig a t io n  
by G rub e r, M ehta and V ernon (1967) analysed a sample o f n ine teen  US 
m a n u fa c tu r in g  in d u s tr ie s  fo r  th e  year 1962. They b roke  down th e  
in d u s tr ie s  in to  tw o  g roups  (h ig h  research  in te n s ity  and low  resea rch  
in te n s ity )  and d is c o ve re d  a h ig h  c o rre la t io n  between e xp o rts  and th e  
R&D a c t iv i t y  o f  th e  v a r io u s  in d u s tr ie s . They also fo u n d  th a t  th e  
p ro p e n s ity  to  in v e s t  abroad was h ig h e r in  the  re s e a rc h - in te n s iv e  
in d u s tr ie s .  F in a lly ,  th e  a u th o rs  compared the  e xp o rts  o f  these US 
in d u s tr ie s  to  th e  sa les o f  th e ir  fo re ig n  su b s id ia rie s  and concluded 
th a t  FD I had  s u b s t itu te d  e xp o rts  to  a la rge  e x te n t in  the  re se a rch ­
in te n s iv e  in d u s tr ie s .
A lth o u g h  these  re s u lts  are com patib le  w ith  the  p ro d u c t l i f e  
cyc le  h y p o th e s is  th e y  m ust neve rthe less  be tre a te d  w ith  ca u tio n , f o r  
i t  can be a rgued  th a t  a c ro s s - in d u s try  sample in  a s in g le  yea r is  
n o t adequa te  enough to  te s t  the  dynamic aspects o f V ernon 's th e o ry . 
S tobaugh (1971) used a lo n g e r tim e series fo r  h is  s tu d y  o f n ine  
p ro d u c ts  in  th e  h ig h ly  re s e a rc h - in te n s iv e  US pe trochem ica ls  
in d u s try .  He fo u n d  th a t  e xp o rts  g e n e ra lly  beg in some tw e n ty  f iv e  
years a f te r  p ro d u c tio n  commences, and th a t  as new p la n ts  are 
c o n s tru c te d  ab road  US e x p o rts  beg in to  dec line  as a percentage o f 
to ta l  o u tp u t.  He fa ile d  to  f in d  many examples, however, o f  less 
deve loped  c o u n tr ie s  (w ith  lo w e r p ro d u c tio n  costs) becoming m a jo r 
sources o f  s u p p ly  la te  in  the  l i f e  o f  the  p roducts .
In  a s u rv e y  by  K le in  (1973) o f  ano the r h ig h ly  re s e a rc h - in te n s iv e  
US in d u s t r y  (p h a rm a ceu tica ls ) i t  was found  th a t  com para tive  
advantage e v e n tu a lly  s h if te d  to  lo w e r wage co u n tr ie s  in  a l l  fo u r  
com panies s tu d ie d . A s tu d y  o f UK pha rm aceu tica l f irm s  by P a rry  
(1976) fo u n d  th a t  " th e  p ro d u c t cycle  e ffe c t ... does have a sys tem atic
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im p a c t on th e  degree o f in te rn a tio n a l p ro d u c tio n " (p27).
A p a r t  fro m  th e  in c o n c lu s iv e  e m p irica l evidence noted above, 
th e re  a re  th e o re t ic a l g rounds fo r  exe rc is ing  ca u tio n  abou t th e
u se fu ln e s s  o f  V e rnon  s model fo r  s tudy in g  the  b e h a v io u r o f MNCs,
because h is  th e o ry  is  e s s e n tia lly  concerned w ith  the  a c t iv it ie s  o f 
hom e-based f irm s , ra th e r  th a n  w ith  the  ope ra tions  o f  MNCs, w h ich  
are g e n e ra lly  ab le  to  in n o v a te  in  any o f th e ir  m arke ts. Th is  is  a 
p o in t  acknow ledged  by Vernon in  a la te r  (1979) e v a lu a tio n  o f  h is  
h y p o th e s is . He a lso  acknowledges in  th is  paper th a t  th e  
e x p la n a to ry  pow e r o f  th e  p ro d u c t l i f e  cycle concept has weakened as 
a r e s u lt  o f  changes in  th e  in te rn a tio n a l economic env ironm ent, ie  a 
re d u c t io n  in  th e  te c h n o lo g y  and income gaps w h ich  had p re v io u s ly  
e x is te d  be tw een advanced in d u s tr ia lis e d  co u n tr ie s . N everthe less, 
Vernon  a ss e rts  th a t  th e  p ro d u c t cycle concept is  " l ik e ly  to  c o n tin u e
to  p ro v id e  a gu id e  to  the  m o tiva tio n s  and response o f some
e n te rp r is e s  in  a l l  c o u n tr ie s  o f  the  w o rld " (p267).
D e sp ite  i t 's  reduced  e m p ir ic a l v a l id i ty ,  V ernon 's model does 
have m any u n iq u e  fe a tu re s  w h ich  can be in c o rp o ra te d  in to  o th e r  
m odels to  e n r ic h  t h e ir  s ta t ic  p re d ic tio n s .
4.6 LOCATION THEORY
The second c a te g o ry  o f  p o s it iv e  economic th e o ry  dep ic ted  in  F ig u re
4-1, lo c a t io n  th e o ry , is  concerned w ith  the  su p p ly  and demand
v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  in f lu e n c e  th e  s p a tia l d is t r ib u t io n  o f p ro d u c tio n . 
A lth o u g h  many o f  i t s  co n c lus ions  are s im ila r  to  those  d e rive d  fro m  
in te rn a t io n a l tra d e  th e o ry , i t  rem ains a d is t in c t  b ranch  o f th e o ry  in  
i t s  own r ig h t  because i t  approaches the  phenomenon o f FDI fro m  th e  
o p p o s ite  d ire c t io n ,  em phasiz ing th e  fa c to rs  w h ich  prom ote th e  
c e n tra liz a t io n  o f  p ro d u c tio n  ra th e r  than  those fa c to rs  w h ich  lead
to w a rd  d e c e n tra liz e d  p ro d u c tio n .
L o c a tio n  th e o ry  id e n t if ie s  th re e  types o f 'agg lom era tion
econom ies w h ic h  a llo w  f irm s  to  reduce costs in  c e rta in  lo c a tio n s  
[G rosse (1981, p l7 ) ] .  Economies o f  scale in  p ro d u c tio n  a llo w  s in g le
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f irm s  to  reduce  costs  a t p a r t ic u la r  fa c i l i t ie s .  L o c a liz a tio n
econom ies reduce  costs  fo r  a l l  f irm s  in  a s in g le  in d u s try  a t a
p a r t ic u la r  lo c a t io n  because o f shared p ro d u c tio n  fa c to rs . F in a lly , 
u rb a n iz a t io n  econom ies reduce costs fo r  a l l  in d u s tr ie s  a t a s in g le  
lo c a tio n  by  ra is in g  demand fo r  th e ir  o u tp u t. The ex is tence  o f these 
econom ies w i l l  s t im u la te  f irm s  to  lo ca te  p ro d u c tio n  in  areas th a t  
o f fe r  such  b e n e fits . The la t t e r  tw o agg lom era tion  economies o f fe r  
an a d d it io n a l e x p la n a tio n  fo r  the  'im ita t iv e ' o l ig p o lis t ic - re a c t io n  
type  o f  FD I m en tioned  e a r lie r .
L o c a tio n  th e o ry  a lso  considers the  ro le s  p layed  by n a tu ra l 
re so u rce  a v a i la b i l i t y  and tra n s p o r ta t io n  costs in  de te rm in in g  w here 
p ro d u c tio n  s h o u ld  be s ite d . I t  p re d ic ts  th a t  p ro d u c tio n  w i l l  be 
lo c a te d  in  o r  n e a r m a jo r p o p u la tio n  centres un less th e  raw  m a te ria ls  
used a re  h ea vy  o r  b u lk y , in  w h ich  case some p rocess ing  w i l l  ta k e
p lace a t o r  n e a r th e  raw  m a te r ia l sources. A lth o u g h  th is  reason ing
does n o t d i r e c t ly  d is t in g u is h  between dom estic and fo re ig n  
in v e s tm e n t, i t  can c le a r ly  be extended across n a tio n a l f ro n t ie rs .
O th e r  re la te d  fa c to rs  w h ich  may in flu e n c e  p ro d u c tio n  lo c a tio n  
in c lu d e  th e  size o f  p a r t ic u la r  m arke ts and th e ir  g ro w th  p o te n t ia l,  
and th e  s tre n g th  o f  lo c a l co m pe titio n . The ex is tence  o f tra d e  
b a r r ie rs  and o th e r  h o s t governm ent p o lic ie s  (eg re la t in g  to  p r o f i t  
re m itta n c e s ) can a lso  e f fe c t  th e  outcome.
S e ve ra l e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  have sought to  d is c o v e r w h ich  
lo c a t io n a l v a r ia b le s  are  th e  most im p o rta n t de te rm inan ts  o f FDI. The 
re s u lts  o f  b o th  re g re s s io n  s tu d ie s  [eg H o rs t (1972)] and o p in io n  
su rve ys  o f  businessm en [eg D unn ing  (1973)] re v e a l th a t  th e  size and 
g ro w th  o f  m a rke ts  a re  th e  s in g le  most im p o rta n t demand v a r ia b le s , 
w h ile  t ra d e  r e s t r ic t io n s  rep re se n ts  th e  most s ig n if ic a n t  s u p p ly  
v a r ia b le .
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4.7 INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION THEORY
4.7.1 Introduction
This  c a te g o ry  o f  p o s it iv e  economic th e o ry  v iew s FDI as a process 
b ro u g h t a b o u t by  u n c o m p e titive  m arke t s tru c tu re s . The approach 
was p io n e e re d  by S tephen Hymer (1960, pub lished  1976), whose th e s is  
is  w id e ly  re g a rd e d  as a p a th -b re a k in g  w o rk  from  w h ich  th e  e x is t in g  
th e o ry  o f  FD I and th e  MNC has emerged.1 Indeed, Hymer's ideas 
have been d e sc rib e d  by C harles K ind lebe rge r (1984) as re p re se n tin g  a 
"K h u n ia n  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  o f d ire c t investm en t" (pl83). Hymer's ideas 
abo u t th e  causes o f  FDI are described below, and th is  is  fo llo w e d  by 
a re v ie w  o f  subsequen t c o n tr ib u tio n s  w h ich  fo llo w e d  h is  lead.
4.7.2 The Hymer Approach
The re a so n  w hy Hym er's ideas were regarded as so ra d ic a l is  th a t,  
up u n t i l  1960, in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l movements were exp la in e d  in  
term s o f  th e  n e o c la s s ic a l th e o ry  o f  in te rn a tio n a l tra d e , as o u t lin e d  
in  S e c tio n  4.5.2. In  th is  p e r fe c t ly  co m pe titive  w o rld , c a p ita l moved 
in te r n a t io n a l ly  in  response to  re a l in te re s t ra te  d if fe re n t ia ls .  Thus, 
MNC's w ere  v ie w e d  s im p ly  as a rb itra g e u rs  o f c a p ita l, m oving e q u ity  
c a p ita l fro m  c o u n tr ie s  where re tu rn s  were low  to  those where 
re tu rn s  w ere  h ig h e r.
H ym er p o in te d  o u t, how ever, th a t  neoc lass ica l tra d e  th e o ry  was 
in c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  obse rvab le  p a tte rn s  o f FDI a t th a t  tim e. The 
e x is t in g  th e o ry  c o u ld  n o t e x p la in  the  fa c t th a t MNCs had fin a n ce d  a 
la rg e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  t h e ir  fo re ig n  investm en ts  in  th e  fo re ig n  
c o u n try 's  c a p ita l m arke t, n o r cou ld  i t  e xp la in  th e  ex is tence  o f  
c ro s s -f lo w s  o f  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t (eg the  fa c t th a t  UK f irm s  were 
in v e s tin g  in  th e  US a t th e  same tim e as US f irm s  were in v e s tin g  in  
th e  UK).2
In  o rd e r  to  p ro v id e  an e x p la n a tio n  fo r  FDI, Hymer d is reg a rded  
th e  m acroeconom ic approach o f neoc lass ica l tra d e  th e o ry , o p tin g  
in s te a d  f o r  a m icroeconom ic approach based la rg e ly  upon the  ideas 
o f th e  in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o r is t  Joe Bain. He u t i l is e d  the
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ideas c o n ta in e d  in  B a in 's  (1956) book B a rrie rs  to  New C om pe tition  
w h ich  a rg u e d  th a t  the  main de te rm inan t o f  an in d u s try 's  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  was th e  ex is tence  o f b a rr ie rs  to  en try . Bain id e n t if ie d  
th re e  m ain  advan tages possessed by firm s  w h ich enabled them to  
c o n s tru c t e n t r y  b a r r ie rs :  f i r s t l y ,  abso lu te  cost advantages; second ly 
the  e x is te n c e  o f  p ro d u c t d i f fe re n t ia t io n ;  and th ir d ly ,  the  ex is tence  
o f sca le  econom ies.
Hym er a rgued  th a t  f irm s  con tem pla ting  a d ire c t in ves tm en t 
overseas a lso  needed to  possess one o f these B a in -typ e  advantages 
in  o rd e r  to  overcom e the  in h e re n t d isadvantages o f p ro d u c in g  
abroad. FD I w o u ld  o n ly  be unde rtake n  by firm s  i f  th e y  expected to  
earn h ig h e r  re tu rn s  abroad  th a n  th e ir  fo re ig n  com petito rs . M ere ly 
to  ea rn  h ig h e r  re tu rn s  abroad than  a t home was n o t a s u f f ic ie n t  
c o n d it io n  f o r  FDI.
Hym er con tended , th e re fo re , th a t  FDI was associa ted  w ith  the  
possess ion  o f  an advantage by the  in v e s tin g  f irm , w h ich  i t s  
c o m p e tito rs  ab roa d  c o u ld  n o t ob ta in . As a re s u lt ,  f irm s  in v o lv e d  in  
FDI w o u ld  be fo u n d  in  o lig o p o lis t ic  m arkets, in  w h ich  o n ly  r e la t iv e ly  
la rg e  f irm s  c o u ld  s u rv iv e . Th is  reason ing  im p lie d  th a t  th e re  m ust 
e x is t  im p e r fe c tio n s  in  dom estic  p ro d u c t and fa c to r  m arke ts  in  o rd e r 
f o r  FDI to  ta k e  p lace .
4.7.3 P o s t-H ym e r C o n tr ib u t io n s
K in d le b e rg e r (1969) id e n t if ie d  a num ber o f d e p a rtu res  from  p e r fe c t 
c o m p e tit io n  in  p ro d u c t and fa c to r  m arkets w h ich  bestow  
m o n o p o lis tic  advan tages and so lead to  FDI. In  p ro d u c t m arke ts , f o r  
exam ple, he id e n t i f ie d  p ro d u c t d i f fe re n t ia t io n  and th e  possession o f 
s p e c ia l m a rk e tin g  s k i l ls ,  and in  fa c to r  m arkets, access to  p a te n te d  
te c h n o lo g y  and d iffe re n c e s  in  access to  ca p ita l. K in d le b e rg e r a lso 
acknow ledged th a t  th e  in v e s tin g  f irm 's  com pensatory advantage may 
stem fro m  in te r n a l and e x te rn a l economies o f  scale, o r  from  
gove rnm en t l im ita t io n s  on o u tp u t o r  e n try .
A t  th is  stage  in  i t s  development, what some authors have  
termed th e 'Hymer-Kindleberger' school of thought had a major
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l im ita t io n :  i t  d id  n o t a tte m p t to  assess the  re la t iv e  im portance  o f
these v a r io u s  m o n o p o lis tic  advantages in  e xp la in in g  fo re ig n  
in v e s tm e n t p a tte rn s . T h is  de fec t was remedied by the  w o rk  o f Caves 
(1971), whose re se a rch  in d ic a te d  th a t p rodu c t d i f fe re n t ia t io n  in  th e  
home m a rk e t was th e  c r i t ic a l  element g iv in g  r is e  to  FDI.
Caves a lso  ex tended Hymer's o r ig in a l hypo thes is  by a rg u in g  
th a t  th e  s p e c ia l advantage possessed by the  f irm  u n d e rta k in g  FDI 
m ust have  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f a p u b lic  good w ith in  th a t  f irm  in  
o rd e r to  e x p la in  th e  advantages o f p roduc ing  abroad. He reached 
th is  c o n c lu s io n  by  o b se rv ing  th a t  successfu l f irm s , p ro d u c in g  a 
d if fe r e n t ia te d  p ro d u c t, c o n tro l know ledge about s e rv ic in g  the  
dom estic  m a rk e t th a t  can be used a t l i t t l e  o r no cost in  o th e r  
m arke ts . The e x is te n ce  o f th is  'in ta n g ib le ' c a p ita l p ro v id e s  th e  
m o tiv a t io n  f o r  in v e s t in g  abroad, as long as the  p ro d u c t can be 
p ro te c te d  ( ty p ic a l ly  v ia  pa te n ts  and copyrigh ts ).
In  a la te r  s tu d y  (1974), Caves tes ted  the  e x p la n a to ry  pow er o f  
th re e  o w n e rs h ip -s p e c if ic  advantages: in ta n g ib le  assets (de fined  as 
advantages a c c ru in g  from  p ro d u c t d if fe re n t ia t io n ) ,  m u lt i-p la n t  
econom ies and th e  a v a i la b i l i t y  o f u n d e r-u t il is e d  e n tre p re n e u ria l 
resou rces  w i th in  th e  f irm . He analysed data  on US m a n u fa c tu rin g  
in v e s tm e n t in to  th e  UK and Canada. The re s u lts  o f  h is  m u lt ip le  
re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  co n firm e d  h is  o r ig in a l f in d in g ; in ta n g ib le  assets 
re p re se n te d  th e  m ost s ig n if ic a n t  de te rm inan t o f  FDI. The m u lt i­
p la n t h y p o th e s is  appeared to  be a s ig n if ic a n t de te rm in a n t f o r  
Canada, b u t  n o t f o r  th e  UK, a re s u lt  w h ich  re fle c ts  th e  geog raph ica l 
p ro x im ity  o f  Canada to  th e  U n ited  States. No su p p o rt was fo u n d  fo r  
the  e n tre p re n e u r ia l resou rces  approach in  e ith e r  co u n try .
The re s u lts  o f  th is  s tu d y  m ust be tre a te d  w ith  some ca u tio n , 
how ever, f o r  Caves used p ro x y  va r ia b le s  (R&D e x p e n d itu re  and 
a d v e r t is in g  in te n s ity )  to  measure the  in ta n g ib le  assets possessed by 
the  f irm .  In  a n o th e r re g re ss io n  s tu d y  on US inves tm en t in to  Canada, 
H o rs t (1972) fo u n d  th a t  h is  independen t v a r ia b le s  (p r in c ip a lly  the  
le v e ls  o f  a d v e r t is in g  and R&D e xpe nd itu re ) v a r ie d  between 
in d u s tr ie s ,  b u t  w ere f a i r l y  co ns tan t w ith in  any g iven  in d u s try . Once 
these in te r - in d u s t r y  d iffe re n c e s  were e lim in a te d  from  th e  ana lys is ,
106
CHAPTER 4
f irm  s ize  em erged as th e  o n ly  o th e r s ig n if ic a n t in flu e n c e  on FDI.
T h is  c o r re la t io n  between m u lt in a t io n a lity  and f irm  size can be 
re a d ily  e x p la in e d  in  term s o f  in d u s tr ia l o rg a n iza tio n  th e o ry . A 
com pany w h ic h  expands ra p id ly  in  i t s  dom estic m arke t may, in  so 
do ing , g a in  th e  necessary a t tr ib u te s  in  term s o f management s k i l ls  
and o th e r  fo rm s  o f  expe rience  w h ich  w i l l  enable i t  to  deve lop i t s  
overseas o p e ra tio n s  a t a fa s te r  ra te  than  sm a lle r f irm s . The costs  
o f  e n te r in g  new m arke ts  may th e re fo re  d im in ish  as company size 
in c rea ses  and more know ledge is  gained.
In  a d d it io n  to  these  in ta n g ib le  assets, the  f irm  w h ich  expands 
ab road  can e x p lo it  th e  more com plex f in a n c ia l mechanisms a v a ila b le  
to  i t  as a r e s u lt  o f  th e  in te g ra t io n  o f i t s  a c t iv it ie s  ove r se ve ra l 
c o u n tr ie s . I t  can, f o r  example, t ra n s fe r  funds  ra p id ly  across
n a t io n a l f r o n t ie r s  to  ta ke  advantage o f s h o rt- te rm  in te re s t  ra te  
d i f fe r e n t ia ls  and c u rre n c y  f lu c tu a t io n s , and i t  has the  a b i l i t y  to  
c irc u m v e n t h o s t-c o u n try  ta x  le g is la t io n  v ia  the  use o f t ra n s fe r  
p r ic e s . The size v a r ia b le ,  th e re fo re , encompasses a l l  o r  most o f  the  
p o s s ib le  o w n e rs h ip -s p e c if ic  advantages w h ich  e x p la in  FDI.
T h is  l in e  o f  reason ing  can, however, be c r it ic is e d  on th e
g rounds th a t  th e  d ire c t io n  o f c a u s a lity  is  w rong ly  spec ified . Hood 
and Young (1979, p75) p o in t  o u t th a t  la rge  f irm  size may w e ll be th e  
b y -p ro d u c t o f  m u lt in a t io n a l expansion ra th e r  th a n  i t s  cause. They 
a lso a rgue  th a t ,  f a r  fro m  R&D in te n s ity  s t im u la tin g  FDI, the  re ve rse  
may a c tu a l ly  occu r. Increased  fo re ig n  investm en t may cause an 
expa ns io n  in  R&D e x p e n d itu re  because the  re s u lts  o f  such 
e x p e n d itu re  c o u ld  be spread  o ve r more fo re ig n  m arkets.
The o l ig o p o lis t ic  m arke ts  fram ew ork  fo r  e x p la in in g  FDI has 
been a do p te d  by  John  Kenneth  G a lb ra ith  (1973). Fo r G a lb ra ith , 
how ever, th e  e x is te n ce  o f  im p e rfe c t m arkets is  o n ly  a necessary, n o t 
a s u f f ic ie n t ,  c o n d it io n  f o r  FDI; the  firm s  o p e ra tin g  in  such m arke ts  
m ust have  reached  a stage o f  o rg a n iza tio n  m ature enough to  fo rm  
w ha t he c a lls  a " te c h n o s tru c tu re " .
T h is  te rm  re fe rs  to  an appara tus  fo r  group dec is ion -m ak ing
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w h ich  p o o ls  and te s ts  th e  in fo rm a tio n  p rov id ed  by the  num erous 
s p e c ia lis ts  h ire d  by  th e  f irm , enab ling  decis ions to  be reached th a t  
are beyond  th e  know ledge o f  any one in d iv id u a l.  I t  is  d e fin e d  by 
G a lb ra ith  (1973) as a "com plex o f s c ie n tis ts , eng ineers and 
te c h n ic ia n s ; o f  sa les, a d v e rt is in g  and m arke ting  men; ... and o f 
c o o rd in a to rs , managers and execu tives" who become the  "g u id in g  
in te ll ig e n c e  o f  th e  bus iness f irm "  (p82).
The o v e r - r id in g  o b je c tiv e  o f th is  group is  the  e lim in a tio n  o f  
the  u n c e r ta in ty  assoc ia ted  w ith  m arkets. They s t r iv e  to  c o n tro l th e  
p r ic e s  a t w h ic h  th e  f irm  buys fa c to r  in p u ts  and s e lls  f in a l  p ro d u c ts , 
and to  ensu re  s u p p ly  and demand a t these p rices . The expansion  o f  
the  f ir m  overseas is  a n a tu ra l ex tens ion  o f these a c t iv it ie s  to  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l m a rke t; by  e s ta b lis h in g  p ro d u c tio n  fa c i l i t ie s  overseas 
th e  f i r m  reduces th e  u n c e rta in tie s  associated w ith  b a r r ie rs  to  tra d e . 
A cco rd in g  to  G a lb ra ith :
"The fu n c t io n  o f  th e  m u lt in a tio n a l c o rp o ra tio n
is  ......... s im p ly , th e  accom odation o f  th e
te c h n o s tru c tu re  to  th e  p e c u lia r  u n c e rta in tie s  o f 
in te r n a t io n a l tra d e . I t  transcends th e  m arke t 
in te r n a t io n a l ly  as i t  does n a t io n a lly  .... By re ­
c re a t in g  i t s e l f  in  o th e r co u n tr ie s  the  
te c h n o s tru c u re , in  e ffe c t,  fo llo w s  it s  p ro d u c t to  
th o s e  c o u n tr ie s ."
I t  is  G a lb ra ith 's  o p in io n , th e re fo re , th a t FDI is  a p ro d u c t o f  
the  u n iq u e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l fo rm  o f the  modern f irm , fo u n d  e x c lu s iv e ly  
in  o l ig o p o lis t ic  m arke ts .
The m a instream  in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iza tio n  th e o rie s , w ith  t h e ir  
e xa m in a tio n s  o f  th e  v a r io u s  im p e rfe c tio n s  in  m arke t s tru c tu re  w h ich  
p rom ote  FDI, m ust lo g ic a l ly  in c lu d e  the  'o l ig o p o lis t ic - re a c t io n  typ e  
o f fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t m entioned in  Sections 4.5 and 4.6. A 
com prehens ive  s tu d y  o f  th is  'm u lt in a tio n a l fa d ' phenomenon was 
conducted  by  K n ic k e rb o c k e r (1973), who found  th a t  fo l lo w - th e -  
le a d e r" b e h a v io u r  was p re v a le n t in  12 o u t o f the  20 US s ta n d a rd  
in d u s t r ia l  c la s s if ic a t io n s  w h ich  he s tud ie d .
A n o th e r  s tu d y  w h ich  e xp lo re d  a s im ila r  hypo the s is  was 
conducted  by  Graham (1974), who u t i l is e d  da ta  on d ire c t in ve s tm e n t
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by E u ropean  f irm s  in  th e  US ove r the  pe rio d  1950-1970. He p roduced  
re s u lts  th a t  were "g e n e ra lly  co n s is te n t" w ith  th e  h yp o the s is  th a t  
FDI is  a m a n ife s ta tio n  o f  re ta lia to ry ,  de fens ive  b e h a v io u r, 
u n d e rta k e n  in  th e  e x p e c ta tio n  th a t  i f  fo re ig n  firm s  can be 
th re a te n e d  in  t h e ir  home m arkets then  they  m igh t cease t h e ir  
r iv a lro u s  b e h a v io u r  in  th e  in v e s tin g  f irm 's  m arket.
G raham 's re s u lts  m ust be tre a te d  w ith  some ca u tio n , how ever, 
fo r  he has d e sc rib e d  h is  model o f r iv a lro u s  b e h a v io u r as "coarse", 
and conceded th a t  a lth o u g h  h is  re s u lts  were "g e n e ra lly  c o n s is te n t"  
w ith  h is  s ta te d  h yp o th e s is , th e y  neve rthe less p resen ted  "some 
puzzles" and " f a l l  s h o r t  o f  p ro v in g  the  case" [Graham (1978, p90, 94)].
A lth o u g h  th e  in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iza tio n  approach o u tlin e d  in  th is  
s e c tio n  has a t t ra c te d  many fo llo w e rs , i t s  basic hyp o th e s is  is  open to  
q u e s tio n . F o r exam ple, i f  u n co m p e titive  m arkets re a lly  do encourage 
th e  m ig ra t io n  o f  c a p ita l abroad, why d id  the  b u lk  o f  FDI f lo w s  
betw een th e  US and Europe in  the  1950s emanate from  the  US when 
th e  degree o f  c o n c e n tra tio n  was g e n e ra lly  much h ig h e r  in  Europe? 
More re c e n t ev idence , on Japanese d ire c t in vestm en t [K o jim a  (1978), 
Ozawa (1979)], suggests  a c o m p a ta b ility  between FDI and a r e la t iv e ly  
c o m p e tit iv e  m a rk e t s t ru c tu re  a t home.
The appearance o f  some o f th e  e xp lana tions  g iven  in  th is  
se c tio n  u n d e r o th e r  th e o re t ic a l g roup ings  id e n t if ie d  in  th is  c h a p te r 
h ig h l ig h ts  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  s tu d y  o f MNCs is  an in te rd is c ip l in a ry  
u n d e r ta k in g  w h ic h  encompasses a num ber o f branches o f econom ic 
th e o ry , m any o f  w h ic h  o ve rla p . In  the  f in a l  sec tion  o f th is  chap te r, 
a c la s s if ic a to r y  scheme is  o u t lin e d  w h ich  u n if ie s  these v a r io u s  
s tra n d s  o f  th o u g h t u n d e r th e  common concept o f  m arke t 





The e x p la n a tio n s  o f  FDI w h ich  can be de rived  from  in ve s tm e n t 
th e o ry  can be sepa ra ted  in to  tw o d is t in c t  v ie w p o in ts . One argues 
th a t  FD I o ccu rs  in  response to  im p e rfe c tio n s  in  c a p ita l m arke ts , 
w h ile  th e  o th e r  suggests th a t  f irm s  expand abroad in  o rd e r to  
reduce  th e  r is k in e s s  th e ir  expected re tu rn s  [Grosse (1981, p l8 ) ] .  
These tw o  v ie w p o in ts  a re  cons idered  separa te ly .
4.8.2 Imperfect Capital Markets Approach
I t  m ig h t be a rgued  th a t  th is  approach to  FDI, p r im a r ily  assoc ia ted  
w ith  A l ib e r  (1970, 1971), fa l ls  w ith in  the  in d u s t r ia l o rg a n iz a tio n
t r a d i t io n  s in ce  i t  is  o r ie n te d  tow ards the  search fo r  an advantage 
w h ich  enab les fo re ig n -o w n e d  firm s  to  o u tpe rfo rm  th e ir  dom estic  
c o m p e tito rs . A l ib e r 's  th e o ry , how ever, suggests th a t  th is  advantage 
is  n o t s p e c if ic  to  in d iv id u a l f irm s , b u t is  common to  a l l  f irm s  based 
in  a p a r t ic u la r  'c u rre n c y  area '.
H is  w h o le  a rgum ent is  based upon the  assum ption th a t  p o r t fo l io  
in v e s to rs  ta k e  no accoun t o f  fo re ig n  exchange r is k  in  e v a lu a tin g  
t h e ir  in v e s tm e n ts ; th e y  assume th a t  the  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  o f 
MNC's a re  a l l  in  th e  same cu rre n cy  area as the  p a re n t f irm . The 
fo re ig n  exchange r is k  in v o lv e d  in  the  re p a tr ia t io n  o f p r o f i t s  to  the  
p a re n t f i r m  is  th e re fo re  igno red .
F o r exam ple, p o r t fo l io  in v e s to rs  are assumed by A lib e r  to  v a lu e  
th e  assets  o f, say, US f irm s  o p e ra tin g  in  the  UK as though  th e y  were 
d o l la r  asse ts  r a th e r  th a n  s te r l in g  assets. I f  the  cu rre n cy  prem ium  
on d o lla rs  ( ie  th e  m a rke t's  assessment o f th e  d e p re c ia tio n  r is k )  was 
lo w e r th a n  th e  c u rre n c y  prem ium  on s te r lin g , then  the  m arke t ra te  
o f in te re s t  on th e  d eb t o f  US_based MNCs w ou ld  be lo w e r th a n  th a t  
on th e  d e b t o f  in d ig e n o u s  UK firm s . US m u lt in a tio n a ls  w ou ld  
th e re fo re  possess an advantage o ve r th e ir  UK com pe tito rs  since th e y  
w o u ld  be ab le  to  b o rro w  more cheap ly  th a n  UK firm s . (Indeed, such 
f irm s  c o u ld  re a lis e  an im m edia te  p r o f i t  by f in a n c in g  the  ta ke o ve r o f
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a UK f irm ) .
I f  th is  im p e r fe c tio n  in  the  m arke t fo r  debt is  compounded by 
in v e s to r  s h o r t-s ig h te d n e s s  in  the  e q u ity  m arket then  th e  ea rn ings o f 
in v e s t in g  f irm s  w i l l  be c a p ita lis e d  a t a h ig h e r ra te  th a n  th e  
ea rn in g s  o f  h o s t-c o u n try  f irm s , thus  enhancing the  in v e s tin g  f irm s ' 
c o m p e tit iv e  p o s it io n s .
A t  th e  tim e  o f  i t s  in c e p tio n , A lib e r 's  th e o ry  ga ined cons ide rab le  
academ ic r e s p e c ta b i l i ty  because i t s  p re d ic tio n s  were co n s is te n t w ith  
the  p o s tw a r p a t te rn  o f  MNC expansion w h ich had p re v a ile d  u n t i l  
th a t  p e r io d , p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  US expansion in to  Europe in  th e  
F if t ie s  and S ix tie s , a t a tim e when the  d o lla r  was s tron g . In  th e  
S even ties  and E ig h tie s , how ever, US investm en t co n tin u e d  to  g row  
d e sp ite  p e r io d s  o f  d o l la r  weakness; UK inves tm en t fo llo w e d  th e  same 
p a tte rn  in  s im ila r  c ircum stances.
A l ib e r 's  m odel may f a i l  to  e xp la in  such events because i t  does 
n o t acknow ledge  th a t  f irm s  o pe ra ting  w ith  weak cu rre nc ie s  may 
a c tu a lly  have  an in c e n tiv e  to  in v e s t abroad since th e y  w i l l  re a lis e  
exchange ra te  ga ins  when c o n v e rtin g  h e a lth ie r  fo re ig n  cu rre n c ie s  
back in to  th e  h o s t-c o u n try  denom ination. The m odel's b reakdow n 
may a lso  be e x p la in e d  by th e  r is e  in  in s t i tu t io n a l in ves tm en t, w h ich  
sh o u ld  have  e lim in a te d  th e  m arke t's  myopia ove r fo re ig n  exchange 
r is k  and so d e p riv e d  th e  th e o ry  o f i t s  fundam en ta l prem ise. The 
type  o f  m yop ia  p o s tu la te d  by A lib e r  may w e ll have been tru e  o f  th e  
t r a n s it io n a l phase when MNCs f i r s t  entered c a p ita l m arke ts on a 
la rg e  sca le , b u t  i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  be lie ve  th a t con tem pora ry  fu n d  
managers a re  so ir r a t io n a l.
Even i f  th is  assum ption  is  re ta in e d , A lib e r 's  th e o ry  s t i l l  canno t 
o f fe r  an e x p la n a tio n  f o r  c ro ss -in ve s tm e n t between cu rre n cy  areas; 
the  fa c t ,  f o r  exam ple, th a t  US f irm s  in v e s t in  Europe a t the  same 
tim e as E u ropean f irm s  in v e s t in  the  US. Nor can i t  account f o r  FDI 
in to  LDCs, w here  c a p ita l m arke ts  may be n o n -e x is te n t, and fo re ig n  
exchanges h ig h ly  re g u la te d .
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4.8.3 Risk Diversification Approach
Th is  a p p ro a ch  is  b a s ic a lly  an ex tens ion  o f M arkow itz 's  (1952, 1959)
p o r t fo l io  th e o ry  to  th e  in te rn a t io n a l environm ent. I t  v iew s FDI as a 
p rocess o f  geo g ra p h ic  d iv e rs if ic a t io n  w h ich  has th e  e ffe c t o f  
re d u c in g  th e  r is k in e s s  o f re tu rn s . Because business cycles are n o t 
synch ron ous  in te rn a t io n a l ly ,  i t  can be argued th a t  f irm s  w i l l  en joy  a 
more s ta b le  s tream  o f  p r o f i t s  ove r tim e i f  they  have inves tm en ts  in  
d i f fe r e n t  c o u n tr ie s . As th e  v a lu a tio n  o f a company's shares is  
dependent on th e  s ta b i l i t y  o f  earn ings, as w e ll as th e ir  a b so lu te  
le v e l, th e  MNC w i l l  be v a lu e d  h ig h e r than  com parable f irm s  w h ich  
re ly  p u re ly  on th e i r  home m arke t.
The fe w  e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  w h ich  have been conducted to  te s t  
the  r is k  d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  h yp o th e s is  have produced am biguous re s u lts . 
The f in d in g s  o f  Rugman's s tu d y  o f US firm s  (1979) are s u p p o rtiv e  o f 
th e  th e o ry . He showed th a t  an increase in  the  num ber o f c o u n tr ie s  
in  w h ic h  h is  sam ple o f  f irm s  opera ted  had the  e ffe c t o f  re d u c in g  th e  
va r ia n c e  o f  t h e ir  ea rn ings  (the  p ro x y  used fo r  r is k ) .  Rugman's 
s ta t is t ic a l  te s ts  have, how ever, been c r it ic is e d  by se ve ra l 
a u th o r it ie s ,  one o f  whom [Ing o  (1979, p l09)] described  them as 
" in c o n s is te n t and s lo p p y ".
An in v e s t ig a t io n  by  J a c q u il la t  and S o ln ik  (1978) compared the  
p o te n t ia l ga in s  fro m  an in te rn a t io n a l p o r t fo l io  o f  s e c u r it ie s  w ith  
the  p o te n t ia l ga ins  fro m  in v e s tin g  in  MNCs. They fo u n d  th a t  th e  
MNCs d id  n o t o f fe r  th e  b e t te r  in ves tm en t: a p o r t fo l io  o f  US-based 
MNC shares  had  90 p e r cen t o f the  s tandard  d e v ia t io n  o f  a 
p o r t fo l io  o f  US dom estic  f irm s ' shares, w h ile  a p o r t fo l io  o f  
s e c u r it ie s  fro m  fo re ig n  and dom estic  s to ck  m arke ts had o n ly  30-50 
pe r ce n t o f  th e  r is k  o f  a p o r t fo l io  o f  US dom estic f irm s  shares. 
F u r th e r  e m p ir ic a l ev idence  is  th e re fo re  re q u ire d  b e fo re  any d e f in ite  
co n c lu s io n s  a b o u t th e  ga ins from  in te rn a t io n a l d iv e rs if ic a t io n  can 




So fa r ,  o n ly  s t r i c t l y  economic th e o rie s  and s t r ic t ly  s u b je c tiv e  
th e o r ie s  have  been cons idered . The fo rm er assume th a t  s u b je c tiv e  
fa c to rs  a re  co n s ta n t, w h ile  the  la t te r  assume th a t  economic fa c to rs  
are c o n s ta n t. In  th e  re a l business w o rld , however, these types o f  
v a r ia b le s  a re  in te rd e p e n d e n t. In  the  o p in io n  o f K o u tso y ia n n is  (1982, 
p 347) a r e a l is t ic  th e o ry  o f the  dec is ion  to  in v e s t abroad m ust 
f i r s t  ta k e  in to  accou n t th is  in te rdependence between s u b je c tiv e  and 
econom ic v a r ia b le s  and then  determ ine the  re la t io n s h ip  o f these 
v a r ia b le s  to  th e  d e c is io n -m a k in g  c r i te r ia  o f  the  f irm ."
R ich a rd so n  (1971) a ttem pted  to  deve lop such a com prehensive 
th e o ry . He in tro d u c e d  s u b je c tiv e  fa c to rs  by us ing  th e  concept o f  
's p a t ia l p re fe re n c e ' to  account fo r  the  tendency o f  f irm s  to  p re fe r  
t h e ir  e x is t in g  lo c a tio n  when cons ide ring  fu r th e r  in ves tm en t. 
A cc o rd in g  to  R ich a rd so n  th e  ty p ic a l f irm  has a d e f in ite  a ve rs io n  to  
new lo c a tio n s  o r  m arke ts , w h ich  stems n o t o n ly  from  p h y s ic a l 
d is ta n ce  b u t  a lso  fro m  d iffe re n c e s  in  language, p o l i t ic a l system, 
econom ic e n v iro n m e n t and ideo logy . A f irm 's  s p a tia l p re fe re nce  w i l l  
th e re fo re  r e f le c t  i t s  a t t i tu d e  tow ards, eg p o l i t ic a l and cu rre n cy  
r is k s .
To in d u ce  a f ir m  to  b u ild  a p la n t in  a new lo c a tio n , a prem ium  
m ust accrue  to  i t  w h ich  is  s u f f ic ie n t  to  overcome i t s  a ve rs io n  to  
new lo c a tio n s . R ich a rd so n  c a lls  the  degree o f th is  a ve rs io n  'th e  
ra te  o f  s p a t ia l p re fe re n c e ', w h ich  grows w ith  'd is ta n ce '. Changes in  
th e  s p a t ia l p re fe re n ce s  o f  f irm s  are b roug h t, abou t by such even ts 
as in c re a se s  in  g e n e ra l in fo rm a tio n  abou t fo re ig n  m arke ts , changes 
in  th e  p o l i t ic a l  o r  econom ic c lim a te  abroad, and increased  in s ig h t  
in to  fo re ig n  m a rke ts  ga ined  by an increased share o f e xp o rts .
The econom ic fa c to rs  w h ich  R ichardson  regarded  as in f lu e n t ia l  
&re th o se  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  de te rm ine  the  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  in ve s tm e n t 
in  a fo re ig n  m a rke t, ie  demand and cost c o n d itio n s  in  b o th  th e  
dom estic  and overseas m arke ts . The f i r s t  stage in  the  f irm  s 
d e c is io n  p rocess c o n s is ts  o f  an a n a lys is  o f  these c o n d itio n s  fo r  each 
p ro s p e c tiv e  in v e s tm e n t p ro je c t.  T h is  g ives in fo rm a tio n  on expected
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p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  w h ic h  th e  f irm  s management ad jus ts  on the  basis o f 
i t s  s p a t ia l p re fe re n ce s . I f  th is  ad jus ted  ra te  o f re tu rn  is  g re a te r 
th a n  th e  f ir m  s ta rg e t  ra te  o f re tu rn  then  the  inves tm en t w i l l  be 
u n d e rta k e n .
R ic h a rd s o n  d e r iv e d  from  th is  p rocedure  an 'in ve s tm e n t 
o p p o r tu n ity  f r o n t ie r '  (o r  dec is io n  curve) re p resen tin g  the  locus  o f 
a l l  c o m b in a tio n s  o f  u n i t  costs and o u tp u t w h ich  make an in ves tm en t 
in  any g iv e n  fo re ig n  m arke t b a re ly  a t tra c t iv e  (see F igu re  4-2 ). He 
also in tro d u c e d  th e  assum ption  th a t  MNCs have some c o n tro l o ve r 
p r ic e , s in ce  m ost o p e ra te  in  o lig o p o lis t ic  m arkets, and th a t  th e y  w i l l  
se t a m in im um  p r ic e  equa l to  th e  dom estic p rice  p lu s  th e  costs o f  
e x p o rt in g . R ich a rd so n 's  in ves tm en t o p p o rtu n ity  f r o n t ie r  is  shown 
be low :
AVERAGE / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  
COSTS/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
----------------------------------------------------------  SAJ_iiiS
(U=Total expected returns, U =Total target returns)
[SOURCE: K o u ts o y ia n n is , (1982, p335)]
As th e  d iagram  i l lu s t r a te s ,  th e  dec is ion  cu rve  rep resen ts  the  
b o u n d a ry  be tw een in ve s tm e n ts  w h ich  w i l l  be unde rtake n  and those
FIGURE 4-2







w h ich  w i l l  n o t. FDI p ro je c ts  w h ich  appear below the  curve , f o r  
exam ple, have  lo w e r average costs fo r  the  g iven p r ic e  and any g iven  
le v e l o f  o u tp u t ,  and w i l l  th u s  be undertaken. Th is  re p re s e n ta tio n  
o f R ic h a rd s o n  s m odel assumes th a t ta rg e t re tu rn s , s p a t ia l 
p re fe re nce , and p r ic e  in  th e  fo re ig n  m arket are a l l  constan t. These 
fa c to rs  w i l l ,  o f  course , be u n s tab le  and th e ir  changes w i l l  a f fe c t th e  
p o s it io n  a n d /o r  s lope  o f  th e  dec is io n  curve, and hence the  le v e l o f 
FDI.
The s tre n g th  o f  R icha rdson 's  model lie s  in  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  
in c o rp o ra te , d ir e c t ly  o r  in d ire c t ly ,  many o f the  d if fe re n t  fa c to rs  
w h ich  have  been suggested as exp lana tions  fo r  the  FDI dec is ion . 
N onethe less, th e  te s t in g  o f  a model w h ich  in c o rp o ra te s  b o th  
econom ic and s u b je c t iv e  fa c to rs  is  a fo rm id ab le  ta sk , and one w h ich  
is  beyond th e  scope o f  th is  th e s is , w h ich  concen tra tes  p u re ly  on 
econom ic fa c to rs .
4.10 A TAXONOMY OF FDI THEORIES: THE MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
PARADIGM
4.10.1 Introduction
The v a r ie ty  o f  th e  econom ic th e o rie s  o f FDI p resen ted  th u s  fa r  
dem onstra tes  th a t  many o f  th e  com peting e xp lana tions  can be l is te d  
und e r m ore th a n  one ca tegory . Th is h ig h lig h ts  th e  need fo r  a 
c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme w h ich  e lim ina tes  th is  o ve rla p  by c le a r ly  
d e f in in g  each app roach  w ith in  a g iven  category. Recent c o n tr ib u tio n s  
to  th e  l i te r a tu r e  [P a rry  (1980), C a lve t (1981)] have suggested th e  
a d o p tio n  o f  a 'm a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  paradigm ' as an a p p ro p ria te  
taxonom ic  dev ice .
The m a rk e t im p e rfe c tio n s  parad igm  stems from  Hymer s sem ina l 
(1960) th e s is , w h ich  e xp la in e d  FDI by exam in ing th e  assum ptions 
u n d e r ly in g  th e  n e o c la ss ica l m odel o f in te rn a tio n a l tra d e . In  th e  
p e r fe c t ly  c o m p e tit iv e  in te rn a t io n a l env ironm ent p o s tu la te d  by th is  
model, th e  use o f  FDI to  p e n e tra te  fo re ig n  m arkets w ou ld  c o n s t itu te  
an i r r a t io n a l  a c tio n , s ince  i t  w o u ld  n o t produce re tu rn s  any g re a te r
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than  th o s e  w h ic h  c o u ld  be earned by fre e  trade. I t  fo llo w s  lo g ic a lly  
from  th is  th a t  any d e p a rtu re s  from  the  model o f p e rfe c t co m p e titio n  
p ro v id e  a ra t io n a le  fo r  FDI. Im pe rfec tions  in  m arkets th e re fo re  
serve to  d e s tro y  th e  bas is  fo r  fre e  trade , w h ich may then  rep laced  
by in te r n a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n .
Hym er s th e o re t ic a l concep tion  was taken  up by K in d le b e rg e r 
(1969), w ho p ropo sed  a fo u r - fo ld  taxonom y o f depa rtu res  from  th e  
model o f  p e r fe c t  c o m p e tit io n  to  exp la in  the  phenomenon o f  FDI. 
These d e p a rtu re s  cons is te d  o f  im p e rfec tions  in  p ro d u c t m arke ts , 
im p e rfe c tio n s  in  fa c to r  m arkets, scale economies and governm ent 
d is ru p t io n s  (such  as taxes  and ta r i f fs ) .
A m ore re c e n t c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme, proposed by C a lve t (1981), 
ca p tu re s  deve lopm en ts  in  the  th e o ry  o f FDI th a t have taken  p lace 
since K in d le b e rg e r 's  c o n tr ib u t io n .  I t  cons is ts  o f the  fo llo w in g  fo u r  
ca te g o rie s :
(1) M a rk e t d is e q u ilib r iu m  im pe rfec tions
(2) G overnm ent induced  im pe rfec tions
(3) M a rke t s tru c tu re  im p e rfe c tio n s
(4) M a rke t fa i lu r e  im p e rfe c tio n s
Each o f  these  ca tego ries , and the  FDI th e o rie s  w h ich  th e y  
embrace, w i l l  now be considered .
4.10.2 M a rk e t D is e q u ilib r iu m  Im p e rfe c tio n s
These im p e r fe c tio n s  o ccu r when p rice s  do n o t a d ju s t to  b r in g  s u p p ly  
and demand in to  e q u il ib r iu m  because o f the  segm enta tion  o f w o r ld  
m arke ts . F irm s  w i l l  seek to  e x p lo it  th is  s itu a t io n  by in v e s tin g  
ab road  u n t i l  m a rke ts  are  b ro u g h t in to  e q u ilib r iu m . FDI is  th e re fo re  
seen as an e q u il ib ra t in g  c a p ita l f lo w  w h ich  comes to  an end when 
ra te s  o f  r e tu rn  are  equ a lise d  among co u n trie s .
T h is  fo rm  o f  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n  embraces in ves tm en t th e o ry  
and th e  co m p a ra tive  cos t schoo l o f  in te rn a t io n a l tra d e  th e o ry , s ince  
the  d is e q u il ib r iu m  c o n d it io n s  w h ich  p ro v id e  in c e n tiv e s  to  in v e s t
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abroad o c c u r m a in ly  in  fa c to r  m arkets and currency m arkets. A 
c o u n try  w ith  an u n d e rva lu e d  cu rrency, fo r  example, w i l l  a t t r a c t  
fo re ig n  f irm s  s ince  i t  o ffe rs  lo w e r costs compared to  o th e r  
c o u n tr ie s . In  a d d it io n , those  f irm s  h o ld ing  underva lued  cu rre nc ie s  
w i l l  re a lis e  a c a p ita l ga in  once m arke t e q u ilib r iu m  is  re -e s ta b lis h e d . 
FDI is  th u s  a t ra n s ie n t  phenomenon w h ich may even be com p le te ly  
re ve rse d  i f  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  decide, once e q u ilib r iu m  is  re s to re d , to  
s e ll t h e i r  fo re ig n  assets, pocke t the  c a p ita l gain, and re tu rn  to  
th e ir  dom es tic  o p e ra tio n s .
As an exam ple o f  d is e q u ilib r iu m  in  fa c to r  m arke ts, i t  is  
p o s s ib le  th a t  re a l ra te s  o f  re tu rn  on s e c u rit ie s  may n o t be 
e q u a lise d  in te r n a t io n a l ly  by p o r t fo l io  c a p ita l flo w s  due to  
in e f f ic ie n c ie s  in  in te rn a t io n a l s e c u r it ie s  m arkets, such as th in n e ss  
o r  la c k  o f  d is c lo s u re . As a re s u lt ,  re a l ra tes o f re tu rn  on assets 
can o n ly  be b ro u g h t in to  e q u ilib r iu m  by flow s o f d ire c t in ve s tm e n t 
across n a t io n a l b ou nda rie s .
The m a rk e t d is e q u ilib r iu m  approach also has close s im ila r it ie s  
w ith  lo c a t io n  th e o ry . MNCs, in  the  p u rs u it  o f cost m in im iza tion , may 
be pe rsua ded  to  in v e s t  in  lo w  la b o u r-c o s t coun trie s . The re s u lta n t  
in c rea se  in  th e  demand fo r  la b o u r w i l l  d r iv e  up wages in  these 
c o u n tr ie s , w h ile  th e  d e c lin e  in  la b o u r demand in  home c o u n tr ie s  w i l l  
fo rc e  wages down. FDI w i l l  th u s  have a f in i te  l ife -s p a n  since th e  
ac t o f  in v e s t in g  abroad  w i l l  se t in  m otion a process w h ich  w i l l  
e v e n tu a lly  le a d  to  th e  re -e s ta b lis h m e n t o f e q u ilib r iu m .
4.10.3 G overnm ent Induced  Im p e rfe c tio n s
These im p e r fe c tio n s  are th e  re s u lt  o f  governm ent p o lic ie s  w h ich  
r e s t r ic t  th e  w o rk in g  o f  th e  m arke t mechanism, such as c e n tra l bank  
in te rv e n t io n  in  c u rre n c y  m arke ts . Such actions cou ld  co n ce ivab ly  be 
re s p o n s ib le  f o r  some o f  th e  d is e q u ilib r iu m  hypotheses cons ide red  
above, b u t  gove rn m e n t-in d u ce d  im p e rfe c tio n s  m e rit a ca tegory  o f 
t h e ir  own in  C a lv e t's  taxonom y because th e re  are no e q u il ib ra t in g  
fo rc e s  w h ic h  w i l l  a u to m a tic a lly  c o rre c t them. In  o rd e r to  n u l l i f y  th e  
in c e n t iv e  f o r  FDI a l l  governm ents w ou ld  have to  harm onise th e ir  
p o lic ie s , o r  have  no p o lic ie s  a t a l l  [C a lv e t (1981, p45)].
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By im pos ing  re s tr ic t io n s  on trade , governm ents can make i t  
im p o s s ib le  f o r  f irm s  to  reach th e ir  m arke t p o te n t ia l th ro u g h  e xp o rts  
alone. F irm s  may f in d  them selves in  the  p o s it io n  o f h av ing  to  
p roduce  in  a fo re ig n  c o u n try  i f  th e y  are to  s e ll the re . A n o th e r 
m a jo r g o ve rn m e n t—in s p ire d  d is to r t io n  is  the  le v y  o f  taxes. S ince 
f irm s  aim  to  m axim ise ra te s  o f re tu rn  a f te r  ta x , in te r -c o u n try  
ta x a t io n  d i f fe r e n t ia ls  and ta x  laws w i l l  s ig n if ic a n t ly  in flu e n c e  th e ir  
cho ice  o f  p ro d u c tio n  lo c a tio n .
A lth o u g h  FDI may occu r as a b y -p ro d u c t o f  governm ent tra d e  
and ta x a t io n  p o lic ie s , governm ents may also se t o u t s p e c if ic a lly  to  
a t t r a c t  fo re ig n  in v e s tm e n t by o f fe r in g  f in a n c ia l in c e n tiv e s , such as 
p re fe re n t ia l ta x  ra te s  and s o f t  loans. These p o lic y  in s tru m e n ts  have 
th e  e f fe c t  o f  'p u l l in g ' companies tow ards c e rta in  lo c a tio n s , whereas 
o th e r  p o lic ie s  te n d  to  'push ' f irm s  in to  FDI.
From  th e  above i t  is  c le a r th a t  th is  ca tego ry  o f  m arke t 
im p e rfe c tio n , l ik e  th e  p re v io u s  one, in co rp o ra te s  v a r ia b le s  th a t  are 
an in te g ra l p a r t  o f  lo c a tio n  th e o ry  and in te rn a t io n a l tra d e  th e o ry . 
The f i r s t  tw o  ca tego ries  o f  C a lve t's  taxonom y are, in  fa c t,  
co m p a tib le  w ith  a r e la t iv e ly  co m p e titive  m arke t s tru c tu re . T h is  is  
n o t th e  case in  th e  th ir d  ca tegory, w h ich  e x p l ic i t ly  cons ide rs  
im p e rfe c t c o m p e tit io n , and th e re fo re  cap tu res in d u s t r ia l o rg a n iz a tio n  
th e o ry  and V e rnon 's  p ro d u c t l i f e  cycle  concept.
4.10.4 M a rk e t S tru c tu re  Im p e rfe c tio n s
These im p e rfe c tio n s  co rre spond  to  d e v ia tio n s  from  p u re ly  m a rk e t-  
de te rm ined  p r ic e s  in  the  p ro d u c t m arke t, b ro u g h t abou t by th e  
ex is te n ce  o f  m o n o p o lis tic  o r  o l ig o p o lis t ic  m arke t c h a ra c te r is t ic s . 
FDI is  th e re fo re  u n d e rta ke n  to  e x p lo it,  as Hymer suggested, th e  
s p e c if ic  advan tages w h ich  f irm s  o p e ra tin g  in  these m arke ts  m ust 
possess.
The tw o  e s s e n tia l a t t r ib u te s  w h ich  set o l ig o p o lis t ic  m arke ts  
a p a rt fro m  c o m p e tit iv e  ones (in te rd e p e n d e n t dec is io n -m ak ing  and the  
ex is te n ce  o f  b a r r ie rs  to  e n try ) fe a tu re  in  the  fo re ig n  in ve s tm e n t 
models o f  b o th  V ernon and K n icke rb o cke r. In  the  fo rm e r, f irm s
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re a c t to  th e  th re a t  o f  lo s in g  m arkets by expanding overseas, w h ile
in  th e  la t t e r  FDI is  t r ig g e re d  by the  decis ions o f lead ing  f irm s  to  
in v e s t ab roa d .
These th e o r ie s  im p l ic i t ly  assume th a t the  m arke t mechanism has 
the  a b i l i t y  to  t ra n s fe r  a f irm 's  un ique assets abroad. FDI takes  
p lace because f irm s  p e rce ive  th a t they  w i l l  de rive  a g re a te r b e n e fit  
by t ra n s fe r r in g  t h e ir  assets w ith in  the  f irm  ra th e r  than  th ro u g h  th e  
m arke t. H ow ever, th e  f in a l  ca tegory  in  C a lve t's  fram ew ork  que s tio n s  
the  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  m arke t mechanism to  e f f ic ie n t ly  t ra n s fe r  th e  
u n iq u e  re n t-s e c u r in g  a b i l i t ie s  o f f irm s  across n a tio n a l f ro n t ie rs .
4.10.5 M a rk e t F a ilu re  Im p e rfe c tio n s
These im p e r fe c tio n s  are d e fin e d  by C a lve t (1981) as "c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
in  p ro d u c t io n  te c h n iq u e s  and commodity p ro p e rtie s  w h ich  p re v e n t 
th e  m a rk e t m echanism  fro m  a llo c a tin g  resources e f f ic ie n t ly "  (p47). 
The m ain  com m od ity  f o r  w h ich  m arkets are deemed to  be in e f f ic ie n t  
re so u rce  a llo c a to rs  is  know ledge. A rrow  (1962) p ioneered th e  
deve lopm en t o f  th e o ry  in  th is  area in  h is  w o rk  on the  m a rke t 
a llo c a t io n  o f  resou rces  fo r  in v e n tio n . H is ideas were deve loped by 
Johnson (1970) who was th e  f i r s t  a u th o r to  app ly  th e  m arke t fa i lu re  
l i te r a tu r e  to  th e  fo re ig n  inves tm en t decis ion.
Jo h n so n 's  a rgum ent commenced w ith  the  o b s e rv a tio n  th a t
know ledge  is  a p u b lic  good w ith  a zero soc ia l p r ice . F irm -c re a te d  
know ledge  has many o f  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f a p u b lic  good (ie  i t  
can be used in  a n o th e r f irm  w ith o u t i t s  va lue  be ing  s u b s ta n t ia lly  
im p a ire d ) and th e  m a rg in a l cost o f  em ploying i t  abroad is  l ik e ly  to  
be m uch le ss  th a n  i t s  average cost o f p ro d u c tio n  and tra n s fe r . The 
c re a tio n  and deve lopm en t o f  such know ledge does, o f  course, re q u ire  
an in v e s tm e n t o f  resou rces  w h ich  must be recompensed i f  th e re  is  to  
be an in c e n t iv e  f o r  p r iv a te  in ves tm en t in  know ledge c re a tio n . Hence 
a c la s s ic  d ilem m a a rise s : fro m  so c ie ty 's  p o in t o f  v ie w  e f f ic ie n c y  in  
use demands th a t  know ledge be fre e , b u t in c e n tiv e s  fo r  th e  
p ro d u c tio n  o f  know ledge  re q u ire  m onopolies to  be awarded so th a t  
kn o w le d g e -c re a to rs  ea rn  h ig h e r  th a n  average re tu rn s .
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Because th e  m a rke t mechanism w i l l  f a i l  to  set a p rice  w h ich  
cap tu res  th e  p r iv a te  cos t o f  know ledge c rea tion  the  f irm  w i l l  have 
an in c e n t iv e  to  t ra n s fe r  i t s  know ledge abroad v ia  FDI, fo r  i t  can 
then  se t th e  p r ic e  w h ich  i t 's  fo re ig n  su b s id ia ry  w i l l  use to  e x p lo it  
th is  know ledge . The MNC thus  reconc iles  the  requ irem en ts  o f  
e f f ic ie n t  p ro d u c t io n  o f  know ledge w ith  the  requ irem en ts o f e f f ic ie n t  
e x p lo i ta t io n  o f  know ledge.
4.10.6 Conclusions
T h roug h  th e  use o f  a common concept, the  m arke t im p e rfe c tio n s  
pa rad igm  l in k s  to g e th e r  th e  v a r io u s  s trands o f economic th o u g h t on 
the  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  FDI. I t  enables sp e c ific  e xp lana tions  and 
models d eve lop ed  by in d iv id u a l th e o r is ts  to  be described in  term s o f  
the  p a r t ic u la r  im p e rfe c tio n  in  w o rld  p ro d u c t and fa c to r  m arke ts  
w h ich  th e y  id e n t if ie d .
As M a rk  Casson (1981) p o in te d  ou t, however, taxonom ies have an 
in h e re n t d e fe c t i f  one is  in te re s te d  in  th e o ry  c o n s tru c tio n , f o r  th e y  
canno t s e rve  as a bas is  f o r  p re d ic tin g  events. The m arke t 
im p e rfe c tio n s  pa rad igm  l is ts  a l l  the  fa c to rs  w h ich  cou ld  co n ce iva b ly  
in f lu e n c e  th e  f irm 's  FDI dec is ion , b u t i t  does n o t suggest w h ich  o f  
th e  c a te g o r ie s  is  more l ik e ly  to  p re v a il in  the  re a l w o rld . I t  o n ly  
e x p la in s  th e  m o tiv a t io n s  fo r  FDI in  a v e ry  lim ite d  way, by "p igeon ­
h o l in g ” obse rve d  phenomena w ith in  the  ca tegories d e fin ed  by th e  
taxonom y. In  o rd e r  to  move away from  taxonom y to  th e o ry  i t  is  
necessary to  im pose re s t r ic t io n s  on the  taxonom y, ie  to  s ta te  th a t  
c e r ta in  cases w h ic h  th e  taxonom y id e n t if ie s  w i l l  neve r be observed.
J u s t  such  re s t r ic t io n s  are imposed on th is  taxonom y by those  
th e o r is ts  who fo cu s  t h e ir  a t te n t io n  on the  in te rn a l o rg a n iz a tio n  
p ro p e r t ie s  o f  th e  MNC. T h e ir  bas ic  p o s tu la te  is  th a t  FDI is  a 
response to  th e  tra n s a c tio n  costs w h ich  a rise  in  in te rn a t io n a l 
m arke ts . The a c t o f  b r in g in g  tra n s a c tio n s  w ith in  th e  f irm , by 
engaging in  FDI, se rves to  reduce these costs. The n e x t c h a p te r 
re v ie w s  in te r n a l o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry  and the  in s ig h ts  w h ich  i t  





1. Assessm ents o f  th e  in flu e n c e  o f  Hymer's (1960) th e s is  can be
fo u n d  in  a r t ic le s  by  D unning and Rugman (1985) and Teece (1985),
b o th  w r i t te n  in  h o n o u r o f Hymer fo r  the  Am erican Econom ic
g-e- ^ ;ew J-.0 m ai*h th e  f i r s t  q u a rte r  cen tu ry  "o f the  th e o ry  o f  
fo re ig n  d ir e c t  in ve s tm e n t."
2. In  fa c t ,  a la rg e  p ro p o r t io n  o f the  postw ar US FDI in to  Europe 
was f in a n c e d  in  d o lla rs , b u t v ia  the  'o ffsh o re ' E u ro d o lla r  m arke t.
3. G a lb ra ith ,  1973, p l67.
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CHAPTER FIVE -  TRANSACTION COST THEORY AND THE MNC
5.1 INTRODUCTION
T ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry 1 seeks to  p ro v id e  an e xp la n a tio n  fo r  th e  
d iv is io n  o f  econom ic a c t iv it ie s  between firm s , m arkets and o th e r  
fo rm s o f  econom ic o rg a n iza tio n . The basic u n it  under in v e s t ig a t io n  
is  th e  tra n s a c tio n . Costs w h ich  a rise  in  the  course o f m a rk e t-
m ed ia ted  tra n s a c tio n s  are he ld  to  p rov id e  the  ra tio n a le  fo r  th e
e x is te n ce  o f  th e  f irm , w h ich  can reduce such costs by o rg a n iz in g  
tra n s a c tio n s  i t s e l f .
S e ve ra l a u th o rs  have p o in te d  o u t th a t  tra n s a c tio n  cost th e o ry
is , in  m any respec ts , s im p ly  a new name fo r  the  economic th e o ry  o f
th e  f i r m  [eg Spence (1975, p l63), C a lve t (1981, p49), S p icer & B a llew  
(1983, p77)]. I t  is ,  th e re fo re , w o rth w h ile  p o in tin g  o u t an im p o rta n t
d iffe re n c e . Whereas th e  m ainstream  th e o ry  o f the  f irm  tre a ts  th e  
f irm  as m e re ly  a u n i t  o f p ro d u c tio n  w h ich  responds in  a p r o f i t  
m ax im is in g  way to  su p p ly  and demand co n d itio n s  in  the  m arke tp lace , 
t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry  analyses the  f irm  as a s u b s t itu te  f o r  
a lte rn a t iv e  modes fo r  com p le ting  exchanges, such as m arkets.
I t  can th u s  be argued th a t  the  term  'th e o ry  o f the  f irm ' is  in  
fa c t  a m isnom er, w h ich  shou ld  be rep laced by th e  te rm  'th e o ry  o f 
m a rke ts ', in  w h ic h  f irm s  are im p o rta n t actors . Th is p o in t was made 
by Jensen and M eck ling  (1976) and re - ite ra te d  by Jensen (1983) as 
fo llo w s :
"J u s t  as as tronom ers  can u s e fu lly  a b s tra c t from  
th e  c o m p le x it ie s  in s id e  a s ta r  o r  ga laxy  fo r  
c e r ta in  purposes, th e  c la s s ic a l economic n o tio n  o f 
th e  f i r m  has u s e fu l ly  a b s tra c te d  from  the  in te rn a l 
c o m p le x it ie s  o f  o rg a n iza tio n s . I t  has y ie ld e d  a 
ro b u s t  th e o ry  o f  m arke ts  th a t  is  o f  g rea t va lue .
H ow ever, p re c is e ly  because th e  d e f in it io n  o f  th e  
f i r m  a b s tra c ts  fro m  most o f  the  re a l problem s and 
c o m p le x it ie s  o f  o rg a n iza tio n s , i t  p ro v id e s  no 
in s ig h ts  to  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f a th e o ry  o f 
o rg a n iz a tio n s .
126
CHAPTER 5
In  essence, th e  t ra d it io n a l th e o ry  o f the f irm  regards the  f irm  
as a 'b la c k  box ' to  w h ich  a p ro d u c tio n  fu n c t io n  is  ro u t in e ly  
assigned. T ra n s a c tio n  cost th e o ry  is  concerned w ith  e xp la in in g  w hat 
goes on in s id e  th is  b la ck  box, so th a t  the  e ffic ie n c y  w ith  w h ich  
f irm s  o rgan ize  tra n s a c tio n s  can be compared w ith  the  tra n s a c tio n a l 
e f f ic ie n c y  o f  a lte rn a t iv e  methods o f resource a llo c a tio n .
T ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  has been app lied  to  the  m u lt in a tio n a l 
as w e ll as to  th e  dom estic  f irm . Th is developm ent is  analysed la te r  
in  th e  c h a p te r. The n e x t sec tion  surveys the  antecedent l i te ra tu r e  
on t ra n s a c t io n  cos t th e o ry .
5.2 TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
5.2.1 The R oots o f  T ra n sa c tio n  Cost Theory
O rth o d o x  econom ists  in  the  e a r ly  p a r t o f th is  ce n tu ry  were 
p re o ccu p ie d  w ith  th e  p e r fe c t ly  com pe titive  model o f  m arke t 
c o m p e tit io n , in  w h ich  the  ex is tence o f tra n s a c tio n  costs is  assumed 
away. The n o t io n  th a t  the  tra n s a c tio n  was an in s ig n if ic a n t  
phenom enon, u n w o rth y  o f in v e s tig a t io n , was f i r s t  cha llenged by John 
R. Commons (1934), who advocated th a t the  s tu d y  o f tra n s a c tio n s  
s h o u ld  fo rm  th e  bas is  o f  economic ana lys is. Commons belonged to  
th e  ' in s t i t u t io n a l is t '  schoo l o f  th o u g h t, an Am erican in te l le c tu a l 
t r a d i t io n  in s p ire d  by  th e  ideas o f T h o rs te in  Veblen [see eg Veblen 
(1899)]. The in s t i tu t io n a l is t s  were c r i t ic a l o f neoc lass ica l economics 
fo r  i t s  re lia n c e  on th e o re t ic a l and m athem atica l models w h ich  n o t 
o n ly  d is to r te d  and o v e rs im p lif ie d  economic phenomena b u t w h ich , 
more im p o r ta n t ly ,  a lso  ig no red  th e ir  non-econom ic, in s t i tu t io n a l 
e n v iro n m e n t.
Commons a rgued  th a t  the  focus o f o rth o d o x  th e o ry  on the  
exchange o f  goods and se rv ices  was m isplaced, f o r  i t  fa ile d  to  
recogn ise  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  the  o th e r  tra n sa c tio n s  w h ich  are a 
necessary p re - re q u is ite  fo r  p ro d u c t m arke t exchange. Two such 
v a r ie t ie s  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  were id e n t if ie d  by Commons, m anageria l 
tra n s a c tio n s  in v o lv in g ,  e s s e n tia lly , re la t io n s  between em ployers and
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em ployees; and ra t io n in g ' tra n sa c tio n s , cons is ting  o f such events as 
the  d e c la ra t io n  o f  d iv ide nds . Commons drew a tte n tio n  to  these 
tra n s a c tio n s  because th e y  were essen tia l to  the  fu n c t io n in g  o f most 
in s t i tu t io n s ,  and in  p a r t ic u la r  to  the  firm .
A lth o u g h  he made the  tra n s a c tio n  the  bas ic  u n it  o f  h is  
in v e s t ig a t io n s ,  Commons d id  n o t associate costs w ith  any o f  the  
p a r t ic u la r  t ra n s a c tio n s  w h ich  he id e n tif ie d . I t  was Ronald Coase who 
in tro d u c e d  th e  concep t o f tra n s a c tio n  costs w ith  h is  1937 a r t ic le  The 
N a tu re  o f  th e  F irm , w h ich  p u t fo rw a rd  an e xp la n a tio n  fo r  the  
ex is te n ce  o f  f irm s  in  m arke t economies. Econom ists a t th is  tim e, 
w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  K n ig h t (1921), were no t in te re s te d  in  ju s t i fy in g  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  f irm . They were concerned, p redo m inan tly , w ith  
th e  w ay in  w h ic h  m arke ts  m ediated exchange; the  boundary  o f  th e  
f irm  was ta k e n  as a param eter. Coase argued, how ever, th a t  the  
b o u n d a ry  o f  th e  f irm  shou ld  be regarded as a dec is ion  v a r ia b le  fo r  
w h ich  an econom ic assessment was needed.
The m ethod o f  ana lys is  used by Coase has s im ila r it ie s  w ith  
th a t  em ployed by th e  seven teen th  ce n tu ry  p o l i t ic a l th e o r is t  Thomas 
Hobbes in  h is  book  L e v ia th a n  (1651).^ I t  in vo lve s  the  use o f w ha t 
may be d e sc rib e d  as a 'th o u g h t expe rim en t1 in  w h ich  a 's ta te  o f 
n a tu re ' is  p roposed  w h ich  has the  in s t i tu t io n  in  que s tio n  absent 
fro m  i t .  In  Hobbes's case the  in s t i tu t io n  was governm ent, and i t s  
e x is te n ce  was e x p la in e d  by the  fa il in g s  o f the s ta te  o f n a tu re  w h ich  
caused gove rnm en t to  a rise , namely human na tu re . Governments 
were fo rm ed , in  Hobbes's op in io n , as the  re s u lt  o f  a v o lu n ta ry  
c o n tra c t be tw een c it iz e n s  and a p ro te c tiv e  sovere ign  in  w h ich  th e  
c it iz e n s  agree to  recogn ise  the  a u th o r ity  o f the  sovere ign  in  re tu rn  
f o r  r e l ie f  fro m  th e  ana rchy and cons tan t war w h ich  w ou ld  o th e rw ise  
make ''th e  l i f e  o f  man s o lita ry ,  poor, nasty, b ru t is h  and s h o r t 
(p l86).
In  Coase's a n a lys is  the  's ta te  o f n a tu re ' is  th e  fre e  m arke t m  
w h ich  f irm s  are  absen t and in d iv id u a ls  tra n sa c t w ith  one ano the r. 
The fa i l in g s  o f  th e  m arke t w h ich  cause firm s  to  a rise  are the  costs 
w h ich  a r is e  in  in d iv id u a l tra n s c a tio n s . Two p a r t ic u la r  tra n s a c tio n  
costs  w ere id e n t if ie d  by Coase. F ir s t ly ,  costs in v o lv e d  in  us ing  th e
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p ric e  m echanism. These a rise  because the  re le v a n t p rices  fo r  the  
exchange o f  fa c to r  in p u ts  have to  be d iscovered. In  a m arke t 
economy w ith o u t  f irm s , fa c to r  in p u ts  have to  search each o th e r o u t 
and com bine v ia  s h o r t- te rm  co n tra c ts  fo r  the  o n e -o ff p ro d u c tio n  o f 
p a r t ic u la r  p ro d u c ts . The f irm , in  con tras t, becomes a sole source 
s u p p lie r  to  i t s e l f  f o r  those tra n sa c tio n s  th a t are s h ifte d  o u t o f  th e  
m arke t and in to  th e  f irm ; re le v a n t p rices are thus  known.
S econd ly , th e  f irm  is  able to  cu t down the  number o f c o n tra c ts  
between fa c to rs  o f  p ro d u c tio n  by s u b s titu t in g  a s in g le  employment 
c o n tra c t in  t h e ir  p lace . Coase exp la ined  i t  as fo llo w s :
"The cos ts  o f  n e g o tia t in g  and conc lud ing  a 
se p a ra te  c o n tra c t f o r  each exchange tra n s a c tio n  
w h ic h  ta ke s  p lace on a m arket ... are n o t 
e lim in a te d  when th e re  is  a f irm  b u t th e y  are 
g re a t ly  reduced . A fa c to r  o f p ro d u c tio n  .... does 
n o t  have to  make a series o f con trac ts  w ith  th e  
fa c to rs  w ith  whom he is  co- ope ra ting  w ith in  the  
f i r m  .... F o r th is  se ries o f  co n tra c ts  is  
s u b s t itu te d  one."^
Coase was th e re fo re  a rgu ing  th a t  the  emergence o f f irm s  may be 
v iew ed  s im p ly  as a process in  w h ich  p rodu c t m arkets are rep laced  
by fa c to r  m arke ts , re s u lt in g  in  a saving in  tra n s a c tio n  costs.
H a v in g  p ro v id e d  a ra tio n a le  fo r  the  existence o f f irm s , Coase 
th e n  needed to  p ro v id e  a reason fo r  the  con tin ued  ex is tence  o f 
m arke ts , g iv e n  th e ir  in h e re n t tra n s a c tio n  costs. The answer was, 
s im p ly , th a t  f irm s  expe rience  d is t in c t iv e  costs o f th e ir  own, so th a t  
a  ba lance  w i l l  be s t ru c k  when the  f irm  has expanded to  th e  p o in t  
where " th e  costs  o f  o rg a n iz in g  an e x tra  tra n s a c tio n  w ith in  the  f irm  
become e q u a l to  th e  costs  o f  c a rry in g  ou t the  same tra n s a c tio n  by 
means o f  an exchange in  th e  open m arke t o r the  costs o f o rgan iz in g  
in  a n o th e r f irm ."^
In  an a r t ic le  w r it te n  some tw e n ty  th re e  years la te r ,  Coase (1960) 
e la b o ra te d  fu r th e r  on th e  tra n s a c tio n  costs th a t re s u lt  from  us ing  
the  m a rke t mechanism. Th is  in v o lv e d  fo rs a k in g  th e  assum ption o f 
p e r fe c t in fo rm a tio n  em bodied in  th e  neoc lass ica l m arke t model. In  
th is  m odel p r ic e s  are n o t se t by in d iv id u a ls  b u t by a f ic t io n a l
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m a rke t a d m in is tra to r ',  the  W alrasian auctioneer, who ensures th a t  
tra d e  o n ly  takes  p lace  when the  e q u ilib r iu m  set o f  p rices  has been 
announced. These c o -o rd in a tio n  serv ices are assumed to  be cos tless , 
so th a t  t ra d e rs  w i l l  be p ro v id e d  w ith  costless m arke t in fo rm a tio n  
ab o u t exchange o p p o r tu n it ie s  as conveyed by p rices ; th e y  w i l l  n o t, 
th e re fo re , in c u r  any search costs.
Coase d ropped  the  economic f ic t io n  o f the  W alrasian a u c tio n e e r 
and re co g n ise d  th a t  d ire c t b a rga in ing  does, in  fa c t,  ta ke  p lace. 
T rade rs  have  to  engage in  a process o f search to  d isco ve r who th e y  
can d e a l w ith .  They m ust subsequen tly  in fo rm  the  tra d in g  p a rtn e rs  
th e y  id e n t i f y  th a t  th e y  w ish  to  dea l w ith  them, and th e y  m ust th e n  
e n te r in to  n e g o tia t io n s , w h ich  w i l l  end w ith  th e  s t r ik in g  o f  a 
b a rg a in  and th e  s ig n in g  o f a c o n tra c t. T he rea fte r, th e y  w i l l  in c u r  
c o n tra c t en fo rcem en t costs as th e y  a ttem pt to  make sure  th a t  th e  
te rm s o f  th e  c o n tra c t are be ing observed.
5.2.2 Recent Contributions
A f te r  a lo n g  h ia tu s , th e  ideas con ta ined  in  Coase's 1937 a r t ic le  on 
the  n a tu re  o f  th e  f irm  began to  e x e rt an in flu e n c e  on the  th in k in g  
o f th o se  econom ists  concerned w ith  the  th e o ry  o f th e  f irm .
A lc h ia n  and Demsetz (1972) fo llo w e d  the  lead o f Coase in  
m o d e llin g  th e  f irm  as th e  nexus o f a set o f c o n tra c tin g  
re la t io n s h ip s  among fa c to rs  o f p ro d u c tio n . They argued th a t  th e  
f irm  owes i t s  e x is te n ce  n o t o n ly  to  the  excessive costs o f  o rgan iz in g  
c o n tra c ts  th ro u g h  th e  m arke t, b u t also to  the  advantages w h ich  
accrue fro m  team p ro d u c tio n  (ie  in d iv id u a ls  w o rk in g  to g e th e r). 
These advan tages a r is e  from  th e  prem ise th a t  in d iv id u a ls  are 
u n l ik e ly  to  make s p e c if ic  know ledge about th e ir  own c a p a b ilit ie s  
f re e ly  a v a ila b le  in  a m arke t s ince in  so doing th e y  w ou ld  weaken 
th e ir  b a rg a in in g  p o s it io n  v is -a -v is  o th e r p a r t ic ip a n ts . However, 
when com bined u n d e r one o rg a n iz a tio n a l um bre lla , in d iv id u a ls  have 
an in c e n t iv e  to  v o lu n ta r i ly  d isc lose  th e ir  s p e c ific  know ledge since 
th e y  a re  p a r t  o f  a team, upon whose success th e ir  own s tanda rd  o f 
l iv in g  and p ro sp e c ts  f o r  advancem ent depend.
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A lc h ia n  and Demsetz recognised, however, th a t  p ro d u c tio n  
processes w h ic h  in v o lv e  team p ro d u c tio n  make the  id e n t if ic a t io n  and 
m easurem ent o f  in d iv id u a l perform ance d i f f ic u l t  s ince the  m arg ina l 
p ro d u c t o f  one in p u t  is  dependent upon the  le v e l o f o u tp u t ach ieved 
by a l l  th e  o th e r  in p u ts  employed. I f  one in p u t were to  w o rk  be low  
i t s  f u l l  p o te n t ia l th e  repercuss ions w ould  be d iss ip a te d  across a l l  
th e  o th e r  in p u ts ,  th u s  m aking the  source o f any 's h irk in g ' d i f f ic u l t  
to  id e n t ify .
A lc h ia n  and Demsetz argued th a t  th is  'm etering  prob lem ', caused 
by in te rd e p e n d e n c y  between fa c to r  in p u ts , was overcome by  the  
e v o lu t io n  o f  h ie ra rc h ic a l s tru c tu re s  w ith in  f irm s  w h ich  enabled one 
o r  m ore o f  th e  fa c to r  in p u ts  to  spec ia lise  in  m o n ito r in g  the  
p ro d u c tiv e  a c t iv i t y  o f  a l l  o th e r in p u ts . These m on ito rs  d id  n o t 
them se lves s h ir k  because th e y  were endowed w ith  'p ro p e rty  r ig h ts ' 
w h ich  gave them  a re s id u a l cla im  to  the  income o f the  f irm  in  
excess o f  paym ents to  a l l  o th e r fa c to r  in p u ts . They th e re fo re  had 
an in c e n t iv e  to  w o rk  a t maximum p ro d u c tiv ity .
The o r ig in  o f  th e  f irm  is  th e re fo re  exp la ined  by A lch ia n  and 
Demsetz in  te rm s o f  i t s  g re a te r e ffe c tiveness  a t m o n ito r in g  the  
pe rfo rm an ce  o f  employees engaged in  'team p ro d u c tio n ' compared to  
n o n -c e n tra liz e d  c o n tra c tu a l arrangem ents. Compared w ith  Coase's 
e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  f irm , th e ir  argum ents can be regarded as th e  
o p p o s ite  s ide  o f  th e  same co in : the  lo w e r the  cost o f managing team 
p ro d u c tio n , th e  g re a te r  the  com para tive  advantage o f o rgan iz in g  
tra n s a c tio n s  w ith in  a f irm .
The a n a ly s is  o f  A lc h ia n  and Demsetz was taken  up and extended 
by Jensen and M eck ling  (1976). They be lieved  th a t  A lch ia n  and 
Demsetz p laced  to o  much emphasis on team p ro d u c tio n  and th e re fo re  
fa ile d  to  re cogn ise  th a t  f irm s  have c o n tra c tu a l re la tio n s h ip s  w ith  
p a r t ie s  o th e r  th a n  employees, eg w ith  custom ers, su p p lie rs , c re d ito rs  
etc. In  th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  f irm  w h ich  they  developed m o n ito r in g  
e x p e n d itu re s  are  o n ly  p a r t  o f  a more ex tens ive  set o f costs w h ich  
a r is e  in  c o n tra c tu a l re la t io n s h ip s . These so -ca lled  agency costs 
a r is e  in  re la t io n s h ip s  w h ich  in v o lv e  a de lega tion  o f dec is ion -m ak ing  
a u th o r i ty  fro m  th e  c o n tra c to r  (p r in c ip a l)  to  the  con trac tee  (agent).
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Jensen and M eck ling  developed th e ir  agency cost model to  
e x p la in  th e  fo rm  o f  th e  c la ss ic  e n tre p re n e u ria l f irm . Fama (1980) 
m o d if ie d  agency th e o ry  to  p ro v id e  an e xp lana tion  fo r  the  m odern 
p u b lic ly -o w n e d  f irm , whose managers own l i t t l e  o r  no e q u ity . He 
d id  so b y  a rg u in g  th a t  management and r is k -b e a r in g  shou ld  be 
tre a te d  as n a tu ra l ly  separab le  fa c to rs  o f p ro d u c tio n , each faced  
w ith  a m a rke t f o r  i t s  se rv ices: the  m anageria l la b o u r m arke t and the  
c a p ita l m a rke t. The fo rm e r serves to  e f fe c t iv e ly  m o n ito r the  
pe rfo rm an ce  o f  management, w h ile  the  la t te r  p rov id es  the  means fo r  
r is k -b e a re rs  to  sa n c tio n  management by s h if t in g  th e ir  resources 
among f irm s  w ith  r e la t iv e ly  low  tra n s a c tio n  costs.
The m ost s ig n if ic a n t  c o n tr ib u t io n  to  the  recen t tra n s a c tio n  cos t 
l i te r a tu r e  is , a rg u a b ly , O.E. W illiam son 's M arkets and H ie ra rch ie s  
(1975).^ T h is  w o rk  is  much more am bitious th a n  the  th e o r ie s  
co n s id e re d  so fa r ,  f o r  i t  a ttem pts to  account fo r  th e  human and 
e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to rs  respon s ib le  fo r  the  existence o f tra n s a c tio n  
costs . In  d o in g  so, i t  in te g ra te s  o th e r lite ra tu re s  in to  tra n s a c tio n  
cos t th e o ry , p r in c ip a l ly  the  m arke t fa i lu re  and o rg a n iza tio n  th e o ry  
l i te ra tu re s .  The th e o re t ic a l syn thes is  w h ich  W illiam son deve loped, 
know n as th e  M a rke t and H ie ra rch ies  (M&H) fram ew ork, is  described  
in  th e  fo llo w in g  sec tion .
5.2.3 The M a rk e t and H ie ra rch ie s  Fram ework: The Basic Model
W illia m so n 's  a n a lys is  o f  tra n s a c tio n  costs re lie s  on tw o c r i t ic a l  
b e h a v io u ra l assum ptions: bounded ra t io n a li ty  and opportun ism . B o th  
are d e r iv e d  fro m  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry .
The te rm  'bounded r a t io n a li ty ' was coined by Simon (1957a) to  
re f le c t  th e  fa c t  th a t  in d iv id u a ls  have lim ite d  c o g n it iv e  powers and 
th e re fo re  expe rience  d i f f ic u l t ie s  in  fo rm u la tin g  and s o lv in g  com plex 
p rob lem s, and in  p rocess ing  in fo rm a tio n . These c o g n itiv e  de fec ts  
stem fro m  n e u ro p h y s io lo g ic a l l im its  on the  one hand and language 
l im its  on th e  o th e r.
The concep t o f  'o p p o rtu n ism ' stems from  the  w o rk  o f 
o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o r is ts  such as S ch e llin g  (1960) and Goffman (1969).
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I t  e x te n d s  th e  c o n v e n tio n a l assum ption th a t in d iv id u a ls  are gu ided  
by c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  s e lf- in te re s t ,  to  make allow ance fo r  's tra te g ic ' 
b e h a v io u r. T h is  in v o lv e s  s e lf- in te re s t  seeking w ith  the  e x tra  
d im ens ion  o f  g u ile  , eg m aking fa lse  th re a ts  in  the  b e lie f  th a t  
in d iv id u a l advan tage  w i l l  th e re b y  be rea lised .
The im p lic a t io n s  o f these two aspects o f human n a tu re  fo r  
econom ic o rg a n iz a t io n  are set o u t by W illiam son as fo llo w s :
"As a consequence o f  these tw o assum ptions, th e  
hum an agents th a t  pop u la te  the  firm s  and m arkets 
w i th  w h ic h  I  am concerned d i f f e r  from  economic 
man (o r  a t  le a s t th e  common c a r ic a tu re  th e re o f)  in  
th a t  th e y  are  less com petent in  c a lc u la tio n  and 
le s s  t ru s tw o r th y  and re lia b le  in  a c tion . A 
c o n d it io n  o f  bounded ra t io n a li ty  is  re spon s ib le  
f o r  th e  c o m p u ta tio n a l l im its  o f  o rg an iza tion  man.
A  p r o c l iv i t y  f o r  (a t le a s t some) economic agents 
to  behave o p p o r tu n is t ic a l ly  is  respons ib le  f o r  
t h e i r  u n r e l ia b i l i t y  ... B u t f o r  the  s im u ltaneous 
e x is te n c e  o f  b o th  bounded ra t io n a li ty  and 
o p p o rtu n is m , a l l  economic c o n tra c tin g  problem s 
axe t r i v i a l  and th e  s tu d y  o f  economic in s t i tu t io n s  
is  u n im p o rta n t."^
N e ve rth e le ss , W illiam son stresses th a t these tw o human 
l im ita t io n s  do n o t in  them selves pose tra n s a c tio n a l problem s; i t  is  
o n ly  w hen th e y  in te ra c t  w ith  the  a p p ro p ria te  'e n v iro n m e n ta l' fa c to rs  
th a t  th e y  g iv e  r is e  to  s ig n if ic a n t  tra n s a c tio n  costs. Bounds on 
r a t io n a l i t y ,  f o r  exam ple, are o n ly  in te re s t in g  to  the  e x te n t th a t  the  
l im its  o f  r a t io n a l i t y  are reached, ie  under co n d itio n s  o f u n c e r ta in ty  
a n d /o r c o m p le x ity . S im ila r ly , opportun ism  w i l l  o n ly  change th e  
t ra d in g  s itu a t io n  i f  th e re  are a sm all number o f tra d e rs . Large 
num bers w i l l  re n d e r o p p o r tu n is t ic  in c lin a t io n s  in e ffe c tu a l because 
tra d e rs  who a tte m p t to  secure gains by s tra te g ic  p o s tu r in g  w i l l  f in d ,  
a t th e  c o n tra c t  renew a l stage, th a t  such beh a v io u r is  n o n -v ia b le .
F ig u re  5-1 sum marises the  co n d itio n s  w h ich , in  W illiam son s 
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[SOURCE: A dap ted  fro m  W illia m so n  (1975, p40)]
The h o r iz o n ta l d ou b le -he aded  a rro w s  re p re s e n t the  m ain 
co m b in a tio n s  o f  hum an and e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to rs  w h ic h  g ive  r is e  to  
tra n s a c tio n  costs . However, these  are n o t th e  o n ly  in te ra c t io n s  
w h ich  p roduce  o rg a n iz a t io n a l fa i lu re .  W illiam son  desc rib e d  a th i r d  
in te ra c t io n ,  betw een u n c e r ta in ty  and o p p o rtu n ism , w h ich  g ives r is e  
to  a c o n d it io n  c a lle d  " in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness". T h is  e x is ts  when 
" t ru e  and u n d e r ly in g  c ircum sta nces  re le v a n t to  th e  tra n s a c tio n , o r  
re la te d  se t o f  tra n s a c tio n s , a re  know n to  one o r  more p a r t ie s  b u t 
cann o t be c o s t le s s ly  d isce rn e d  by o r  d isp la ye d  f o r  o th e rs 1' (1975, 
p31).
The concep t o f  in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness is  d e r iv e d  fro m  a 
s e c tio n  o f  th e  m a rke t fa i lu r e  l i te r a tu r e  w h ich  dea ls w ith  th e  e ffe c ts  
o f  in fo rm a tio n  asym m etries on m a rke t exchange. The sem ina l 
c o n tr ib u t io n s  were made by A rro w  (1969) and A k e r lo f  (1970).
A rro w  h ig h lig h te d  th e  in fo rm a tio n  asym m etry p rob lem  in  th e  
c o n te x t o f  c o n tra c t in g  f o r  an item  whose f in a l  cos t a n d /o r 
pe rfo rm ance  is  s u b je c t to  u n c e r ta in ty .  I f  th e  s u p p lie r  chooses to  
bea r th is  r is k  he w i l l  u n d e rta k e  a f ix e d  p r ic e  c o n tra c t to  d e liv e r  a 
s p e c if ie d  re s u lt ,  b u t o n ly  a f te r  a tta c h in g  a r is k  prem ium  to  the  
p r ic e . I f  th e  b u y e r has d i f fe r e n t  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t th e  n a tu re  o f  
th e  r is k  and rega rds  th is  prem ium  as excessive , th e n  he can o p t to
Envi  r o n me n ta l  f a c t o r s
*  U n c e r t a i n t y / C o m p l e x i t y
I n f o r m a t i o n  im p ac te d n e s s
134
CHAPTER 5
bea r th e  r is k  h im s e lf  by  o f fe r in g  a c o s t-p lu s  c o n tra c t. T h is , 
how ever, im p a irs  th e  in c e n t iv e  o f  th e  s u p p lie r  to  ach ieve  le a s t cos t 
pe rfo rm ance : hence th e  'm o ra l haza rd ' p rob lem  a rise s . R is k -b e a r in g  
w i l l  n o t, th e re fo re , be o p t im a lly  a llo c a te d  where th e re  is  in e q u a lity  
o f  in fo rm a tio n  among econom ic agents.
A k e r lo f,  in  h is  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  used ca r m a rke t as "The M a rke t 
f o r  'Lem ons'", dem on s tra te d  th a t  th is  m a rke t fa i ls  because 
tra n s a c to rs  have u n e q u a l in fo rm a tio n  abou t th e  p ro d u c t be ing  
exchanged. Because th e  s e l le r  know s more abou t th e  t ru e  c o n d it io n  
o f  th e  ca r he has been u s in g  th a n  a p o te n t ia l b u y e r can expec t to  
know  a b o u t i t ,  th e  p r ic e  a cus tom er w i l l  be p ru d e n t ly  w i l l in g  to  pay 
w i l l  be w h a t i t  seems to  be w o rth  less some d is c o u n t es tim a ted  to  
re p re s e n t th e  d e fic ie n c ie s  in  q u a li ty  th a t  may have been m issed. 
T h e re fo re , i f  a ca r is  r e a l ly  as good as i t  lo o ks , th e  ow ner w i l l  ga in  
by  n o t s e llin g  i t  and c o n tin u in g  to  use i t  h im s e lf. Because th e  
m a rke t m ust assume used ca rs  to  be 'lem ons', th e y  m o s tly  are ; th e  
m a rke t f o r  used ca rs  is  s u b -o p tim a l, and th e  m a rke t f o r  good used 
cars may be n o n -e x is te n t.
In  d e r iv in g  h is  c o n d it io n  o f  in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness, 
W illiam so n  a rgued th a t  i t  was n o t m ere ly  asym m etry a lone b u t 
asym m etry coup led  w ith  th e  h ig h  cos t o f  a c h ie v in g  in fo rm a tio n
p a r ity ,  and th e  te nden cy  o f  agents to  behave o p p o r tu n is t ic a l ly ,  
w h ic h  is  p ro b le m a tic . The agen t w ith  s u p e r io r  in fo rm a tio n  w i l l  use 
h is  know ledge  in  an o p p o r tu n is t ic  fa s h io n  i f  he know s th a t  th e  
o th e r  p a r ty  to  th e  exchange is  u na b le  to  bear th e  cos t o f  a c h ie v in g  
in fo rm a tio n  p a r ity .  W illia m so n  a lso  p o in te d  o u t th a t  in fo rm a tio n  
im pactedness can a r is e  in  th e  absence o f  in fo rm a tio n  asym m etry i f  
one p a r ty  is  p re p a re d  to  a c t o p p o r tu n is t ic a l ly .  Where b u ye r and 
s e l le r  have id e n t ic a l in fo rm a tio n , one agen t may make
re p re s e n ta tio n s  th a t  th e  t ru e  s ta te  o f  the  w o rld  is  d i f fe re n t  fro m  
w h a t b o th  p a r t ie s  know  i t  to  be. I f  i t  is  c o s t ly  f o r  an o u ts id e
a r b ite r  to  de te rm ine  w h a t th e  t ru e  s ta te  o f th e  w o r ld  is , th e n  an
in c e n t iv e  f o r  m aking  o p p o r tu n is t ic  re p re s e n ta tio n s  w i l l  e x is t.
A necessary c o n d it io n  fo r  in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness to  p re v a il,  
how ever, is  th e  e x is te n ce  o f  a sm a ll num ber o f tra n s a c to rs . I f  th e re
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are many p o te n t ia l b id d e rs , o p p o r tu n is t ic  tra n s a c to rs  w i l l  f in d  th a t  
t h e ir  c o n tra c t w i l l  n o t be renew ed when i t  e x p ire s  because o f  th e  
ex is te n ce  o f  a la rg e  p o o l o f  a lte rn a t iv e  tra d e rs ; o p p o rtu n ism  w o u ld  
e f fe c t iv e ly  be com peted away.
The te rm  "o rg a n iz a t io n a l fa i lu re "  is  used by W illiam son  to  
h ig h l ig h t  th e  fa c t  th a t  h is  fra m e w o rk  a pp lies  to  m a rke t and no n - 
m a rke t in s t i tu t io n s  a lik e . O rg a n iz a tio n a l fa i lu re  is  sa id  to  occu r 
when th e  tra n s a c tio n  costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  one mode o f  o rg a n iz in g  
tra n s a c tio n s  (such as th e  m a rke t) c o u ld  be reduced  by s h i f t in g  those  
tra n s a c tio n s  to  an a lte rn a t iv e  o rg a n iz a tio n a l a rrangem ent (such as 
th e  f irm ) .  A p re su m p tio n  o f  m a rke t fa i lu re  is  w a rra n te d  where i t  is  
obse rved  th a t  t ra n s a c tio n s  are  s h if te d  o u t o f  a m a rke t and in to  a 
f irm . A p re su m p tio n  o f  in te rn a l o rg a n iz a tio n  fa i lu r e  is  w a rra n te d  
fo r  t ra n s a c tio n s  th a t  a re  u n s h if te d  (co n tin u e  to  be m arke t-m e d ia ted ).
The m eaning o f  th e  w o rd  'o rg a n iz a tio n ' in  th e  sense in  w h ich  i t  
is  used by W illiam so n  is  c le a r ly  d i f fe re n t  from  i t s  m eaning in  o th e r  
c o n te x ts . O uch i (1980) has suggested th a t ,  in  th e  b ro a d e r language 
necessary to  encompass b o th  econom ics and o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry , i t  is  
u s e fu l to  d e fin e  an o rg a n iz a tio n  as "any s ta b le  p a tte rn  o f  
tra n s a c tio n s "  (p l32). W ith  th is  d e f in it io n ,  a m a rke t may be rega rded  
as an o rg a n iz a tio n  ju s t  as much as a f irm  o r any o th e r  m ethod o f  
m e d ia tin g  tra n s a c tio n s .
5.2.4 The C hoice o f  Econom ic O rg a n iza tio n : M a rke t Costs
H av ing  id e n t if ie d  a se t o f  human and e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to rs  whose 
in te ra c t io n s  g ive  r is e  to  tra n s a c tio n  costs, W illiam son  w ent on to  
a p p ly  h is  m ethod o f  a n a ly s is  to  a p a r t ic u la r ly  common tra n s a c tio n , 
th a t  betw een em ployer and em ployee. The m ethod w h ich  he em ployed 
is  s im ila r  to  th e  H obbesian m ethod used by Coase in  th a t  m arke ts  
are  presum ed to  c o n s t itu te  th e  's ta te  o f n a tu re ' w h ich  in i t i a l l y  
p re v a ils . W illiam son  th e n  proceeded w ith  h is  th o u g h t expe rim en t by 
c o n s id e r in g  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  fo u r  d i f fe re n t  types  o f  m a rk e t-  
based c o n tra c ts  b e fo re  co n c lu d in g  th a t  n o n -m a rke t c o n tra c tin g  is  
s u p e rio r .
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W illiam so n  cons ide red , f i r s t l y ,  th e  's p o t m a rke t c o n tra c t '.  
T h is  ty p e  o f  c o n tra c t, w h ich  o b lig e s  employees to  p e rfo rm  s p e c if ic  
ta s k s  in  th e  fu tu re ,  is  una b le  to  p e rm it a d a p ta tio n  to  ta ke  p lace. 
In  th e  face  o f  u n c e r ta in y  a b o u t th e  fu tu re ,  W illiam so n  argued th a t  
th is  in f l e x ib i l i t y  ru le s  i t  o u t as a fe a s ib le  c o n tra c tin g  mode.
M ost tra n s a c tio n s  in v o lv e  lo n g - te rm  o b lig a tio n s , and these  are  
com m only d e a lt w ith  by  th e  second typ e  o f  c o n tra c t cons ide red  by 
W illiam so n , ie  c o n tra c ts  th a t  are d raw n  up in  p ro b a b il is t ic ,  o r  
c o n tin g e n t, te rm s to  accoun t f o r  u n c e r ta in ty . These 'c o n tin g e n t 
c la im s c o n tra c ts ' s p e c ify  th e  o b lig a t io n s  o f  each p a r ty  to  an 
exchange, c o n tin g e n t upon a l l  p o s s ib le  fu tu re  s ta te s  o f  n a tu re . 
H ow ever, g ive n  a fu tu re  th a t  is  e ith e r  com plex o r  u n c e rta in , th e  
bounded r a t io n a l i t y  o f  in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  make i t  im p o ss ib le  to  s p e c ify  
such a c o n tra c t com p le te ly . L e a v in g  th e  c o n tra c t in c o m p le te ly  
s p e c if ie d  is  an a lte rn a t iv e ,  b u t one th a t  w i l l  o n ly  succeed i f  each 
p a r ty  can t r u s t  th e  o th e r  to  in te r p r e t  th e  fu tu re .  Thus, acco rd in g  
to  W illiam son , g ive n  th e  ex is te n ce  o f  u n c e r ta in ty ,  bounded 
r a t io n a l i t y  and o p p o rtu n ism , c o n tin g e n t c la im s c o n tra c tin g  w i l l  f a i l .
In s te a d  o f  t r y in g  to  a n t ic ip a te  th e  fu tu re  in  cumbersome, 'once - 
a n d - fo r -a l l '  c o n tra c ts , t ra d e rs  may em ploy a se rie s  o f  c o n tra c ts , 
each one w r it te n  f o r  a s h o r t  p e r io d  w ith in  w h ich  fu tu re  even ts  can 
be c o n f id e n t ly  fo reseen . However, w ill ia m s o n  p o in ts  o u t th a t  th e  
p rob lem  w ith  th is  t h i r d  typ e  o f  c o n tra c tin g  mode, 's e q u e n tia l sp o t 
c o n tra c t in g 1, is  th a t  many exchange re la t io n s h ip s  in v o lv e  th e  
t ra n s fe r  o f  u n iq u e  goods o r  se rv ice s  w h ich  re q u ire  sp e c ia lis e d  
know ledge  to  be p ro v id e d  by th e  s u p p lie r  abo u t how to  s u p p ly  th e  
cus tom er b es t and m ost e f f ic ie n t ly .  The s u p p lie r  w i l l  a c q u ire  
know ledge  abo u t h is  id io s y n c ra t ic  ta sks  o v e r tim e , and in  so do ing  
w i l l  g a in  a ' f i r s t  m over advan tage ' w h ic h  enables h im  to  b id  more 
e f fe c t iv e ly  on subsequen t c o n tra c ts  th a n  any o f  h is  p o te n t ia l 
c o m p e tito rs . K now ing th is ,  p o te n t ia l c o m p e tito rs  w i l l  n o t w aste 
t h e ir  tim e  b id d in g , th u s  p ro d u c in g  a s itu a t io n  o f  'sm a ll num bers 
b a rg a in in g ' ( b i la te ra l m onopoly) in  w h ic h  th e re  is  o n ly  one s e lle r  
and one buye r.
U nder these  c o n d it io n s  c o m p e tit iv e  p ressu res  are absent, and
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each p a r ty  w i l l  o p p o r tu n is t ic a l ly  c la im  h ig h e r  costs  o r  p o o r q u a li ty ,  
w h ic h e v e r is  in  i t s  b e s t in te re s ts .  In  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  such an 
exchange, each p a r ty  w i l l  have to  go to  c o n s id e ra b le  expense to  
a u d it  th e  costs  o r  pe rfo rm ance  o f  th e  o th e r. W illiam so n  argues th a t  
i f  these  tra n s a c tio n  costs  are to o  h ig h , th e  m a rke t re la t io n s h ip  w i l l  
f a i l  due to  th e  co n flu e n ce  o f  o p p o rtu n is m  w ith  sm a ll num bers 
b a rg a in in g , even th o u g h  th e  l im ita t io n s  o f  u n c e r ta in ty  and bounded 
r a t io n a l i t y  may have been overcom e.
The fo u r th  ty p e  o f  c o n tra c tu a l re la t io n s h ip  cons ide red  by 
W illiam so n  was th e  'a u th o r i ty  re la t io n ',  d e fin e d  o r ig in a l ly  by  Simon 
(1957b) as an agreem ent in  w h ic h  an employee accepts an em p loye r's  
a u th o r i ty  in  exchange f o r  a s ta te d  wage. The fe a tu re  w h ic h  
d is t in g u is h e s  th is  fo rm  o f  c o n tra c t fro m  o th e rs  is  th a t  b o th  p a r t ie s  
do n o t agree on a l l  te rm s ex an te  b u t  'agree to  agree la te r '.  T h is  
a rrangem ent is  th e re fo re  more f le x ib le  th a n  th e  s im p le  sp o t 
c o n tra c t,  and i t  does n o t pose th e  bounded r a t io n a l i t y  p rob lem s th a t  
th e  c o n tin g e n t c la im s c o n tra c t in g  m odel is  s u b je c t to . I t  a lso  
reduces th e  fre q u e n c y  w ith  w h ich  c o n tra c ts  m ust be n e g o tia te d , in  
com parison  w ith  th e  s e q u e n tia l sp o t c o n tra c tin g  mode. However, a l l  
th e  p rob lem s o f  ta s k  id io s y n c ra c y  w h ic h  are p re se n t in  s e q u e n tia l 
s p o t c o n tra c t in g  rem a in ; f irm s  w i l l  e ith e r  have to  bear th e  h ig h  
cos ts  o f  c o n tin u o u s  la b o u r  tu rn o v e r  o r  th e  h ig h  costs  o f  m eeting  
th e  demands o f  id io s y n c ra t ic  w o rk e rs  w ith  m onopo ly b a rg a in in g  
pow er.
The f i f t h  ty p e  o f  c o n tra c t in g  mode cons ide red  by W illiam so n  
was th e  ' in te rn a l la b o u r  m a rk e t' ( ie  th e  f irm ) . A lth o u g h  n o t 
o p t im a l in  te rm s o f  m in im is in g  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  between em ployees 
and em ployers, W illia m so n  con s id e re d  i t  to  be th e  c lo se s t to  
o p t im a lity .  In  p a r t ic u la r ,  i t  overcom es th e  p rob lem s posed by ta s k  
id io s y n c ra c ie s  by  i t s  use o f  c o lle c t iv e  ba rg a in s  ra th e r  th a n  
in d iv id u a l c o n tra c ts . Wage ra te s , u n d e r th is  system, are a tta ch e d  
m a in ly  to  jo b s  ra th e r  th a n  to  w o rk e rs  and so th e  in c e n tiv e  to  
behave o p p o r tu n is t ic a l ly  w h ic h  em ployees w o u ld  have in  in d iv id u a l 
c o n tra c t in g  (due to  t h e ir  u n iq u e  expe rience ) is  g re a t ly  reduced. The 
c o l le c t iv e  agreem ent a lso  overcom es p rob lem s o f u n c e r ta in ty  by 
b e ing  w r it te n  in  g e n e ra l term s.
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The o rg a n iz a t io n a l fa i lu re s  fra m e w o rk  h o ld s  th a t  th e  mode o f  
econom ic exchange w h ich  p re v a ils  a t any tim e  is  de te rm ined  n o t o n ly  
by  th e  costs  o f  tra n s a c tin g  in  m arke ts  b u t a lso  by  th e  costs  o f  
o rg a n iz in g  tra n s a c tio n s  w ith in  f irm s . W illiam so n  th e re fo re  w ent on 
to  c o n s id e r th e  costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  expa ns io n  o f  a f irm 's  
h ie ra rc h y . These 'h ie ra rc h y  co s ts ' a re  cons ide red  in  th e  fo llo w in g  
se c tio n .
5.2.5 The C hoice o f  Econom ic O rg a n iza tio n : H ie ra rc h y  costs
The expa ns io n  o f a f irm  is  l i k e ly  to  in v o lv e  a d d it io n a l h ie ra rc h ic a l 
la y e rs  o f  management, assum ing th a t  i t s  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re  is  
h e ld  c o n s ta n t. In  W illiam so n 's  o p in io n , th is  w i l l  g e n e ra lly  r e s u lt  in  
a le sse n in g  o f  c o n ta c t w ith  p e rso n n e l a t th e  lo w e r le v e ls  o f  th e  
h ie ra rc h y . F u rth e rm o re , i f  e xpans ion  is  ach ieved  by means o f  
v e r t ic a l in te g ra t io n  th is  w i l l  te n d  to  c rea te  'go a l d is to r t io n s ' w ith in  
th e  o rg a n iz a tio n . A cco rd in g  to  W illiam son , fo u r  typ e s  o f  d is to r t io n s  
are  common: an 'in te rn a l p ro cu re m e n t b ia s ', an 'in te rn a l expans ion  
b ia s ', a 'program m e p e rs is te n ce  b ia s ', and a 'com m un ica tion  
d is to r t io n  b ia s '.
The f i r s t  o f  these  d is to r t io n s  stems fro m  th e  ex is te n ce  o f  an 
in te rn a l sou rce  o f  s u p p ly  th a t  tends to  d is to r t  p rocu rem en t 
de c is io n s . D iv is io n a l goa ls te n d  to  be g ive n  to o  much w e ig h t in  
re la t io n  to  o b je c t iv e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  c o n s id e ra tio n s , and 'norm s o f  
r e c ip ro c ity ' deve lop  (u s u a lly  o f  th e  'I  b u y  fro m  y o u r  d iv is io n ,  you  
s u p p o rt my p ro je c t ' type ). In  W illiam so n 's  v ie w , th e  o p p o r tu n it ie s  
f o r  th is  ty p e  o f  b e h a v io u r  are more e x te n s ive  w ith in  th e  f irm  th a n  
w ith in  m arke ts .
The second d is to r t io n ,  th e  'in te rn a l expans ion  b ia s ', is  d r iv e n  
by  th e  know ledge  th a t  th e  re w a rd  system fo r  management is  o fte n  
p o s it iv e ly  c o rre la te d  w ith  f irm  size, in d u c in g  management to  ta k e  
d e c is io n s  w h ich  expand th e  size o f  th e  f irm , even i f  th is  is  c o n tra ry  
to  th e  in te re s ts  o f  sh a re h o ld e rs . The th i r d  d is to r t io n ,  th e  
'program m e p e rs is te n ce  b ia s ', re fe rs  to  th e  p ro p e n s ity  o f  management 
to  ad o p t c ro s s -s u b s id is a t io n  as a means o f  m a in ta in in g  uneconom ic 
d iv is io n s  in  s itu a t io n s  w here m a rke t fo rce s  w o u ld  lead  to  th e ir
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e lim in a tio n .
S u p p o rtin g  a l l  o f  these  th re e  b iases are th e  d is to r t io n s  c re a te d  
by  in fo rm a tio n  passed h o r iz o n ta lly  and v e r t ic a l ly  w i th in  th e  f irm . 
These 'com m un ica tion  d is to r t io n  b iases ' a r is e  when in d iv id u a ls  
w ith in  th e  f irm  seek to  p rom ote  p e rso n a l goa ls by  d is t r ib u t in g  fa ls e  
o r  m is le a d in g  in fo rm a tio n  th ro u g h  th e  f irm 's  com m un ica tion  channe ls .
Much o f  W illia m so n 's  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  c o n tro l losses assoc ia ted  
w ith  v e r t ic a l in te g ra t io n  is  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry  
l i te r a tu r e .  He does n o t re fe r ,  how ever, to  an im p o r ta n t id ea  fro m  
th e  econom ics l i te r a tu r e  w h ic h  ca p tu re s  many o f  th e  n o tio n s  p u t  
fo rw a rd  by  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o r is ts ,  nam ely H a rvey  L e ib e n s te in 's  
concep t o f  X - in e f f ic ie n c y  (1966). T h is  type  o f  in e f f ic ie n c y  is  sa id  to  
e x is t  when o rg a n iz a tio n s  do n o t ope ra te  in  a fa s h io n  w h ic h  
m in im izes costs  because in d iv id u a ls  do n o t w o rk  as p ro d u c t iv e ly  as 
th e y  are  ab le  to . X - in e f f ic ie n c y  may th e re fo re  be p re se n t in  
s itu a t io n s  w here  a l lo c a t iv e  e f f ic ie n c y  e x is ts , ie  a lth o u g h  fa c to rs  o f  
p ro d u c tio n  may be a llo c a te d  to  th e  r ig h t  d e c is io n  u n its ,  these u n its  
may n o t n e c e s s a rily  use th e  in p u ts  as e f fe c t iv e ly  as poss ib le . The 
d iffe re n c e  betw een th e  maximum e ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f  u t i l iz a t io n  and 
a c tu a l u t i l iz a t io n  is  th e  degree o f  X - in e ff ic ie n c y .
The o v e ra ll c o n c lu s io n  reached by W illiam son  in  h is  a n a lys is  o f  
th e  expa ns io n  o f  f irm s ' h ie ra rc h ie s  is  th a t  th e  d is to r t in g  b e h a v io u r 
w h ic h  re s u lts  can o n ly  be re lie v e d  by th e  a d o p tio n  o f  a p p ro p r ia te  
c o n tro l mechanisms and th a t  a ba lance m ust th e re fo re  be s t ru c k  
betw een th e  costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  c o n t ro ll in g  these  d is to r t io n s  and 
th e  b e n e fits  o f  h ie ra rc h ic a l c o n tro l.
The g en e ra l m ethod o f  a n a ly s is  p roposed  by W illiam so n  in  h is  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l fa i lu re s  fra m e w o rk  has been advoca ted  by  o th e r  
econom ists, n o ta b ly  Demsetz (1969) and Dahlman (1979). The m e rits , 
and p o te n t ia l p i t f a l ls ,  in v o lv e d  in  com paring  th e  re la t iv e  e f f ic ie n c y  
o f  a lte rn a t iv e  in s t i t u t io n a l  a rrangem ents are co n s ide red  in  th e  
fo llo w in g  sec tion .
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5.2.6 C om para tive  In s t i tu t io n a l  A n a ly s is
The co m p a ra tive  a n a ly s is  o f  a lte rn a t iv e  in s t i t u t io n a l  a rrangem ents 
was o r ig in a l ly  recommended by Demsetz (1969) as a s u ita b le  m ethod 
f o r  th e  s tu d y  o f econom ic p rob lem s. He com pared h is  'co m p a ra tive  
system s app roach ' w ith  w h a t he c a lle d  th e  'n irv a n a  app ro ach ', w here  
th e  cho ice  is  betw een id e a l and re a l in s t i tu t io n a l  a rrangem ents. I f  
d isc re p a n c ie s  are fo u n d , th e  re a l a rrangem ent is  deduced to  be 
in e f f ic ie n t .  Demsetz a rgued  th a t  th e  n irv a n a  approach , ie  u s in g  a 
zero tra n s a c tio n  cos t w o r ld  as a fram e o f  re fe re n ce , was lo g ic a l ly  
fa lla c io u s  because i t  is  u n a tta in a b le  in  th e  re a l w o rld .
The same co n c lu s io n  was reached by Dahlm an (1979), who a rgued  
th a t  P a re to  o p t im a l ity  was ir r e le v a n t  as a measure o f  e ff ic ie n c y . He 
reached th is  c o n c lu s io n  fro m  an e xa m in a tio n  o f e x te rn a lit ie s ,  ie  
s id e -e ffe c ts  o f  p ro d u c tio n  (o r  consum ption ) w h ich  c o n fe r b e n e fits  o r  
costs  on o th e r  p ro d u c e rs  (o r  consum ers) f o r  w h ich  no paym ent o r  
com pensa tion  is  made. Dahlm an p o in te d  o u t th a t  e x te rn a lit ie s  are  
dependent upon th e  ex is te n ce  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  costs , f o r  w ith o u t  them  
w e a lth -m a x im is in g  econom ic agents w o u ld  be ab le  to  make th e  
e m it to r  o f  an e x te rn a l i ty  'in te rn a liz e ' th e  cos t o f  h is  a c tio n s . I t  
th e re fo re  fo llo w s  th a t  tra n s a c tio n  costs  are re s p o n s ib le  f o r  
d e v ia t io n s  fro m  P a re to  o p t im a lity .
A cc o rd in g  to  Dahlm an, a l l  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  can be rega rded  as 
re so u rce  losses caused by  la c k  o f  in fo rm a tio n : search  costs ,
b a rg a in in g  costs  and p o lic in g  and en fo rcem ent costs  a l l  owe th e ir  
e x is te n ce  to  im p e rfe c t in fo rm a tio n . Arm ed w ith  th is  d e f in it io n  o f  
t ra n s a c tio n  costs , Dahlm an proceeded to  ana lyse th e  c la s s ic  te x tb o o k  
exam ple o f  an e x te rn a lity ,  ie  th e  smoke p o l lu t io n  case, in  w h ic h  a 
la u n d ry  ow ner m ust dec ide  w h e th e r to  tra n s a c t w ith  a smoke 
em m ito r to  c u r ta i l  h is  o u tp u t. I f ,  on th e  bas is  o f  a v a ila b le  
in fo rm a tio n , th e  la u n d ry  ow ner decides th a t  th e  costs  o f  t ra n s a c tin g  
w ith  th e  p o l lu te r  are  to o  h ig h , th e n  th e  smoke is  endured  and 
in te rn a liz e d  in  th e  m arke t. On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  s u f fe re r  may 
dec ide  on th e  bas is  o f  a v a ila b le  in fo rm a tio n  to  c o n tra c t w ith  th e  
p o l lu te r  so th a t  th e  e x te rn a l i ty  is  in te rn a liz e d  in  th e  f irm . In  b o th  
cases th e  e x te rn a l i ty  is  in te rn a liz e d .
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In  th e  case w here  th e  la u n d ry  ow ner decides to  endure  th e  
smoke, b u t  h is  e s tim a te  o f  th e  costs  o f  tra n s a c tin g  are  in c o r re c t  ( to  
th e  e x te n t th a t  th e  b e n e f it  ga ined  fro m  tra n s a c tin g  w o u ld  o u tw e ig h  
th e  cos t) th e n  th e  la u n d ry  ow ner s u ffe rs  a lo ss  o f  income. A cco rd in g  
to  Dahlm an, how ever, th is  case canno t be c la s s if ie d  as an 
e x te rn a l i ty  because th e  la u n d ry  ow ner's  d e c is io n  is  based upon  
in fo rm a tio n  w h ich  he p e rce ive s  to  be c o rre c t. I t  is  o n ly  la te r  th a t  
he may re a lis e  th a t  he has made a m is take , in  v ie w  o f  a d d it io n a l 
in fo rm a tio n  th a t  was n o t a v a ila b le  a t th e  tim e. G iven th e  e x is te n ce  
o f  im p e rfe c t in fo rm a tio n , an o p tim a l a llo c a tio n  o f  resou rces  is  
im p o ss ib le . To be ab le  to  c la im  th a t  a d e v ia t io n  fro m  o p t im a lity  
does re p re s e n t an e x te rn a l i ty  i t  is  necessary to  possess s u p e r io r  
in fo rm a tio n  to  th a t  a v a ila b le  to  m a rke t tra n s a c to rs . T h is  re a so n in g  
le d  Dahlm an to  make th e  fo llo w in g  o b s e rv a tio n :
” ... tra n s a c tio n  cos ts  p e r se have n o th in g  to  do 
w ith  e x te rn a lit ie s .  W hat is  in v o lv e d  is  a v a lu e  
judgem ent: i f  yo u  b e lie v e  th a t  m arke ts  in te rn a liz e  
e v e ry th in g , yo u  w i l l  b e lie v e  th a t  e x te rn a lit ie s  do 
n o t e x is t;  on th e  o th e r  hand, i f  you  b e lie v e  th a t  
m arke ts  do n o t in te rn a liz e  s ide  e ffe c ts , you  w i l l  
b e lie v e  in  th e  p e rs is te n c e  o f  e x te rn a lit ie s  as 
d e v ia t io n s  fro m  an a tta in a b le  optim um . T h is  is  
n o t  science; i t  is  m e taphys ics ."^
The im p lic a t io n  o f  Dahlm an's c r i t iq u e  is  th a t  e x te rn a lit ie s  are  
re le v a n t o n ly  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  com parisons between e x is t in g  
in s t i t u t io n a l  a rrangem ents  and a lte rn a t iv e  in s t i tu t io n a l  
a rrangem ents  ( ra th e r  th a n  a P a re to  o p tim a l se t o f  in s t i t u t io n a l  
a rrangem ents). A ny e x te rn a l i ty  can th e n  be m easured by th e  
d iffe re n c e  betw een th e  costs  and b e n e fits  o f  a lte rn a t iv e  re a l-w o r ld  
arrangem ents  r e la t iv e  to  th e  costs  and b e n e fits  o f  e x is t in g  
arrangem ents.
W illiam so n  (1979, 1981a, 1981b, 1985, 1986, 1990) has co n tin u e d  to  
e la b o ra te  th e  M a rke t and H ie ra rc h ie s  th e o ry  o f o rg a n iz a tio n a l 
change and has had h is  ideas adop ted  by econom ists concerned w ith  
th e  th e o ry  o f  the  m u lt in a t io n a l f irm , m ost n o ta b ly  C a lv e t (1981) and 
Teece (1980, 1981a, 1981b, 1981c, 1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1986). These, and 
o th e r  re la te d  c o n tr ib u t io n s ,  are re v iew ed  in  th e  n e x t sec tion .
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5.3 TRANSACTION COST THEORIES OF THE MNC
5.3.1 In tro d u c t io n
A lth o u g h  th e  tra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o r ie s  c ite d  so fa r  re la te  to  th e  
th e o ry  o f th e  f irm  a t th e  n a t io n a l le v e l,  th e  m ost p ro m in e n t s u p p o rt 
f o r  th e  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t app roach  in  re c e n t yea rs  has come fro m  
th e o r is ts  concerned w ith  th e  m u lt in a t io n a l f irm . They have 
recogn ised  th a t  Coase's id e a  th a t  a f irm  grows th ro u g h  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  
o rgan ize  tra n s a c tio n s  a t a lo w e r cos t th a n  th e  m a rke t is  ju s t  as 
a p p lic a b le  to  th e  MNC a t th e  le v e l o f  w o rld  m arke ts  as i t  is  to  th e  
dom estic  f irm  f o r  w h ich  th e  th e o ry  was f i r s t  deve loped. One 
econom ist a t  th e  fo re f r o n t  o f  th is  deve lopm ent has c re d ite d  s tu d e n ts  
o f  th e  MNC w ith  th e  t i t l e  " th e o re t ic a l in n o v a to rs "  f o r  t h e ir  
" in tro d u c t io n  o f t ra n s a c tio n  costs  in to  c o n v e n tio n a l econom ic 
th e o ry "  [Casson (1981, p l6 ) ] .
The Coasian th e o ry  o f  th e  m u lt in a t io n a l f irm  has come to  be 
know n as 'in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry ',  so ca lle d  because MNCs axe 
b e lie v e d  to  evo lve  by  in te rn a liz in g  im p e rfe c t m arke ts  (ie  m arke ts  
w ith  tra n s a c tio n  costs). The ideas o f  Coase were f i r s t  a p p lie d  to  
th e  s tu d y  o f  MNCs by McManus (1972). I t  was n o t u n t i l  1976, 
how ever, w ith  th e  p u b lic a t io n  o f  P e te r B uck ley  and M ark Casson's 
'lo n g - ru n  th e o ry  o f  th e  m u lt in a t io n a l e n te rp r is e ' th a t  the  te rm  
'in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry ' was em ployed. The ru d im e n ts  o f 
in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  as i t  has e vo lve d  s ince  1976 are o u t lin e d  
be low , and i t s  s tre n g th s  and weaknesses are cons idered .
5.3.2 In te rn a liz a t io n  Theo ry
As in i t i a l l y  deve loped  by B u ck ley  and Casson (1976), and 
su b s e q u e n tly  ex tended by Rugman (1981), in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  
s ta r ts  w ith  th e  s im p le  o b s e rv a tio n  th a t  th e  m odern f irm  c a rr ie s  o u t 
many a c t iv i t ie s  a p a rt fro m  th e  ro u t in e  p ro d u c tio n  o f goods and 
se rv ice s . A l l  o f  these  a c t iv i t ie s  (m a rke ting , R&D, etc) are 
in te rd e p e n d e n t and are re la te d  th ro u g h  the  f lo w  o f in te rm e d ia te  
p ro d u c ts , m o s tly  in  th e  fo rm  o f  know ledge and e xp e rtise . B u ck ley  
and Casson argued th a t  i t  is  th e  ex is te n ce  o f im p e rfe c tio n s  in  these 
in te rm e d ia te  p ro d u c t m arke ts  w h ich  p ro v id e  the  in c e n tiv e  f o r
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f irm s  to  engage in  FDI. Such a cou rse  o f  a c t io n  leads to  th e  
c re a tio n  o f  in te rn a l m arke ts ; th a t  is , a c t iv i t ie s  p re v io u s ly  l in k e d  by  
th e  m a rke t are b ro u g h t u n d e r common o w ne rsh ip  and c o n tro l.  I t  is  
th is  in te rn a liz a t io n  o f  m arke ts  across n a t io n a l b o u n d a rie s  w h ich  
g ives  r is e  to  th e  MNC.
L ik e  W illiam son , B u ck le y  and Casson p o in t  o u t th a t  th e  
p rocess o f  in te rn a liz a t io n  in v o lv e s  costs : in c rea sed  a cco u n tin g  and 
c o n tro l in fo rm a tio n  is  re q u ire d , com m un ica tion  costs  are g re a te r, 
and th e re  is  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  in c u r r in g  some fo rm  o f p o l i t ic a l  
d is c r im in a t io n . Thus, th e  f irm  w i l l  o n ly  in te rn a liz e , in  t h e ir  
o p in io n , up to  th e  p o in t  w here m a rg in a l b e n e fits  ga ined  are equa ted  
w ith  m a rg in a l costs  in c u rre d .
B u ck le y  and Casson suggest th a t  th e  in c e n t iv e  to  in te rn a liz e  
depends on th e  re la t io n s h ip  betw een fo u r  g roups  o f  fa c to rs :  
in d u s t ry -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs ,  w h ic h  re la te  to  the  n a tu re  o f  th e  p ro d u c t 
and th e  s t ru c tu re  o f  th e  e x te rn a l m arke t; re g io n -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs ,  
w h ich  re la te  to  th e  g e o g ra p h ic a l and s o c ia l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  
re g io n s  l in k e d  by  th e  m arke t; n a t io n -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs ,  w h ich  re la te  
to  p o l i t ic a l  and f is c a l re la t io n s h ip s  between th e  n a tio n s  concerned; 
and f in a l ly  f irm -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs ,  w h ich  r e f le c t  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  
management to  o rgan ize  an in te rn a l m arke t. T h e ir  m ain em phasis is  
on in d u s t ry -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs ,  f o r  th e y  b e lie ve  th a t  these  g ive  r is e  to  
m ost o f  th e  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  w h ic h  p rom ote  in te rn a liz a t io n .
B u ck le y  and Casson (1976, pp37-39) o u t lin e d  f iv e  c lasses o f  
m a rke t im p e r fe c tio n  w h ic h  th e y  re g a rd e d  as im p o r ta n t s t im u la n ts  to  
in te rn a liz a t io n :
(1) Absence o f  fu tu re s  m a rke t;
(2) Inadequa te  p ro te c t io n  f o r  f irm -g e n e ra te d  know ledge;
(3) M o n o p o lis t/m o n o p so n is t b a rg a in in g  (b i la te ra l m onopoly);
(4) B uyer u n c e r ta in ty ;
(5) G overnm ent in te rv e n t io n .
The e x is ten ce  o f  fu tu re s  m a rke ts  enables f irm s  to  e lim in a te  th e  
u n c e r ta in ty  in v o lv e d  in  c o -o rd in a t in g  b u y in g  and s e ll in g  p lans  w h ich
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in v o lv e  s ig n if ic a n t  tim e  lags. Where such m arke ts  are n o t p re se n t, 
f irm s  have an in c e n t iv e  to  c re a te  th e ir  own fu tu re s  m a rke t 
in te r n a l ly  by b r in g in g  t h e ir  in te rm e d ia te  a c t iv i t ie s  un d e r common 
c o n tro l.
The second im p e r fe c tio n  l is te d  by  B u ck le y  and Casson is  
e s s e n tia lly  a re s ta te m e n t o f  Johnson 's  (1970) v ie w  abo u t th e  
in a d e q u a te  n a tu re  o f  th e  m a rke t f o r  know ledge : s ince  know -h ow
p ro v id e s  th e  f irm  w ith  a l im ite d  'n a tu ra l m onopo ly ', i t  is  m ost 
e f f ic ie n t ly  e x p lo ite d  th ro u g h  d is c r im in a to ry  p r ic in g ,  w h ich  is  n o t 
fe a s ib le  in  an e x te rn a l m arke t.
These f i r s t  tw o  im p e rfe c tio n s  can be l is te d  u n d e r C a lv e t's  
ca te g o ry  o f  'm a rke t fa i lu r e  im p e rfe c tio n s '.  The th i r d  and fo u r th  o f  
B u c k le y  and Casson's im p e rfe c tio n s  stem fro m  de fec ts  in  th e  
s t ru c tu re  o f  m arke ts  and can th u s  be l is te d  u n d e r C a lv e t's  ca te g o ry  
o f  'm a rke t s t ru c tu re  im p e rfe c tio n s '.  The t h i r d  im p e rfe c tio n  a rise s  
when th e re  e x is ts  a b i la te r a l c o n c e n tra tio n  o f  econom ic pow er, 
w h ic h  g ives  r is e  to  an u n s ta b le  b a rg a in in g  s itu a t io n .  Where 
p ro s p e c tiv e  p u rch a se rs  o f  know ledge  are m onopson is ts , and th e  
p r o p r ie to r  o f  know ledge  is  a m o n o p o lis t, c o n f l ic t  w i l l  in e v ita b ly  
re s u lt .  T h is  is  b e s t avo ided , a rgue B u ck ley  and Casson, by th e  jo in t  
o w n e rsh ip  o f  in te rm e d ia te  p ro d u c ts , w h ich  may be ach ieved  th ro u g h  
m erger o r  ta k e o v e r.
The fo u r th  typ e  o f  im p e r fe c tio n  a rise s  when an in fo rm a tio n  gap 
e x is ts  betw een b u y e r and s e l le r  w ith  re sp e c t to  know ledge abo u t th e  
n a tu re  o r  v a lu e  o f  a p ro d u c t. I f  th e  s e lle r  o f  an in te rm e d ia te  
p ro d u c t is  b e t te r  in fo rm e d  th a n  th e  buye r, b u t is  n e ve rth e le ss  
u na b le  to  conv ince  th e  la t t e r  th a t  th e  p r ic e  re q u e s te d  is  reasonab le , 
th e re  w i l l  be an in c e n t iv e  f o r  th e  s e lle r  to  in te g ra te  fo rw a rd s  and 
u n d e rta k e  th e  b u y e r's  a c t iv i t ie s  h im s e lf.
The fo u r  types o f  im p e r fe c tio n  m entioned  so fa r  depend m a in ly  
on th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  p ro d u c ts  tra d e d  and on th e  s tru c tu re  o f  
m arke ts . The f in a l  ty p e  o f  im p e rfe c tio n , how ever, stems from  
gove rnm en t in te rv e n t io n  in  in te rn a t io n a l m arke ts . T ak ing  ta x a t io n  
as an exam ple, i t s  im pac t on th e  f irm  w i l l  be reduced  i f  the  f irm  is
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ab le  to  se t i t 's  own p r ic e s  f o r  ta x  purposes. S ince i t  cann o t 
ach ieve  th is  in  e x te rn a l m arke ts  (w here p r ic e s  are  u s u a lly  p u b lis h e d  
and ca n n o t th e re fo re  be e a s ily  m isquo ted  when th e  f irm  re p o r ts  i t 's  
ta x  l i a b i l i t y )  i t  has a s tro n g  in c e n t iv e  to  c rea te  an in te rn a l m a rke t 
f o r  t r a n s fe r -p r ic in g  purposes. T h is  la s t  ty p e  o f  im p e rfe c tio n  
co rre spond s  to  C a lv e t's  ca te g o ry  o f  'governm ent im posed d is to r t io n s '.
The in te rn a liz a t io n  app roach  has been w idened by  Rugman (1980, 
1981, 1982). H is m ain c o n t r ib u t io n  lie s  in  h is  e x p l ic i t  id e n t i f ic a t io n  
o f  in te rn a liz a t io n  w ith  th e  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  approach , in i t ia te d  
by  Hym er (1960). S ince in te rn a liz a t io n  is  th e  p rocess by  w h ich  a 
f ir m  overcom es m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s , th e  concep t enables th e  
v a r io u s  types  o f  im p e rfe c tio n s  to  be syn th e s ise d  in to  a 'g e n e ra l 
th e o ry ' o f  FDI. E x is t in g  th e o r ie s  o f FDI are  th u s  re a l ly  sub-cases 
o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  in te rn a liz a to n .
Rugman goes so f a r  as to  make th e  fo llo w in g  c la im  a b o u t th e  
e x p la n a to ry  c a p a b il it ie s  o f in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry :
"M ilto n  F riedm an has sa id  th a t  in f la t io n  is  a lw ays
and eve ryw here  a m one ta ry  phenomenon. We can
say th a t  in te rn a liz a t io n  is  a lw ays a response to  
m a rk e t im p e rfe c tio n s  and th a t  b o th  n a tu ra l m a rke t 
fa i lu r e  and u n n a tu ra l gove rnm en t re g u la t io n s  are  
eve ryw here . W h ile  w o r ld  in f la t io n  has a 
m o n e ta r is t cause we a lso  now know  th a t  
m u lt in a t io n a l e n te rp r is e s  e x is t  due to  w o rld w id e  
m a rk e t im p e rfe c tio n s  to  w h ic h  in te rn e d  m a rke ts  
a re  th e  o n ly  v ia b le  econom ic response."
The in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  is , how ever, n o t w ith o u t  i t s  c r i t ic s .  
T h e ir  a rgum ents are cons ide red  la te r ,  in  s e c tio n  5.4.
A p a r t ic u la r  v e rs io n  o f th e  in te rn a liz a t io n  v ie w  o f th e  MNC 
was in i t ia te d  by  Magee (1977a, 1977b, 1981) who focussed  on th e  ro le
o f  im p e rfe c tio n s  in  th e  m a rke t f o r  know ledge. T h is  v e rs io n , know n
as th e  'a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  th e o ry ' o f  th e  MNC, is  cons ide red  n ex t.
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5.3.3 A p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  T he o ry
The th e o ry  is  based upon  w o rk  done by  A rro w  (1962), Demsetz (1969) 
and Johnson  (1970) on th e  c re a tio n  and a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  o f  re tu rn s  
fro m  p r iv a te  in v e s tm e n t in  know ledge  c re a tio n . I t  was A rro w  who 
f i r s t  d iagnosed th e  'a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  p rob lem ', w h ic h  stems fro m  th e  
o b s e rv a tio n  th a t  know ledge  is  a p u b lic  good. As such, i t s  use by  
th e  f irm  w h ich  c rea tes  i t  does n o t p re c lu d e  i t s  e x p lo ita t io n  by 
o th e r  f irm s , a lth o u g h  i f  th is  were to  occu r i t  w o u ld  reduce  th e  
r e tu rn  on know ledge  f o r  th e  in n o v a t in g  f irm . In  o rd e r  to  f u l l y  
a p p ro p r ia te  th e  re tu rn s  fro m  know ledge  c re a tio n , th e  in n o v a t in g  
f irm  m ust be ab le  to  p re v e n t o th e rs  fro m  u s in g  i t s  p ro p r ie ta ry  
know ledge. I f  i t  is  ab le  to  a c q u ire  a m onopoly, how ever, s o c ie ty  
w i l l  lose  o u t because th e  la c k  o f  c o m p e tit io n  w i l l  r e s u lt  in  h ig h e r  
p r ic e s : hence th e  'a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  p rob lem '.
The need to  ensu re  th a t  in n o v a t iv e  f irm s  ea rn  a h ig h  enough 
r e tu rn  to  p ro v id e  them  w ith  an in c e n t iv e  to  c rea te  f u r th e r  
know ledge  le d  to  th e  c re a tio n  o f  th e  p a te n t system  and o th e r  le g a l 
sa fegua rds . In  d e v e lo p in g  h is  a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  th e o ry , Magee a rgued 
th a t  n o rm a l m a rke t and in s t i t u t io n a l  means o f  p ro te c t io n  a g a in s t 
f r e e - r id in g  (n o ta b ly  p a te n ts ) have had l im ite d  e ffe c tiv e n e s s  in  
m a in ta in in g  p ro p r ie ta r y  r ig h ts  to  in fo rm a tio n  and tech n o lo g y . The 
p ro te c t io n  o f  these  assets is  th e re fo re  more e f fe c t iv e ly  c a r r ie d  o u t, 
he suggested, by  th e  b u n d lin g  o f  in fo rm a tio n  and know ledge  
a c t iv i t ie s  w ith in  th e  f irm .
A t th e  in te rn a t io n a l le v e l th is  in v o lv e s  e n te r in g  fo re ig n  
m arke ts  v ia  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t, w ith  ow ne rsh ip  and c o n tro l o f  fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s . O n ly  th is  m ethod o f  overseas expa ns io n  ensures th a t  
th e  f irm  is  ab le  to  f u l l y  a p p ro p r ia te  th e  re tu rn s  to  i t s  in v e s tm e n t 
in  know ledge  c re a tio n . F o r Magee, th e re fo re , th e  MNC is  e s s e n tia lly  
a dev ice  f o r  s lo w in g  th e  ra te  o f  d i f fu s io n  o f in n o v a tio n s  on an 
in te rn a t io n a l sca le , th u s  e n a b lin g  p r o f i t s  to  be m axim ised.
The possess ion  o f  f irm -s p e c if ic  know ledge  as a ra t io n a le  fo r  
th e  ex is te n ce  o f  MNCs was a lso  p roposed  by G a lb ra ith  and Kay 
(1986). T h e ir  th e o ry  is  based upon th e  p o te n t ia l "econom ies o f
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scope" (ie  s y n e rg is t ic  b e n e fits )  w h ic h  can be o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  
sh a r in g  o f  p ro p r ie ta ry  know ledge  betw een p a re n t and s u b s id ia r ie s , 
th u s  sp re a d in g  th e  co s t o f  in d iv id u a l R&D p ro je c ts .1^ They a rgued 
th a t  th e  ga ins  fro m  te c h n o lo g ic a l resea rch  can be more e a s ily  
t ra n s fe r re d  th a n  o th e r  p o te n t ia l sources o f  syne rgy  (eg m a rk e tin g  
e x p e rt is e , w h ic h  tends  to  be c o u n try -s p e c if ic ) .
A cco rd in g  to  G a lb ra ith  and Kay, th e  key  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  a 
know ledge  advan tage  w h ic h  m o tiv a te s  f irm s  to  e x p lo it  i t  ab road  v ia  
FDI is  th e  degree to  w h ic h  i t  is  re la te d  to  a s p e c if ic  p ro d u c t. T h is  
is  re fe r re d  to  by  th e  a u th o rs  as the  degree o f  "p ro d u c t 
s p e c if ic i ty " . - ^  They a rgued  th a t  th e  lo w e r is  th e  degree o f  p ro d u c t 
s p e c if ic ity ,  th e  more d i f f i c u l t  i t  w i l l  be f o r  f irm s  to  f u l l y  
a p p ro p r ia te  th e ir  re tu rn s  fro m  know ledge  c re a tio n . T h is  is  because 
th e  use o f  th e  m a rk e t-p la c e  (ie  lic e n s in g )  to  e x p lo it  know ledge  w ith  
a lo w  p ro d u c t-s p e c if ic  c o n te n t may re s u lt  in  th e  know ledge  be ing  
a p p lie d  by  th e  lice n se e  to  o th e r  p ro d u c ts  w ith o u t  a p p ro p r ia te  
com pensation . The p o te n t ia l f o r  such o p p o r tu n is t ic  b e h a v io u r 
in c rea ses  th e  costs  o f  p o lic in g  lic e n s in g  agreem ents and th u s  makes 
th e  use o f  FDI more appea ling .
W hether i t  is  th e  possess ion  o f  f irm -s p e c if ic  know ledge  th a t  
leads to  in te rn a liz a t io n  (as a rgued  by Magee and by G a lb ra ith  and 
Kay) o r  a range o f  fu n c t io n s  w h ich  are p o te n t ia l ly  c a r r ie d  o u t by  
m a rke ts  b u t, because o f  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s , a re  in te rn a liz e d  
w ith in  th e  MNC (as a rgued  by B u ck le y  and Casson) b o th  approaches 
are  u n ite d  in  ag ree ing  th a t  i t  is  n o t th e  possess ion  o f  u n iq u e  assets 
p e r  se w h ich  g iv e  f irm s  an advantage. R a the r, i t  is  th e  p rocess o f  
in te rn a liz in g  these  assets w ith in  th e  f irm  w h ich  g ive s  th e  MNC i t 's  
u n iq u e  advantage.
5.3.4 The M a rke t and H ie ra rc h ie s  E x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  MNC
The a p p l ic a b i l i t y  o f  th e  M&H fra m e w o rk  to  th e  MNC was exam ined by 
W illia m so n  (1981b), Teece (1980-1986) and C a lve t (1981). The la t t e r  
a rgued  th a t  th e  M&H fra m e w o rk  is  necessary to  e x p la in  th e  
ex is te n ce  o f  th e  MNC, b u t  th a t  i t  is  n o t in  i t s e l f  s u f f ic ie n t  f o r  th e  
pu rpose . (C a lve t's  a rgum ent is  cons ide red  in  C h a p te r Seven).
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W illiam so n  and Teece, on th e  o th e r  hand, b o th  a rgued  th a t  th e  M&H 
fra m e w o rk  p ro v id e s  a s u f f ic ie n t  e x p la n a tio n  f o r  th e  ex is te n ce  o f  
c o rp o ra te  m u lt in a t io n a l ity .  T h e ir  ideas are cons ide red  in  th e  
re m a in d e r o f  th is  sec tion .
W illiam so n  a rgued  th a t  th e  d i f f ic u l t ie s  w h ich  f irm s  face  in  
u s in g  m a rke ts  to  t ra n s fe r  know ledge  across n a t io n a l b o u n d a rie s  
encourages FDI. He id e n t i f ie d  (1981b, ppl562-63) th re e  p r in c ip a l
im ped im ents  to  th e  m a rke t t r a n s fe r  o f  know ledge:
(1) R e co g n itio n
(2) D is c lo s u re
(3) Team o rg a n iz a tio n .
The f i r s t  o f  these  fo llo w s  fro m  Coase's in s ig h t  th a t  f irm s  are  
o b lig e d  to  e n te r in to  a sea rch  process to  d is c o v e r p o te n t ia l t ra d in g  
p a r tn e rs . S ince th e  p ro te c t io n  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l know -h ow  o fte n  
re q u ire s  th e  su p p re ss io n  o f  in fo rm a tio n  on exchange p o s s ib i l i t ie s ,  
t r a n s fe r  may f a i l  by  reason  o f  n o n -re c o g n it io n . T h is  s itu a t io n  may 
a lso  a r is e  i f  p o te n t ia l re c ip ie n t  f irm s  (e s p e c ia lly  i f  th e y  are lo c a te d  
in  LDCs) do n o t possess th e  re q u is ite  c a p a b il it ie s  f o r  a b so rb in g  
fo re ig n  know -how . In  such c ircum stances  in te rn a liz a t io n  w o u ld  be 
th e  o n ly  o p tio n  a v a ila b le  to  th e  f irm .
Assum ing th a t  re c o g n it io n  p rob lem s are overcom e, m arke ts  may 
s t i l l  b re a k  down i f  th e  f ir m  has d i f f ic u l t y  in  d is c lo s in g  in fo rm a tio n  
to  b u ye rs  in  a way th a t  is  c o n v in c in g  y e t does n o t d e s tro y  th e  bas is  
f o r  exchange. T h is  is  th e  fa m i l ia r  p rob lem  o f  'in fo rm a t io n  
im pactedness ', w h ic h  can be c h a ra c te r is e d  as fo llo w s : i f  a com pany 
has a p iece o f  know ledge  w h ic h  i t  know s w i l l  be v a lu a b le  to  o th e r  
f irm s , i t  w i l l  t r y  to  co n v in ce  them  o f  th is  v a lu e  by  d e s c r ib in g  i t s  
ge n e ra l n a tu re  and c h a ra c te r, b u t  i t  w i l l  n o t re v e a l th e  d e ta ils  
because th e n  th e  ca t w o u ld  be o u t o f  th e  bag and th e  p o te n t ia l 
cus tom er w o u ld  be fre e  to  use th e  know ledge w ith o u t  pay ing  f o r  i t .  
Thus, i f  th e re  is  s u f f ic ie n t  d is c lo s u re  to  assure th e  b u ye r th a t  th e  
in fo rm a tio n  possesses v a lu e , A rro w 's  "fu n d a m e n ta l pa rad ox" o f  
in fo rm a tio n  a rise s : " i t s  v a lu e  f o r  th e  p u rch a se r is  n o t know n u n t i l  
he has th e  in fo rm a tio n , b u t th e n  he has in  e f fe c t  a cq u ire d  i t  
w ith o u t  cos t" (1971, p l52).
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Since f irm s  w h ic h  w ish  to  s e l l t h e ir  know -h ow  need to  l im i t  
d is c lo s u re  in  o rd e r  to  keep i t  p ro p r ie ta ry ,  f irm s  w a n tin g  to  
purchase  th is  know -h ow  w i l l  d e c lin e  to  pay as much as i t  is  w o rth  
to  th e  s e lle r  because th e y  w i l l  suspec t the  s e l le r  o f  beh av in g  
o p p o r tu n is t ic a l ly .  W ith  these  c o n d it io n s  p resen t, a company cann o t 
c o lle c t in  an a rm 's - le n g th  t ra n s fe r  th e  f u l l  n e t-re v e n u e  p ro d u c t o f  
i t s  know ledge. In  o rd e r  to  ea rn  th e  m ost i t  can i t  w o u ld  have to  
p u t th is  know ledge  to  w o rk  i t s e l f ,  th e re b y  engaging in  d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t when d e a lin g  w ith  overseas m arke ts .
Assum ing, n e v e rth e le s s , th a t  th e  d is c lo s u re  p rob lem  is
overcom e, ie  th a t  b u ye rs  do recogn ise  v a lu e  w ith  o n ly  l im ite d  
d is c lo s u re  and are p re p a re d  to  pay fo r  th e  s e lle rs ' in fo rm a tio n , th e  
use o f  c o n tra c ts  may s t i l l  pose prob lem s. S ince know ledge
fre q u e n t ly  has a h ig h  ta c i t  c o n te n t i t  may n o t be e a s ily  c o d ifie d : 
in d iv id u a ls  o fte n  know  more th a n  th e y  are ab le  to  a r t ic u la te .  The 
t ra n s fe r  o f  know ledge  may th u s  be im p o ss ib le  w ith o u t a lso
t ra n s fe r r in g  people , who may re q u ire  team s u p p o rt. In  
c ircum stances  w here such t ra n s fe rs  o ccu r in fre q u e n t ly  th e  
c o n tra c tu a l m ethod may be a p p ro p r ia te . Repeated c o n tra c tin g , 
how ever, p ro v id e s  th e  f ir m  w ith  an in c e n t iv e  to  u n d e rta k e
tra n s a c tio n s  i t s e l f  and th u s  e lim in a te  m arke t t ra n s a c tio n  costs . The 
n a tu ra l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  know ledge , conc luded  W illiam son , fa v o u r  
i t s  t ra n s fe r  w ith in  a s in g le  f irm .
D a v id  Teece a lso  e x p lo re d  th e  e x p la n a to ry  c a p a b il it ie s  o f  th e  
M&H fra m e w o rk  w ith  re sp e c t to  FDI. He ana lysed th e  th re e  d i f fe r e n t  
ca te g o rie s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l m a rke ts  w h ich  MNCs ty p ic a l ly  span: 
in te rm e d ia te  p ro d u c t m a rke ts , m arke ts  f o r  know -how , and 
in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l m arke ts . The f i r s t  ca te g o ry  in v o lv e s  v e r t ic a l 
FDI, th e  second h o r iz o n ta l FDI, and th e  la t t e r  e ith e r  v e r t ic a l,  
h o r iz o n ta l o r  cong lom era te  FDI.
V e r t ic a l FDI is  l i k e ly  to  o c c u r in  s itu a t io n s  w here  f irm s  f in d  
th a t  t h e ir  in te rm e d ia te  p ro d u c t m arke ts  (eg fo r  raw  m a te ria ls ) are  
n o t w e ll deve loped. C o n tra c ts  w ith  s u p p lie rs  are  n e c e s s a rily  
in com p le te  because u n c e r ta in ty  im p lie s  th e  e x is te n ce  o f a la rg e
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num ber o f  p o s s ib le  co n tin g e n c ie s . O p p o r tu n is t ic  s u p p lie rs  have th e  
in c e n t iv e , and o fte n  th e  a b i l i t y ,  to  renege on tra n s a c tio n s , o r  
change th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  sa le. Where ju d ic ia l  red ress  is  weak, and 
a lte rn a t iv e  s u p p lie rs  a re  u n a v a ila b le , th e  b u ye r may be o b lig e d  to  
h o n o u r any new te rm s. B ackw ard  v e r t ic a l in te g ra t io n  can e lim in a te  
th is  r is k ,  f o r  i f  s u p p lie r  and p u rc h a s e r are one and th e  same, th e  
in c e n t iv e  f o r  s o -c a lle d  'p o s tc o n tra c tu a l re c o n tra c t in g ' is  weakened. 
W ho lly -ow n ed  s u b s id ia r ie s  th u s  a f fo rd  g re a te r  s e c u r ity  o f  s u p p ly  
th a n  re lia n c e  on m a rke t c o n tra c ts  w ith  in depe nden t f irm s .
H o r iz o n ta l FDI can a lso  be e x p la in e d  by  m a rke t fa i lu r e  
c o n s id e ra tio n s . F irm s w h ic h  seek to  e x tra c t  f u r th e r  econom ic re n ts  
fro m  t h e ir  p ro p r ie ta ry  know ledge  by  lic e n s in g  overseas f irm s  may 
e n c o u n te r t ra n s a c tio n a l d i f f ic u l t ie s  (o f th e  ty p e  e la b o ra te d  by 
W illiam so n ) w h ich  encourage th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  such know ledge  to  be 
com ple ted  w ith in  th e  f irm  ra th e r  th a n  th ro u g h  th e  m arke t.
The in te rn a liz a t io n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l c a p ita l m a rke ts  as a reason  
f o r  FDI is  n o t g ive n  much credence by Teece because th e  a v a ila b le  
ev idence  in d ic a te s  th a t  c a p ita l t ra n s fe rs  are n o t a s ig n if ic a n t  
fe a tu re  o f  FDI. I t  is  lo c a l sou rces o f c a p ita l (eg th e  re ta in e d  
e a rn in g s  and d e p re c ia t io n  a llow ances  o f  e s ta b lis h e d  s u b s id ia r ie s )  
w h ic h  accoun t f o r  th e  b u lk  o f  th e  c a p ita l com ponent o f  FDI. 
N eve rthe less , Teece p o in te d  o u t th a t  th e re  may be a num ber o f  
e f f ic ie n c y  ga ins  assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  in te rn a liz a t io n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
c a p ita l m arke ts . Where c a p ita l m arke ts  are p o o r ly  deve loped  (as in  
many LDCs, f o r  exam ple) th e  MNC can a c t as an e f fe c t iv e  s u b s t itu te  
f o r  these  m arke ts  by  a llo c a t in g  fu n d s  to  h ig h  y ie ld  uses, 
ir re s p e c t iv e  o f  n a t io n a l b o u n d a rie s .
The essence o f  th e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l fa i lu re s  v ie w p o in t,  as a p p lie d  
to  MNC's, was summed up b y  Teece (1981a) as fo llo w s :
"... in t r a f i r m  t ra n s fe r  to  a fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  
(w h ich  avo id s  th e  need f o r  re p e a te d  n e g o tia t io n s  
and a tte n u a te s  th e  hazards o f  o p p o rtu n ism ) has 
advantages o v e r au tonom ous tra d in g . B e tte r  
d is c lo s u re , e a s ie r agreem ent, b e t te r  governance, 
and more e f fe c t iv e  team  o rg a n iz a t io n  ... Here lie s  
an in c e n t iv e  f o r  fo re ig n  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t."
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5.4 LIMITATIONS OF TRANSACTION COST THEORY
The e x te n t to  w h ich  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry  has been adop ted  by 
MNC th e o r is ts  in  re c e n t yea rs  does n o t o b v ia te  th e  fa c t  th a t  i t  
c o n ta in s  a num ber o f  d e fic ie n c ie s . Indeed, th e  way in  w h ich  th e  
app roach  has been e la b o ra te d  by  some sch o la rs , in  p a r t ic u la r  c la im s 
th a t  i t  re p re se n ts  a 'g e n e ra l th e o ry ' o f  FDI, has n o t met w ith  th e  
a p p ro v a l o f  those  who o r ig in a l ly  e x p lo re d  i t s  a p p lic a b il i t y  to  th e  
MNC.13
F o r exam ple, B u ck le y  (1983), one o f  th e  o r ig in a l p ropo nen ts  o f  
th e  in te rn a liz a t io n  app roach , has been a c tiv e  in  p in p o in t in g  a 
num ber o f  i t s  weaknesses. He does n o t re g a rd  in te rn a liz a t io n  as a 
g e n e ra l th e o ry  o f  FDI, b u t  ra th e r  has c h a ra c te r is e d  i t  as "a concep t 
in  sea rch  o f  a th e o ry "  (1983, p42). He p o in ts  o u t th a t  th e  concep t 
is ,  a t  i t s  m ost gen e ra l, ta u to lo g ic a l:  f irm s  in te rn a liz e  im p e rfe c t
m a rke ts  u n t i l  th e  co s t o f  f u r th e r  in te rn a liz a t io n  ou tw e ighs  th e  
b e n e fits . To have any e m p ir ic a l c o n te n t, t ra n s a c tio n  costs  a r is in g  
fro m  im p e rfe c tio n s  in  in te r n a l and e x te rn a l m arke ts  m ust be d e fin e d  
and o p e ra tio n a lis e d .
V e lja n o v s k i (1982) has d raw n  a t te n t io n  to  th e  ex is tence  o f  a 
v a r ie ty  o f  d e f in it io n s  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  costs , th e  m ost bas ic  o f  w h ich  
is  a lso  a ta u to lo g y : t ra n s a c t io n  cos ts  are  any f r ic t io n s  th a t  impede 
an e f f ic ie n t  outcom e. He quo tes  th e  c o m p la in t made abo u t 
t ra n s a c tio n  costs  by  S ta n le y  F is c h e r (1977):
"T ra n s a c tio n  cos ts  have  a w e ll-d e s e rv e d  bad name
as a th e o re t ic a l dev ice  ......  because th e re  is  a
s u s p ic io n  th a t  a lm os t a n y th in g  can be ra t io n a lis e d  
b y  in v o k in g  s u ita b ly  s p e c if ie d  tra n s a c tio n  
c o s ts ."1^
The ta u to lo g ic a l n a tu re  o f  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  was a lso 
c r i t ic is e d  by  Kay (1983) who s ta te d  th a t  " in te rn a liz a t io n  does n o t 
s a t is fy  th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  r e fu ta b i l i t y  th a t  is  re q u ire d  o f  a th e o ry "  
(p305). In  a d d it io n , Casson (1982, 1984) a lso  c r i t ic is e d  th e  tendency 
o f  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  to  be ta u to lo g ic a l.  He a rgued th a t  i t  is  no 
more th a n  a gen e ra l th e o ry  o f  w hy f irm s  e x is t,  and th a t  to  make i t  
o p e ra tio n a l re q u ire s  th e  s p e c if ic a t io n  o f  assum ptions abo u t the
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r e la t iv e  tra n s a c tio n  costs  o f  in te r n a l and e x te rn a l m arke ts . (T h is  
ta s k  is  u n d e rta k e n  in  th e  C h a p te r Seven).
B u ck le y 's  (1983) c r it ic is m s  o f  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  a lso  
focussed  on i t s  in a b i l i t y  to  p ro v id e  an adequate e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  
t r a n s it io n  process fro m  th e  in te rn a l mode to  th e  e x te rn a l mode. 
Because i t  adop ts  a s ta t ic  app roach  i t  tends to  p roduce  a b ias  
to w a rd s  th e  s ta tu s  quo as th e  id e a l s o lu tio n .  ^
The a s s e rt io n  by  Rugman (1981, p30) th a t  " th e  th e o ry  o f
in te rn a liz a t io n  is  a lso  a th e o ry  o f  c e n tra liz a t io n  in  d e c is io n -m a k in g " 
has been c r i t ic is e d  by  Kay (1983) and Casson (1984). B o th  o f  them  
p o in te d  o u t th a t  th e  c re a tio n  o f  an in te rn a l m a rke t does n o t 
n e c e s s a r ily  im p ly  c e n tra liz a t io n , s ince  c o n tro l can s t i l l  be e xe rc ise d  
w ith in  a d e c e n tra liz e d  o rg a n iz a tio n  th ro u g h  th e  use o f  t ra n s fe r  
p r ic in g ,  o r  some o th e r  means o f  b u d g e ta ry  c o n t r o l . ^
P a rry  (1985) a lso  p o in te d  o u t th a t  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  
ig n o re s  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  th e  f irm 's  in te rn a l m a rke t may n o t 
n e c e s s a r ily  be any b e t te r  a t c o n t ro ll in g  i t s  p ro p r ie ta ry  r ig h ts  th a n  
th e  a rm 's - le n g th  m arke t. As he p u t  i t ,  " th e re  is  no a p r io r i  reason 
f o r  q u a s i-c o n tra c tu a l c o n tro l v ia  an in te rn a l h ie ra rc h y  to  be e a s ie r 
(o r  le ss  c o s tly )  th a n  v ia  c o n tra c tu a l a rrangem ents w ith  u n re la te d  
p a r t ie s  in  m arke t tra n s a c tio n s "  (1985, p568). P a rry  argued th a t  
kn o w -h o w  is  ju s t  as l ik e ly  to  le a k  fro m  w ith in  f irm s  because th e  
"q u a s i-c o n tra c tu a l"  c o n tro l w h ich  th e y  have o v e r t h e ir  employees 
may be less  easy to  e n fo rce  th a n  th e  fo rm a l c o n tro l exe rc ised  o v e r 
a licensee . He a lso  q u e s tio n e d  th e  assum ption  made by 
in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o r is ts  th a t  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  and c o n tro l 
s tru c tu re s  possessed by MNCs are c o n s is te n t w ith  c e n tra liz e d  
de c is io n -m a k in g . F o re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  o f  MNCs o fte n  have a degree 
o f  au tonom y o v e r a range o f  fu n c t io n s . The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  such 
"s u b s id ia ry - in d e p e n d e n t"  b e h a v io u r, a te rm  co ined  by  S to p fo rd  and 
W ells (1972), is  g e n e ra lly  g re a te r  f o r  those  MNCs w ith  a lo n g e r 
h is to r y  and w ith  in d ig e n o u s  p e rso n n e l occupy ing  s e n io r  p o s it io n s .
A n o th e r m a jo r weakness o f  th e  in te rn a liz a t io n  approach  lie s  in  
i t s  assum ption  th a t  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  are exogenous to  the
153
CHAPTER 5
( in te rn a liz in g )  f irm . T h is  d e fe c t has been h ig h lig h te d  by  a num ber 
o f  a u th o rs : Hood and Young (1979), C a lve t (1981), K o gu t (1983) and
B u ck le y  (1983). A lth o u g h  th e  assum ption  o f  exogenous im p e rfe c tio n s  
g ives  de te rm inacy  to  th e  th e o ry , i t  a lso  u n d u ly  r e s t r ic ts  i t .  As 
B u ck le y  (1983) s ta te d , " f irm s  p la y  a ro le  in  c re a tin g , s u s ta in in g , 
d o m in a tin g  and su p p re ss in g  m a rke ts  as w e ll as m ere ly  re a c t in g  to  
them " (p35). Thus th e  fa c t  th a t  MNCs have th e  pow er to  endogenise 
m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  (eg by  c re a tin g  b a r r ie rs  to  e n try )  m ust be 
recogn ised  i f  th e  th e o ry  is  to  have c r e d ib i l i t y .  In  B u ck ley 's  v ie w , 
th e  fo rc e s  w h ic h  move econom ic tra n s a c tio n s  to  be in te rn a liz e d  o r  
e x te rn a liz e d  need to  be u n d e rs to o d  b e fo re  th e  ro le  o f  th e  MNC in  
c re a tin g  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  a n d /o r re sp o n d in g  to  them  can be 
asce rta in e d .
In  th e  o p in io n  o f  K o gu t (1983) th e  in te rn a liz a t io n  l i te r a tu r e  
fa i ls  to  come to  te rm s w ith  th e  advantages w h ic h  are  assoc ia ted  
w ith  be ing  a m u lt in a t io n a l.  He a rgued  th a t  th is  f a u l t  a rises  fro m  
i t s  tenden cy  to  v ie w  FDI as a d e c is io n  made a t a d is c re te  p o in t  in  
tim e . He p o in te d  o u t th a t  th e re  is  "an im p o r ta n t d is t in c t io n  
betw een th e  o r ig in a l m o tiv a t io n s  to  e s ta b lis h  p la n ts  in  fo re ig n  
c o u n tr ie s  and th e  subsequen t in v e s tm e n t dec is io ns . There is , in  
s h o r t,  a fa l la c y  o f  e x p la n a tio n  o f  genesis in  f a i l in g  to  d is t in g u is h  
betw een th e  in i t i a l  in v e s tm e n t d e c is io n  and th e  subsequen t 
in c re m e n ta l in v e s tm e n t f lo w s "  (1983, p38).
K o g u t a rgued th a t  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry 's  f a i lu r e  to  co n s id e r 
a lte rn a t iv e  p ro je c ts  as in c re m e n ta l a t a g lo b a l le v e l re s u lts  in  a 
m isp laced  em phasis on th e  s t r u c tu r a l e lem ents o f  p la n t  lo c a tio n  and 
th e  e lim in a tio n  o f  tra n s a c tio n  costs , ra th e r  th a n  a c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  
th e  o p e ra tio n a l v a lu e  o f  a m u lt in a t io n a l system. He id e n t if ie d  th re e  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  assoc ia ted  w ith  m u lt in a t io n a l i ty  w h ic h  p ro v id e  th is  
o p e ra tio n a l v a lu e : f i r s t l y ,  th e  a b i l i t y  to  a rb it ra g e  in s t i tu t io n a l
r e s t r ic t io n s ;  second ly , th e  a b i l i t y  to  ca p tu re  e x te rn a lit ie s  in  
in fo rm a tio n ; and th ir d ly ,  th e  a b i l i t y  to  o b ta in  jo in t  p ro d u c tio n  
econom ies.
The f i r s t  o f  these  fe a tu re s , th e  a b i l i t y  to  a rb it ra g e  
in s t i t u t io n a l  re s tr ic t io n s ,  re fe rs  to  th e  p o te n t ia l w h ich  MNCs have
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f o r  c irc u m v e n tin g  h ig h  ta x  ra te s , a n t i - t r u s t  p ro v is io n s , e tc. In  th e  
w o rds o f  K ogu t (1983) "th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  an in te rn a t io n a l system  has 
p ro v id e d  th e  m u lt in a t io n a l w ith  a s t r in g  o f  o p tio n s  w r it te n  on 
c o n tin g e n t outcom es ... The MNC can, in  e ffe c t,  e xe rc ise  an o p tio n  
upon  th e  occurence o f  an even t, eg i t s  o p t io n  to  choose in  w h ich  
c o u n try  to  dec la re  i t s  p r o f i ts .  B ounda ries  do n o t re p re s e n t o n ly  th e  
cos ts  o f  t a r i f f s  and t ra n s p o r t ;  th e y  a lso  re p re s e n t p r o f i t  
o p p o r tu n it ie s  w h ic h  can o n ly  be e x p lo ite d  by  a m u lt in a t io n a l 
c o rp o ra t io n "  (p43).
The second fe a tu re  id e n t i f ie d  by  K o gu t a rise s  fro m  th e  need o f  
f irm s  in v o lv e d  in  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n  to  o b ta in  in fo rm a tio n  
a b o u t d i f fe r e n t  h o s t-c o u n try  env iro n m e n ts . He p o in te d  o u t th a t  
th e re  are  im p o r ta n t le a rn in g  costs  in v o lv e d  in  such in fo rm a tio n -  
g a th e r in g  a c t iv i t ie s ,  w h ich  are  c a p tu re d  by  MNCs. Thus, th e  w id e r  a 
f irm 's  m u lt in a t io n a l n e tw o rk , th e  g re a te r  w i l l  be i t s  advantage o v e r 
less  in te r n a t io n a l ly - d iv e r s i f ie d  f irm s .
The th i r d  o f  K o g u t's  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  re fe rs  to  cos t sav ings  in  
m a n u fa c tu rin g  and m a rk e tin g  w h ic h  a r is e  fro m  th e  c re a tio n  o f  a 
m u lt in a t io n a l n e tw o rk . These jo in t  p ro d u c tio n  econom ies se rve  to  
reduce  th e  costs  o f  p ro d u c tio n  and m a rk e tin g  o f in c re m e n ta l 
in ve s tm e n ts . F o r exam ple, o th e rw is e  n o n -e x p o rta b le  goods may be 
e x p o rte d  s ince  th e  f ix e d  cos ts  o f  e s ta b lis h in g  sa les o ffic e s , h ir in g  
p e rso n n e l and lo c a tin g  p la n t  s ite s  have a lre a d y  been sunk.
The e s s e n tia l th r u s t  o f  K o g u t's  c r i t iq u e  o f  in te rn a liz a t io n  
th e o ry , th e n , is  th a t  i t  is  p re -o c c u p ie d  w ith  m arke t fa i lu re  and does 
n o t pay s u f f ic ie n t  a t te n t io n  to  th e  m a rke t pow er w h ic h  a rise s  fro m  
th e  in h e re n t b e n e fits  o f  m u lt in a t io n a l ity .
In  a fu r th e r  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  th e  debate on th e  m e rits  o f  th e  
tra n s a c tio n  cos t parad igm , B u ck le y  (1988) argued th a t  in te rn a liz a t io n ,  
as a g en e ra l th e o ry , cann o t be te s te d  d ire c t ly .  A lth o u g h  th is  
v ie w p o in t is  n o t a t odds w ith  Kay's e a r l ie r  (1983) comment th a t  
" in te rn a liz a t io n  does n o t s a t is fy  th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  r e fu ta b i l i t y  th a t  
is  re q u ire d  o f  a th e o ry "  (op c it ) ,  B u ck le y  has n e v e rth e le s s  la b e lle d  
th is  statem em ent as " ra th e r  n ih i l is t ic "  (1988, p l8 4 ) .^  He adop ts  a
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more p o s it iv e  o u tlo o k , a rg u in g  th a t  i t  is  p o s s ib le  to  genera te  a 
num ber o f  "s p e c ia l th e o r ie s "  by in tro d u c in g  "p la u s ib le  re a l w o r ld  
assum ptions" w h ich  l im i t  th e  g e n e ra lity  o f  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  
(1988, pl82).
These s p e c ia l th e o r ie s  can be o b ta in e d , in  B u ck le y 's  o p in io n , by  
building a b rid g e  betw een in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  and W illia m so n 's  
M&H approach. T h is  in v o lv e s  s p e c ify in g  d i f fe r e n t  typ e s  o f  
transaction costs  w h ic h  a r is e  in  e x te rn a l and in te rn a l m arke ts . 
Although he recogn ised  th a t  th e  m easurem ent o f  these  costs  is  a 
difficult task, he s ta te d  th a t  i t  is  necessary to  make some es tim a tes  
"if we are to move beyond h e u r is t ic  m odels to  co n c re te  p re d ic t io n s  
about market c o n f ig u ra t io n s "  (1988 p l84).
Another assum ption  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  th a t  has come 
under challenge is  th e  v ie w  th a t  f irm s  and m arke ts  y ie ld  th e  same 
equlilibrium a llo c a tio n  o f  resou rces , b u t a t d i f fe r e n t  costs . T h is  
assertion is p re s e n t in  Coase's sem ina l 1937 p a p e r (p395) and is  
repeated by W illiam so n  (1975), who s ta te d  th a t  "m a rke ts  and f irm s  
a re  a lte rn a t iv e  in s tru m e n ts  fo r  com p le ting  a re la te d  se t o f  
transactions" (p8).
McManus (1975) a rgued th a t  f irm s  do n o t d u p lic a te  th e  
a l lo c a t iv e  re s u lts  o f  a p r ic e  system, b u t ra th e r  c re a te  d i f fe r e n t  
re so u rc e  a llo c a tio n s . A cco rd in g  to  McManus:
"B o th  th e  f irm  and th e  p r ic e  system  are a tte m p ts  
to  a p p ro x im a te , as c lo s e ly  as is  econom ica l, a 
p e r fe c t ly  e f f ic ie n t  a llo c a t io n  o f  resources ; b u t  in  
an im p e rfe c t w o r ld , th e y  are  n o t a tte m p ts  to  
a p p ro x im a te  each o th e r. °
Thus, a lth o u g h  th e  f irm  may reduce th e  cos t o f  co m p le tin g  
tra n s a c tio n s  p re v io u s ly  c a r r ie d  o u t in  th e  m arke t, i t  may a lso  
d is to r t  th e  a llo c a tio n  o f  resources p roduced  by  th e  m arke t, eg by  
th e  use o f  t ra n s fe r  p r ic in g . Increased  tra n s a c tio n a l e f f ic ie n c y  may 
th e re fo re  be o f fs e t  by a llo c a t io n a l in e ff ic ie n c y .
The in te rn a l o rg a n iz a t io n a l v ie w p o in t has a lso  been c r i t ic is e d  
fo r  I t s  tendency to assume a d icho tom ous c la s s if ic a t io n  betw een
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f irm s  (h ie ra rc h ie s ) and m a rke ts  [N ic h o la s  (1982, pp6 -7 )]. Such a
c la s s if ic a t io n  is  in a p p ro p r ia te  because th e re  are  in te rm e d ia te  
m ethods o f  c o -o rd in a tin g  a c t iv i t ie s .  A p a rt fro m  th e  more o b v io u s  
in te rm e d ia te  modes such as lic e n s in g  and f ra n c h is in g , M acM illan  and 
Farm er (1979), N icho las  (1982) and M a r i t i  and S m iley (1983) have a l l  
h ig h lig h te d  a n o th e r im p o r ta n t in te rm e d ia te  mode, nam ely "co ­
o p e ra tiv e  b e h a v io u r" . T h is  is  d e fin e d  by M a r i t i  and Sm iley (1983, 
p437) as "any lo n g  te rm , e x p l ic i t  agreem ent am ongst tw o  o r  more 
f irm s ."
Thus, th e  o n e -o ff  pu rchase  o f  goods and s e rv ice s  w o u ld  n o t 
c o n s t itu te  a c o -o p e ra t iv e  agreem ent, b u t  an agreem ent to  pu rchase  
a l l  in p u ts  fro m  one s u p p lie r  o v e r a f ix e d  num ber o f  years w o u ld . 
The re la t io n s h ip s  betw een th e  UK r e ta i l in g  MNC M arks and Spencer 
and i t s  s u p p lie rs  are exam ples o f c o -o p e ra t iv e  agreem ents. 
B a rg a in in g  and n e g o tia t io n  betw een th e  p a r t ie s  leads to  lo n g - te rm  
c o n tra c ts  and c o -o p e ra t iv e  b e h a v io u r. T h is  can be c o n tra s te d  w ith  
m a rke ts  (where th e re  is  no b a rg a in in g  and p r ic e s  c le a r  th e  m a rke t) 
and f irm s  (where p r ic e s  are  de te rm in e d  by  a d m in is tra t iv e  f ia t ) .
D esp ite  th e  c r it ic is m  th a t  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  ig n o re s  
in te rm e d ia te  fo rm s  o f  o rg a n iz a tio n , W illiam so n  d id  recogn ise  th a t  h is  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l fa i lu re s  fra m e w o rk  can be a p p lie d  to  in s t i tu t io n s  
o th e r  th a n  f irm s  and m arke ts  (1975, p l02). The w idesp read  use o f  
th e  te rm  'M arke ts  and H ie ra rc h ie s ' by  w r ite rs  c it in g  h is  ideas has, 
n e v e rth e le ss , tended  to  c re a te  th e  im p re ss io n  th a t  he d id  n o t 
c o n s id e r in te rm e d ia te  o rg a n iz a t io n a l fo rm s. In  a la te r  c o n tr ib u t io n ,  
W illiam so n  (1981b) e x p l ic i t ly  advoca ted  a "co m p a ra tive  in s t i t u t io n a l  
assessm ent o f  a lte rn a t iv e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l fo rm s" c o n s is tin g  o f  
m a rke ts , f irm s  and "m ixed  modes -  eg fra n c h is in g "  (pl544).
In  h is  m ost re c e n t c o n tr ib u t io n ,  W illiam so n  (1990) has 
advoca ted  th a t  th e  te rm  w h ic h  is  com m only used by  tra n s a c tio n  cos t 
th e o r is ts  to  d escrib e  th e  f irm , 'nexus o f  c o n tra c ts ',  be rep laced  by  a 
new te rm , 'nexus o f  t re a t ie s '.  The d ro p p in g  o f  th e  w o rd  'c o n tra c t ' is  
ju s t i f ie d  by W illiam son  on th e  g rounds th a t  i t  o fte n  c a rr ie s  
unw an ted  le g a l m eanings w h ich  se rve  to  in h ib i t  u n d e rs ta n d in g  (1990, 
pp3-4). The b ro a d e r te rm  't re a t ie s ' is  recommended on th e  bas is  th a t
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i t  accom odates o rg a n iz a t io n a l fo rm s  such as c o a lit io n s  and a llia n c e s , 
th u s  m ak ing  i t  e a s ie r f o r  o th e r  d is c ip lin e s  such as so c io lo g y  and 
p o l i t ic a l  science to  " jo in  th e  d ia lo g u e " and fo s te r  th e  in te g ra t io n  o f  
th e o r ie s  o f  b u re a u c ra cy  and pow er in to  th e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l fa i lu re s  
fra m e w o rk .
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
T ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry  is  concerned  w ith  th e  tra n s a c tio n  c o s t-  
econom iz ing p ro p e r t ie s  o f  a l te rn a t iv e  fo rm s  o f  econom ic o rg a n iz a tio n  
(m arke ts  and h ie ra rc h ie s  be in g  th e  tw o  extrem es). The concep t o f  
e f f ic ie n c y  i t  em ploys is  n o t th e re fo re  P a re to  o p t im a lity  because 
a lte rn a t iv e  in s t i t u t io n a l  a rrangem ents  are com pared w ith  one 
a n o th e r, n o t w ith  th e  a b s tra c t io n  o f  a p e r fe c t ly  c o m p e tit iv e  m arke t. 
The th e o ry  p re d ic ts  th a t  f irm s  w i l l  s u b s t itu te  f o r  m arke ts , o r  any 
o th e r  mode o f  econom ic o rg a n iz a tio n , i f  in  so do in g  th e y  are ab le  to  
reduce  th e  cos t o f  co m p le tin g  tra n s a c tio n s .
T h is  co m pa ra tive  in s t i t u t io n a l  app roach  is  re a d ily  a p p lic a b le  to  
th e  a rena  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness. I t  p re d ic ts  th a t  th e  fo rm  o f  
in te rn a t io n a l in v o lv e m e n t chosen by  a f irm  is  dependent upon tw o  
v a r ia b le s : th e  e f f ic ie n c y  o f  i t s  own o rg a n iz a tio n  and im p e rfe c tio n s
in  in te rn a t io n a l m arke ts . I f  th e  costs  w h ich  a r is e  fro m  tra n s a c tin g  
in  im p e rfe c t in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c t m arke ts  a re  g re a te r, n e t o f  
in te rn a l o rg a n iz a tio n  costs , th a n  th e  costs  o f  tra n s a c tin g  in  
im p e rfe c t in te rn a t io n a l fa c to r  m arke ts , th e n  FDI w i l l  o ccu r in  
p re fe re n ce  to  e x p o rt in g . The same an a lys is  h o ld s  f o r  in te rn a t io n a l 
know ledge  m arke ts ; w here n e t t ra n s a c tio n  costs  in  these  m arke ts  are 
g re a te r  th a n  th e  costs  o f  t ra n s a c tin g  in  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c t and 
fa c to r  m arke ts , know ledge  w i l l  be e x p lo ite d  w ith in  th e  f irm  ra th e r  
th a n  lic e n s e d  to  an in d e p e n d e n t p ro d u ce r.
The a p p lic a t io n  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t a n a lys is  to  th e  MNC has 
p rodu ced  th re e  d is t in c t iv e ,  b u t  com plem enta ry th e o r ie s : 
in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry , a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  th e o ry  and th e  M arke ts  and 
H ie ra rc h ie s  approach. A p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  th e o ry  is  re a lly  o n ly  a 
sp e c ia l case o f in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  (fo c u s in g  e x c lu s iv e ly  on
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im p e rfe c tio n s  in  th e  know ledge  m a rke t) w h ile  th e  o n ly  re a l 
d iffe re n c e  between th e  M&H fra m e w o rk  and in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  is  
th a t  th e  fo rm e r tra c e s  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  (b o th  in te rn a l and 
e x te rn a l)  to  human and e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to rs .  A l l  th re e  approaches 
are  u n ite d  in  t h e ir  b e l ie f  th a t  i t  is  th e  e x is te n ce  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  
cos ts  w h ic h  de te rm ine  th e  cho ice  between d i f fe r e n t  fo rm s o f  
econom ic o rg a n iz a tio n .
T ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  d e r iv e s  much o f  i t s  appea l from  i t s  use 
o f  a n o n -P a re tia n  concep t o f  e f f ic ie n c y . A measure o f  th e  
p o p u la r i ty  o f  th e  app roach  can be guaged fro m  th e  im pact i t  has 
made in  re la te d  d is c ip lin e s . In  th e  f ie ld  o f  bus iness  h is to ry ,  f o r  
exam ple, N icho las  (1983, 1986a, 1986b) has used W illiam so n 's  m odel to  
d e r iv e  an e x p la n a tio n  f o r  th e  t r a n s it io n  fro m  agency s e llin g  to  FDI 
by  B r i t is h  m a n u fa c tu rin g  m u lt in a t io n a ls  b e fo re  1939. A cco un tan ts  
have begun to  a p p ly  th e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l fa i lu re s  fra m e w o rk  to  
e x p la in  th e  deve lopm en t and des ign  o f  m anageria l a cco u n tin g  
system s [S p ic e r and B a lle w  (1983), Johnson  (1983)]. The em erging 
l i te r a tu r e  on th e  phenom enon o f  management b u y -o u ts  has u t i l is e d  
concep ts  fo u n d  w ith in  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  [eg W rig h t (1986), 
W rig h t and Thompson (1985)]. And, in  th e  f ie ld  o f  deve lopm ent 
econom ics, th e  use fu le n e ss  o f  W illiam so n 's  ideas have been 
h ig h l ig h te d  by  C ru ise  O 'B rien  and H e lle in e r  (1980).
L a s t, b u t n o t le a s t, th e  in s ig h ts  p ro v id e d  by th e  tra n s a c tio n  
co s t app roach  have been a p p lie d  by  s ch o la rs  w o rk in g  in  th e  f ie ld  o f  
bus iness  s tra te g y . F o r exam ple, Jones and H i l l  (1988) ana lysed th e  
re la t io n s h ip  betw een s tra te g y , s t ru c tu re  and pe rfo rm ance  in  te rm s o f  
t ra n s a c tio n  costs , w h ic h  th e y  used as a fra m e w o rk  to  in te g ra te  a 
num ber o f  ideas in  th e  bus iness  s tra te g y  l i te ra tu r e .  D esp ite  th e  
fa c t  th a t  th e  tra n s a c tio n  co s t app roach  and bus iness s tra te g y  
th e o r ie s  share  s e v e ra l com m o na litie s , th e y  d i f f e r  fu n d a m e n ta lly  in  
te rm s o f  th e  o b je c tiv e s  w h ic h  th e y  a sc rib e  to  th e  f irm . T h is  n a tu re  
o f  th is  d iffe re n c e  is  d iscussed  in  C h a p te r Seven, w h ich  o u tlin e s  a 
fra m e w o rk  o f  a n a lys is  f o r  th e  re se a rch  issues ta c k le d  in  th e  th e s is . 
B e fo re  th is  fra m e w o rk  can be describ ed , how ever, i t  is  necessary to  
re v ie w  th e  l i te r a tu r e  p e r ta in in g  to  th e  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  





1. T ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  is  som etim es re fe r re d  to  as " in te rn a l 
o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry "  o r  th e  "new in s t i t u t io n a l  econom ics", a f te r  
W illiam so n  (1975). I t  is  a lso  o c c a s io n a lly  c a lle d  th e  " in s t i tu t io n a l  
th e o ry  o f  the  f irm "  [eg Casson (1983)].
2. Jensen, 1983, p326.
3. The s im ila r i t y  betw een Coase's m ethod o f  a n a ly s is  and th a t  used 
by  Hobbes was h ig h lig h te d  by  Shepherd e t a l (1985, pp37-38).
4. Coase, 1937, p391.
5. Q uoted in  W illiam son , 1981b, pl541.
6. The tra n s a c tio n  cos t app roach  o u t lin e d  in  W illiam so n 's  1975 book  
has been fu r th e r  e la b o ra te d  in  a fo llo w -u p  book  [W illia m so n  
(1985)]. T h is  is  based la rg e ly  upon  th e  w o rk  done by  W illiam son  
and o th e rs  in  th e  in te rv e n in g  p e r io d . Many o f  th e  o r ig in a l 
a r t ic le s  p u b lis h e d  by W illiam so n  s ince  1975 are rep roduce d  in  a 
subsequen t p u b lic a t io n  [W illia m so n  (1986)] w h ich  co n ta in s  a 
s e le c tio n  o f  h is  essays d a tin g  fro m  1963.
7. W illiam son , 1981b, pl545.
8. Dahlm an, 1979, p l56.
9. Rugman, 1981, p l56.
10. The te rm  "econom ies o f  scope" is  used to  d e fin e  a s itu a t io n  in  
w h ic h  " jo in t  p ro d u c tio n  o f  tw o  goods by one e n te rp r is e  is  less 
c o s t ly  th a n  th e  com bined costs  o f  p ro d u c tio n  o f  tw o  s p e c ia lty  
f irm s "  [W il l ig  (1979, p346)].
11. The id ea  th a t  f irm -s p e c if ic  know ledge  may have v a ry in g  degrees 
o f  p ro d u c t s p e c if ic i ty  is  s im ila r  to  th e  n o t io n  o f  " fu n g ib le  
know ledge" p roposed  by Teece (1982a). T h is  re fe rs  to  know ledge 
in  w h ich  "th e  human c a p ita l in p u ts  em ployed by th e  f irm  are n o t 
a lw ays e n t ir e ly  s p e c ia lis e d  to  th e  p a r t ic u la r  p ro d u c ts  and 
se rv ice s  w h ich  th e  e n te rp r is e  is  c u r re n t ly  p ro d u c in g " (p45).
12. Teece, 1981a, pp9-10.
13. The c la im  th a t  th e  tra n s a c tio n  cos t approach, in  th e  fo rm  o f  
in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry , re p re se n ts  a 'ge ne ra l th e o ry ’ o f  FDI has 
been advanced by Rugman (1980, 1981, 1982).
14. V e lja n o v s k i, 1982, p57.
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15. B u ck le y  and Casson (1981) have a tte m p te d  to  in je c t  a dynam ic 
e lem ent in to  th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  MNC by d e ve lo p in g  a m odel o f  th e  
o p tim a l t im in g  o f  FDI, based upon a num ber o f  h e ro ic  
assum ptions a b o u t th e  cos ts  o f  FDI and o f  a l te rn a t iv e  modes o f  
m a rke t s e rv ic in g  o v e r tim e . T h is , and o th e r  s im ila r  models are 
cons ide red  in  C h a p te r Seven.
16. T h is  p o in t  was a lso  made by  B u ck le y  (1983) in  a d i f fe r e n t  
c o n te x t.
17. I t  is  in te re s t in g  to  no te  th a t  B uck ley , in  h is  1988 paper, was 
som ewhat a p o lo g e tic  ab o u t h is  1983 comment th a t  in te rn a lis a t io n  
re p re se n te d  "a concep t in  sea rch  o f  a th e o ry " . He s ta te d  th a t  
th is  comment has been "m uch quo ted , b u t n o t a lw ays in  th e  s p i r i t  
in te n d e d  by th e  a u th o r"  (p l91).
18. McManus, 1975, p343.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.1.1 The L ite ra tu re  on In te rn a t io n a l L ic e n s in g
There  e x is t  fo u r  m ain bod ies  o f  l i te r a tu r e  w here  e x p la n a tio n s  can 
be fo u n d  fo r  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  as a means o f  e a rn in g  incom e 
overseas.
F ir s t ly ,  th e re  is  a body o f  l i te r a tu r e  concerned w ith  
in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  i t s e l f .  Much o f th is  is  concerned  w ith  th e  
le g a l aspects o f  lic e n s in g , a re f le c t io n  o f  th e  c o n tra c tu a l n a tu re  o f  
th is  fo rm  o f  bus iness. There is  a lso  a s e c tio n  o f  th is  l i te r a tu r e  
w h ic h  is  concerned w ith  th e  p ra c t ic a l i t ie s  o f  lic e n s in g : how to
n e g o tia te  a lice n ce , th e  p r ic in g  o f  tech n o lo g y , e tc. The s e c tio n  o f 
th e  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  l i te r a tu r e  w h ic h  is  o f  m ost concern  in  
th is  c h a p te r is  th a t  w h ic h  id e n t if ie s  th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f 
in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g .
The p io n e e rin g  re se a rch  on th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
l ic e n s in g  to o k  p lace  in  th e  US in  th e  la te  1950's. L o v e ll (1958) 
id e n t i f ie d  a v a r ie ty  o f  reasons f o r  fo re ig n  lic e n s in g  by US f irm s .^  
A n o th e r  s tu d y  o f  th e  same phenom enon, u n d e rta k e n  by Behrman 
(1957-1960), genera ted  a s izeab le  am ount o f  da ta  on th e  n a tu re  and 
e x te n t o f  fo re ig n  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  among US f irm s , i t s  c o n tr ib u t io n  
to  econom ic g ro w th , th e  fa c to rs  p ro m o tin g  i t ,  and th e  costs  and 
b e n e fits  in v o lv e d .^
O th e r u s e fu l c o n tr ib u t io n s ,  b o th  th e o re t ic a l and e m p ir ic a l, have 
been made by L o v e ll (1969), Baranson (1970), Z enno f (1970), W ilson 
(1975, 1977), Business In te rn a t io n a l (1977), Te les io  (1979), B u ck ley  and 
D avies (1979, 1981), C o n tra c to r  (1981a, 1985) and Lowe and C ra w fo rd  
(1984). These, and o th e r  s tu d ie s  o f  a less s ig n if ic a n t  n a tu re , w i l l  be 
re fe r re d  to  in  th e  ensu ing  a n a lys is .
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In  a d d it io n  to  th e  l i te r a tu r e  concerned w ith  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g  p e r se, re fe re n ce  to  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  can a lso  be 
fo u n d  in  th e  te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  l i te ra tu r e .  In  th is  l i te r a tu r e  
lic e n s in g  is  ana lysed  as one means o f  t ra n s fe r r in g  te ch n o lo g y  
betw een f irm s  and betw een n a tio n s , th e  o th e r  p r in c ip a l mode be ing  
e q u ity  in ve s tm e n t. R eference to  fa c to rs  w h ic h  in flu e n c e  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  can a lso  be fo u n d  in  th e  l i te ra tu re s  
concerned w ith  th e  th e o ry  o f  FDI and the  th e o ry  o f  the  MNC, 
covered  in  C hap te rs  F o u r and F ive  re s p e c tiv e ly .
These fo u r  l i te ra tu r e s  are  by  no means d is c re te  e n t it ie s ;  th e re  
is  a c o n s id e ra b le  degree o f  o v e r la p  in  th e  e x p la n a tio n s  to  be fo u n d  
in  each o f  them. The th e o r ie s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  d e scrib ed  
in  th is  c h a p te r are  d e r iv e d  fro m  a l l  fo u r  l i te ra tu re s .
6.1.2 F a c to rs  A f fe c t in g  th e  L ic e n s in g  D ec is ion
The lic e n s in g  l i te r a tu r e  id e n t if ie s  a la rg e  num ber o f  fa c to rs  w h ich  
p o te n t ia l ly  in f lu e n c e  th e  lic e n s in g  dec is io n . These fa c to rs  w i l l  be 
d iscussed  u n d e r th e  fo llo w in g  b road  head ings: (1) te ch n o lo g y  and 
p ro d u c t-s p e c if ic  fa c to rs ;  (2) in d u s try -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs ;  (3) c o u n try -  
s p e c if ic  fa c to rs  and (4) f irm -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs .
The f i r s t  c a te g o ry  g roups  to g e th e r  c e r ta in  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  
p ro d u c ts , and th e  te c h n o lo g y  used to  m anu fac tu re  them , w h ich  are  
h e ld  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n . The fa c to rs  w h ich  com prise  
th e  second ca te g o ry  are  re la te d  to  th e  s tru c tu re  o f  th e  in d u s try  in  
w h ich  f irm s  ope ra te ; in c lu d e d  among these are th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  
as a s tra te g y  to  enhance a f irm 's  c o m p e tit iv e  p o s it io n  w ith in  i t s  
in d u s try .  The t h i r d  c a te g o ry  co n ta in s  fa c to rs  th a t  a re  assoc ia ted  
p r im a r i ly  w ith  th e  h o s t (ie  lice n se e 's ) c o u n try , b u t a lso  th e  source  
(ie  lic e n s o r 's )  c o u n try . The fa c to rs  w h ich  make up th e  f in a l  
c a te g o ry  are  s p e c if ic  to  th e  f irm s  in v o lv e d  in  lic e n s in g , and re la te  
m a in ly  to  lic e n s o rs .^
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6.2 TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCT-SPECIFIC FACTORS
6.2.1 Im p e rfe c tio n s  in  th e  In te rn a t io n a l T echno logy M a rke t
Because a rm s -le n g th  lic e n s in g  is  a m a rke t-m e d ia te d  tra n s a c tio n  
(u n lik e  FDI o r  e x p o rt in g , w h ic h  are  gove rned  by  th e  f irm 's  in te rn a l 
m arke t) a key  d e te rm in a n t o f  th e  v ia b i l i t y  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  o p tio n  
w i l l  be th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  a rm 's - le n g th  m a rke t f o r  te c h n o lo g y  
licences . I f  th e  m a rke t is  c h a ra c te r is e d  by im p e rfe c tio n s  w h ic h  
make i t  c o s t ly  to  tra n s a c t in  i t ,  th e n  lic e n s in g  may p ro ve  to  be a 
less a t t ra c t iv e  o p tio n  com pared to  th e  a lte rn a t iv e s  o f  FDI o r  
e x p o rt in g .
The l i te r a tu r e  on t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry  th e re fo re  p ro v id e s  
u s e fu l in s ig h ts  f o r  th e  e v a lu a tio n  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  o p tio n . Indeed, 
Caves e t a l (1983) s ta te d  th a t  " th e  concepts needed to  ana lyse  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents l ie  in  th e  l i te r a tu r e  o f in s t i t u t io n a l  econom ics, 
w ith  i t s  em phasis on th e  costs  and u n c e r ta in t ie s  o f  c o n tra c tu a l 
agreem ents between o p p o r tu n is t ic  p a r t ie s "  (p249). These concepts 
have been describ ed  a t le n g th  in  th e  p re v io u s  chap te r. T h e ir  
re leva nce  to  th e  a rm 's - le n g th  te c h n o lo g y  m a rke t w i l l  be o u t lin e d  
here, in  b r ie f ,  u n d e r th e  fo llo w in g  th re e  head ings: sm a ll-num bers
b a rg a in in g , in fo rm a tio n  asym m etry, and t ra n s fe r  costs . A v a ila b le  
e m p ir ic a l ev idence on th e  degree o f  im p e rfe c tio n  assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  
in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  m a rke t is  th e n  o u tlin e d .
Sm all-num bers B a rg a in in g
As B u ck ley  and Casson (1976) p o in te d  o u t, know ledge  is  a "n a tu ra l 
m onopo ly", a t le a s t f o r  a l im ite d  p e r io d  o f  tim e. Thus, when 
te c h n o lo g y  is  em bodied in  th e  fo rm  o f  p a te n ts  and know -how  th e re  
are l ik e ly  to  be few , i f  any, a lte rn a t iv e  s u p p lie rs . When th e re  are  
a lso  a l im ite d  num ber o f  com petent licensees, th e re  e x is ts  a 
s itu a t io n  w h ich  has been d e sc rib e d  by W illiam son  (1975) as "s m a ll-  
num bers b a rg a in in g " and by B u ck le y  and Casson (1976) as a " b i la te ra l 
c o n c e n tra tio n  o f  m arke t pow er". When th is  s itu a t io n  is  com bined 
w ith  o p p o r tu n is t ic  b e h a v io u r by  th e  c o n tra c tin g  p a r t ie s  th e  costs  o f  
tra n s a c tin g  w i l l  increase , in  r e la t io n  to  those  in c u rre d  in  in te rn a l
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m arke ts , and w i l l  th e re fo re  a c t as a d is in c e n tiv e  to  th e  use o f  th e  
a rm 's - le n g th  m arke t.
In fo rm a tio n  Asym m etry
When te c h n o lo g y  ta ke s  th e  fo rm  o f  w ha t is  com m only d e scrib ed  as an 
in ta n g ib le  asset (eg know -h ow ) th e re  is  in e v ita b ly  an asym m etrica l 
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  in fo rm a tio n  am ongst p o te n t ia l p a r t ie s  to  any 
tra n s a c tio n  ab o u t th e  v a lu e  o f  th a t  asset. The e f fe c t  o f  such 
in fo rm a tio n  asym m etry on m a rke t exchange has been h ig h lig h te d  by  
A rro w  (1969) and A k e r lo f  (1970). These c o n tr ib u t io n s  have fo rm ed  
th e  bas is  f o r  W illia m so n 's  (1975) concep t o f  " in fo rm a tio n  
im pactedness". A cco rd in g  to  W illiam son , in fo rm a tio n  becomes 
im pacted  when th e  u n c e r ta in ty  w h ich  a rises  fro m  in fo rm a tio n  
asym m etry canno t be overcom e by th e  use o f  gua ran tees  because o f  
th e  e x is te n ce  o f  "o p p o rtu n is m ". As a r e s u lt  o f  in fo rm a tio n  
im pactedness, th e  a rm s -le n g th  m a rke t f o r  in ta n g ib le  assets is  p rone  
to  fa i lu re ,  and is  th e re fo re  l ik e ly  to  be re p la ce d  by in te rn a l 
m arke ts .
The c o n d it io n  o f  in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness has been de sc rib e d  
e lsew here  b y  W illiam so n  (1981) as th e  "d is c lo s u re "  p rob lem . I t  a lso  
p ro v id e d  th e  bas is  f o r  B u ck le y  and Casson's (1976) concep t o f  "b u y e r 
u n c e r ta in ty " .  They a rgued  th a t  b u y e r u n c e r ta in ty  is  a lm ost 
in e v ita b le  w heneve r u n p a te n te d  know ledge  is  m arke ted , s ince  th e re  
are  l im its  to  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  in fo rm a tio n  can be d iv u lg e d  a b o u t 
th is  ty p e  o f  know ledge  w ith o u t  a c tu a lly  d is c lo s in g  th e  know ledge  
i t s e l f .  I f  in a d v e r ta n t  d is c lo s u re  were to  occur, th e n  th e  v a lu e  o f  
th e  know ledge  to  th e  s e l le r  w o u ld  be e lim in a te d . T h is  le d  B u ck le y  
and Casson (1976) to  conc lude  th a t  i t  is  "e s s e n tia l th a t  some b u y e r 
u n c e r ta in ty  is  p re se rve d , w h ic h  means th a t  in e v ita b ly  th e  b u y e r is  
w i l l in g  to  pay less th a n  th e  s e lle r  c o u ld  a f fo rd  to  g ive  were he in  
th e  same p o s it io n . There is  th u s  a s tro n g  in c e n t iv e  fo r  th e  s e l le r  
to  assume th e  b u y e r's  r is k  by in te rn a lis in g  th e  know ledge and 
in te g ra t in g  fo rw a rd  in to  th e  b u ye r's  in d u s try "  (p40).
An a d d it io n a l p rob lem  w h ic h  a rise s  because o f  in fo rm a tio n  
asym m etry is  th a t  o f  " re c o g n it io n "  [W illia m so n  (1981)]. T h is  p rob lem
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occurs  p r io r  to  th e  d is c lo s u re  p rob lem , and re fe rs  to  th e  in a b i l i t y  
o f  p o te n t ia l licensees to  recogn ise  th e  o p p o r tu n it ie s  f o r  lic e n s in g  
because o f  t h e ir  la c k  o f  aw areness o f  th e  b e n e fits  w h ich  cou ld  be 
p ro v id e d  by  in ta n g ib le  know ledge.
I t  is  im p o r ta n t to  p o in t  o u t th a t  th e  p rob lem s o f  re c o g n it io n  
and d is c lo s u re  do n o t a r is e  f o r  p a te n ts  and th a t  i t  is  th e re fo re  
e a s ie r to  lice n se  p a te n ts  th a n  i t  is  to  lice n se  know -how . These 
p rob lem s do n o t a p p ly  to  p a te n ts  because th e  ac t o f  p a te n tin g  i t s e l f  
p laces know ledge  in  th e  p u b lic  dom ain. In  p a te n tin g  t h e ir  
d is c o v e r ie s  com panies make a consc ious  d e c is io n  to  fo re g o  secrecy 
in  fa v o u r  o f  p u b lic  d is c lo s u re . P o te n tia l licensees  are th e re fo re  
ab le  to  "recogn ise " th e  p o te n t ia l b e n e fits  w h ic h  p a te n ts  may p ro v id e  
by  se a rch in g  th ro u g h  p a te n t f i l in g s .  There may s t i l l ,  o f  course , 
e x is t  a degree o f  in fo rm a tio n  asym m etry between th e  p a te n t h o ld e r  
and p o te n t ia l licensees  co n ce rn in g  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  p a te n te d  
know ledge , b u t  th is  w i l l  n o t be as severe  as th a t  s u rro u n d in g  kn o w ­
how.
In  a d d it io n , because p a te n te d  know ledge  is  p u b lic ly  a v a ila b le  i t  
does n o t m a tte r  i f  i t  is  passed on to  a n o th e r company by th e  
licensee . As lo n g  as th e  p a te n t is  in  fo rc e  o th e r  com panies canno t 
( le g a lly )  use th is  know ledge  w ith o u t  o b ta in in g  a lice n ce  from  th e  
p a te n t h o ld e r. H ow ever, th e  leakage  o f  know -h ow  from  th e  
license e  does re p re s e n t a p rob lem  as i t  d e s tro ys  th e  c o n f id e n t ia l i ty  
w h ic h  is  necessary f o r  kn o w -h o w  to  re ta in  i t s  va lu e . In  the  o p in io n  
o f  Rugman (1981, pp l56-157) i t  is  th is  " r is k  o f  d is s ip a t io n  o f  th e  
f irm -s p e c if ic  advan tage" w h ic h  is  th e  ke y  d raw b ack  o f  lic e n s in g .
In  a d d it io n  to  th e  r is k  o f  th e  licensee , o r  an employee o f th e  
license e , pass ing  on th e  lic e n s o r 's  know -h ow  to  a t h i r d  p a r ty , th e re  
is  a lso  th e  r is k  th a t  th e  know -h ow  w i l l  be d is s ip a te d  by th e  
license e  u s in g  i t  f o r  pu rposes  o th e r  th a n  those  o r ig in a l ly  in ten ded . 
I t  m ust be no ted , how ever, th a t  th is  fo rm  o f d is s ip a t io n  may a lso 
a f fe c t  p a te n te d  know ledge. The e x te n t to  w h ich  i t  is  p resen t w i l l  
depend upon w ha t G a lb ra ith  and Kay (1986, p l4 ) re fe r re d  to  as th e  
degree o f  " p ro d u c t- s p e c if ic ity "  in h e re n t in  th e  know ledge  th a t  is  
be ing  lice n se d .^  The h ig h e r  is  th e  p ro d u c t- s p e c if ic i ty  o f  know ledge
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( ie  th e  more s p e c if ic  i t  is  to  a p a r t ic u la r  p ro d u c t)  th e  more 
d i f f i c u l t  i t  is  to  use i t  in  th e  deve lopm en t o f  o th e r  p ro d u c ts . 
G iven th a t  p a te n te d  know ledge  is  g e n e ra lly  less t a c i t  in  n a tu re  th a n  
kn o w -h o w  i t  is  l i k e ly  to  e x h ib it  a h ig h e r  degree o f  p ro d u c t-  
s p e c i f ic i ty  and th e re fo re  be less s u s c e p tib le  to  d is s ip a t io n  and more 
s u s c e p tib le  to  lic e n s in g .
T ra n s fe r  Costs
A p a rt  fo rm  th e  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  in c u rre d  as a r e s u lt  o f  in fo rm a tio n  
asym m etry and sm a ll num bers o f  tra d e rs , th e re  are  a d d it io n a l costs  
in v o lv e d  in  u s in g  th e  m a rke t mechanism. These are  o f  th e  ty p e  
id e n t i f ie d  by  Coase (1960), ie  search  costs , p o lic in g  cos ts , e tc. I f  
these  tra n s a c tio n  costs  are s m a lle r when in te rn a l m a rke ts  a re  used 
to  e f fe c t  t ra n s fe r ,  ra th e r  th a n  e x te rn a l m arke ts , th e n  th e re  w i l l  be 
less  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  o p tio n  be ing  adopted.
E vidence  to  s u p p o rt th e  c o n te n tio n  th a t  in te rn a l te c h n o lo g y  
t ra n s fe rs  are  less c o s t ly  th a n  e x te rn a l te c h n o lo g y  tra n s fe rs  has 
been p ro v id e d  by Teece (1976). He o b ta in e d  da ta  on th e  "re so u rce  
cos ts " assoc ia ted  w ith  26 in te rn a t io n a l te ch n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  p ro je c ts  
in v o lv in g  US MNCs, w here  these  costs  were d e fin e d  as th e  costs  o f  
" t ra n s m it t in g  and a b so rb in g " a l l  o f  th e  re le v a n t unem bodied 
know ledge  (1976, p36).5
Teece fo u n d  th a t  th e  costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  m a rke t o r  
"sem im arke t" (ie  jo in t  v e n tu re ) t ra n s fe rs  were g re a te r  th a n  those  
a ssoc ia ted  w ith  n o n -m a rk e t (ie  in t r a - f i r m )  t ra n s fe rs .  H is da ta  
in d ic a te d  th a t ,  on average, t ra n s fe rs  to  jo in t  v e n tu re s  cos t 5 p e r 
c en t m ore th a n  tra n s fe rs  to  w h o lly -o w n e d  s u b s id ia r ie s , w h ile  
t ra n s fe rs  to  in d e p e n d e n t f irm s  cos t 9 p e r cen t more. T ra n s fe rs  to  
gove rnm en t e n te rp r is e s  in v o lv e d  th e  g re a te s t resou rce  cost, 17 p e r 
cen t h ig h e r  th a n  th o se  in c u rre d  fo r  in t r a - f i r m  tra n s fe rs  (1976, pp81- 
83).
In  aggregate, t ra n s fe r  costs  were fo u n d  to  re p re s e n t 19.16 p e r 
c en t o f  to ta l  p ro je c t costs , a lth o u g h  th e re  was co n s id e ra b le  
v a r ia t io n  in  th e  d a ta  (the  range ex tended fro m  2.25 p e r cen t to  59
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p e r cent). Teece's re s u lts  th e re fo re  re fu te  th e  n o tio n  th a t  
te c h n o lo g ic a l know ledge  is  in  any sense a p u b lic  good, ie  th a t  i t  can 
be so ld  a t zero m a rg in a l cost. In  a d d it io n , Teece fo u n d  th a t  
t ra n s fe r  costs  were lo w e r f o r  te c h n o lo g y  th a t  had p re v io u s ly  been 
com m erc ia lised  (ie  tra n s fe r re d ) .  They were a lso  lo w e r th e  g re a te r  
was th e  am ount o f  re la te d  m a n u fa c tu rin g  expe rience  possessed by 
th e  tra n s fe re e .
E m p ir ic a l Evidence
E vidence to  s u p p o rt th e  c o n te n tio n  th a t  th e  in te rn a t io n a l m a rke t f o r  
te c h n o lo g y  licence s  is  an im p e rfe c t one was p ro v id e d  by  Caves e t a l 
(1983). They a rgued th a t  im p e rfe c tio n s  in  th is  m a rke t w o u ld  lead  
lic e n s o rs  to  in c lu d e  " r e s t r ic t iv e  te rm s" in  t h e ir  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents, as a p ro te c t iv e  measure. As th e y  p u t  i t ,  lic e n s o rs  have 
"an in c e n t iv e  to  tra d e  some lice n ce  revenue  f o r  a u x i l ia r y  te rm s th a t  
a v e r t  n e g a tive  e x te rn a l e ffe c ts  o f  th e  lice n se e 's  s tre n g th e n e d  
c o m p e tit iv e  p o s it io n  on th e  lic e n s o r 's  expected fu tu re  p ro f i ts .  Thus 
th e  te rm s o f  te c h n o lo g y  lice n ce s  sh o u ld  r e f le c t  th e  im p e rfe c tio n s  o f 
th e  lic e n c e  m a rke t" (1983, p251).
In  t h e ir  s u rv e y  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  agreem ents o f  22 US, Canadian 
and UK MNCs, Caves e t a l fo u n d  a "h ig h  in c id e n ce " o f  p ro te c t iv e
term s.^ In  34 p e r cen t o f  th e  agreem ents covered  in  t h e ir  su rv e y
th e  license e  was p ro h ib ite d  fro m  e ith e r  s e llin g  o r  p ro d u c in g  th e  
lic e n s e d  p ro d u c t o u ts id e  c e r ta in  s p e c if ie d  m arke ts . In  43 p e r cen t 
o f  th e  agreem ents th e  license e  was re q u ire d  to  share  w ith  th e  
lic e n s o r  any advances o r  im provem ents  in  th e  lice n se d  te chno logy , 
th u s  c u r ta i l in g  th e  lice n se e 's  in c e n t iv e  to  in v e s t in  fu r th e r  
deve lopm ent o f  th e  te ch n o lo g y .
I t  was p re d ic te d  by  th e  a u th o rs  th a t  th e  r is k  to  lic e n s o rs  o f
s e tt in g  up a p o te n t ia l c o m p e tito r  w o u ld  be assoc ia ted  w ith  th e
in c id e n ce  o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses. T h is  r is k  was m easured by the  
lic e n s o r 's  le v e l o f  p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ,  on the  assum ption  th a t  
"d o m in a n t-p ro d u c t"  lic e n s o rs  s h o u ld  be more averse to  a license e 's  
emergence as a s tro n g  c o m p e tito r  th a n  " d iv e rs if ie d "  lic e n s o rs . A 
s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  degree o f  a s s o c ia tio n  was fo u n d  to  e x is t
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betw een th e  in c id e n ce  o f  lic e n s in g  and these  tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f  
lic e n s o r, th u s  c o n firm in g  th e  p re d ic te d  re la t io n s h ip .^
The in c id e n ce  o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses in  lic e n s in g  agreem ents was 
a lso  in v e s tig a te d  by  C o n tra c to r  (1981a) who fo u n d  th a t ,  "as a m a tte r  
o f  p o lic y , lic e n s o rs  d e s ire  to  p lace  re s tra in ts  on n o n a f f i l ia te d  
licensees  w h e re ve r i t  is  le g a l o r  fe a s ib le  to  do so" (p61).^ C lauses 
w h ic h  re s tr ic te d  th e  e x p o rt sa les o f  licensees  w ere fo u n d  to  be less  
p re v a le n t th a n  those  w h ich  re s t r ic te d  p ro d u c tio n  lo c a tio n , o r  those  
w h ich  p ro v id e d  fo r  te c h n o lo g y  flo w b a c k . T h is  was a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  
fa c t  th a t  th e  fo rm e r o fte n  co n tra ve n e  h o s t c o u n try  a n t i - t r u s t  
le g is la t io n ,  whereas th e  la t t e r  tw o  g e n e ra lly  do no t.
The s tu d ie s  by C o n tra c to r  (1981a) and by Caves e t a l (1983) were 
b o th  concerned w ith  th e  in c id e n ce  o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses in  a rm s- 
le n g th  lic e n s in g  agreem ents. They d id  n o t measure th e  in c id e n ce  o f  
a rm s -le n g th  r e s t r ic t io n s  r e la t iv e  to  those  o c c u rin g  in  in t r a - f i r m  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents, ie  agreem ents betw een MNC p a re n ts  and th e ir  
s u b s id ia r ie s . T h is  om iss ion  was rem edied by  P a rry  (1986, 1988) who 
m easured th e  in c id e n ce  o f  r e s t r ic i tv e  c lauses in  th e  know -h ow  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents o f  137 dom estic  and fo re ig n -o w n e d  A u s tra lia n  
f irm s .^  The fo re ig n -o w n e d  f irm s  in  P a rry 's  sam ple o b ta in e d  th e ir
kn o w -h o w  " p r im a r ily  fro m  th e ir  fo re ig n  a f f i l ia te s "  w h ile  th e
d o m e s tic a lly -o w n e d  f irm s  o b ta in e d  th e irs  " p r im a r ily  fro m  
u n a f f i l ia te d  fo re ig n  e n te rp r is e s "  (1988, pp359-400). As a re s u lt ,  these  
tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents can be v ie w ed  as p ro x ie s  f o r  
a rm 's - le n g th  and in t r a - f i r m  agreem ents.
P a rry 's  s tu d y  concerned i t s e l f  w ith  th re e  p r in c ip a l ca te g o rie s  
o f  r e s t r ic t io n s :  e x p o r t r e s t r ic t io n s ,  r e s t r ic t io n s  on th e  re - l ic e n s in g  
o f  te c h n o lo g y  em bodying th e  ove rsea s -sou rced  know -how , and
re q u ire m e n ts  to  pu rchase  des igna ted  raw  m a te ria ls , c a p ita l 
equ ipm en t o r  o th e r  in p u ts  fro m  th e  lic e n s o r. W hat he fo u n d  was 
th a t ,  w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  r e s t r ic t io n s  on re - l ic e n s in g  te chno logy , 
th e re  was no s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe re n c e  betw een fo re ig n  and
d o m e s tica lly -o w n e d  f irm s  in  th e  in c id e n ce  o f  re s tr ic t io n s .
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T h is  f in d in g  was a t odds w ith  th e  tw o  m ain schoo ls  o f  th o u g h t 
a b o u t th e  in c id e n ce  o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  c o n d it io n s  in  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents. One o f  these  schoo ls  o f  th o u g h t, la b e lle d  by P a rry
(1986) as th e  "p o p u la r  v ie w ", h o ld s  th a t  a rm 's -leng th  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents w i l l  be assoc ia ted  w ith  fe w e r r e s t r ic t iv e  c o n d it io n s  th a n  
in t r a - f i r m  agreem ents. A cc o rd in g  to  th is  v ie w , agreem ents betw een 
in d e p e n d e n t p a r t ie s  are  seen as be ing  more l ik e ly  to  r e f le c t  
w h a te v e r c o m p e tit iv e  c o n d it io n s  p re v a il in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
te c h n o lo g y  m arke t. P a rry  no tes  th a t  th is  p o p u la r  v ie w  is  h e ld  
p re d o m in a n tly  by p o lic y -m a k e rs  in  h o s t c o u n tr ie s , who have used i t  
as a ra t io n a le  f o r  p o lic ie s  aimed a t u n b u n d lin g  th e  te ch n o lo g y  
com ponent o f  th e  FDI package by  encourag ing  dom estic  f irm s  to  
e n te r  in to  a rm 's - le n g th  lic e n s in g  agreem ents w ith  MNCs.
The o th e r  sch o o l o f  th o u g h t, la b e lle d  by P a rry  (1986) as th e  
" in te rn a liz a t io n  app ro ach ", h o ld s  th a t  MNCs w i l l  be more l ik e ly  to  
im pose c o n d it io n s  on lic e n s in g  agreem ents w ith  in depe nden t p a r t ie s  
th a n  on agreem ents w ith  t h e ir  own s u b s id ia r ie s .^  T h is  fo llo w s  fro m  
th e  need th a t  MNCs have to  p ro te c t  t h e ir  "p ro p r ie ta ry  in te re s ts " ,  ie  
to  a v o id  te c h n o lo g y  le a k in g  o u t to  com p e tito rs . I t  is  ta ke n  f o r  
g ra n te d  th a t  th e  s u b s id ia r ie s  o f  MNCs w i l l  n o t a c t a g a in s t th e  bes t 
(g lo b a l)  in te re s ts  o f  th e  MNC p a re n t, and w i l l  th e re fo re  n o t be 
s u b je c t to  th e  same r e s t r ic t iv e  c o n d it io n s  in  t h e ir  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents as are in d e p e n d e n t f irm s .
To accoun t f o r  h is  re s u lts ,  w h ic h  suggested th a t  th e re  was, in  
fa c t,  no s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe re n c e  betw een th e  in c id e n ce  o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  
c lauses in  a rm 's - le n g th  and in t r a - f i r m  lic e n s in g  agreem ents, P a rry  
(1986) p roposed  an a lte rn a t iv e  schoo l o f th o u g h t, ca lle d  th e  
" im p e rfe c t/c o n s tra in e d  h ie ra rc h y "  approach, w h ich  draws on h is  
e a r l ie r  w o rk , P a rry  (1985), re fe r re d  to  in  C hap te r F ive . H is approach  
c a lle d  in to  q u e s tio n  one o f  th e  m ain assum ptions o f th e  
in te rn a liz a t io n  approach , nam ely th a t  th e  MNC can i t s e l f  more e a s ily  
m o n ito r  a c t iv i t ie s  and e n fo rce  p ro p r ie ta ry  r ig h ts  v ia  i t s  in te rn a l 
h ie ra rc h y  th a n  i t  can v ia  a rm 's - le n g th  c o n tra c ts . P a rry  p o in te d  o u t 
th a t  th e re  e x is ts  ev idence o f a re la t io n s h ip  between th e  leakage o f 
te c h n o lo g y  w ith in  h o s t c o u n tr ie s  and th e  movement o f  pe rson ne l 
fro m  MNC s u b s id ia r ie s  [see eg R euber (1973)]. He a lso  suggested
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th a t  fo rm a l, c o n tra c tu a l agreem ents w ith  in d e p e n d e n t t h i r d  p a r t ie s  
may be e a s ie r to  en fo rce  th a n  th e  "q u a s i-c o n tra c tu a l"  o b lig a tio n s  o f  
em ployees in  s u b s id ia ry  com panies (1986, p l3 ) . ^
In  a d d it io n , P a rry  q u e s tio n e d  w h e th e r MNCs in  gen e ra l have 
o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re s  w h ic h  e x h ib it  th e  h ie ra rc h ic a l co­
o rd in a t io n ,  c o n tro l and en fo rcem en t th a t  is  assumed by th e  
in te rn a liz a t io n  approach. He p o in te d  o u t th a t  th e re  are  many MNCs 
w here  s u b s id ia r ie s  have a s ig n if ic a n t  degree o f  independence o v e r a 
range  o f  fu n c t io n s , in c lu d in g  a c t iv i t ie s  assoc ia ted  w ith  te ch n o lo g y  
a c q u is it io n . T h is  "s u b s id ia ry - in d e p e n d e n t1' b e h a v io u r  is  re in fo rc e d  
by  th e  fa c t  th a t  lo c a l m anagers o fte n  have ca re e r o b je c tiv e s  and 
p e rc e p tio n s  d i f fe r e n t  fro m  those  o f  p a ren t-com pany  managers (Op 
c i t ,  p l5 ).
So, a cco rd ing  to  P a rry 's  " im p e rfe c t/c o n s tra in e d  h ie ra rc h y "  
app roach , many o f  th e  e lem ents assoc ia ted  w ith  m a rke t fa i lu re  are 
to  be fo u n d  in  th e  in te rn a l m arke ts  o f  MNCs as w e ll as in  e x te rn a l 
m arke ts . As a re s u lt ,  th e re  sh o u ld  be no s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe re n c e  in  
th e  in c id e n ce  o f r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses fo u n d  in  in t r a - f i r m  and arm s- 
le n g th  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
P a rry  (1986) a lso  suggested th a t  th e  in c id e n ce  o f  lic e n s in g  
r e s t r ic t io n s  o v e ra ll is  l i k e ly  to  have decreased in  th e  1980s. Two 
reasons were p roposed  to  accoun t f o r  th is  tre n d . F ir s t ly ,  he a rgued 
th a t  th e  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  m arke t had become more 
c o m p e tit iv e  in  th e  1980s as a r e s u lt  o f  an in c rea se  in  th e  num ber o f 
f irm s  ab le  to  s u p p ly  te ch n o lo g y , and a lso  in  th e  num ber o f  c o u n tr ie s  
in  w h ic h  these  f irm s  are lo ca te d . Secondly, he p o in te d  o u t th a t  
governm ents  in  many c o u n tr ie s  had so u g h t in d iv id u a l ly  to  l im i t  th e  
use o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  c o n d it io n s  in  lic e n s in g  agreem ents. There have 
a lso  been n e g o tia t io n s  a t an in te r-g o v e rn m e n ta l le v e l (conducted  
u n d e r th e  ausp ices o f  UNCTAD) to  fo rm u la te  an in te rn a t io n a l code o f  
co n d u c t on te ch n o lo g y  tra n s fe r .  A lth o u g h  these n e g o tia t io n s  have 
been go ing  on s ince 1975, a code has n o t y e t been agreed upon, 
la rg e ly  as a re s u lt  o f  d iffe re n c e s  o v e r th e  re g u la t io n  o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  
p ra c tic e s  [see R o ffe  (1 9 8 7 )].^
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The lic e n s in g  agreem ents w h ich  were su rveyed  in  th e  s tu d ie s  by 
Caves e t a l (1983) and C o n tra c to r  (1981a) b o th  re ve a le d  a lo w e r 
in c id e n ce  o f  those  r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses w h ich  f a l l  w i th in  th e  dom ain 
o f  g o ve rn m en ta l re g u la t io n s , th u s  b a c k in g  up P a rry 's  c o n te n tio n  th a t  
th e  a c tio n s  o f governm ents  have had an im pac t in  re d u c in g  th e  
p re va le n ce  o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  p ro v is io n s .
6.2.2 Degree o f  C o d if ic a t io n  and D if fu s io n  o f  Techno logy
In  h is  1976 s tu d y  o f  th e  re so u rce  costs  in v o lv e d  in  te c h n o lo g y  
t ra n s fe r ,  Teece was concerned o n ly  w ith  th e  t ra n s fe r  costs  
a ssoc ia ted  w ith  "unem bod ied", r a th e r  th a n  "em bod ied", tech n o lo g y . 
A cc o rd in g  to  Teece, th e  la t t e r  "em braces p h y s ic a l item s such as 
to o lin g ,  equ ipm ent and b lu e p r in ts " ,  w h ile  th e  fo rm e r " is  th e  
in fo rm a tio n  th a t  m ust be a cq u ire d  i f  th e  p h y s ic a l equ ipm ent, o r  
'h a rd w a re ', is  to  be u t i l is e d  e f fe c t iv e ly "  (1976, p34). The reason
g iv e n  b y  Teece f o r  fo c u s in g  h is  s tu d y  on th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  unem bodied 
te c h n o lo g y  is  th a t  i t  re p re se n te d  "a much more com plex process 
th e  c ru x  o f  th e  process o f  te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r "  (op c it ,  p34). The 
t ra n s fe r  o f  em bodied te ch n o lo g y , on th e  o th e r  hand, in v o lv e d  
"n o th in g  more th a n  th e  p h y s ic a l re lo c a tio n  o f  o b je c ts " (op c it ,  p34).
The d is t in c t io n  betw een these  tw o d i f fe r e n t  ca tego ries  o f  
te c h n o lo g y  was em phasised in  la te r  c o n tr ib u t io n s  by  Teece (1981a, 
1981b, 1981c, 1983) when he h ig h lig h te d  th e  g re a te r  ease w ith  w h ic h
te c h n o lo g y  can be t ra n s fe r re d  v ia  th e  a rm 's - le n g th  m arke t i f  i t  is  
in  c o d if ie d  (ie  em bodied) fo rm  ra th e r  th a n  in  u n c o d if ie d  (ie  
unem bodied) form .-1-4 He a lso  obse rved  th a t  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  
u n c o d if ie d  te c h n o lo g y  is  o fte n  im p o ss ib le  w ith o u t  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  
peop le , g iv in g  r is e  to  th e  p rob lem  o f  "team  o rg a n iz a tio n " id e n t if ie d  
by  W illiam so n  (1981).-^ The e x te n t to  w h ich  th is  p rob lem  w i l l  in h ib i t  
a com pany fro m  lic e n s in g  i t s  te c h n o lo g y  depends upon w h e th e r th a t  
te c h n o lo g y  c o n s is ts  o f  p a te n ts  o r  know -how . The fo rm e r m ust by 
d e f in i t io n  be c o d if ia b le  in  o rd e r  to  be p u b lic ly  d isc lo se d  and so th e  
p rob lem  o f  team o rg a n iz a tio n  does n o t e x is t  to  th e  same e x te n t as i t  
does in  know -how  tra n s fe rs .
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The d i f f ic u l t ie s  in v o lv e d  in  t ra n s fe r r in g  u n c o d if ie d  know ledge 
w ere a lso  exam ined by  B o iso t (1982, 1983). He p roposed  a co n ce p tu a l 
fra m e w o rk  f o r  a n a lys in g  th e  com m un ica tion  o f  know ledge  c a lle d  th e  
"C-D fra m e w o rk ", so-nam ed because i t  is  based upon  th e  e x te n t to  
w h ic h  know ledge  is  b o th  c o d if ie d  and d iffu s e d . By d ic h o to m is in g  
each o f  these  tw o  d im ens ions, B o is o t d e r iv e d  a fo u r - fo ld  
c la s s if ic a t io n  o f  know ledge , w h ic h  is  i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  6-1.
FIGURE 6-1
TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE AND ASSOCIATED TRANSACTION MODES
Uncodi  f i  ed 
Know!edge
Cod i f i  ed 
Know!edge
[SOURCE: B o is o t (1983, p ’s 165 & 171)]
A lso  i l lu s t r a te d  are  th e  tra n s a c tio n a l modes w h ich  B o iso t 
assoc ia ted  w ith  each c a te g o ry  o f  know ledge. The bo ttom  tw o  
q u a d ra n ts  re p re s e n t e x te rn a l (ie  m a rke t) tra n s a c tio n s . In  th e  le f t -  
hand q u a d ra n t know ledge  is  p ro p r ie ta ry  in  n a tu re  (eg pa te n ts ) and 
is  th e re fo re  lic e n s e d  in  o rd e r  to  c o n tro l th e  ra te  o f  d if fu s io n .  In  
th e  r ig h t-h a n d  q u a d ra n t, know ledge  has become d iffu s e d , and 
because i t  is  in  c o d if ie d  fo rm  i t  can be re a d ily  b o u g h t and so ld  (eg 
in  book  fo rm ).
The u p p e r tw o  q u a d ra n ts  re p re s e n t in te rn a l (ie  h ie ra rc h ic a l)  
tra n s a c tio n s . In  th e  le f t -h a n d  q u a d ra n t, know ledge  w h ich  is  b o th
P e r s o n a l  knowledge  
( C a r r y  o u t  i n t e r n a l l y )
P u b l i c  t a c i t  knowledge  
( C r e a t e  j o i n t  v e n t u r e )
P r o p r i e t a r y  knowledge  
( Li c e n s e )
Common knowledge  
( Buy and s e l l )




u n c o d if ie d  and u n d if fu s e d  (eg know -how ) p re se n ts  th e  m ost 
d i f f ic u l t ie s  f o r  m a rk e t- tra n s a c tin g  and w i l l  th e re fo re  be in te rn a lis e d  
w ith in  th e  f irm . In  th e  r ig h t-h a n d  q u a d ra n t, know ledge  w i l l  s t i l l  be 
in te rn a lis e d , b u t as i t  is  no lo n g e r f irm -s p e c if ic  i t  is  more l ik e ly  to  
be u t i l is e d  w ith in  a jo in t  v e n tu re  a rrangem ent.
The d icho tom ies  re p re se n te d  in  F ig u re  6-1 are, o f  course , 
som ewhat a r t i f i c ia l ;  in  r e a l i t y  b o th  d im ensions are  c o n tin u o u s . The 
C-D fra m e w o rk  is , n e v e rth le s s , a u s e fu l dev ice  f o r  d e m o n s tra tin g  th e  
p o in t  th a t  th e  n a tu re  o f  know ledge  w i l l  i t s e l f  p la y  a p a r t  in  
d e te rm in in g  th e  m ethod used to  e x p lo it  i t .  B o is o t h im s e lf  
acknow ledged th a t  th e  f in a l  cho ice  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  mode w i l l  o fte n  
depend on a much b ro a d e r se t o f  c o n s id e ra tio n s , b u t p o in te d  o u t 
th a t  h is  d iagram  was m eant to  d esc rib e  "th e  t ra n s a c tio n  d e c is io n s  
th a t  c o n fro n t  a f irm  a t th e  m arg in  in  d i f fe r e n t  q u a d ra n ts " (1983, 
P171).
6.2.3 P ro d u c t C ycle  S ta n d a rd is a tio n
The p ro d u c t l i f e  cyc le  th e o ry  deve loped  by Vernon  (d iscussed  e a r l ie r  
in  C h a p te r F ou r) re la te s  a num ber o f  stages in  th e  l i f e  o f  a p ro d u c t 
to  th e  cho ice  betw een e x p o rt in g  and fo re ig n  p ro d u c tio n .
A cc o rd in g  to  th e  th e o ry , 'new ' p ro d u c ts  become 'm a tu re ' o v e r a 
p e r io d  o f  tim e  as c o m p e tito rs  deve lop  s u b s t itu te s  w h ic h  serve  to  
weaken th e  in n o v a t in g  f irm 's  i n i t i a l  c o m p e tit iv e  advantage. T h is  
advan tage  w i l l  e v e n tu a lly  be lo s t  as c o m p e tit io n  in te n s if ie s  and th e  
p ro d u c t becomes 's ta n d a rd is e d '. I t  is  in  th is  f in a l  s tage o f th e  
p ro d u c t l i f e  cyc le  th a t  f irm s  are  l ik e ly  to  lo c a te  p ro d u c tio n  abroad, 
as th e  o v e r - r id in g  p r io r i t y  by  th is  tim e  is  to  s ite  p ro d u c tio n  a t th e  
le a s t-c o s t lo c a tio n .
A lth o u g h  m ost s tu d ie s  o f  th e  p ro d u c t cyc le  h y p o th e s is  have 
been concerned w ith  th e  cho ice  between e x p o rt in g  and FDI, 
S tobaugh 's  (1968) s tu d y  o f  US p e tro ch e m ica l p ro d u c ts  fo u n d  th a t  th e  
l ik e l ih o o d  o f  these p ro d u c ts  be ing  license d  to  overseas f irm s  
in c re a s e d . as th e y  became more m atu re . S ubsequent s tu d ie s  by 
T e les io  (1979) and C o n tra c to r  (1981a) have p ro v id e d  ev idence to
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s u p p o rt th e  v ie w  th a t  th e  p ro d u c t l i f e  cyc le  has an im pac t upon 
th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n .^  The re s u lts  o f  t h e ir  su rve ys  o f  e x e c u tiv e  
o p in io n  in d ic a te  th a t  th e  more m atu re  p ro d u c ts  w ith in  a f irm  are 
o fte n  s in g le d  o u t as be ing  s u ita b le  f o r  lic e n s in g . A cco rd in g  to  
C o n tra c to r , some com panies have fo rm a lis e d  th is  in  t h e ir  p la n n in g  
p roced u re s : "a p ro d u c t l i s t  is  d raw n  up and g ive n  to  th e  lic e n s in g
d ep a rtm en t w ith  a m andate to  go a l l  o u t and m axim ise lic e n s in g  
re c e ip ts .
I t  sh o u ld  be no ted  th a t  th e  e x is te n ce  o f  a p ro d u c t l i f e  cyc le  
n e c e s s a rily  im p lie s  th e  ex is te n ce  o f  a p a ra l le l te c h n o lo g y  l i f e  cyc le . 
A new p ro d u c t w i l l  o n ly  become m a tu re  and s ta n d a rd is e d  i f  
c o m p e tito rs  are ab le  to  p roduce  s u b s t itu te s  fro m  th e  same, o r  v e ry  
s im ila r ,  te chno logy . I t  is  n o t p ro d u c ts  w h ich  f irm s  lice n se , b u t  th e  
te c h n o lo g y  used to  m a n u fa c tu re  them.
Magee (1977), and F o rd  and Ryan (1981), a tte m p te d  to  d e fin e  th is  
p a ra l le l te ch n o lo g y  l i f e  cyc le  f o r  in d u s tr ie s . B o th  o f  t h e ir  cyc les 
h y p o th e s ise  e s s e n tia lly  th e  same p a t te rn  o f  e v o lu t io n  o ve r tim e.
F o rd  and Ryan's cyc le  is , how ever, th e  more d e ta ile d  one, c o n ta in in g
1 Rs ix  stages o f  e v o lu t io n  (com pared to  Magee's th re e ).
The v ie w p o in t th a t  o ld e r  te c h n o lo g y  is  more s u s c e p tib le  to  
lic e n s in g  is  s u p p o rte d  by  th e  f in d in g s  o f  M a n s fie ld  e t a l (1979) and 
M a n s fie ld  and Romeo (1980). ^  T h e ir  s tu d ie s  o f  th e  te c h n o lo g y  
t ra n s fe r  p o lic ie s  o f US f irm s  fo u n d  th a t  new er te c h n o lo g y  tended  to  
be t ra n s fe r re d  overseas th ro u g h  e s ta b lis h e d  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s , 
b u t th a t  lic e n s in g  to  in d e p e n d e n t overseas f irm s  became more 
p re d o m in a n t as th e  age o f  th e  te c h n o lo g y  inc reased . O th e r s tu d ie s  
o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  tra n s a c tio n s  o f  US f irm s , 
conducted  by  D av idson  and M cF e tridge  (1984, 1985), a lso  fo u n d  th a t
new er te ch n o lo g ie s  were more l ik e ly  to  be t ra n s fe r re d  in te r n a l ly
20ra th e r  th a n  by an a rm 's - le n g th  lic e n s in g  agreement.
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6.2.4 R ate o f  T e c h n o lo g ica l T u rn o v e r
As w e ll as th e  age o f  te c h n o lo g y  a ffe c t in g  th e  p ro p e n s ity  to  a d o p t 
lic e n s in g , th e  pace o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l change may a lso  have an im pact. 
I f  th e  ra te  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l tu rn o v e r  is  ra p id , th e n  f irm s  may be
w i l l in g  to  lice n se  t h e ir  te c h n o lo g y  in  o rd e r  to  genera te  a q u ic k
re tu rn  b e fo re  i t  becomes superceded. M ic h a le t and D e la p ie rre  (1976, 
pp l6 -17 , 24) p ro v id e d  ev idence  o f  F rench  f irm s  a d o p tin g  lic e n s in g
when te c h n o lo g ic a l tu rn o v e r  was ra p id .
C o n tra c to r  (1981b, p78) no ted  th a t  h ig h  te c h n o lo g ic a l tu rn o v e r  
is  a c h a ra c te r is t ic  fe a tu re  o f  c e r ta in  in d u s tr ie s ,  eg e le c tro n ic s  and 
com puting . F irm s in  such in d u s tr ie s ,  he argued, are  w i l l in g  to  
lic e n s e  th e ir  c o m p e tito rs  in  th e  know ledge  th a t  these  c o m p e tito rs  
are te c h n o lo g ic a lly  equa l, so th a t  lic e n s in g  w i l l  n o t in  i t s e l f  
s ig n if ic a n t ly  im p rove  t h e ir  co m p e titive n e ss .
6.2.5 L e n g th  o f  P a te n t L i fe
L ic e n s in g  may sometimes be adop ted  when a p a te n t is  due to  e x p ire  
[C o n tra c to r  (1981a, p 7 1 ) ] .^  The reason  f o r  do ing  so is  to  g ive  th e  
f irm  chosen by th e  lic e n s o r  a head s ta r t  o v e r i t s  lo c a l r iv a ls .  The 
lic e n s o r  is  th e re fo re  ab le  to  "choose" th e  c o m p e tito r  th a t  i t  w i l l  
face , a t le a s t in i t ia l ly ,  when th e  p a te n t e v e n tu a lly  ru n s  ou t.
A lth o u g h  th is  ta c t ic  may be i l le g a l in  some c o u n tr ie s , f irm s  can
s t i l l  p e rp e tu a te  th e  b e n e fits  o f  a p a te n t beyond i t s  le g a l l i f e  by  
e n te r in g  in to  a lic e n s in g  agreem ent c o v e rin g  re la te d  know -how  o r  
tra d e m a rks . As no ted  e a r lie r ,  in  C h a p te r Three, these  tw o  fo rm s o f  
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  have, in  th e o ry , an in f in i t e  l i f e  (a lth o u g h  th e  
l i f e  o f  know -h ow  is , in  p ra c t ic e , dependent upon  i t  be ing  k e p t 
c o n f id e n t ia l) .
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6.2.6 S p in -o f f  T echno logy
N ot a l l  o f  th e  te c h n o lo g y  w h ich  a ris e s  fro m  a f irm 's  R&D e f fo r t  is  
n e c e s s a r ily  s u ite d  to  i t s  e x is t in g  p ro d u c t range. Where th is  is  th e  
case, lic e n s in g  may be adop ted  to  e x p lo it  w h a t is  te rm ed 's p in - o f f  
te ch n o lo g y . F o r exam ple, th e  US m u lt in a t io n a l G enera l E le c tr ic  
hand les  's p in - o f f ' te c h n o lo g y  th ro u g h  a sepa ra te  lic e n s in g  u n i t  
[M illm a n  (1983, p29)]. One such s p in - o f f  w h ich  th is  company has
lic e n s e d  is  a m ic ro -o rg a n ism  th a t  d e s tro y s  s p il le d  o i l  by d ig e s tin g  
i t  [F o rd  & Ryan (1981, p l l8 ) ] .
C o n tra c to r  (1981a, p70) re p o r te d  th a t  lic e n s in g  o p p o r tu n it ie s
o fte n  e x is t  f o r  p rocess te c h n o lo g ie s  w h ic h  are  p e r ip h e ra l to  th e  
bas ic  p ro d u c tio n  p rocess. F o r exam ple, a US a lum in ium  p ro d u c e r 
was fo u n d  by C o n tra c to r  to  be w a ry  o f  lic e n s in g  i t s  bas ic  a lum in ium  
sm e ltin g  and r o l l in g  p rocess, b u t  was eager to  lice n se  i t s  p e r ip h e ra l 
p rocess tech n o lo g y , such as anod iz ing .
In  a su rv e y  o f  te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  by  C anadian f irm s , i t  was 
fo u n d  th a t  tw o  d is t in c t  types  o f  te c h n o lo g y  were be ing  lice n se d :
n o
core  te c h n o lo g y  and p e r ip h e ra l te c h n o lo g y  [C ro o k e ll (1982, pp4 -6 )]. 
The fo rm e r was deemed by th e  f irm s  su rveyed  to  be o f  s tra te g ic  
im p o rta n ce , w h ile  th e  la t t e r  c o n s is te d  o f e ith e r  unneeded o r  
u n p ro v e n  te chno logy . Core te c h n o lo g y  was o n ly  lic e n s e d  by these  
f irm s  in  c ircum stances  w here  th e y  c o u ld  n o t a f fo rd  d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t abroad, o r  w here  th e  h o s t m a rke t was c losed  to  d ire c t  
in ve s tm e n t. P e r ip h e ra l te ch n o lo g y , on th e  o th e r  hand, was w i l l in g ly  
lic e n s e d  f o r  p r o f i t .
F u r th e r  ev idence  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  som etim es u n d e rta k e n  to  
e x p lo it  s p in -o f f  te c h n o lo g y  is  p ro v id e d  by a s tu d y  o f  A u s tra lia n  
com panies [C a rs ta irs  and W elch (1982, p35), Welch and C a rs ta irs  (1983, 




6.3.1 L e v e l o f  In d u s try  C o n c e n tra tio n
The c o m p e tit iv e  s t ru c tu re  o f  an in d u s try ,  in  b o th  th e  h o s t and 
source  c o u n tr ie s , may in f lu e n c e  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n . I f  th e  h o s t 
m a rke t is  o lig o p o lis e d , th e  e n try  o f  a fo re ig n  f irm  may in duce  a 
c o m p e tit iv e  re a c tio n  fro m  lo c a l f irm s , such as p r ic e  c u t t in g ,  in  o rd e r  
to  p re v e n t th e  new e n tra n t  fro m  s e cu rin g  a s tro n g  p o s it io n . The 
l ik e ly  e f fe c t  o f  new e n try , th e re fo re , is  to  reduce  th e  p r o f i t s  made 
by  lo c a l f irm s  and e f fe c t iv e ly  "s p o il th e  m a rke t" f o r  a l l  f irm s , 
in c lu d in g  th e  e n tra n t [B u c k le y  and D avies (1981, p85 )].^4
In  th is  s itu a t io n ,  lic e n s in g  becomes a more a t t r a c t iv e  m a rke t 
s e rv ic in g  s tra te g y  as i t  a vo id s  d is tu rb a n c e  o f  th e  c o m p e tit iv e  s ta tu s  
quo. In  a d d it io n , i t  is  l i k e ly  th a t  lo c a l f irm s  w i l l  be w i l l in g  to  
o f fe r  a h ig h e r  b id  f o r  a lic e n s in g  agreem ent, and th a t  fo re ig n  f irm s  
w i l l  be more w i l l in g  to  accep t a lo w e r o f fe r ,  in  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  
th e  s ta tu s  quo.
Evidence in  s u p p o rt o f  w ha t B u ck le y  and D avies (1981) have 
c a lle d  th e  "o lig o p o ly  m odel o f  lic e n s in g "  was p ro v id e d  by  P a rry
(1976) in  h is  s tu d y  o f  th e  fo re ig n  m a rke t s e rv ic in g  s tra te g ie s  o f  UK
? cp h a rm a ce u tica l f irm s . P a rry  fo u n d  th a t  th e  lic e n s in g  com m itm ent 
o f  these  f irm s  in c rea sed  w ith  th e  size o f th e  fo re ig n  m arke t, a 
f in d in g  w h ich  seemed to  c o n tra d ic t  e x is t in g  argum ents w h ich  
suggested th a t  lic e n s in g  was more l ik e ly  to  o ccu r in  sm a lle r 
m arke ts . P a rry  e x p la in e d  th is  a p p a re n t c o n tra d ic t io n  by  p o in t in g  
o u t th a t  th e  la rg e r  m arke ts  had w e ll-d e v e lo p e d  in d ig e n o u s  
p h a rm a c e u tic a l in d u s tr ie s ;  lic e n s in g  was th u s  a s tra te g y  adop ted  to  
overcom e th e  b a r r ie rs  to  e n try  w h ich  faced  UK f irm s  in  these  
m arke ts .
I t  has been suggested th a t  th e  in d u s t r ia l  s t ru c tu re  w h ich  
e x is ts  in  th e  source c o u n try , as w e ll as th a t  w h ich  p re v a ils  in  th e  
h o s t c o u n try , may have an im pac t upon th e  lic e n s in g  dec is io n . 
B u ck le y  and Davies (1979, p27) a rgued  th a t  lic e n s in g  may be th e  
re s u lt  o f  m onopsony pow er in  th e  source  c o u n try . They c ite d
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ev idence o f  UK f irm s  w h ic h  e n te re d  in to  lic e n s in g  agreem ents w ith  
In d ia n  f irm s  because th e y  came u n d e r p re ssu re  to  do so fro m  th e ir  
m a jo r UK buye rs . These buye rs  had o r ig in a l ly  come u n d e r p ressu re  
fro m  th e  In d ia n  G overnm ent to  buy  equ ipm ent fro m  in d ig e n o u s  In d ia n  
firm s , so th e y  re q u e s te d  th e ir  UK s u p p lie rs  to  lic e n s e  these  In d ia n  
f irm s  so th a t  th e y  w o u ld  m a in ta in  th e  same s ta n d a rd  o f  equ ipm ent 
w o rld w id e .
So fa r ,  lic e n s in g  has been p resen ted  as a response to  an 
im p e r fe c t ly  c o m p e tit iv e  m a rke t s tru c tu re .  W ilson  (1975) has 
suggested th a t  lic e n s in g  is  one means w hereby an im p e r fe c tly  
c o m p e tit iv e  e n v iro n m e n t is  a c tu a lly  c rea ted  a t an in te rn a t io n a l 
le v e l. He a rgued th a t  lic e n s in g  is  a s tra te g ic  d e c is io n  in  
o l ig o p o lis t ic  r iv a l r y ,  in  w h ic h  one o f  th e  o b je c tiv e s  is  to  segment 
m arke ts  on a g e o g ra p h ic a l bas is . T h is  is  ach ieved  by th e  
in c o rp o ra t io n  o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses in to  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  
agreem ents, l im it in g  th e  t e r r i t o r ie s  in  w h ich  licensees  can compete 
a g a in s t th e  lic e n s o r.
6.3.2 R e c ip ro c a l Access to  T echno logy
In  in d u s tr ie s  c h a ra c te r is e d  by  h ig h  R&D e x p e n d itu re , lic e n s in g  may 
be e n te re d  in to  in  o rd e r  to  o b ta in  access to  th e  license e 's  
tech n o lo g y . In  s o -c a lle d  're c ip ro c a l' lic e n s in g  agreem ents th e re  is  
an u n d e rs ta n d in g  th a t  any fu tu re  in n o v a tio n s  p roduced  by th e  
licensee  w i l l  be made a v a ila b le  u n d e r lice n ce  to  th e  lic e n s o r.
T h is  typ e  o f  agreem ent is  im p o r ta n t f o r  th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l 
deve lopm en t o f  in d u s tr ie s  such as pha rm a ce u tica ls , e le c tro n ic s  and 
chem ica ls, where in n o v a tio n s  o fte n  b u i ld  upon one a n o th e r. In  th e  
absence o f  re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  agreem ents, any one f irm  in  an 
in d u s try  c o u ld  b lo c k  f u r th e r  p rog ress  in  a p a r t ic u la r  area by  
re fu s in g  to  lice n se  key  p a te n ts . The e x is ten ce  o f  re c ip ro c a l 
lic e n s in g  dea ls rem oves th e  in c e n t iv e  fo r  such b e h a v io u r, as 
lic e n s o rs  know  th a t  th e y  w i l l  have access to  any fu tu re  in n o v a tio n s  
p roduced  by th e ir  licensees.
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The deve lopm ent o f  th e  e le c tro n ic s  in d u s t ry  was la rg e ly  
in f lu e n c e d  by th e  ex is te n ce  o f  re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  agreem ents in  
s e m icon duc to r te ch n o lo g y . T i l to n  (1971) p ro v id e d  an a n a lys is  o f  th e  
g ro w th  o f  re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  in  th is  area. M ost o f  th e  key p a te n ts  
in  sem iconducto rs  were o r ig in a l ly  h e ld  by  th e  US m u lt in a t io n a l AT&T, 
as a r e s u lt  o f  re se a rch  c a r r ie d  o u t a t B e ll L a b o ra to r ie s . The 
t ra n s is to r  was in v e n te d  by  th re e  AT&T s c ie n tis ts  in  1947, an even t 
w h ich  h e ra ld e d  th e  s ta r t  o f  th e  e le c tro n ic s  in d u s try .  Because AT&T's 
p a te n ts  were v i t a l  to  th e  fu tu re  deve lopm en t o f  th is  in d u s try  i t  
soon became a p p a re n t th a t  o th e r  f irm s  were go ing  to  make use o f  
them  w h e th e r o r  n o t th e y  had o b ta in e d  a licence . Some f irm s  were 
a lso  d e ve lo p in g  t h e ir  own te c h n o lo g ie s  and w o u ld  e v e n tu a lly  have 
'in n o v a te d  a ro u n d ' th e  AT&T p a te n ts . As a re s u lt ,  AT&T en te red  in to  
re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  agreem ents w ith  i t s  co m p e tito rs .
L ic e n s in g  agreem ents w h ic h  p ro v id e  fo r  re c ip ro c a l access to  
te c h n o lo g y  are  som etim es re fe r re d  to  as 'c ro s s - lic e n c e s '. A lth o u g h  
c ro s s - lic e n s in g  is  r a re ly  d e fin e d  in  p re c ise  te rm s, i t  may be 
cons ide red  as a s p e c ia l case o f  re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  in  w h ich  th e  
exchange o f  licence s  ta ke s  p lace  c o n c u rre n t ly  and th e  re c ip ro c a l 
paym ents are  n e tte d  o u t [T e le s io  (1979, p24)]. Any re s id u a l paym ents 
fro m  one p a r ty  to  a n o th e r w o u ld  o c cu r i f  d i f fe r e n t  va lues  were 
a tta ch e d  to  th e  te c h n o lo g ie s  be ing  exchanged.
Sometimes a la rg e  num ber o f  c ro s s - lic e n s in g  agreem ents, o fte n  
in v o lv in g  a num ber o f  d i f fe r e n t  p a r t ie s , b u i ld  up a round  a 
p a r t ic u la r  te c h n o lo g y  so th a t  a 'p a te n t p o o l' is  crea ted . The 
members o f  th e  p o o l have  access to  each o th e rs  p a te n ts  and can 
th e re fo re  m a rke t t h e ir  p ro d u c ts  u n h in d e re d  by each o th e rs  p a te n t 
r ig h ts .  An exam ple o f  a te c h n o lo g y  a roun d  w h ich  a p a te n t p o o l was 
c rea ted  is  la s e r-o p tic s .  F o u r m u lt in a t io n a ls  had been w o rk in g  
in d e p e n d e n tly  f o r  a num ber o f  yea rs  on th e  use o f  la s e r -o p t ic a l 
te c h n o lo g y  to  re c o rd  sound and v is io n  on d iscs  and sheets o f  
r e f le c t iv e  and tra n s p a re n t m a te r ia l, ie  th e  D u tch  f irm  P h ill ip s ,  Sony 
o f  Japan, and tw o  US firm s , MCA and IBM [F o x  (1981, p653)].
R e a lis in g  th e  p a te n t in fr in g e m e n t p rob lem s w h ich  w o u ld  have a r is e n  
a t th e  p ro d u c t la u n c h  stage these  f irm s  dec ided to  c ro s s -lic e n s e  
t h e ir  p a te n ts  in  o rd e r  to  a v o id  such d i f f ic u l t ie s .
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In  th e  UK, p a te n t po o ls  p layed  a ro le  in  th e  deve lopm ent o f  
ra d io , te le v is io n , ra d a r  and com pu te r te ch n o lo g ie s , a lth o u g h  th e y  are  
no lo n g e r o f  any s ig n if ic a n c e  [T a y lo r  and S ilb e rs to n  (1973, pp291-
292)]. These poo ls  w ere 'fo rm a l' in  n a tu re , a llo w in g  f o r  p a te n ts  to  
be lic e n s e d  'en b lo c ' to  any f ir m  f o r  paym ent o f  a s ta n d a rd  ro y a lty ,  
w ith  th e  re c e ip ts  be ing  d iv id e d  among th e  pa ten tees in  p ro p o r t io n  
to  t h e ir  c o n tr ib u t io n s  to  th e  poo l. The f i r s t  p o o l, in  ra d io , was 
s ta r te d  by  M arcon i in  1923 and la s te d  u n t i l  1964. The d isappearance  
o f  th is ,  and the  o th e r  p a te n t poo ls , in  th e  UK can be a t t r ib u te d  
m a in ly  to  th e  e x p iry  o f  bas ic  p a te n ts  and th e  lo ss  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l 
le a d e rs h ip  to  th e  US. A lth o u g h  fo rm a l p a te n t p o o ls  no lo n g e r e x is t  
in  th e  UK, in fo rm a l a rrangem ents  f o r  th e  p o o lin g  o f  p a te n ts  may 
s t i l l  o c c u r th ro u g h  th e  use o f  c ro s s - lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
In  a d d it io n  to  e n s u rin g  te c h n o lo g ic a l deve lopm ent in  an 
in d u s try ,  re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  agreem ents a lso p ro v id e  cos t sav ings  
by  a v o id in g  d u p lic a t io n  o f  resea rch . They may a lso  be used by 
f irm s  w h ic h  need te c h n o lo g ie s  fro m  co m p e tito rs  to  f i l l  gaps in  t h e ir  
p ro d u c t range, o r  when th e y  w an t to  e n te r a new business, b u t  
cann o t o b ta in  them un less  th e y  o f fe r  te ch n o lo g y  in  re tu rn .
A cco rd in g  to  T e les io  (1979), how ever, th e  m ain ro le  o f re c ip ro c a l 
lic e n s in g  is  as an a n t i-c o m p e t it iv e  s tra te g y  w h ich  ensures th a t  no 
s in g le  f irm  in  an in d u s t ry  ga ins  a s u b s ta n t ia l advantage o v e r any 
o th e r. I t  a lso  p ro v id e s  a b a r r ie r  to  e n try  f o r  f irm s  o u ts id e  th e  
in d u s try .  In  th e  w o rds o f  T e les io , re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  "serves to  
p re s e rv e  s ta b i l i t y  in  te ch n o lo g y -b a se d  o lig o p o lie s "  (p24).
Because o f  i t s  ro le  in  re d u c in g  c o m p e tit io n , re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  
arrangem ents  may v io la te  th e  a n t i - t r u s t  re g u la t io n s  o f  c e r ta in  
c o u n tr ie s , p a r t ic u la r ly  i f  i t  is  th o u g h t th a t  th e  m o tive  f o r  th is  ty p e  
o f  lic e n s in g  is  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  a c a r te l.
6.3.3 P re -e m p tio n  o f  C o m p e titio n
I t  is  a commonly h e ld  b e l ie f  th a t  one o f  th e  d isadva tages o f 
lic e n s in g  is  th a t  i t  in v o lv e s  th e  s e tt in g  up o f  a p o te n t ia l 
c o m p e tito r. However, one suggested m o tiv a t io n  fo r  lic e n s in g  is  th a t ,
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i t  a c tu a lly  de te rs  c o m p e tit io n . The argum ent here  is  th a t ,  by  
a llo w in g  o th e r  f irm s  to  sha re  te ch n o lo g y , lic e n s in g  makes th e  
deve lopm ent o f  com peting  te c h n o lo g ie s  a less a t t r a c t iv e  p ro p o s it io n  
[Fram e (1982, p l l3 ) ,  Tw iss (1986, p57)]. B o th  o f these  a u th o rs  c ite d  
th e  lic e n s in g  o f th e  f lo a t-g la s s  p rocess by th e  UK f irm  P ilk in g to n  
B ro th e rs  in  s u p p o rt o f  th is  a rgum ent.
T h is  new process, deve loped  in  1958, p roduced  shee t g lass fa r  
more chea p ly  th a n  th e  o ld  p rocess, w h ich  re q u ire d  th e  m echan ica l 
g r in d in g  o f  sheet g lass to  r id  i t  o f  s u rfa ce  im p e rfe c tio n s . 
P ilk in g to n  had l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  in  lic e n s in g  th e  process to  o th e r  
g lass m akers a round  th e  w o rld . So lo n g  as these  co m p e tito rs  c o u ld  
use th e  new process on reason ab le  te rm s i t  was n o t cos t e f fe c t iv e  
f o r  them  to  e xp lo re  a lte rn a t iv e  means o f  p ro d u c in g  shee t g lass.
A lth o u g h  th e  m o tive  o f  p re -e m p tin g  th e  deve lopm ent o f  
com peting  te ch n o lo g ie s  is  re p u te d  to  have p la ye d  a p a r t  in  
P ilk in g to n 's  d e c is io n  to  lic e n s e  i t s  f lo a t  g lass p rocess, i t  does n o t 
p ro v id e  a com plete e x p la n a tio n . B o th  Lowe and C ra w fo rd  (1984, p l l2 )  
and Shepherd e t a l (1985, p l43 ) have a rgued th a t  P ilk in g to n  was 
fo rc e d  to  ru le  o u t FDI as th e  means o f  e x p lo it in g  th e  new process 
because i t  la cked  th e  re sou rces  re q u ire d  to  se t up p ro d u c tio n  
fa c i l i t ie s  in  a l l  p o te n t ia l fo re ig n  m arke ts . In  a d d it io n , Lowe and 
C ra w fo rd  a lso p o in te d  o u t th a t  P ilk in g to n  c o u ld  n o t e a s ily  s e rv ic e  
fo re ig n  m arke ts  by e x p o rts  because th e  p h y s ic a l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  
g lass make i t  u n s u ita b le  f o r  t ra n s p o r t in g  o ve r lo n g  d is tances . Thus 
lic e n s in g  emerged, to  some e x te n t, as a 'seco nd -bes t' s tra te g y .
The use o f  lic e n s in g  as a means o f p re -e m p tin g  c o m p e tit io n  has 
a lso  been e xp lo re d  by  W ilson  (1975, 1977). He a rgued  th a t  lic e n s in g  
can be u s e fu l ly  em ployed w here  f irm s  are  engaged in  p ro d u c t r iv a l r y  
based upon th e  p h y s ic a l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  t h e ir  p ro d u c ts . T h is  ty p e  
o f  r iv a l r y  in v o lv e s  th e  search  fo r  new o r p h y s ic a lly  changed 
p ro d u c ts  to  ga in  advan tage  a g a in s t a c tu a l o r  p o te n t ia l co m p e tito rs . 
I t  o fte n  takes  th e  fo rm  o f  im ita t in g  e x is t in g  p ro d u c ts  th ro u g h  
're ve rse  e n g ine e ring ' o r  'in v e n t in g  a ro u n d ' a p a te n t.
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W ilson  (1977) a rgued  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  app ea ling  in  
s itu a t io n s  w here im ita t io n  o f  m a jo r b re a k th ro u g h s  is  l ik e ly  s ince  
" th e  co s t o f  r iv a ls  d u p lic a t in g  th e  te c h n o lo g y  can be v e ry  h ig h . 
T ra n s fe r r in g  th e  te c h n o lo g y  to  them  th ro u g h  a lic e n c e  can th u s  save 
co n s id e ra b le  im ita t iv e  re sea rch  expense" (p l72). L ice n s in g  a lso  
b e n e fits  th e  in n o v a to r  by d e te r r in g  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  r iv a l  
te ch n o lo g y , and is  th e re fo re  a t t r a c t iv e  "fro m  a jo in t  p r o f i t  
m ax im iz ing  s ta n d p o in t"  (Op c it ,  p l72).
T h e o re tic a l s u p p o rt f o r  th e  id e a  th a t  lic e n s in g  may be used as
a p re -e m p tiv e  s tra te g y  to  d e te r th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  s u b s t itu te
te c h n o lo g y  has been p ro v id e d  by G a ll in i (1984). U t i l is in g  concepts
fro m  game th e o ry , she p rodu ced  a m a th em a tica l m odel w h ich
dem on s tra te d  th a t  such 'p re -e m p tiv e ' lic e n s in g  is  more l ik e ly  to
o c cu r in  a sm a ll num bers s itu a t io n ,  in  w h ich  th e  costs  in c u rre d  by
an e n tra n t ( ie  r iv a l )  in  p ro d u c in g  s u b s t itu te  te c h n o lo g y  are much
?7le ss  th a n  th e  costs  in c u rre d  by th e  in cum b en t ( ie  in n o v a to r) .  
A cc o rd in g  to  G a ll in i (1984, p936) " fro m  th e  in cu m b e n t's  v ie w p o in t,  
lic e n s in g  p ro te c ts  a g a in s t th e  r is k  o f  d is c o v e ry  o f  a lo w e r-c o s t 
te c h n o lo g y  by  re d u c in g  th e  e n tra n t 's  in c e n t iv e  f o r  f u r th e r  research . 
From  th e  f irm s ' c o lle c t iv e  v ie w p o in t,  th e  e x p e n d itu re  th a t  w o u ld  be 
in c u r re d  w ith o u t  lic e n s in g  w o u ld  be excess ive . The re n ts  fro m  th e  
lic e n s in g  c o n tra c t r e f le c t  th e  sav ings  o f  th is  excess ive  e xp e n d itu re ."
Even i f  a s u b s t itu te  te c h n o lo g y  c o u ld  be deve loped  b y  an 
e n tra n t  a t th e  same, o r  a h ig h e r, co s t th e re  w o u ld  s t i l l  be a 
s tra te g ic  in c e n tiv e  fo r  lic e n s in g  i f  th e  incum ben t were to  v a lu e  th e  
te c h n o lo g y  more h ig h ly  th a n  th e  e n tra n t. The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  such 
asym m etric  v a lu a t io n  was ra is e d  b y  H a rr is  and V ic k e rs  (1985) in  
t h e ir  game th e o ry  m odel o f  th e  s tra te g ic  fa c to rs  a ffe c t in g  th e  
p a te n tin g  d e c is io n . In  th e ir  m odel, i t  is  th e  p a te n tin g  o f  re la te d  
te c h n o lo g ie s  by th e  incum b en t f irm  ( ra th e r  th a n  th e  lic e n s in g  o f  
e x is t in g  te chno logy) w h ic h  p re v e n ts  p o te n t ia l r iv a ls  fro m  e n te r in g  
th e  m a rk e t .^
I t  sh o u ld  be no ted , how ever, th a t  th e  v a lu e  o f  p a te n tin g  as a 
p re -e m p tiv e  s tra te g y  was th ro w n  in to  q u e s tio n  by  M a n s fie ld  e t a l 
(1981).^  T h e ir  e m p ir ic a l s tu d y  o f  th e  costs  o f  le g a lly  im ita t in g  new
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p ro d u c ts  re ve a le d  th a t  p a te n t p ro te c t io n  does n o t make m arke t e n try
im p o ss ib le ; s ix ty  p e r cen t o f  th e  su cce ss fu l, p a te n te d  p ro d u c ts  in
th e ir  sam ple were im ita te d  w ith in  fo u r  years o f t h e ir  in tro d u c t io n .
The f in d in g s  o f  th is  s tu d y  a lso  cas t dou b ts  upon th e  use o f
lic e n s in g  as a s tra te g y  f o r  p re -e m p tin g  c o m p e tit io n , s ince  th e  
ge n e ra l fe e lin g  o f  th e  f irm s  su rve ye d  was th a t  p a te n t lic e n s in g  
w o u ld  encourage p o te n t ia l r iv a ls  (p909).
A s l ig h t ly  d i f fe re n t ,  b u t re la te d , m o tiv a t io n  fo r  lic e n s in g  is  
w here  i t  is  used in  o rd e r  to  p re -e m p t th e  a d o p tio n  o f  te ch n o lo g ie s  
w h ic h  have been deve loped  a t th e  same tim e  as th e  lic e n s o r 's  
te ch n o lo g y . An exam ple o f  lic e n s in g  be ing  adop ted  in  these  
c ircum stances  was th e  d e c is io n  by  th e  West German f irm  T e le fu n ke n  
to  lic e n s e  i t s  PAL c o lo u r  te le v is io n  te c h n o lo g y  to  o th e r  te le v is io n  
m a n u fa c tu re rs . B o th  T e le s io  (1979, p l7 )  and Business In te rn a t io n a l 
(1977, p51) con tended th a t  T e le fu n k e n 's  aim was to  p re v e n t th e
a d o p tio n  o f  th e  com peting  SECAM system  by te le v is io n  n e tw o rk s  in  
Europe.
6.3.4 C re a tio n  o f  A u x i l ia r y  Business
The v a lu e  o f  lic e n s in g  may be d e r iv e d  as much fro m  th e  a u x i l ia r y  
bus iness  w h ich  i t  c rea tes , as fro m  th e  income d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  
lic e n s in g  agreem ent i t s e l f .  The im p o rta n ce  o f  a u x i l ia r y  bus iness 
c re a te d  by  lic e n s in g  was f i r s t  id e n t i f ie d  by  L o v e ll (1958), who 
s tre sse d  th e  ro le  o f  lic e n s in g  in  d e v e lo p in g  o u t le ts  f o r  com ponents 
o r  o th e r  p ro d u c ts  made by th e  lic e n s o r, and a lso  in  d e ve lo p in g  
sources o f  raw  m a te r ia ls  o r  com ponents f o r  th e  lic e n s o r 's  
o p e ra tio n s .
A rd is s o n  and B id a u lt  (1986) p roposed  th a t  lic e n s in g  m otives  
c o u ld  be desc rib e d  by th re e  g e n e ric  s tra te g ie s , one o f  w h ich , th e  
"m a rke t" s tra te g y , was th e  g e n e ra tio n  o f  a u x i l ia r y  bus iness. T h e ir  
re se a rch  w ith  F rench  lic e n s o rs  re v e a le d  th a t  th is  typ e  o f  s tra te g y  
was im p o r ta n t in  te rm s o f  b o th  th e  num ber o f c o n tra c ts  and th e  
am ount o f  money in v o lv e d , and th a t  i t  le d  to  th e  c re a tio n  o f  an 
in te rn a t io n a l n e tw o rk  o f p u rc h a s in g  and su p p ly  re la t io n s h ip s  
c e n tre d  a roun d  th e  lic e n s o r.
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A l i s t  o f  th e  m ain ca te g o rie s  o f  a u x i l ia r y  bus iness , com piled  
by  C o n tra c to r  (1981b), is  g ive n  in  Tab le  6-1.
TABLE 6 - 1
CATEGORIES OF AUXILIARY BUSINESS FOUND IN LICENSING AGREEMENTS
a.  M a t e r i a l s  and components s o l d  t o  l i c e n s e e
b. P r o d u c t s  " b o u g h t - b a c k "  f rom l i c e n s e e
c.  Fees f o r  f u t u r e  t e c h n i c a l  imp rovemen ts
d.  J o i n t  b i d d i n g  and c o n s t r u c t i o n  w i t h  l i c e n s e e
e.  Ad hoc t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e
f .  Q u a l i t y  C o n t r o l  and T e s t i n g  f o r  l i c e n s e e
g.  T r a i n i n g  o f  Pe rs o n ne l
[SOURCE: C o n tra c to r  (1981b, p79)]
In  C o n tra c to r 's  o p in io n  th is  e x tra  bus iness "o fte n  t i l t s  th e  
e n try  m ethod d e c is io n  in  fa v o u r  o f  lic e n s in g "  and in  s e v e ra l cases 
" i t  is  so p re do m inan t th a t  th e  lic e n s in g  agreem ent is  ta n ta m o u n t to  
be ing  a co ve r" (1981b, p79). In  c o u n tr ie s  w h ich  la c k  lo c a l sources o f  
s u p p ly  f o r  th e  p ro d u c t w h ich  is  license d , th e  s u p p ly  o f  com ponents 
to  th e  licensee  can in  e f fe c t  am ount to  "d is g u is e d  im p o rts " . I t  
s h o u ld  be no ted , how ever, th a t  s o -c a lle d  " t ie d "  lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
are  deemed to  be a n t i-c o m p e tit iv e  in  some c o u n tr ie s , and may 
th e re fo re  v io la te  a n t i - t r u s t  law s. N eve rthe less , when th e  lic e n s o r  is  
th e  so le  possessor o f  needed su p p lie s , th e  licensee  has l i t t l e  cho ice  
b u t  to  dea l w ith  i t .
A n o th e r b e n if ic ia l s p in -o f f  fro m  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i ty ,  id e n t if ie d  
by  L o v e ll (1958), is  th e  c re a tio n  o f  g o o d w ill f o r  o th e r  company 
p ro d u c ts  o r  se rv ices . The m an u fa c tu re  o f  one o r  tw o  p ro d u c ts  
u n d e r lic e n s e  may c rea te  p o p u la r  acceptance in  th e  h o s t c o u n try  f o r  
o th e r  p ro d u c ts  e x p o rte d  fro m  the  home c o u n try . L o v e ll fo u n d  th a t  
in c reases  in  th e  e x p o rts  o f  o th e r  p ro d u c ts  is  o fte n  spa rked  by th e  
fa c t  th a t  more lo c a l custom ers become fa m il ia r  w ith  th e  lic e n s o r 's  




6.4.1 Leg a l C o n s id e ra tio n s
L ic e n s in g  may som etim es be e n te re d  in to  f o r  a num ber o f  le g a l 
reasons. These concern , f i r s t l y ,  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a company be ing  
fo rc e d  b y  th e  h o s t c o u n try  a u th o r i t ie s  to  lic e n s e  i t s  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty ; second ly , th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  lic e n s in g  o c c u rr in g  to  p re ­
empt expected  in fr in g e m e n t o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts  by  f irm s  
in  th e  h o s t c o u n try ; and th i r d ly ,  lic e n s in g  be ing  used as a means o f  
c irc u m v e n tin g  h o s t-c o u n try  a n t i - t r u s t  re g u la t io n s .
In  many c o u n tr ie s , p a te n t law s a llo w  lice n ce s  to  be g ra n te d  i f  
c e r ta in  c o n d it io n s  have n o t been f u l f i l le d  by  th e  p a te n t ow ner 
w ith in  a c e r ta in  p e r io d  o f  tim e  a f te r  th e  g ra n t in g  o f  th e  p a te n t. 
The m ain g roun d  f o r  th e  g ra n t in g  o f  a s o -c a lle d  "co m p u lso ry  lic e n c e " 
is  th a t  th e  p a te n t is  e ith e r  n o t be ing  "w o rke d " a t a l l  ( ie  no
p ro d u c ts  are  be ing  p roduced  fro m  th e  p a te n t)  o r  n o t as f u l l y  as i t  
s h o u ld  be. The la t t e r  c o n d it io n  may a r is e  i f  th e  p a te n t ow ner is  
p ro d u c in g  m ost o f  th e  goods fro m  th e  w o rk in g  o f  a p a te n t o u ts id e  a 
c o u n try  and s a t is fy in g  lo c a l demand by e x p o rts .
A  com pu lso ry  lic e n c e  may a lso  be g ra n te d  i f  i t  can be shown
th a t  th e  p a te n t ow ner w i l l  n o t g ra n t a lice n ce  on reasonab le  te rm s.
A d d it io n a lly ,  i f  a p a te n t ow ner re fu se s  to  g ra n t a lice n ce  f o r  a 
p a te n t th a t  is  e s s e n tia l to  th e  e x p lo ita t io n  o f  a n o th e r p a te n te d  
item , th e n  a com pu lso ry  lic e n c e  may be awarded. In  th e  UK th e
P a ten ts  A c t 1977 a llo w s  com pu lso ry  licence s  to  be a p p lie d  f o r  once 
th re e  yea rs  have e lapsed fro m  th e  da te  o f  th e  p a te n t g ra n t. In  m ost
o th e r  European c o u n tr ie s  th e  tim e  p e r io d  is  fo u r  years.
One m o tive  fo r  lic e n s in g  p a te n ts , th e re fo re , is  to  a v o id
com pu lso ry  lic e n s in g . A lth o u g h  ro y a lt ie s  are s t i l l  p a id  to  th e
p a te n t ow ner when a com pu lso ry  lice n ce  is  g ra n te d , th e  re tu rn s  
genera ted  fro m  a fre e ly -n e g o tia te d  lice n ce  are  l ik e ly  to  be much 
g re a te r.
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In  some c ircum stances  fa i lu r e  to  e x p lo it  a p a te n t may n o t be 
th e  re s u lt  o f  d e lib e ra te  in a c t io n  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  ow ner. The 
ow ner may s im p ly  n o t have th e  re sou rces  to  w o rk  i t ,  o r  may have 
fa i le d  to  f in d  anyone else in te re s te d  in  do in g  so. In  these  
c ircum sta nces  th e  ow ner can have th e  p a te n t re g is te re d  as one fo r  
w h ic h  a " lice n ce  o f  r ig h t "  w i l l  be made a v a ila b le . T h is  means th a t  
th e  ow ner is  w i l l in g  to  n e g o tia te  a lic e n c e  w ith  any in te re s te d  
p a r ty .  In  re tu rn ,  reduced  a nn ua l re n e w a l fees are  u s u a lly  payab le  
by  th e  ow ner.
M addison (1981, p48) obse rved  th a t  th is  re d u c t io n  in  a n n u a l
re n e w a l fees is , in  p ra c t ic e , th e  o n ly  p ra c t ic a l v a lu e  o f  a lic e n c e  o f  
r ig h t .  P a ten ts  w h ich  are  re g is te re d  as be ing  a v a ila b le  f o r  lice n ce s  
o f  r ig h t  a re  v e ry  seldom  ta k e n  up. T h is  is  because any p a r t ie s  
in te re s te d  in  w o rk in g  th e  p a te n t w o u ld , in  a l l  p ro b a b il i ty ,  have 
a lre a d y  approached th e  ow ner and n e g o tia te d  an o rd in a ry  licence .
A p a r t  fro m  seek ing  to  a v o id  com pu lso ry  lic e n s in g , a f irm  may 
dec ide  to  lice n se  i t s  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  i f  i t  b e lie v e s  th a t  i t  is  
l i k e ly  to  be in fr in g e d  because o f  weak le g a l p ro te c t io n . In  such a 
s itu a t io n ,  th e  f i r m  may b e lie v e  th a t  i t  is  b e t te r  to  lice n se  i t s  
p ro p e r ty  and th e re fo re  e xe rc ise  some degree o f  c o n tro l o v e r th e  
a c t iv i t ie s  o f  th e  licensee .
T h is  v ie w  th a t  w eak in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  p ro te c t io n  w i l l  
in c re a se  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  f irm s  o p tin g  f o r  lic e n s in g  is  n o t sha red  
b y  Teece (1986). He a rgued  th a t  i f  th e  "reg im e o f  a p p ro p r ia b i l i t y ” 
w i th in  w h ich  com panies o p e ra te  "p e rm its  o n ly  weak le g a l 
en fo rcem en t o f r ig h ts  o v e r in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty , t ra n s a c tio n a l 
p rob lem s w i l l  abound, and a lte rn a t iv e  governance modes [ to  
l ic e n s in g ]  a re  l ik e ly  to  be p re fe rre d "  (op c it ,  p29). Teece a r r iv e d  a t 
th is  c o n c lu s io n  because h is  a n a ly s is  focused  upon a s in g le  ca te g o ry  
o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty ,  nam ely know -how . U n lik e  p a te n ts , th e  
v a lu e  o f  know -how  is  dependent th e  m ain tenance o f  c o n f id e n t ia l i ty ;  
once t h i s  is  lo s t ,  kn o w -h o w  is  n o t capable  o f  be ing  license d , 
u n le s s  i t  i s  p ro te c te d  by  tra d e  se c re t law s. P a ten ts , on th e  o th e r  
hand* can s t i l l  be lice n se d  a f te r  a f te r  th e y  are in fr in g e d  because 
th e y  re p re s e n t  a le g a l m onopoly to  th e  h o ld e r  and th e re fo re  s t i l l
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possess va lu e . The essence o f  Teece's a rgum ent, th e re fo re , is  th a t  
th e  h ig h  r is k  o f  kn o w -h o w  be ing  d is s ip a te d  i f  i t  is  lice n se d  
fa v o u rs  i t s  e x p lo ita t io n  w ith in  th e  company v ia  FDI o r  e x p o rts .
The e x te n t o f  in fr in g e m e n t o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  is  g e n e ra lly  
a fu n c t io n  o f  tw o  fa c to rs :  th e  adequacy o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
p ro te c t io n  and th e  co s t o f  p o l ic in g  th a t  p ro te c tio n . A lth o u g h  th e  
degree o f  p ro te c t io n  o ffe re d  to  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  in  d i f fe r e n t  
c o u n tr ie s  may n o t be v e ry  d i f fe re n t ,  th e  'de fa c to ' p ro te c t io n  may 
d i f f e r  m a rke d ly  due to  d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  a t t i tu d e s  o f c o u r ts  o f  law . 
In  th e  f ie ld  o f  p a te n t p ro te c t io n ,  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  i t  is  o fte n  a rgued  
th a t  th e re  e x is ts  a ju d ic ia l  b ias  a g a in s t p a te n ts . F o r exam ple, 
K in g s to n  (1983, p l l )  s ta te d  th a t  " th e  b ias  o f  th e  c o u rts  a g a in s t 
pa ten tee s  has been g ro w in g  th ro u g h o u t th is  c e n tu ry , p ro b a b ly  
because p a te n ts  re p re s e n t 'v is ib le ' m onopoly."
I f  th e  le v e l o f  le g a l p ro te c t io n  a ffo rd e d  to  p a te n ts  is  weak, i t  
can be a rgued th a t  com panies w o u ld  be b e t te r  o f f  accep ting  th e  r is k  
o f  ke ep ing  t h e ir  p a te n ta b le  know ledge  se c re t and e x p lo it in g  i t  
in te r n a l ly  [see eg Casson (1979, pp95-96), Prasad (1981, p l9 4 )].
H ow ever, w here a d e c is io n  has been made to  f i l e  a p a te n t, com panies 
become r e l ia n t  upon th e  c o u r ts  f o r  p ro te c tio n . There is  ev idence to  
suggest th a t  c o u rts  in  th e  US have become more fa v o u ra b ly  d isposed  
to w a rd s  p a te n ts . Indeed  A ls te r  (1988, p71) argued th a t  th e re  has 
been "a genu ine  re v o lu t io n  in  [US] gove rn m en ta l en fo rcem ent and 
ju d ic ia l  in te rp re ta t io n . "  T h is , in  tu rn ,  has s tre n g th e n e d  th e  
p o s it io n  o f  US f irm s  in  lic e n s in g  n e g o tia t io n s .
I t  w o u ld  appear, how ever, th a t  th is  " re v o lu t io n "  has been 
c o n fin e d  to  th e  US. A cc o rd in g  to  A ls te r  (1988, p71) p a te n ts
e lsew here  "a re  o fte n  a b o u t as e f fe c t iv e  a defence as th e  M ag ino t 
lin e ."  In  s u p p o rt o f  th is  v ie w p o in t he c ite d  an es tim a te  by th e  US 
In te rn a t io n a l T rade Com m ission th a t  a t le a s t $40 b i l l io n  a ye a r are  




In  those  s itu a t io n s  w here  a f ir m  fe e ls  th a t  i t  is  u n l ik e ly  to  
o b ta in  fa v o u ra b le  tre a tm e n t fro m  th e  c o u rts  in  u p h o ld in g  th e
p ro te c t io n  o f  i t s  in d u s t r ia l  p ro p e r ty  i t  may dec ide  to  e n te r in to  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents w ith  lo c a l f irm s  in  o rd e r  to  p re -e m p t th e  
'p ira t in g ' o f  i t s  p ro p e rty .
A p a rt fro m  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  ju d ic ia l  b ias, th e  h ig h  cos t o f  
p o lic in g  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts  may a lso p ro v id e  a m o tiv a t io n  
f o r  lic e n s in g . The in i t ia t iv e  f o r  e n fo rc in g  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
r ig h ts  re s ts  w ith  th e  ow ner, who is  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  d e te c tin g
in fr in g e m e n ts  and p ro v in g  them  in  th e  c o u rts . T h is  can be an 
expens ive  and tim e -co nsum ing  bus iness , o fte n  ru n n in g  in to  many 
years.
In  t h e ir  s tu d y  o f th e  econom ic im p a c t o f  th e  UK p a te n t system ,
T a y lo r  and S ilb e rs to n  (1973) fo u n d  th a t  " th e  v i r t u a l ly  unanim ous
v ie w  o f  everyone in  in d u s t ry  to  whom we ta lk e d  was th a t  p a te n t 
l i t ig a t io n  was to  be avo ided  ' l ik e  th e  p lague ', a lth o u g h  some f irm s  
are  d r iv e n  to  i t  when lic e n s in g  c o n f l ic ts  canno t be re s o lv e d  in  any 
o th e r  w ay” (p l02). The reasons u n d e r ly in g  th is  a t t i tu d e ,  a p a rt fro m  
th e  co s t o f  l i t ig a t io n  and th e  tim e  in v o lv e d , were th e  la rg e  scope 
f o r  com prom ise, th e  u n lik e lih o o d  o f  a c h e iv in g  o u t r ig h t  v ic to ry ,  and 
th e  adverse  p u b l ic i t y  th a t  tends  to  a tta c h  to  la rg e  com panies 
in v o lv e d  in  c o u r t  a c tio n s , e s p e c ia lly  w here th e ir  opponents are  
s m a lle r f irm s .
The cos t o f  p o lic in g  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts  ( ie  o f  
d e te c tin g  in fr in g e m e n t and e n fo rc in g  th e  law  th ro u g h  th e  c o u rts )  
may th u s  p ro v id e  an in c e n t iv e  f o r  lic e n s in g . A lth o u g h  th e  lic e n s in g  
o f  a s in g le  f irm  in  a fo re ig n  m a rke t may n o t p re v e n t o th e r  lo c a l 
f irm s  fro m  'p ira t in g ' th e  lic e n s o r 's  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty , th e  
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  ju d ic ia l  b ias  is  l i k e ly  to  be lo v /e r i f  a lo c a l lic e n s in g  
arrangem ent e x is ts . In  a d d it io n , lo c a l licensees may sometimes be 
used to  m o n ito r  u n a u th o r is e d  use o f  th e  lic e n s o r 's  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  by o th e r  lo c a l f irm s  [D a n ie ls  and Radebaugh (1986, p510)].
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A n o th e r m o tiv a t io n  f o r  lic e n s in g  w h ic h  fa l ls  u n d e r th e  'le g a l' 
c a te g o ry  is  avo idance o f  a n t i - t r u s t  a c tio n . I f  a com pany has a la rg e  
share  o f  a fo re ig n  m a rke t i t  may be less  v u ln e ra b le  to  charges o f 
m o n o p o lis tic  a c t iv i t y  i f  i t  lice n se s  i t s  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  to  lo c a l 
c o m p e tito rs . The te rm s o f  such an agreem ent w o u ld , o f  course, need 
to  be ph rased  in  such a m anner th a t  th e y  them se lves d id  n o t v io la te  
a n t i - t r u s t  re g u la t io n s  (eg by  th e  in c lu s io n  o f  c ro s s - lic e n s in g  
a rrangem ents o r  't ie d ' sa les p ro v is io n s ) . To th e  e x te n t th a t  
c o u n tr ie s  d i f f e r  in  th e ir  a n t i - t r u s t  p o lic ie s  th e  a ttra c t iv e n e s s  o f 
lic e n s in g  w i l l  a lso d i f fe r ,  c e te r is  p a r ib u s . L ic e n s in g  is  more l ik e ly  
to  o c c u r in  c o u n tr ie s  w ith  w e ake r p o lic ie s  s ince  lic e n s o rs  w i l l  have 
g re a te r  freedom  to  d e fin e  th e  scope o f  th e  lic e n s o r 's  a c t iv i t ie s  in  
these  c o u n tr ie s  and w i l l  th e re fo re  f in d  lic e n s in g  a more a t t r a c t iv e  
p ro p o s it io n .
6.4.2 M a rk e t size, V o la t i l i t y  and G row th  P o te n tia l
The l im ite d  size o f  th e  h o s t m a rke t is  o fte n  id e n t if ie d  as an 
e x p la n a tio n  f o r  lic e n s in g  [eg Baranson (1970), Business In te rn a t io n a l
(1977), T e les io  (1979), C o n tra c to r  (1981a, 1985)].
Sm all m arke ts  are  less s u ita b le  f o r  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t s ince  th e y  
o f fe r  le ss  o p p o r tu n ity  f o r  re c o v e r in g  th e  i n i t i a l  s ta r t -u p  costs  
in v o lv e d . These costs  are  n o t l i k e ly  to  be v e ry  much lo w e r in  sm a ll 
m a rke ts  because o f  m inimum  sca le  re q u ire m e n ts  and in d iv is ib i l i t ie s .  
Sm all m arke ts  a lso  re p re s e n t a lo w e r o p p o r tu n ity  cos t to  th e  
lic e n s o r, in  a b d ic a tin g  th e  m a rke t to  th e  license e  [C o n tra c to r  (1985, 
p46)]. Thus, w here ho s ts  m arke ts  a re  sm a ll and e x p o rt in g  is  n o t a 
v ia b le  p ro p o s it io n , lic e n s in g  is  more l ik e ly  to  be the  fa v o u re d  
o p tio n .
In  a d d it io n  to  i t s  size, th e  g ro w th  p o te n t ia l o f  th e  h o s t m a rke t 
may a lso  in f lu e n c e  th e  m a rke t s e rv ic in g  dec is io n . I f  a m arke t is  in  
a phase o f  ra p id  expans ion , th e  speed w ith  w h ic h  a lic e n s in g  
agreem ent can be se t up m ig h t be o f  c ru c ia l im po rtance , e ith e r  as a 
means o f  g a in in g  a fo o th o ld  in  th e  m a rke t, o r  as a p i lo t  v e n tu re  
[B u c k le y  and D avies (1981, p87)].
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The p e rce ive d  v o la t i l i t y  o f  demand in  a m a rke t may a lso a f fe c t  
th e  m a rke t s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n . Where v o la t i l i t y  is  deemed to  be 
h ig h , th e  p r o b a b il i t y  o f  re c o v e r in g  any f ix e d  in v e s tm e n t o u t la y  w i l l  
be sm a lle r, and so lic e n s in g  w i l l  appear as a more a t t r a c t iv e  o p tio n , 
c e te r is  p a r ib u s .
6.4.3 R is k  C o n s id e ra tio n s
Because lic e n s in g  does n o t u s u a lly  in v o lv e  th e  com m itm ent o f  any 
f ix e d  (c a p ita l)  assets to  a fo re ig n  m a rke t, th e  r is k  o f  e x p ro p r ia t io n  
is  avo ided . Thus, w here  th e  p o l i t ic a l  c o n d it io n s  in  a c o u n try  are  
such th a t  e x p ro p r ia t io n  r is k  is  deemed to  be h ig h , lic e n s in g  may be 
u n d e rta k e n  in s te a d  o f  FDI.
F irm s may a lso  be su b je c te d  to  gove rn m e n ta l in te r fe re n c e  in  
t h e ir  o p e ra tio n s  w h ich  fa l ls  s h o r t  o f  o u t r ig h t  e x p ro p r ia t io n . They 
may, f o r  exam ple, face  exchange c o n tro l re g u la t io n s  w h ic h  make i t  
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them to  re p a tr ia te  income. In  such a s itu a t io n ,  r o y a lty  
re c e ip ts  fro m  lic e n s in g  agreem ents are  less l ik e ly  to  rem a in  fro ze n  
th a n  d iv id e n d s  s ince  th e y  re p re s e n t a c o n tra c tu a l com m itm ent 
[C o n tra c to r  (1985, p5)].
N o t o n ly  are  ro y a lt ie s  b e t te r  in s u la te d  a g a in s t s o -c a lle d  
'p o l i t ic a l '  r is k ,  th e y  a lso  o f fe r  b e t te r  p ro te c t io n  a g a in s t o rd in a ry  
com m erc ia l r is k .  T h is  is  because ro y a lt ie s  are  u s u a lly  pegged to  th e  
lice n se e 's  tu rn o v e r  and are  th e re fo re  more s ta b le  th a n  d iv id e n d s , 
w h ic h  may f a l l  to  zero i f  no p r o f i t s  are earned.
I f  a f irm  is  c o n s id e r in g  in v e s tin g  in  a c o u n try  th a t  w i l l  n o t 
p e rm it 100 p e r cen t e q u ity  in v e s tm e n t, b u t  w i l l  a llo w  jo in t  ve n tu re s , 
th e n  lic e n s in g  may become a more a t t r a c t iv e  p ro p o s it io n . T h is  is  
because i t  is  g e n e ra lly  much e a s ie r to  v e r i f y  th e  tu rn o v e r  upon 
w h ic h  ro y a lt ie s  u s u a lly  depend th a n  i t  is  to  v e r i f y  p ro f i ts ,  w h ich  
may be s u b je c t to  m a n ip u la tio n  by th e  lo c a l p a r tn e r .
A n o th e r area in  w h ic h  gove rnm en ts  im p inge  upon co rp o ra te  
a c t iv i t ie s  is  ta x a t io n . L ic e n s in g  may become more a t t ra c t iv e  th a n  
FDI i f  ro y a lt ie s  are  s u b je c te d  to  lo w e r ra te s  o f ta x  th a n
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d iv id e n d s .^  The ta x  tre a tm e n t o f  ro y a lt ie s  v a r ie s  fro m  c o u n try  to  
c o u n try  and may be su b je c t to  change o v e r tim e , so i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  
g e n e ra lis e  abo u t th e  im pact o f  ta x a t io n  upon th e  lic e n s in g  dec is io n . 
I t  is  w o rth  n o tin g , how ever, th a t  in  m ost c o u n tr ie s  ro y a lt ie s  do 
a t t r a c t  a more fa v o u ra b le  ta x  tre a tm e n t th a n  d iv id e n d s  [E item an and 
S to n e h il l (1986, p555), S h ap iro  (1986, p363)].
In  a d d it io n  to  fa c in g  p o l i t ic a l  r is k ,  f irm s  a lso  have to  cope
op
w ith  fo re ig n  exchange r is k  i f  th e y  own o p e ra tio n s  overseas. I f  
th e re  is  b e lie ve d  to  be a lo w e r le v e l o f  fo re ig n  exchange r is k  
asso c ia te d  w ith  lic e n s in g  th a n  w ith  FDI, th e n  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  
d e c is io n  may be t ip p e d  in  fa v o u r  o f  lic e n s in g . C o n tra c to r  (1981b, 
p80) has argued th a t  lic e n s in g  does have a lo w e r le v e l o f  fo re ig n  
exchange r is k  because i t  in v o lv e s  a lo w e r c a p ita l com m itm ent th a n  
FDI. In  a d d it io n , a n t ic ip a te d  re tu rn s  are  much more im m edia te  
com pared w ith  th e  lo n g e r tim e  h o riz o n  o f a c a p ita l in ve s tm e n t, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  i f  lum p sum fees are  p a id  a t th e  o u ts e t o f  th e  lic e n s in g  
agreem ent.
One o th e r  m o tiv a t io n  f o r  a d o p tin g  lic e n s in g  is  th a t  i t  may h e lp  
to  reduce  th e  com pany’s o v e ra l l r is k  p r o f i le  th ro u g h  a 'p o r t fo l io  
d iv e r s i f ic a t io n ' e ffe c t.  By d iv e rs i fy in g  th e  fo rm s o f  incom e w h ich  i t  
re ce ive s , th e  f irm  reduces i t s  re lia n c e  upon any s in g le  source  o f  
incom e and hence lo w e rs  th e  v a r ia n c e  o f  i t s  expec ted  re tu rn s . T h is  
m o tive  was o r ig in a l ly  id e n t if ie d  by L o v e ll (1958).
6.4.4 H o s t C o u n try  R e s tr ic t io n s  on FDI
In  many d e ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  governm ent re g u la t io n s  r e s t r ic t  FDI to  
se le c te d  in d u s t r ia l  sec to rs . F o r some MNCs, th e re fo re , m a rke t e n try  
v ia  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t may n o t be p o ss ib le .
D ata fro m  de ve lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  in d ic a te  th a t  th e  in tro d u c t io n  
o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  p o lic ie s  to w a rd s  FDI is  accom panied by subsequen t 
in c rea ses  in  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  [UN (1983, p l6 9 )]. In  th e  1970s, f o r  
exam ple, b o th  Korea and M a lays ia  in tro d u c e d  p o lic ie s  to  r e s t r ic t  
in w a rd  FDI, and in  b o th  cases th is  re s u lte d  in  an in c rea se  in  th e  
num ber o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents between MNCs and lo c a l f irm s .
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6.4.5 H ost C o u n try  R e s tr ic t io n s  on E x p o rts
As w e ll as in h ib i t in g  th e  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t o p tio n , governm ent 
in te r fe re n c e  can a lso  se rve  to  c o n s tra in  th e  e x p o rt in g  o p tio n . The 
im p o s it io n  o f  b a r r ie rs  to  tra d e , such as t a r i f f s  and quo tas , may ru le  
o u t e x p o r t in g  and fo rc e  MNCs in to  c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  lic e n s in g . 
C o n tra c to r  (1981b, p77) re p o r te d  th a t  gove rnm en t p o l ic y  in  Japan,
B ra z il,  In d ia , M exico and A rg e n tin a  had  been d ire c te d  to w a rd s  
r e s t r ic t in g  im p o rts  in  o rd e r  to  encourage lic e n s in g , in  th e  b e lie f  
t h a t  th is  w o u ld  reduce  b o th  th e  ba lance  o f  paym ents and fo re ig n  
dependency.
In  a d d it io n  to  g o ve rn m e n t-c re a te d  im p e rfe c tio n s , a n a tu r a l ly -  
o c c u rin g  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n , t ra n s p o r t  costs , may se rve  to  make 
e x p o rt in g  im p ra c t ic a l o r  to o  c o s t ly , th u s  m aking  lic e n s in g  more 
l ik e ly .
6.4.6 A b s o rp tiv e  C a p a c ity  in  th e  H ost C o u n try
The a b i l i t y  o f  h o s t-c o u n try  f irm s  to  abso rb  fo re ig n  te c h n o lo g y  w i l l  
p la y  a p a r t  in  d e te rm in in g  w h e th e r o r  n o t lic e n s in g  is  fe a s ib le . 
Where p o te n t ia l re c ip ie n t  f irm s  are  la c k in g  in  te c h n ic a l a b s o rp tiv e  
c a p a c ity , th e  cos t o f  lic e n s in g  te c h n o lo g y  to  them  w i l l  be g re a te r  
[Teece (1976)]. As a re s u lt ,  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t ( in te rn a l t ra n s fe r )  is  
l i k e ly  to  become more appea ling .
T h is  p re fe re n ce  f o r  in te r n a l t ra n s fe r  in  th e  absence o f  
adequate  a b s o rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  has been co n firm e d  b y  a num ber o f  
s tu d ie s  o f  f irm s  in v o lv e d  in  t ra n s fe r in g  te c h n o lo g y  to  In d ia  
[B aranson  (1967), Balasabram anyam  (1973), Davies (1977)]. There is  
a lso  ev idence  a t th e  aggregate, c o u n try - le v e l to  s u p p o rt th e  l in k  
betw een a b s o rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  and th e  use o f  lic e n s in g . C o n tra c to r  
(1981a) fo u n d  a s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  re la t io n s h ip  between th e  
r e la t iv e  a d o p tio n  o f  lic e n s in g  by  US f irm s  and th e  in d ig e n o u s  
te c h n ic a l c a p a b il it ie s  o f  33 h o s t c o u n t r ie s .^  A fu r th e r  s tu d y  
[C o n tra c to r  (1985)] u s in g  tw o  d i f fe r e n t  s u rro g a te  measures o f 
a b s o rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  in  t h i r t y  h o s t c o u n tr ie s  a lso  fo u n d  a 
s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  re la t io n s h ip  betw een th is  v a r ia b le  and th e
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a d o p tio n  o f  lic e n s in g  by  US f irm s .35
A nderson  and G a tignon  (1986, p l9 ) have a rgued  th a t  a h o s t 
c o u n try 's  a b s o rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  in c reases  in  accordance w ith  th e  size 
o f  i t s  fo re ig n  bus iness  com m unity. T h is  is  because fo re ig n  f irm s  
im p a r t management s k i l ls  to  t h e ir  lo c a l em ployees, in  a d d it io n  to  
in c re a s in g  awareness among o th e r  h o s t-c o u n try  n a tio n a ls  o f  th e  
b e n e fits  o f  o b ta in in g  a bus iness  e d u ca tio n . The g ra d u a l d i f fu s io n  
o f  management s k i l ls  among th e  g e n e ra l p o p u la tio n  w h ic h  re s u lts  
fro m  th e  presence o f  fo re ig n  f irm s  th e re fo re  serves to  rem ove one 
o f  th e  m a jo r b a r r ie rs  to  lic e n s in g , ie  th e  la c k  o f  com petent 
c a n d id a te  licensees.
A c o n tra s tin g  v ie w p o in t  co n ce rn in g  th e  e f fe c t  o f  a b s o rp tiv e  
c a p a c ity  was p roposed  by G a lb ra ith  and Kay (1986, pp l5 -16 ) who
argued th a t  a b s o rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  may a c tu a lly  have a n e g a tiv e  im pac t 
upon  th e  p ro p e n s ity  to  lice n se . A lth o u g h  a cce p tin g  th a t  th e  
possess ion  o f  c e r ta in  te c h n ic a l s k i l ls  by  p o te n t ia l licensees  is  a 
necessary p re - re q u is ite  f o r  lic e n s in g  to  occu r, th e y  p o in te d  o u t th a t  
th e  a b i l i t y  o f  licensees  to  behave o p p o r tu n is t ic a l ly  inc reases  in  l in e  
w ith  t h e ir  le v e l o f  te c h n ic a l s o p h is t ic a t io n . F o r exam ple, w here 
lic e n s e d  te c h n o lo g y  is  n o t p ro d u c t-s p e c if ic ,  licensees  may be ab le  to  
u t i l is e  i t  in  p ro d u c tio n  processes n o t gove rned  by th e  lice n ce  
agreem ent. The h ig h e r  costs  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  m o n ito r in g  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents w ith  te c h n ic a lly  s o p h is t ic a te d  licensees  may th e re fo re  
serve  to  make d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t a p re fe ra b le  s tra te g y .
6.5 FIRM-SPECIFIC FACTORS
6.5.1 L e v e l o f  E xp e rience  o f  O verseas O p e ra tions
E xpe rience  o f  o p e ra tin g  in  fo re ig n  m a rke ts  is  an im p o r ta n t c o rp o ra te  
resou rce . Te les io  (1979) re fe r re d  to  th e  expe rience  o f  o p e ra tin g  
ab road  becom ing " in te rn a liz e d  as a 'te c h n o lo g y ' o f  m u lt in a t io n a l 
o p e ra tio n s " (p20). MNCs th a t  possess l i t t l e  o f  th is  'te c h n o lo g y ' w i l l  
be more l ik e ly  to  o p t f o r  lic e n s in g  ra th e r  th a n  ex te n d  th e ir  own 
overseas o p e ra tio n s , f o r  in  do ing  so th e y  w i l l  be ab le  to  b e n e fit
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fro m  the  m a n u fa c tu rin g  and m a rk e tin g  e x p e rt is e  o f  lo c a l licensees; 
th e y  w i l l  be ab le  to  supp lem en t th e ir  own resou rces  w ith  those  o f  
in d ig e n o u s  firm s . A s tu d y  by B aranson (1970) fo u n d  th a t  f irm s  w ith  
r e la t iv e ly  l i t t l e  expe rience  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  are  more l ik e ly  to  
lic e n s e  th a n  u n d e rta k e  FDI, and th is  was backed up by T e les io 's  own 
f in d in g s  (1979, p p 8 3 -8 7 ).^
The idea  th a t  lic e n s in g  may be u n d e rta k e n  because a f irm  has 
in a d e q u a te  expe rience  o f  o p e ra tin g  ab road  can be fo u n d  in  th e  
l i te r a tu r e  concerned w ith  th e  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  process. In  th is  
l i te r a tu r e ,  lic e n s in g  is  v ie w ed  as one stage in  a s e q u e n tia l p rocess 
o f  in te rn a t io n a l expa ns io n  c u lm in a t in g  in  FDI. The re  are v a ry in g  
o p in io n s  as to  th e  p o s it io n  o ccu p ie d  by  lic e n s in g  in  th is  sequence. 
The m ore common v ie w p o in t is  th a t  i t  fo llo w s  on fro m  e x p o rt in g . A 
ty p ic a l fo re ig n  expa ns io n  sequence is  i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  6-2.
FIGURE 6-2 
TYPICAL FOREIGN EXPANSION SEQUENCE
S a l a s  
Subs i d i a r yExpo r t  i ng
P r o d u c t i  on 
O v e r s e a s
S e r v i c e
System
[SOURCE: S hap iro , (1986, p6)]
The p o s it io n  o f  l ic e n s in g  in  th e  above sequence in d ic a te s  th a t
i t  is  an o p t io n a l s tage in  th e  in te rn a t io n a liz a t io n  process. The
reason  p u t fo rw a rd  to  e x p la in  th is  e v o lu t io n a ry  app roach  is  th a t  
f irm s  assoc ia te  a h ig h  degree o f  r is k  w ith  o p e ra tin g  in  fo re ig n  
m arke ts . In  o rd e r  to  reduce  th is  r is k ,  th e y  expand in  stages, 
g ra d u a lly  b u ild in g  up in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t fo re ig n  m arke ts  and th u s  
in c re a s in g  the  chances o f  success a t succeeding stages. Some
exam ples o f  th e  ev idence  w h ic h  e x is ts  in  s u p p o rt o f  th is
g ra d u a lis t ic  le a rn in g  app ro ach ' to  fo re ig n  expans ion  are Johanson 
and V ah lne 's  (1977) s tu d y  o f  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  among Swedish
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f irm s , and D av idson 's  (1980) s tu d y  o f  th e  fo re ig n  expans ion  
b e h a v io u r  o f  US f irm s .  ^  7
In  a d d it io n  to  e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a liz a t io n  
p rocess, a num ber o f  th e o re t ic a l m odels have been fo rm u la te d  w h ic h  
a tte m p t to  p re d ic t  th e  sequence o f  th e  th re e  p r in c ip a l modes o f  
m a rke t s e rv ic in g , ie  e x p o rt in g , lic e n s in g  and FDI [G id d y  and Rugman 
(1979), B u ck ley  and Casson (1981), Rugman (1981), Rugman e t a l (1985), 
Grosse (1985)]. These m odels p lace  lic e n s in g  a t d i f fe r e n t  p o in ts  on 
th e  e v o lu t io n a ry  sequence, a c c o rd in g  to  th e  d i f fe r in g  assum ptions 
w h ic h  th e y  adop t. They are  co n s id e re d  f u r th e r  in  C h a p te r Seven.
6.5.2 Size
E xperience  o f  o p e ra tin g  ab road  is  c lo s e ly  re la te d  to  f irm  size, so i t  
is  n o t s u rp r is in g  th a t  s m a lle r f irm s  seem to  be more l ik e ly  to  
u t i l is e  th e  lic e n s in g  o p tio n  ra th e r  th a n  ado p t FDI. Te les io  (1979, 
pp77-83) fo u n d  th a t  th e  s m a lle r a MNC ( re la t iv e  to  th e  p a x t ic u la r  
in d u s try  in  w h ich  i t  ope ra ted ) th e  more i t  w o u ld  te n d  to  license .
Some firm s , how ever, may g row  in  such a way th a t  lic e n s in g  
a c tu a lly  becomes more appea ling . T h is  may o ccu r i f  a f irm  grow s 
v ia  p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ,  w h ic h  is  cons ide red  n e x t.
6.5.3 L e v e l o f  P ro d u c t D iv e rs if ic a t io n
The argum ent here  is  th a t  f irm s  w h ich  become h ig h ly  d iv e rs i f ie d  
have to  a llo c a te  t h e ir  resou rces  o v e r a num ber o f  d i f fe r e n t  p ro d u c t 
lin e s , and th a t  th is  a llo c a t io n  w i l l  be uneven because o f  th e  
lum p iness  o f  these  resou rces . S ince a m inimum  com m itm ent o f  
resou rces  is  necessary f o r  in v e s tm e n t abroad, h ig h ly  d iv e rs i f ie d  
f irm s  may be unab le  to  make th e  re q u ire d  in ve s tm e n ts  f o r  a l l  o f  
t h e ir  p ro d u c t lin e s  in  a l l  th e  fo re ig n  m arke ts  w here  th e y  w ish  to  
ope ra te . I f  each p ro d u c t lin e ,  f o r  exam ple, needed a d is t in c t  
m a rk e tin g  fo rm u la  fo r  each c o u n try , th e n  a d o p tin g  FDI as th e  
m ethod o f  m a rke t p e n e tra t io n  w o u ld  be a c o s t ly  o p tio n . By u s in g  
lic e n s in g , MNCs can u t i l is e  th e  m a rk e tin g  e x p e rt is e  o f  lo c a l f irm s , 
w h ich  have a lre a d y  sunk  costs  in to  a c q u ir in g  know ledge  o f  t h e ir
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own m arke t.
So, th e  p ro p e n s ity  to  lic e n s e  is  l i k e ly  to  decrease as f irm s  
g row  in  size and g a in  more expe rience  o f  o p e ra tin g  abroad, b u t  is  
l i k e ly  to  in c rea se  i f  g ro w th  ta ke s  p lace  as a r e s u lt  o f  p ro d u c t 
d iv e rs i f ic a t io n .  A n o th e r fa c to r  w h ic h  makes lic e n s in g  more 
a t t r a c t iv e  to  h ig h ly  d iv e rs i f ie d  com panies is  th a t  th e  lo ss  o f  c o n tro l 
w h ic h  lic e n s in g  e n ta ils  w i l l  be o f  less im p o rta n ce  because each 
p ro d u c t l in e  w i l l  o n ly  accoun t f o r  a sm a ll p ro p o r t io n  o f  to ta l  sales. 
The h y p o th e s is  th a t  MNCs w ith  h ig h e r  th a n  average p ro d u c t 
d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  are  more l ik e ly  to  choose lic e n s in g  is  su p p o rte d  by  
th e  f in d in g s  o f  T e les io  (1979, pp72-77).
An a lte rn a t iv e  e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  re la t io n s h ip  betw een p ro d u c t 
d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  and th e  p ro p e n s ity  to  lic e n s e  was p ro v id e d  by 
C o n tra c to r  (1981b, p79). H is  a rgum ent is  th a t  h ig h ly  d iv e rs i f ie d
f irm s  have s tro n g e r c e n tra lis e d  depa rtm en ts ; a sys te m a tic  a n a lys is  
o f  m a rke t e n try  m ethods w i l l  u s u a lly  be u n d e rta k e n  by th e  
h e a d q u a rte rs -b a se d  lic e n s in g  o r  c o rp o ra te  p la n n in g  depa rtm en ts  o f  
such f irm s . L ic e n s in g  is  more l ik e ly  to  be fa v o u re d , in  these  
c ircum stances , f o r  tw o  reasons. F ir s t ly ,  c e n tra lis e d  departm en ts  are  
more l ik e ly  to  have f u l l  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t a c o u n try  and to  be 
aw are o f  a l l  th e  p o s s ib le  e n try  m ethods th a n  a p ro d u c t manager. 
And second ly , th e  p e rso n n e l in  c e n tra lis e d  depa rtm en ts  la c k  th e  b ias  
w h ic h  p ro d u c t d iv is io n  m anagers n a tu ra l ly  have f o r  in te rn a l 
expa ns io n  ra th e r  th a n  bus iness  m ethods w h ich  in v o lv e  e x te rn a l 
p a r t ie s .
6.5.4 L e v e l o f  G eog raph ica l D iv e rs if ic a t io n
I t  can be argued th a t  th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  a f irm  is  g e o g ra p h ic a lly  
d iv e rs i f ie d  w i l l  a lso  a f fe c t  i t s  p ro p e n s ity  to  ado p t lic e n s in g . T h is  
a rgum ent is  based upon th e  assum ption  th a t  a f irm  w ith  a h ig h  
degree o f  g e o g ra p h ica l d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  w i l l  have ga ined  a g re a t dea l 
o f  expe rience  ab o u t o p e ra tin g  in  d i f fe r e n t  fo re ig n  env iro nm en ts . 
T h is  v a lu a b le  asset w i l l  enab le  th e  f irm  to  more e a s ily  expand i t s  
o p e ra tio n s  in to  o th e r  m arke ts . F irm s w ith  o n ly  a few  overseas 
o p e ra tio n s  w i l l  n o t have th e  same le v e l o f  expe rience  as more
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g e o g ra p h ic a lly  d iv e rs i f ie d  f irm s  and may th e re fo re  be more l ik e ly  to  
c o n s id e r th e  lic e n s in g  o p tio n  because i t  u t i l is e s  th e  license e 's  f i r s t ­
hand expe rience  o f  th e  fo re ig n  m arke t.
In  a d d it io n , f irm s  w ith  a h ig h  degree o f  g e o g ra p h ica l
d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  are more l ik e ly  to  r e ly  upon  in te rn a l t ra n s fe r  
because o f  the  sunk  costs  a lre a d y  in c u rre d  in  e s ta b lis h in g  fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s  in  num erous c o u n tr ie s .
6.5.5 Access to  E x te rn a l R esources
In  a d d it io n  to  re q u ir in g  access to  s u f f ic ie n t  in te rn a l resources to
u n d e rta k e  FDI, f irm s  may a lso  need to  o b ta in  resources  fro m  
e x te rn a l sources. F o r exam ple, w here  a f irm  has in s u f f ic ie n t
re ta in e d  ea rn ings  to  f in a n c e  fo re ig n  expans ion , i t  may lo o k  to  
c a p ita l m arke ts  to  p ro v id e  i t  w ith  th e  necessary fu n d s . I f  these  
fu n d s  are  n o t fo rth c o m in g , lic e n s in g  may be adopted as an 
a lte rn a t iv e  means o f  m a rke t p e n e tra t io n .
F irm s in v e s tin g  overseas may a lso  w is h  to  h ire  lo c a l managers, 
because o f  t h e ir  f a m i l ia r i t y  w ith  th e  lo c a l m arke t. I f  th is  resou rce  
is  n o t a v a ila b le , lic e n s in g  may be chosen s ince  i t  enables lo c a l 
m anag e ria l e x p e rt is e  to  be u t i l is e d  in d ir e c t ly  v ia  th e  licensee  f irm .
6.5.6 O rg a n iz a tio n a l S tru c tu re
The argum ent th a t  a f irm 's  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re  w i l l  a f fe c t  i t s  
p ro p e n s ity  to  lice n se  was p roposed  by D av idson  (1983).^  I t  is  based 
upon  th e  o b s e rv a tio n  made by Teece (1976) th a t  te ch n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  
costs  d e c lin e  as a fu n c t io n  o f  th e  num ber o f  t ra n s fe rs  a lre a d y  
execu ted . O rg a n iz a tio n a l s tru c tu re s  w h ic h  are  ab le  to  c e n tra liz e  
th is  cu m u la tiv e  expe rience  w i l l  re a lis e  g re a te r  e ffic e n c y  in  
t ra n s fe r r in g  te c h n o lo g y  in te rn a lly .  S tru c tu re s  w h ic h  d iv is io n a lis e  
o r  fra g m e n t expe rience  w i l l  p e rfo rm  a t le s s e r e ff ic ie n c y . S ince 
t ra n s fe r  in e ff ic ie n c ie s  w i l l  r e s u lt  in  reduced  re tu rn s  from  fo re ig n  
in v e s tm e n t p ro je c ts , a g re a te r  use o f  lic e n s in g  can be expected in  
e x p lo it in g  fo re ig n  m arke ts .
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In  h is  1983 s tu d y , D av idson  re la te d  th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  a 
num ber o f  US f irm s  t ra n s fe r re d  new p ro d u c ts  ab road  by  lic e n s in g  
w ith  t h e ir  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re ,  u s in g  fo u r  o f  th e  ca tego ries  o f 
o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re  p roposed  by S to p fo rd  and W ells (1972), 
nam ely: dom estic , in te rn a t io n a l d iv is io n ,  g lo b a l p ro d u c t and g lo b a l
m a tr ix .
A lth o u g h  D av idson  d id  n o t p ropose  any s p e c if ic  h y p o th e s is  
a b o u t th e  e x te n t o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  expected u n d e r th e  'dom estic ' 
s t ru c tu re ,  i t  is  reasonab le  to  presum e th a t  i t  w o u ld  be assoc ia ted  
w ith  a r e la t iv le y  h ig h  in c id e n ce  o f  lic e n s in g  com pared to  th e  o th e r  
s tru c tu re s . F irm s o rgan ised  on a dom estic  bas is  b re a k  down th e ir  
a c t iv i t ie s  on e ith e r  fu n c t io n a l lin e s  (eg p ro d u c tio n , m a rke tin g , 
f in a n c e ) o r  p ro d u c t lin e s . Overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  w ith in  such a 
s t ru c tu re  te n d  to  be autonom ous and re p o r t  d ir e c t ly  to  th e  f irm 's  
m anaging d ire c to r .  T h is  re f le c ts  th e  fa c t  th a t  f irm s  o rgan ised  on a 
dom estic  bas is  e ith e r  have v e ry  few  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  o r  v e ry  
l i t t l e  com m itm ent to  overseas o p e ra tio n s . As a r e s u lt ,  th e y  are  more 
l i k e ly  to  o p t f o r  lic e n s in g .
A cco rd in g  to  D av idson  (1983), th e  h ig h e s t in c id e n ce  o f  lic e n s in g  
was expected  to  o ccu r among those  f irm s  w h ich  w ere o rgan ised  by 
'g lo b a l p ro d u c t' d iv is io n s . In  th is  s t ru c tu re ,  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  b o th  
dom estic  and overseas o p e ra tio n s  is  d iv is io n a lis e d  a cco rd ing  to  
p ro d u c t g roups. D av idson  argued th a t  th is  d iv is io n a l is a t io n  re s u lts  
in  a fra g m e n ta tio n  o f  expe rience  and in fo rm a tio n , and d u p lic a t io n  o f  
overheads and p e rson ne l. There is  a tendency  f o r  each d iv is io n  to  
op e ra te  on i t s  own le a rn in g  cu rve , re s u lt in g  in  an in c rea se  in  th e  
m a rg in a l costs  o f  t r a n s fe r r in g  te chno logy .
The f ix e d  costs  o f  te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  a lso  in c re a se  as a re s u lt  
o f  fra g m e n ta tio n . D av idson  (1983) no ted  th a t  these  in c rea sed  costs  
o c cu r a t b o th  th e  h e a d q u a rte rs  and s u b s id ia ry  le v e l: "a t
h e a d q u a rte rs , th e  need to  c rea te  and s u p p o rt d u p lic a te  p e rson ne l 
and a d m in is tra t iv e  system s in  in d iv id u a l d iv is io n s  can ra is e  th e  
costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  p o te n t ia l p ro je c ts . A t the  s u b s id ia ry  le v e l, 
th e  p ro d u c t d iv is io n  fo rm a t can re s u lt  in  a reduced a b i l i t y  to  share  
fa c i l i t ie s ,  pe rson ne l, in fo rm a tio n  and s u p p o rt systems across
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d iv is io n s . The re s u lt  is  a lo w e r le v e l o f  e f f ic ie n c y  in  e v a lu a tin g  
and im p lem en ting  t ra n s fe r  p ro je c ts . The in a b i l i t y  o f  th e  f irm  to  
f u l l y  share  resou rces  and costs  across d iv is io n s  w i l l  d e te r  many 
d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t p ro je c ts "  (p457). As a r e s u lt  o f  th is  re d u c tio n  in  
t ra n s fe r  e f f ic ie n c y , lic e n s in g  was expected  to  be a m ore p ro b a b le  
o p t io n  i f  a f irm  was o rg a n ise d  g lo b a lly  by  p ro d u c t d iv is io n s .
A lo w e r in c id e n ce  o f  lic e n s in g  was expected  among those  f irm s  
whose o rg a n iz a tio n  in c lu d e d  an 'in te rn a t io n a l d iv is io n '.  U nder th is  
s t ru c tu re  f irm s  are o rg a n ise d  d o m e s tic a lly  a long  e ith e r  fu n c t io n a l o r  
p ro d u c t lin e s  b u t have a l l  t h e ir  overseas o p e ra tio n s  managed by th e  
in te rn a t io n a l d iv is io n .  Because o f  th is  c e n tra lis a t io n  o f  expe rience , 
i t  was expected th a t  in te rn a l te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe rs  w o u ld  occu r w ith  
g re a te r  e ff ic ie n c y , and th a t  lic e n s in g  was th e re fo re  less  l ik e ly  to  be 
adopted.
The o rg a n iz a tio n a l s t ru c tu re  w h ic h  was expected  to  be 
assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  lo w e s t tenden cy  to w a rd s  lic e n s in g  was th e  
'g lo b a l m a tr ix 1 s tru c tu re .  T h is  is  because p ro d u c t and fu n c t io n a l 
m anagers g e n e ra lly  sha re  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  a g iv e n  m a rke t u n d e r 
th is  s tru c tu re ,  and so th e re  is  a h ig h e r  degree o f  com m un ica tion  and 
c o -o rd in a tio n  th a n  in  th e  o th e r  s tru c tu re s .
The re s u lts  o f  D a v idson 's  (1983) a n a ly s is  o f  d a ta  on te c h n o lo g y  
t ra n s fe rs  by US f irm s  te n d  to  s u p p o rt h is  a p r io r i  hypo theses. 
Tab le  6-2 sum marises th e  da ta .
TABLE 6-2
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND LICENSING RATES (1945-78)
Structure at time 
of transfer




Global Product 30 . 3
Global Matrix 5.1
Total 25.9
[SOURCE: D avidson  (1983, p462)]
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As th e  ta b le  shows, f irm s  o rg a n ise d  on a g lo b a l p ro d u c t bas is  
used lic e n s in g  m a rg in a lly  more th a n  f irm s  o rg a n ise d  a long  p u re ly  
dom estic  lin e s . As p re d ic te d , f irm s  w ith  in te rn a t io n a l d iv is io n s  used 
lic e n s in g  s l ig h t ly  less f re q u e n t ly ,  w h ile  f irm s  o rg a n ise d  a long  m a tr ix  
lin e s  e x h ib ite d  a v e ry  lo w  p ro p e n s ity  to  use lic e n s in g . On the  bas is  
o f  D av idso n 's  ev idence, th e re  w o u ld  appear to  be some degree o f  
a s s o c ia tio n  betw een o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re  and th e  p ro p e n s ity  to  
ad o p t lic e n s in g .
6.5.7 D iffe re n c e s  in  D is c o u n t Rates
I f  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  cos t o f  c a p ita l em ployed by a lice n se e  is  h ig h e r  
th a n  th a t  em ployed by a lic e n s o r, th e n  th e  license e  w i l l  p u t  a lo w e r 
v a lu e  on th e  stream  o f  cash f lo w s  expected  fro m  th e  te c h n o lo g y  
th a n  w i l l  th e  lic e n s o r  [Caves (1982, p206), B on in  (1987, p 8 7 ) ] .^  As a 
re s u lt ,  l ic e n s in g  w i l l  be less l ik e ly  to  occu r, c e te r is  p a r ib u s .
In  c o n tra s t, th e  ex is te n ce  o f  h ig h e r  in te re s t  ra te s  in  ge n e ra l 
w i l l  be l ik e ly  to  in c rea se  th e  p ro p e n s ity  to  lice n se , c e te r is  p a r ib u s . 
T h is  is  because f irm s , when faced  w ith  th e  cho ice  betw een FDI and 
lic e n s in g  in  these c ircum stances , a re  more l ik e ly  to  p re fe r  th e  la t t e r  
as i t  o f fe rs  a r e la t iv e ly  q u ic k e r , less r is k y  re tu rn  w ith  a 
c o m p a ra tiv e ly  n e g lig ib le  o u tla y . The co m pa ra tive  r is k  o f  lic e n s in g  
is  lo w e r  because o f th e  fre q u e n t l in k in g  o f  ro y a lt ie s  to  tu rn o v e r  
and th e  fa c t  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  le ss  p rone  to  p o l i t ic a l  r is k  




I t  is  a p p a re n t fro m  th e  fo re g o in g  a n a ly s is  th a t  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  is  a com plex one, de te rm ined  by  th e  in te ra c t io n  o f  
fo u r  k e y  se ts  o f  fa c to rs . I t  is  p o s s ib le , how ever, to  id e n t i f y  tw o  
gen e ra l se ts  o f  c ircum stances  in  w h ic h  lic e n s in g  may be adopted. 
The f i r s t  is  w here th e  lic e n s in g  o p t io n  is  e v a lu a te d  a g a in s t th e  
a lte rn a t iv e s  o f FDI and e x p o rt in g , and chosen because i t  is  
' in t r in s ic a l ly 1 more p ro f ita b le .  In  th is  s itu a t io n  lic e n s in g  may be 
d e sc rib e d  as a 'f i r s t - b e s t ' s tra te g y .
The c o n d it io n s  necessary f o r  lic e n s in g  to  e v o lv e  as a ' f i r s t -  
b e s t' o p t io n  are, how ever, r a th e r  r e s t r ic t iv e .  Indeed, B u ck ley  and 
D avies (1981) a rgued th a t  th is  ty p e  o f  lic e n s in g  can o n ly  be 
e x p la in e d  in  te rm s o f  a "p e r fe c t m a rke t f o r  advan tages" model, s ince  
lic e n s in g  w i l l  o n ly  be th e  m ost p ro f i ta b le  fo rm  o f  overseas a c t iv i t y  
"w here m arke ts  are a to m is tic , in fo rm a tio n  p e r fe c t,  advantages 
id e n t if ia b le  and ch ea p ly  t ra n s fe ra b le , and p o te n t ia l buye rs  
com peten t" (p85).
I t  is  more l ik e ly ,  th e re fo re , th a t  lic e n s in g  w i l l  be adopted as a 
'se co n d -b e s t' s tra te g y .4^ T h is  may be d e fin e d  as a s itu a t io n  in  
w h ich  lic e n s in g  occu rs  as a r e s u lt  o f  c o n tra in ts  w h ic h  make th e  
d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g  o p tio n s  in fe a s ib le .44 F o u r ca te g o rie s  
o f  c o n s tra in ts  can be id e n t i f ie d  fro m  th e  l i te r a tu r e :  d ire c t
in v e s tm e n t c o n s tra in ts , e x p o r t in g  c o n s tra in ts , in te rn a l re sou rce  
c o n s tra in ts  and e x te rn a l re so u rce  c o n s tra in ts .
D ire c t in ve s tm e n t c o n s tra in ts  a r is e  e s s e n tia lly  fro m  econom ic 
n a tio n a lis m , re f le c te d  in  h o s t-g o v e rn e m n t p o lic ie s  aimed a t 
r e s t r ic t in g  th e  le v e l o f  fo re ig n  o w ne rsh ip  in  t h e ir  economies. 
E x p o rt in g  c o n s tra in ts  a lso  a r is e  fro m  gove rnm en ta l in te r fe re n c e , in  
th e  fo rm  o f  tra d e  b a r r ie rs ,  a lth o u g h  t ra n s p o r t  costs  may a lso se rve  
to  c o n s tra in  e x p o rt in g  a c t iv i ty .  In te rn a l resou rce  c o n s tra in ts  are  
sho rtages  o f  resou rces  w ith in  a f irm , p r im a r ily  m anageria l 
expe rience  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s , w h ile  e x te rn a l re so u rce  c o n s tra in ts  
a r is e  o u tw ith  a f irm , eg a la c k  o f  adequate  cash f lo w  to  f in a n c e  
fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s .
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The lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  can a lso  be in te rp re te d  in  term s o f  th e  
'm a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  pa rad igm ' as p roposed  by C a lv e t (1981), and 
d iscussed  in  C hap te r F o u r in  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  FDI de c is io n . In  
th e  presence o f  a p e r fe c t m a rke t f o r  te c h n o lo g y  lice n ce s , lic e n s in g  
w o u ld  emerge as a 'f i r s t - b e s t ' s tra te g y . I f  th is  m a rke t is  im p e rfe c t, 
how ever, f irm s  may w ith d ra w  fro m  i t  and s e rv ic e  overseas m arke ts  
by  e ith e r  FDI o r  e x p o rts , b o th  o f  w h ic h  in v o lv e  th e  u t i l is a t io n  o f  
te c h n o lo g y  w ith in  th e  f irm .
In  co n c lu s io n , i t  s h o u ld  be no ted  th a t  th e  a v a ila b le  e m p ir ic a l 
ev idence  suggests th a t  lic e n s in g  is  g e n e ra lly  adop ted  as a 'second- 
b e s t' s tra te g y . In  h e r s u rv e y  o f  fo re ig n  lic e n s in g  a p p ra is a l m ethods 
used b y  US f irm s , L o v e ll (1969) fo u n d  th a t  " th e  lic e n s in g  approach  is  
c o n s c io u s ly  re se rved  in  some com panies as a 'la s t  re s o r t ' o r  
'sa lvage ' measure when no o th e r  m ethod o f  s e rv in g  o r  d e ve lo p in g  a 
m a rke t is  im m ed ia te ly  fe a s ib le "  (p 3 8 ).^  Zenno f's  (1970) s tu d y  o f  
fo re ig n  lic e n s in g  by US f irm s  conc luded  th a t  " lic e n s in g  is  o f te n  
v ie w ed  as a d is ta n t  t h i r d  cho ice  betw een e x p o rt in g  and fo re ig n  
in v e s tm e n t" (p300 ).^
In  h is  s tu d y  o f  lic e n s in g  and jo in t  v e n tu re s  betw een UK and 
In d ia n  f irm s , D avies (1977) fo u n d  th a t  lic e n s in g  was "a second -bes t 
fo rm  o f  o p e ra tio n , d ic ta te d  by  th e  im pac t o f  c o n s tra in ts "  (p l6 8 ) .^  
T e le s io 's  (1979) s u rve y  o f  N o rth  A m erican and E uropean MNCs fo u n d  
th a t  lic e n s in g  was adop ted  as a " la s t  re s o r t  a lte rn a t iv e "  (p 3 7 ).^  In  
t h e ir  s u rv e y  o f  B r it is h  m a n u fa c tu rin g  in v e s tm e n t overseas, Shepherd 
e t a l (1985) fo u n d  th a t  " lic e n s in g  w o u ld  o n ly  r e a l ly  be cons ide red  as 
a la s t  re s o r t  i f  th e re  were im p o r ta n t obs ta c le s  to  overseas 





1. L o v e ll 's  resea rch  c o n s is te d  o f  a s u rv e y  o f 240 US firm s , and was 
conducted  fo r  th e  US N a tio n a l In d u s t r ia l  C on fe rence Board.
2. Behrm an's resea rch  was sponsored  by th e  P a te n t, T radem ark  and 
C o p y rig h t F o u n d a tio n , based a t George W ash ing ton U n iv e rs ity . I t  
in v o lv e d  an a n a lys is  o f  th e  expe rience  o f  207 US firm s , in v o lv e d  
in  some 4,000 lic e n s in g  agreem ents. A b o u t tw o - th ir d s  o f  these  
agreem ents were w ith  in d e p e n d e n t f irm s , th e  rem a ind e r w ith  
s u b s id ia r ie s . The re s u lts  o f  th e  resea rch  are  co n ta in e d  in  a 
se rie s  o f  te n  a r t ic le s  p u b lis h e d  in  th e  P a ten t, T radem ark and 
C o p y r ig h t J o u rn a l o f  Research and E d u ca tio n  betw een th e  years 
1957 and 1960. D e ta ils  o f  f iv e  o f  these  a r t ic le s ,  o f  p a r t ic u la r  
re le va n ce  to  th e  to p ic  d iscussed  in  th is  ch a p te r, are  g ive n  in  th e  
re fe ren ces .
3. A v a r ie ty  o f  d i f fe r e n t  c la s s if ic a t io n s  o f  th e  fa c to rs  in f lu e n c in g  
th e  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  can be c o n s tru c te d , 
depend ing  upon th e  le v e l o f  a g g re g a tio n  th a t  is  adopted. F o r 
exam ple, Lowe and C ra w fo rd  (1984) b ro ke  dow n th e  v a r io u s  
fa c to rs  in to  e leven  ca te g o rie s , whereas D an ie ls  and Radebaugh 
(1986) em ployed o n ly  th re e  ca tego ries . The fo u r - fo ld  
c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme adop ted  he re  is  based la rg e ly  upon th e  f iv e  
ca te g o rie s  adopted by B u ck le y  and Davies (1981), w h ich  in  tu rn  is  
s im ila r  to  th e  fo u r  ca te g o rie s  adop ted  by Baranson (1970).
4. T h is  concept o f  p ro d u c t- s p e c if ic ity  is  s im ila r  in  n a tu re  to  th e  
concep t o f  asset s p e c if ic i ty  em ployed by W illiam so n  (1981): "as 
assets become more f u l l y  s p e c ia lize d  to  a s in g le  use o r  user, 
hence are  less tra n s fe ra b le  to  o th e r  uses and use rs , econom ies o f 
sca le  can be as f u l l y  re a liz e d  when a f irm  ope ra tes  u n d e r i t s  
own in te rn a l d ire c t io n  as when i t s  se rv ice s  are o b ta in e d  
e x te rn a lly  by c o n tra c t"  (op c i t ,  p l548).
5. The da ta  fo r  Teece's 1976 s tu d y  o f  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  
t ra n s fe r  p ro je c ts  were o b ta in e d  fro m  q u e s tio n n a ire s  f i l l e d  in  
d u r in g  in te rv ie w s  w ith  US MNCs. Some o f  Teece's re s u lts  are 
a lso  re p o rte d  in  a subsequen t a r t ic le  (1977).
6. The s u rv e y  o f r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses by  Caves e t a l (1983) was based 
upon da ta  re la t in g  to  257 a rm 's - le n g th  lic e n s in g  agreem ents, 
o b ta in e d  fro m  in te rv ie w s  w ith  22 MNCs.
7. T h is  r e s u lt  is  a lso  re p o r te d  in  C ro o k e ll (1982).
8. C o n tra c to r 's  (1981a) re s u lts  were based upon  an in i t i a l  m a iled  
q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  o f  37 US com panies and more e x te n s ive  
fo llo w -u p  in te rv ie w s  w ith  12 o f them .
9. P a rry 's  s u rve y  (1986, 1988) in v o lv e d  in te rv ie w s  w ith  393 
" in n o v a tin g "  A u s tra lia n  f irm s , o f  w h ich  137 were fo u n d  to  have 
know -h ow  lic e n s in g  agreem ents w ith  overseas f irm s .
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10. R e -lic e n s in g  r e s t r ic t io n s  were fo u n d  by P a rry  (1986, 1988) to  be 
more common in  lic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv in g  fo re ig n -o w n e d  
f irm s .
11. P a rry  (1986) acknow ledged th a t  th e  p re d ic t io n s  conce rn ing  
r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  " in te rn a liz a t io n  app roach" 
can a lso  be d e r iv e d  fro m  b o th  a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  th e o ry  and th e  
m a rke t and h ie ra rc h ie s  m odel o f  th e  MNC.
12. T h is  p o in t  was deve loped  f u r th e r  in  P a rry  (1985).
13. R o ffe  (1987) suggested th a t  one o f  th e  reasons u n d e r ly in g  th e  
fa i lu r e  to  reach  any agreem ent on an in te rn a t io n a l code o f 
co n d u c t on te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  is  a re c e n t t re n d  in  key  
deve loped  c o u n tr ie s  to w a rd s  th e  l ib e ra l iz a t io n  o f  a n t i - t r u s t  
le g is la t io n  d e a lin g  w ith  r e s t r ic t io n s  on te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g . I f  
t ru e ,  th is  re p re se n ts  a re v e rs a l o f  th e  tre n d  id e n t i f ie d  by  P a rry  
(1986).
14. Teece (1981b) d e fin e d  c o d if ic a t io n  as " th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  
expe rience  and in fo rm a tio n  in to  sym bo lic  fo rm  ... such as 
b lu e p r in ts ,  fo rm u la s , o r  com pu te r languages" (pp 83-84).
15. The p rob lem s o f  " re c o g n it io n " ,  "d is c lo s u re "  and "team 
o rg a n iz a tio n " were deve loped  jo in t ly  by  W illiam so n  and Teece. 
C o nsequen tly  th e y  are  a lso  d e sc rib e d  by Teece (1981a-1983).
16. T e le s io 's  (1979) re s u lts  w ere based upon  a q u e s tio n n a ire  su rv e y  
o f  66 MNCs, 40 o f  them  based in  th e  US, 26 in  Europe and Canada. 
D a ta  were c o lle c te d  by  in te rv ie w  f o r  55 o f  th e  com panies, and by 
m a il f o r  th e  rem a inder.
17. C o n tra c to r , 1981b, p75.
18. The th re e  stages p roposed  by  Magee (1977) were: 'in v e n t io n ',  
' in n o v a tio n ' and 's ta n d a rd is a t io n '.  The s ix  stages p roposed  by 
F o rd  and Ryan (1981) were: 'deve lopm en t' and 'a p p lic a t io n ' (these 
co rre sp o n d  to  Magee's 'in v e n t io n ' s tage), 'la u n c h ' and 'g ro w th ' 
(these  are  covered  by Magee's 'in n o v a tio n ' stage) and 'm a tu r ity ' 
and 'd e g ra d a tio n ' (w h ic h  co rre sp o n d  to  Magee's 's ta n d a rd is a t io n ' 
stage).
19. The da ta  fo r  b o th  s tu d ie s  were o b ta in e d  fro m  in te rv ie w s  w ith  
com pany e xe cu tive s  and fro m  in te r n a l company re co rds . The 
re s u lt  re p o r te d  in  M a n s fie ld  e t a l (1979) is  based upon th e  
e x p e c ta tio n s  w h ich  23 US f irm s  had a b o u t th e  te ch n o lo g y  
t ra n s fe r  channe l w h ic h  th e y  w o u ld  be u s in g  to  e x p lo it  new 
te c h n o lo g y  a r is in g  fro m  th e ir  1974 R&D p ro je c ts . The re s u lt  
re p o r te d  by M a n s fie ld  and Romeo (1980) is  based upon in fo rm a tio n  
conce rn ing  th e  age o f  65 te c h n o lo g ie s  tra n s fe r re d  ab road  by  31 
US f irm s  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  1960 to  1978.
20. The s tu d ie s  by  D av idson  and M cF e tridge  (1984, 1985) were based 
upon  da ta  on in te rn a l and e x te rn a l te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  
tra n s a c tio n s  in v o lv in g  32 US MNCs d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  1945-1975. 
The 1984 s tu d y  was based on a sam ple o f  1,367 such tra n s a c tio n s ; 
th e  1985 s tu d y  was c a r r ie d  o u t on 1,226 tra n s a c tio n s .
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21. A num ber o f th e  re s u lts  p u b lis h e d  in  C o n tra c to r 's  (1981a) book  
a lso  appeared in  an a r t ic le  co n ce rn in g  th e  ro le  o f  lic e n s in g  in  
in te rn a t io n a l s tra te g y , p u b lis h e d  by h im  in  th e  same ye a r (1981b). 
T h is  a r t ic le ,  in  tu rn ,  fo rm ed  th e  bas is  f o r  C h a p te r F ive  o f  h is  
la te r  book, p u b lis h e d  in  1985.
22. The f in d in g s  o f  C ro o k e ll's  (1982) s tu d y  were based upon th e  same 
database used by Caves e t a l (1983).
23. C a rs ta irs  and W elch (1982) and Welch and C a rs ta irs  (1983) 
re p o r te d  th e  f in d in g s  o f  a s tu d y  o f  fo re ig n  te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  
by  a sample o f  43, m a in ly  sm a lle r, A u s tra lia n  com panies.
24. The suggested m o tiv a t io n s  fo r  lic e n s in g  re p o r te d  in  B u ck ley  and 
D avies (1981) were based upon in te rv ie w s  w ith  t h i r t y  f irm s  w h ic h  
had  lic e n s in g  agreem ents in  In d ia  and th e  I r is h  R epub lic . The 
f in d in g s  fro m  these  in te rv ie w s  were a lso  re p o r te d  in  B u ck ley  and 
D av ies  (1979).
25. P a rry 's  (1976) s tu d y  in v o lv e d  a n a ly s is  o f  da ta  on th e  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  m ethods o f  s ix  UK p h a rm a ce u tica l f irm s , f o r  each o f  
f i f te e n  overseas m a rke ts , o v e r th e  p e r io d  1967-1972. The s tu d y  
was re s tr ic te d  to  "e th ic a l"  p h a rm a c e u tic a l p ro d u c ts  (ie  
p h a rm a cu e tica ls  n o t a d v e rt is e d  to  th e  p u b lic  and g e n e ra lly  
a v a ila b le  o n ly  on p re s c r ip t io n ) .  D ata was o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  s ix  
f irm s  and fro m  in d e p e n d e n t sources.
26. P i lk in g to n  had a lre a d y  e s ta b lis h e d  a num ber o f  overseas 
s u b s id ia r ie s  by  th e  tim e  i t  in v e n te d  th e  f lo a t-g la s s  process, b u t  
these  were m a in ly  re s t r ic te d  to  "O ld  Com m onwealth" c o u n tr ie s  
[S hephe rd  e t a l (1985, p l4 2 )].
27. The m odel deve loped  by G a ll in i (1984) o r ig in a l ly  assumed a 
p o te n t ia l d u o p o ly  s itu a t io n  (ie  in cum b en t and e n tra n t) . T h is  
assum ption  was re la x e d  la te r  to  a llo w  f o r  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
a d d it io n a l e n tra n ts .
28. In  th e  m odel deve loped  by H a rr is  and V ic k e rs  (1985) f irm s  are  
in v o lv e d  in  a "p a te n t race ". I f  the  incum b en t w ins  th e  race, th e  
e n try  o f  p o te n t ia l r iv a ls  is  b locked . I f  th e  incum b en t loses, i t s  
m onopo ly  p o s it io n  is  eroded.
29. The s tu d y  by  M a n s fie ld , Schw artz and Wagner (1981) was based 
upon  in te rv ie w  d a ta  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  s e n io r  o f f ic ia ls  o f  f irm s  
lo c a te d  in  th e  n o r th e a s t o f  th e  US. These f irm s  p ro v id e d  
in fo rm a tio n  on th e  es tim a ted  costs  o f  le g a lly  im ita t in g  48 new 
p ro d u c ts .
30. The o th e r  tw o  s tra te g ie s  id e n t if ie d  by  A rd is s o n  and B id a u lt  
(1986) were 'te c h n o lo g y ' and 'p ro d u c tio n ' s tra te g ie s . In  th e  
fo rm e r th e  o b je c t iv e  is  to  m axim ise th e  re tu rn s  fro m  lic e n s in g  in  
o rd e r  to  p rom ote  more R&D; in  th e  la t t e r  lic e n s in g  is  u n d e rta ke n  
as a s u b s t itu te  f o r  fo re ig n  p ro d u c tio n  because th e  lic e n s o r  
possesses in a d e q u a te  resou rces  o r  is  p re ve n te d  fro m  s e tt in g  up 
in  th e  h o s t m a rke t by  governm ent re g u la tio n s . In  t h e ir  e m p ir ic a l 
s tu d y  th e  a u th o rs  ana lysed in te rv ie w  da ta  fro m  33 F rench  
lic e n s o rs  and 24 licensees  based in  P o rtu g a l and Morocco.
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31. In  a d d it io n , ro y a lty  paym ents b y  licensees  are  u s u a lly  ta x -  
d e d u c tib le  in  th e  h o s t c o u n try . MNCs can th e re fo re  lo w e r t h e ir  
o v e ra l l ta x  b i l l  i f  t h e ir  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  are  ab le  to  re m it  
r o y a lt ie s  to  th e  p a re n t in  p lace  o f  d iv id e n d s . F o r an exam ple, 
see E item an and S to n e h il l (1986, pp555-556).
32. D om estic f irm s  may a lso  face  fo re ig n  exchange r is k  i f  th e y  are 
s u b je c t to  c o m p e tit io n  fro m  im p o rts , o r  i f  th e y  e x p o rt to  fo re ig n  
m arke ts . However, in  a d d it io n  to  fa c in g  th is  econom ic r is k ,  f irm s  
w h ic h  have overseas o p e ra tio n s  a lso  have to  con tend  w ith  
t ra n s a c tio n  r is k  and t ra n s la t io n  r is k .
33. A lth o u g h  lic e n s in g  does n o t g e n e ra lly  in v o lv e  e q u ity  in ve s tm e n t 
in  th e  licensee , th e  lic e n s o r  may a llo w  th e  licensee  c re d it  
f a c i l i t ie s  [B usiness In te rn a t io n a l (1977, p23)]. F u tu re  in te re s t  
repaym ents w o u ld  th e re fo re  be exposed to  fo re ig n  exchange r is k .
34. C o n tra c to r 's  (1981a) s tu d y  in v o lv e d  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  a m u lt ip le  
re g re s s io n  m odel to  te s t  th e  re la t io n s h ip  betw een th e  in c id e n ce  
o f  lic e n s in g  among US f irm s , d e r iv e d  fro m  US D epartm ent o f  
Commerce data , and th e  deve lopm en t s ta tu s  o f  33 h o s t c o u n tr ie s . 
One o f  th e  in depe nden t v a r ia b le s  em ployed was th e  in d ig e n o u s  
te c h n o lo g ic a l c a p a c it ie s  o f  th e  h o s t c o u n tr ie s , p ro x ie d  by  th e  
num ber o f  s c ie n tis ts  and eng ineers , m easured in  thousands. The 
d a ta  in  th is  s tu d y  covered  th e  years  1975 and 1976.
35. The m u lt ip le  re g re ss io n  m odel in  C o n tra c to r 's  (1985) s tu d y  used 
tw o  p ro x ie s  fo r  th e  in d ig e n o u s  te c h n o lo g ic a l c a p a c ity  o f  t h i r t y  
h o s t c o u n tr ie s : R&D e x p e n d itu re , and re se a rch  pe rso n n e l 
no rm a lise d  by  p o p u la tio n . The re la t io n s h ip  betw een a b s o rp tiv e  
c a p a c ity  and lic e n s in g  in te n s ity  h e ld  f o r  da ta  c o v e rin g  1977, 1978 
and 1980.
36. Baranson 's (1970) s tu d y  was based, in  p a r t,  upon  correspondence 
and in te rv ie w s  w ith  30 e x e c u tiv e s  o f  MNCs.
37. D a v idson 's  (1980) s tu d y  d id  n o t c o n s id e r th e  f u l l  range o f  
in te rn a t io n a l bus iness m ethods. I t  focused  on th e  cho ice  
betw een lic e n s in g , jo in t  v e n tu re s  and FDI.
38. D av idson 's  (1983) s tu d y  o f  th e  im p a c t o f  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re  
upon  te ch n o lo g y  t ra n s fe r  e f f ic ie n c y  was based upon  da ta  fro m  a 
sam ple o f  57 US MNCs w h ich  had in tro d u c e d  954 s ig n if ic a n t  new 
p ro d u c ts  o v e r th e  p e r io d  1945-1975.
39. Caves (1983, p206) acknow ledged Jones (1979, p264) as th e  
o r ig in a to r  o f  th is  e x p la n a tio n .
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40. The ra t io n a le  f o r  th e  d is t in c t io n  betw een lic e n s in g  as e ith e r  a 
' f i r s t - b e s t ' o r  a 'se co n d -b e s t' s tra te g y  is  th e  same as th a t  
p roposed  by D avies (1982), a lth o u g h  he a lso  d e fin e d  a t h i r d  
s itu a t io n  when lic e n s in g  is  th e  p re fe r re d  s tra te g y , ie  in  h ig h ly  
c o n c e n tra te d  in d u s tr ie s . T h is  t r i - p a r t i t e  c la s s if ic a t io n  is  a lso  
c o n ta in e d  in  B u ck ley  and D avies (1981), a lth o u g h  th e  te rm  ' f i r s t -  
b e s t' s tra te g y  is  n o t a c tu a lly  used. T h is  pap e r is , in  tu rn ,  a 
re fin e m e n t o f  t h e ir  e a r l ie r  pap e r [B u c k le y  and D avies (1979)], in  
w h ic h  th e  te rm  'se co n d -b e s t' s tra te g y  was o n ly  used to  co ve r 
th o se  s itu a t io n s  in  w h ich  lic e n s in g  is  adop ted  to  "b u y  tim e " o r  
" te s t  th e  m a rke t" p r io r  to  th e  e v e n tu a l e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  a jo in t  
v e n tu re  o r  w h o lly -o w n e d  s u b s id ia ry  (pp26-27).
41. A d icho tom y  s im ila r  to  th e  d is t in c t io n  betw een ' f i r s t - b e s t ' and 
'seco nd -bes t' lic e n s in g  was p roposed  by Lowe and C ra w fo rd  (1984, 
p 's  105 & 171). They d is t in g u is h e d  betw een 're a c t iv e ' lic e n s in g , 
w h ic h  occurs  in  response to  e x te rn a l o r  in te rn a l c o n tra in ts  on 
a lte rn a t iv e  bus iness m ethods, and 'p ro a c t iv e ' lic e n s in g , w h ich  
re s u lts  fro m  a consc ious  d e c is io n  to  u t i l is e  lic e n s in g  in  
p re fe re n ce  to  o th e r  fo rm s  o f  m a rke t e x p lo ita t io n .
42. L o v e ll 's  (1969) re p o r t  was based upon  m a iled  q u e s tio n n a ire  
re tu rn s  fro m  191 US firm s .
43. Z enno f's  (1970) s tu d y  was based upon in te rv ie w  and q u e s tio n n a ire  
d a ta  o b ta in e d  fro m  47 US com panies in v o lv e d  in  fo re ig n  lic e n s in g  
in  1967.
44. The s tu d y  by  D avies (1977) in v o lv e d  a p o s ta l s u rv e y  o f  119 UK 
com panies in v o lv e d  in  jo in t  v e n tu re s  and lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
w ith  In d ia n  f irm s  o v e r th e  p e r io d  1963-69, and subsequen t 
in te rv ie w s  w ith  27 o f  them.
45. T e le s io 's  a n a lys is  o n ly  con s id e re d  lic e n s in g  as a s u b s t itu te  f o r  
FDI. I t  d id  n o t address th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  lic e n s in g  s u b s t itu t in g  
f o r  e x p o rts .
46. The s tu d y  by Shepherd e t a l (1985) fo llo w e d  a 'case s tu d y ' 
app roach  w h ich  in v o lv e d  in te rv ie w s  w ith  th e  s e n io r  management 
o f  23 la rg e  UK com panies, who a lso  f i l l e d  o u t a gen e ra l 
q u e s tio n n a ire .
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CHAPTER SEVEN -  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The fo re g o in g  re v ie w  o f  th e  l i te r a tu r e  has su rve ye d  n o t o n ly  
th e o r ie s  o f  lic e n s in g  b u t  a lso  th e o r ie s  o f  FDI and o f  th e  MNC. T h is  
coverage re f le c ts  th e  fa c t  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  o n ly  one means o f  
s e rv ic in g  fo re ig n  m arke ts , and th a t  i t  w i l l  th e re fo re  be in flu e n c e d  
by  th e  fa c to rs  w h ich  a f fe c t  th e  o th e r  m ain a lte rn a t iv e s ,  ie  FDI and 
expo rting .-^  F o r exam ple, lic e n s in g  may be adop ted  because 
t ra n s p o r t  costs  ru le  o u t e x p o r t in g  and h ig h  p o l i t ic a l  r is k  makes FDI 
u n a tt ra c t iv e .  A com prehensive  a n a ly t ic a l fra m e w o rk  f o r  th e  
lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  m ust th e re fo re  in c o rp o ra te  th o se  fa c to rs  a f fe c t in g  
a lte rn a t iv e  means o f  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  as w e ll as those  w h ich  
d i r e c t ly  im p inge  upon lic e n s in g .
T h is  ch a p te r id e n t if ie s  th e  th e o r ie s  re v ie w e d  in  th e  la s t  th re e  
c h a p te rs  w h ich  can p ro v id e  such a fra m e w o rk , and i t  describes  a 
num ber o f  e c le c tic  approaches w h ic h  have been p roposed  as a means 
o f  in te g ra t in g  these  sepa ra te  th e o r ie s  in to  a gen e ra l th e o ry . 
A t te n t io n  is  th e n  focussed  on tw o  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  fe a tu re  in  
these  e c le c tic  approaches: t ra n s a c tio n  costs  and p ro d u c tio n  costs. 
The use o f  these  v a r ia b le s  to  m odel th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  is  
cons ide red , a long  w ith  th e  p rob lem s assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  m easurem ent 
o f  t ra n s a c tio n  costs. The c h a p te r conc ludes w ith  a b r ie f  
c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  th e  im pac t o f  bus iness  s tra te g y  c o n s id e ra tio n s  on 
th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  and how  these  c o n s id e ra tio n s  f i t  in to  
th e  a n a ly t ic a l fra m e w o rk  p re v io u s ly  o u tlin e d .
7.2 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE LICENSING DECISION
7.2.1 R e le va n t T heo ry
In d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry  is  c le a r ly  o f  re le va n ce  in  e x p la in in g  
th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n , f o r  i t  s p e c ifie s  th a t  a f irm  m ust have 
a p ro p r ie ta ry  advantage in  o rd e r  f o r  FDI o r  lic e n s in g  to  take  p lace. 
The th e o ry , i t  sh o u ld  be no ted , cann o t e x p la in  v e r t ic a l FDI, fo r  
w h ic h  th e  possess ion  o f  a p ro p r ie ta r y  advan tage  is  unnecessary.
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T h is  d e fe c t is  o f  no consequence, how ever, f o r  th e  re sea rch  is  o n ly  
concerned  w ith  h o r iz o n ta l FDI as an a lte rn a t iv e  to  lic e n s in g . 
N e ve rthe less , th e  th e o ry  is  s t i l l  in s u f f ic ie n t  because i t  o n ly  
e x p la in s  how f irm s  are  ab le  to  o p e ra te  in te rn a t io n a l ly ;  i t  canno t 
e x p la in  w hy th e y  m ig h t p re fe r  to  lice n se  th e ir  p ro p r ie ta ry  
advantages ra th e r  th a n  o p t f o r  FDI o r  e x p o rt in g . The use fu leness  
o f  th e  th e o ry  lie s  in  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  id e n t i f y  th e  ty p e  o f  f irm  w h ich  
is  ab le  to  engage in  FDI and, th e re fo re , ab le  to  ad o p t lic e n s in g  as 
an a lte rn a t iv e .
To in c o rp o ra te  th e  lic e n s in g  o p t io n  i t  is  necessary to  b r in g  in  
tra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry , f o r  i t  s p e c ifie s  a gen e ra l c o n d it io n  u n d e r 
w h ic h  th e  e x p lo ita t io n  o f  a p ro p r ie ta ry  advan tage  by  th e  f irm  w i l l  
be p re fe r re d  to  th e  a rm 's - le n g th  m arke t, ie  when m a rke t tra n s a c tio n  
costs  exceed f irm  tra n s a c tio n  costs . The c ircum stances  w h ich  fo s te r  
excess ive  m a rke t t ra n s a c tio n  costs  have been d e fin e d  by v a r io u s  
th e o r is ts .  W illiam so n  (1975, 1981) s tresse d  th e  in te ra c t io n  o f
bounded r a t io n a l i t y  w ith  u n c e rta in ty ,,  th e  e f fe c t  o f  o p p o rtu n ism  
com bined w ith  sm a ll num bers b a rg a in in g , and th e  d e r iv a t iv e  
c o n d it io n  o f  in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness. These c o n d it io n s  are  
e s p e c ia lly  l i k e ly  to  p re v a il in  know ledge  m arke ts , w here  prob lem s o f 
re c o g n it io n , d is c lo s u re  and team o rg a n iz a tio n  abound. The la c k  o f  
le g a l p ro te c t io n  f o r  p ro p r ie ta ry  know ledge  was s tre sse d  by Magee 
(1977a, 1977b) in  h is  a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  th e o ry  o f  th e  MNC. T h is
im p e r fe c tio n  was a lso  no te d  by B u ck le y  and Casson (1976), who 
p laced  more em phasis upon th e  p rob lem s caused by in fo rm a tio n  
asym m etry and b i la te r a l m onopoly.^
T ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry  is  a lso  a p p lic a b le  to  p ro d u c t m arke ts , 
and to  fa c to r  m arke ts  o th e r  th a n  th e  know ledge  m arke t. I t  
th e re fo re  serves to  id e n t i f y  th e  c ircum stances  u n d e r w h ich  overseas 
m a rke ts  are  more l ik e ly  to  be se rved  by lic e n s in g  ra th e r  th a n  by 
fo re ig n  p ro d u c tio n  o r  e x p o rt in g . F o r exam ple, im p e rfe c tio n s  in  th e  
p ro d u c t m a rke t a r is in g  from , say, th e  im p o s it io n  o f  t a r i f f s  im pose 
cos ts  on f irm s  w h ic h  e x p o rt and th e re fo re  encourage p ro d u c tio n  to  
be lo c a te d  abroad. Im p e rfe c tio n s  w h ich  a r is e  in  fa c to r  m arke ts , 
such as governm ent a id  schemes to  a t t r a c t  fo re ig n  in v e s to rs , w i l l  
a lso  a f fe c t  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  dec is io n .
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Since these  types  o f  m a rke t im p e r fe c tio n  de te rm ine  w here 
p ro d u c tio n  w i l l  be lo c a te d  (home o r  abroad) th e y  can p la u s ib ly  be 
co n s id e re d  as p a r t  o f  lo c a tio n  th e o ry . T ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  does 
n o t, how ever, f u l l y  embrace lo c a tio n  th e o ry , f o r  i t  f a i ls  to  c o n s id e r 
th e  im pac t o f  home and h o s t c o u n try  fa c to rs  w h ich  canno t be 
c h a ra c te r is e d  in  te rm s o f m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s . F o r exam ple, i f  a 
fo re ig n  f irm  is  p re v e n te d  fro m  e x p o rt in g  by  t a r i f f  b a r r ie rs  i t  may 
s t i l l  decide a g a in s t s e t t in g  up a s u b s id ia ry  in s id e  th e  p ro te c te d  
m a rke t i f  th is  m a rke t is  n o t la rg e  enough to  a llo w  i t  to  re c o v e r th e  
costs  o f  i t s  fo re ig n  in ve s tm e n t. I t  may th e re fo re  dec ide  to  e x p lo it  
i t s  advantage by lic e n s in g  even i f  i t  in c u rs  g re a te r  t ra n s a c tio n  
costs  in  do ing  so. M a rke t size is  th u s  a v a r ia b le  w h ich  is  n o t 
c a p tu re d  by  tra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry .
Thus, a lth o u g h  th e  possess ion  o f  a p ro p r ie ta ry  advantage, and 
th e  ex is te n ce  o f an im p e rfe c t a rm 's - le n g th  m a rke t f o r  i t s  
e x p lo ita t io n ,  are necessary p re - re q u is ite s  fo r  FDI, th e y  are n o t 
a lw ays s u f f ic ie n t  c o n d it io n s . To f u l l y  e x p la in  th e  p re fe re n ce  fo r  
FDI o v e r e x p o rt in g  and lic e n s in g  i t  is  necessary to  ta k e  lo c a tio n  
th e o ry  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n . The a ttra c t iv e n e s s  o f  s p e c if ic  lo c a tio n s  
w i l l ,  o f  course, be s u b je c t to  change o v e r tim e. I t  is  necessary, 
th e re fo re , to  ta k e  accoun t o f  th e  dynam ic aspects o f  th e  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  dec is io n . P ro d u c t l i fe - c y c le  th e o ry  is  re le v a n t in  th is  
re sp e c t, f o r  i t  p re d ic ts  th a t  th e  mode o f  bus iness is  l i k e ly  to  a l te r  
as p ro d u c ts  move th ro u g h  a se rie s  o f  s tages; ie  new, m atu re , and 
s ta nda rd ized .
To sum m arise, th re e  ca te g o rie s  o f th e o ry  re v ie w e d  in  th e  
p re v io u s  cha p te rs  are re le v a n t to  th e  resea rch  issues  ta c k le d  in  th e  
th e s is : in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry , t ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  and
lo c a tio n  th e o ry . The f i r s t  o f  these  e x p la in s  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  a f irm  to  
com pete in  overseas m a rke ts  in  te rm s o f  th e  possess ion  o f  a 
p ro p r ie ta ry  o w ne rsh ip  advantage. The second e x p la in s  w hy th is  
advantage is  l i k e ly  to  be e x p lo ite d  by th e  f irm  i t s e l f  ra th e r  th a n  by 
o th e r  f irm s , w h ile  th e  t h i r d  id e n t if ie s  c o u n try -s p e c if ic  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  w h ich  may fa v o u r  FDI o v e r e x p o r t in g  and lic e n s in g .
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Some a u th o rs  have a tte m p te d  to  syn thes ize  these  th re e  classes 
o f  th e o ry  in to  a gene ra l, 'e c le c t ic ' th e o ry . These e f fo r ts  are now 
cons ide red .
7.2.2 Eclectic Approaches
The th re e  s tra n d s  o f  th e o ry  w h ic h  are  re le v a n t to  th e  p rob lem  have 
been in te g ra te d  by D unn ing  (1977, 1979) in to  w h a t he c a lls  th e
'e c le c t ic  th e o ry  o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n '.  He d e r iv e d  from  these  
th e o r ie s  th re e  c o n d it io n s  w h ich  a f irm  m ust s a t is fy  i f  i t  is  to  
engage in  FDI:
(1) I t  m ust possess a n e t 'o w n e rs h ip -s p e c if ic  advan tage ' v is - a - v is  
f irm s  o f  o th e r  n a t io n a l it ie s  in  s e rv in g  a p a r t ic u la r  m arke t.
(2) I t  m ust be more p r o f i ta b le  f o r  th e  f irm  to  use i t s  advantage 
i t s e l f  r a th e r  th a n  s e l l o r  lease i t  to  fo re ig n  f irm s , ie  i t  m ust
possess an 'in te rn a liz a t io n  advan tage '.
(3) I t  m ust be more b e n e fic ia l f o r  th e  f irm  to  u t i l iz e  i t s  advantage 
in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  a t le a s t some fa c to r  in p u ts  lo c a te d  o u ts id e  
i t s  home c o u n try , ie  th e  overseas m a rke t m ust e x h ib it  a
'lo c a t io n -s p e c if ic  advan tage ' in  o rd e r  to  make FDI more a t t r a c t iv e  
th a n  e x p o rt in g .
Tab le  7-1 sum m arises th e  advantages w h ic h  are  re q u ire d  f o r  
each o f  th e  th re e  m ain ca te g o rie s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness.
Because D unn ing 's  e c le c tic  th e o ry  is  based a ro u n d  ow nersh ip , 
lo c a t io n a l and in te rn a liz a t io n  advantages i t  is  som etim es re fe r re d  to  
in  acronym ic  fo rm  as th e  O LI th e o ry  o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n . The 
th e o ry  makes no a p r io r i  p re d ic t io n s  a b o u t w h ic h  c o u n tr ie s ,
in d u s tr ie s  o r  f irm s  are  m ost l i k e ly  to  engage in  FDI, b u t i t  does 
hyp o th e s ize  th a t  a t le a s t some o f  these  advantages w i l l  be u n e ve n ly  
sp read  across c o u n tr ie s , in d u s tr ie s  and f irm s  and th a t  th e y  are 


























The e c le c tic  th e o ry  o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n  is  app ea ling  
because i t  d raw s on each o f  th e  th re e  m ain lin e s  o f  e x p la n a tio n  
w h ic h  have  emerged fo llo w in g  H ym er's sem ina l (1960) th e s is . I t  is  
acknow ledged by many s c h o la rs  as th e  c o n v e n tio n a l th e o ry  o f  th e  
MNC. F o r exam ple, Casson (1983) s ta te d  th a t  " i t  is  now w id e ly  
recogn ised  th a t  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  m u lt in a t io n a l e n te rp r is e s  can be 
ana lysed  in  term s o f  th re e  g roup s  o f  fa c to rs :  o w n e rsh ip  advantages, 
lo c a t io n  advantages, and in te rn a liz a t io n "  (p i) .
There  is  n o t, how ever, w idesp rea d  agreem ent th a t  th e  e c le c tic  
app ro ach  re p re se n ts  a g e n e ra l th e o ry . Rugman (1981, 1982) c la im ed
th a t  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  is  th e  t ru e  parad igm . He a rgued th a t  th e  
lo c a t io n a l aspect o f  e c le c tic  th e o ry  can be in c o rp o ra te d  in to  
in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  by re g a rd in g  th e  a b i l i t y  to  economize on 
t ra n s p o r t  costs  as a n o th e r exam ple o f  a f irm -s p e c if ic  advantage 
in te rn a liz e d  by  th e  MNC. He th e re fo re  tre a te d  lo c a t io n -s p e c if ic  
v a r ia b le s  as exogenous pa ram ete rs ; in  h is  o p in io n  th e y  e x p la in  tra d e  
p a tte rn s  between n a tio n s  ra th e r  th a n  in t r a - f i r m  tra d e . The o n ly  
d iffe re n c e  w h ich  th e n  rem a ins between D unn ing 's  e c le c tic  th e o ry  and 
in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  is  th a t  th e  fo rm e r accepts th a t  th e  MNC has 
th e  pow er to  genera te  i t s  own f irm -s p e c if ic  advan tages o ve r tim e  (ie  
to  endogen ise them ) whereas th e  la t t e r  t re a ts  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  
as exogenous. Rugman (1982), how ever, d ism issed  th is  d iffe re n c e  as 
"n o t a s u b s ta n tiv e  d iffe re n c e , m e re ly  th e  cho ice  o f  a s u ita b le  
m ethod to  m odel th e  MNC" (p l3 ).
The c la im  by Rugman th a t  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  is  th e  t ru e  
'g e n e ra l th e o ry ' is  based upon som ewhat sem antic  a rgum ents; 
lo c a t io n  th e o ry  is  in c lu d e d  in  h is  approach , b u t  g ive n  a d i f fe r e n t  
name, ie  "s p a t ia l cos t sa v in g ". In  th is  th e s is  in te rn a liz a t io n  th e o ry  
is  re g a rd e d  as a subse t o f  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry , w h ich  in  tu rn  is  
d is t in g u is h a b le  fro m  in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry  and lo c a tio n  
th e o ry .
The a d o p tio n  o f  an e c le c tic  fra m e w o rk  to  e x p la in  th e  MNC was 
a lso  advoca ted  by C a lve t (1981). He suggested th a t  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
in v o lv e m e n t o f  f irm s  can be e x p la in e d  b y  in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iz a tio n  
th e o ry , lo c a tio n  th e o ry  and p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts  th e o ry  (th e  la t t e r  be ing
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th e  te rm  he used to  d e sc rib e  a p p ro p r ia b i l i ty  th e o ry ). To these he 
added th e  M arke ts  and H ie ra rc h ie s  fra m e w o rk  in  o rd e r  to  accoun t 
f o r  th e  p a r t ic u la r  mode o f  t ra n s a c tin g  chosen. C a lv e t's  e c le c tic  
fra m e w o rk  is  th u s  v e ry  s im ila r  to  th a t  p roposed  by D unn ing . B o th  
are  in  agreem ent th a t  th e  cho ice  o f  mode o f  t ra n s a c tin g  obeys 
d if fe r e n t  ru le s  fro m  those  w h ich  ju s t i f y  fo re ig n  in v o lv e m e n t [C a lv e t 
(1981, p54), D unn ing  (1981, pp32-33)]. The la t t e r  can be e x p la in e d  by 
f irm -s p e c if ic  and lo c a t io n -s p e c if ic  fa c to rs ,  w h ile  th e  fo rm e r are  
d e te rm ined  by o rg a n iz a t io n a l c o n s id e ra tio n s .
In  a re c e n t re -e v a lu a t io n  o f  h is  e c le c tic  parad igm , D unn ing  
(1988) a rgued  th a t  i t  rem a ins, d e s p ite  th e  c r it ic is m s  o f i t ,  a "u s e fu l 
and ro b u s t  gen e ra l fra m e w o rk " (p24). He has, n e ve rth e le ss , re ­
o rg a n ise d  th e  parad igm  in to  w h a t he te rm s th e  "m ark  2" v e rs io n  
(p22). T h is  new v e rs io n  em phasises th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  tw o  in te r ­
re la te d  s tra n d s  o f  econom ic a n a ly s is : f i r s t l y ,  th e  n e o c la s s ic a l th e o ry  
o f  fa c to r  endowm ents, ex tended  to  embrace in te rm e d ia te  p ro d u c ts ; 
and, second ly , th e  th e o ry  o f  m a rke t fa i lu re .  I t  is  th e re fo re  fo rm a lly  
re fe r re d  to  by  D unn ing  as th e  " fa c to r  endow m ents /m arke t f a i lu r e  
pa rad igm " (pp l2 -13).
W ith in  th is  new v e rs io n  o f th e  parad igm , D unn ing  c la s s if ie d  
m a rke t fa i lu re s  in to  one o f  tw o  ca te g o rie s : s t ru c tu r a l o r
t ra n s a c tio n a l.  The fo rm e r a r is e  fro m  th e  lik e s  o f  governm ent 
in te rv e n t io n  and b a r r ie rs  to  e n try , w h ile  th e  la t t e r  a r is e  m a in ly  
fro m  th e  in h e re n t c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  in ta n g ib le  assets w h ich  make 
them  d i f f i c u l t  to  tra d e  a t a rm 's - le n g th . In  a d d it io n  to  c la s s ify in g  
m a rke t fa i lu re  in to  tw o  ca te g o rie s , D unn ing  a lso  d is t in g u is h e d  
betw een tw o  types  o f  o w n e rsh ip  advan tages: asset advantages (0 a) 
and tra n s a c tio n  advantages (0 t  )? The fo rm e r a r is e  fro m  th e  
p ro p r ie ta ry  ow ne rsh ip  o f  s p e c if ic  assets and are  dependent upon th e  
ex is te n ce  o f  s t ru c tu r a l m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s . The la t t e r  stem fro m  
th e  a b i l i t y  o f  MNC h ie ra rc h ie s  to  c a p tu re  th e  b e n e fits , o r  lo w e r th e  
costs , o f  c o -o rd in a tin g  tra n s a c tio n s  across c o u n tr ie s .
The tra n s a c tio n  advantages possessed by MNCs are a fu n c t io n  
o f  t h e ir  size and th e  g e o g ra p h ic a l spread o f  t h e ir  fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s . As MNCs e vo lve  th e y  g ra d u a lly  deve lop  a n e tw o rk  o f
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fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s , w h ich  become p a r t  o f  a g lo b a l system o f 
a c t iv i t ie s .  As th is  system  deve lops th e  re la t iv e  im po rtance  o f 
fa c to r  endowm ents in  e x p la in in g  changes in  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n  
is  l i k e ly  to  decrease, w h ile  th a t  o f  m a rke t fa i lu r e  is  l ik e ly  to  
in c rea se  [D u n n in g  (1988, p l l ) ] .
The a d o p tio n  o f  w h a t may be d e sc rib e d  as an e c le c tic  approach  
has a lso  been advoca ted  by  Teece (1982, 1983). He p roposed  a
syn th e s is  o f  n e o c la s s ic a l tra d e  and lo c a tio n  th e o ry  w ith  th e  
tra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry  o f  th e  MNC. To fa c i l i t a te  th is  syn th e s is , 
Teece made a d is t in c t io n  betw een p ro d u c tio n  costs  and governance 
( ie  tra n s a c tio n )  costs . He a rgued  th a t ,  in  accordance w ith  th is  
d is t in c t io n ,  th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n  can be 
d iv id e d  in to  tw o  p a r ts : f i r s t l y ,  an e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  lo c a tio n a l 
fo rc e s  w h ich  ju s t i f y  sp re a d in g  p ro d u c tio n  a roun d  th e  g lobe; and, 
second ly , an e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  
p la c in g  these  p ro d u c tio n  a c t iv i t ie s  u n d e r "common a d m in is tra tiv e  
c o n tro l"  ( ie  th e  f irm )  ra th e r  th a n  le t t in g  m a rke ts  m edia te 
tra n s a c tio n s  between in d e p e n d e n t f irm s  [(1982, p3), (1983, p53)].
Teece's p roposed  s y n th e s is  is  th u s  v e ry  s im ila r  to  th e  "m ark 2" 
v e rs io n  o f  th e  e c le c tic  pa rad igm  o u t lin e d  by D unn ing  (1988).
Teece no ted , how ever, th a t  i t  is  n o t a lw ays p o s s ib le  to  separa te  
a n a ly s is  o f  th e  lo c a t io n a l fa c to rs  w h ich  a f fe c t  p ro d u c tio n  costs fro m  
a n a ly s is  o f  th e  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  w h ic h  de te rm ine  th e  fo rm  o f 
p ro d u c tio n . The tw o  may in te ra c t  to  some e x te n t; f o r  exam ple, th e  
t ra n s a c tio n  costs  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  t ra n s fe r r in g  know -h ow  w i l l  
de te rm ine , a t le a s t in  p a r t ,  th e  le v e l o f  p ro d u c tio n  costs  p re v a il in g  
a t v a r io u s  lo c a tio n s . N e ve rthe less , th is  does n o t d e tra c t fro m  the  
key  p o in t  Teece was seek ing  to  make, nam ely th a t  th e  e f f ic ie n t  (ie  
le a s t-c o s t)  b o u n d a ry  o f  a MNC is  d e te rm ined  by how i t  responds to  
th e  sum o f  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  and p ro d u c tio n  costs.
Teece (1982, 1983, 1986) a lso  o u t lin e d  a fra m e w o rk  f o r  m ode llin g  
th e  re la t io n s h ip  betw een these  tw o  sets o f  costs  and th e  cho ice  o f 
m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  mode. T h is  fra m e w o rk  is  now cons ide red , a long  
w ith  a lte rn a t iv e  m odels o f  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n .
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7.2.3 M odels o f  th e  M a rk e t-S e rv ic in g  D e c is io n
The fra m e w o rk  o u t lin e d  by Teece in te g ra te d  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  
tra n s a c tio n  costs  and p ro d u c tio n  costs  f o r  tw o  p a r t ic u la r  ca tego ries  
o f  FDI: h o r iz o n ta l in te g ra t io n  and v e r t ic a l in te g ra t io n .  The la t t e r  is  
concerned  w ith  th e  m ost e f f ic ie n t  means o f t ra n s fe r r in g  in te rm e d ia te  
p ro d u c ts  betw een d i f fe r e n t  stages o f  a p ro d u c tio n  process. S ince 
th e  th e s is  is  concerned w ith  th e  m ost e f f ic ie n t  means o f 
t ra n s fe r r in g  p ro p r ie ta ry  know ledge  to  p roduce  th e  same p ro d u c ts  in  
d i f fe r e n t  c o u n tr ie s  we w i l l  fo cu s  on th e  fo rm e r, ie  h o r iz o n ta l FDI.
In  h is  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  costs  in v o lv e d  in  h o r iz o n ta l FDI, Teece 
co n c e n tra te d  on th e  cho ice  betw een lic e n s in g  and FDI as a lte rn a t iv e  
means o f  e x p lo it in g  know -h ow  in  fo re ig n  m arke ts . He c o n s tru c te d  a 
m odel w h ic h  assumed th a t  p ro d u c tio n  costs  and governance (ie  
tra n s a c tio n )  costs  w o u ld  each v a ry  to  d i f fe r in g  degrees in  
accordance w ith  a p a r t ic u la r  fa c e t o f  know -h ow : i t s  degree o f
c o m p le x ity .
Teece assumed th a t  th e  governance  costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  
lic e n s in g  (GC^) w o u ld  in c rea se  in  accordance w ith  th e  degree to  
w h ic h  know -h ow  is  com plex. On th e  o th e r  hand, i t  was assumed 
th a t  th e  governance costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  FDI (GCpQj) w o u ld  be 
in v a r ia n t  to  th e  degree o f  c o m p le x ity  o f  know -h ow . G overnance 
cos ts  w ere a lso  assumed, in i t ia l ly ,  to  be h ig h e r  f o r  FDI th a n  f o r  
lic e n s in g  s ince  FDI was presum ed to  in v o lv e  'de novo ' e n try  ra th e r  
th a n  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  kn o w -h o w  to  an e x is t in g  overseas s u b s id ia ry . 
( I f  FDI d id  in v o lv e  th e  la t te r ,  th e n  G C p^j w o u ld  be much lo w e r).^
These assum ptions are i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  7-1, w h ich  a lso  
d e p ic ts  th e  cu rve  re p re s e n tin g  th e  d iffe re n c e  in  governance costs  
betw een th e  tw o  modes (G C p^j -  GC^) w h ic h  is  a c c o rd in g ly  dow nw ard  
s lo p in g . The p o in t  a t w h ic h  th is  c u rve  cu ts  th e  X -a x is  in d ic a te s  









A\Index of complexity of know-how
A GC = GCpoj -  GC]
[SOURCE: Teece (1983, p58)]
A s im ila r  g raph  was c o n s tru c te d  by  Teece to  i l lu s t r a te  th e  
d i f f e r e n t ia l  p ro d u c tio n  costs  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  lic e n s in g  (PC^) and 
w ith  FDI (PCpQj). He assumed th a t  th e  p ro d u c tio n  costs  assoc ia ted  
w ith  b o th  modes in c re a se  in  accordance w ith  th e  degree o f  
c o m p le x ity  o f  know -how , b u t  th a t  those  assoc ia ted  w ith  lic e n s in g  
s ta r t  o f f  from  a s m a lle r base and in c rea se  a t a fa s te r  ra te  th a n  









Index of canplexity of know-how
A  PC = PCpD! -  Pq
[SOURCE: Teece (1983, p59)]
The schedu les d e p ic t in g  th e  d iffe re n c e s  in  governance and 
p ro d u c tio n  costs  be tw een th e  tw o  modes are  b ro u g h t to g e th e r  in  
F ig u re  7-3, to  d e r iv e  a to ta l  d if fe re n c e  schedu le  (ATC). I t  can be 
seen fro m  th is  schedu le  th a t  gove rnance  costs  and p ro d u c tio n  co s t 
c o n s id e ra tio n s  w o rk  in  th e  same d ire c t io n ,  s e rv in g  jo in t ly  to  fa v o u r  










C\~ iT\Index of complexity of know-how
AGC
A  PC
A  TC =AGC +APC
[SOURCE: Teece (1983, p59)]
F ig u re  7-3 i l lu s t r a te s  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  a n a ly s in g  th e  m a rke t 
s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  on th e  bas is  o f  t o ta l  costs  ra th e r  th a n  on 
p ro d u c tio n  o r  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  a lone . O ver th e  range  A-B o f  th e  
in d e x  o f  c o m p le x ity  o f  know -how , p ro d u c tio n  and governance costs  
jo in t ly  may lead  to  a d i f fe r e n t  cho ice  betw een lic e n s in g  o r  FDI th a n  
w o u ld  p ro d u c tio n  o r  governance cos ts  cons ide red  in  is o la t io n .
I t  sh o u ld  be no te d  th a t  th e  d iag ram m atic  tre a tm e n t o f  
p ro d u c tio n  and governance costs  i l lu s t r a te d  above re p re se n ts  a 
g ross s im p lif ic a t io n  o f  r e a l i ty .  O n ly  tw o  m a rke t s e rv ic in g  
a lte rn a t iv e s  are  cons ide red , and cos ts  are assumed to  v a ry  in  
accordance w ith  o n ly  one c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  the  te c h n o lo g y  ( in  th is  
case know -how ) be ing  t ra n s fe r re d . F u r th e r  c o m p le x ity  c le a r ly  needs 
to  be in tro d u c e d  in to  Teece's m odel, a p o in t  w h ich  Teece h im s e lf
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acknow ledged (1982, p l7 ).^  N e ve rthe less , th e  m odel is  a u s e fu l
s ta r t in g  p o in t  f o r  d e ve lo p in g  a c o n tin g e n c y  th e o ry  o f  the  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  dec is ion .
One o f  th e  m ain d e fec ts  o f  Teece's m odel is  th a t  i t  is  s ta t ic  in  
n a tu re ; no accoun t is  ta ke n  o f  th e  way in  w h ich  governance and 
p ro d u c tio n  costs change o v e r tim e . I t  is  th e re fo re  a p p ro p r ia te  to  
c o n s id e r those  m odels w h ich  p re d ic t  th e  sequence o f  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  modes o v e r tim e  [ ie  G iddy and Rugman (1979), B u ck ley  and 
Casson (1981), Rugman (1981), Rugman e t a l (1985) and Grosse (1985)]. 
A l l  o f  these  models are  concerned  w ith  th e  t im in g  o f  th e  th re e  
p r in c ip a l modes o f m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g , ie  e x p o rt in g , lic e n s in g  and FDI. 
A lth o u g h  d i f fe r in g  in  th e  assum ptions w h ic h  th e y  adop t, th e y  a l l  
in c o rp o ra te  th e  use o f  d is c o u n tin g  to  ca p tu re  th e  dynam ic e lem ents 
o f  th e  cho ice  o f o p tim a l mode, and may th u s  be re fe r re d  to  
g e n e r ic a lly  as the  "NPV app roach ". The m odel deve loped  by Rugman 
e t a l (1985) is  o u t lin e d  be low  as an i l lu s t r a t io n  o f  the  bas ic  
fe a tu re s  o f  th is  approach.^
A cco rd in g  to  Rugman e t a l (1985), " th e  MNC sh o u ld , in  p r in c ip le ,  
c a lc u la te  th e  NPV o f  each o f  th e  th re e  m o d a lit ie s  by  co n s id e r in g  th e  
d iffe re n c e  between th e  d is c o u n te d  revenues and cos ts  [a n d ] th e n  
choose th e  e n try  mode w h ic h  has th e  maximum NPV f o r  th e  le n g th  o f 
t im e  i t  is  a n t ic ip a te d  th a t  th e  fo re ig n  m a rke t w i l l  be se rv ice d " 
(p l25). I t  is  necessary, th e re fo re , to  d e fin e  th e  revenues and costs  
w h ic h  are  in v o lv e d  in  each p a r t ic u la r  mode, and how  th e ir  r e la t iv e  
va lu e s  change o ve r tim e.
Rugman e t a l made the  s im p lify in g  assum ption  th a t  revenues 
w o u ld  be th e  same fo r  each o f th e  th re e  modes o f  m a rke t s e rv ic in g , 
so th a t  th e  cho ice  among them  w o u ld  depend upon th e  re la t iv e  costs
n
assoc ia ted  w ith  each mode. Costs were c la s s if ie d  in to  tw o  
ca te g o rie s : th e  no rm a l costs  o f  p ro d u c tio n  in c u rre d  in  th e  home and 
h o s t c o u n tr ie s  ( lo c a t io n -s p e c if ic  costs) and th e  s p e c ia l costs  o f 
p ro d u c tio n  assoc ia ted  w ith  each o f  th e  th re e  modes ( f irm -s p e c if ic  




VARIABLES IN THE CHOICE OF ENTRY MODE
R T o ta l revenues fro m  sales o f  th e  f in a l  p ro d u c t w h ic h  uses a 
f irm -s p e c if ic  know ledge  advan tage
L o c a tio n -s p e c if ic  costs
C T o ta l cos t o f  la b o u r, c a p ita l and o th e r  n o rm a l in p u ts  in  th e
p ro d u c tio n  fu n c t io n  o f  th e  home n a tio n
*
C T o ta l cos t o f  la b o u r, c a p ita l and o th e r  no rm a l in p u ts  in  th e
p ro d u c tio n  fu n c t io n  o f  th e  fo re ig n  n a tio n
S pec ia l costs
M E x p o rt m a rk e tin g  costs  (p ro d u c t m arke t)
A A d d it io n a l costs  o f  FDI (p ro d u c t and fa c to r  m a rke ts )
*
D C osts due to  r is k  o f  d is s ip a t io n  o f  f irm -s p e c if ic  advantage
[SOURCE: A dapted  fro m  Rugman e t a l (1985, p 's  123, 126)].
G iven th e  above s p e c if ic a t io n  o f  revenues and cos ts , th e  NPV o f  
each mode can be a s c e rta in e d  u s in g  th e  f irm 's  co s t o f  c a p ita l.  The 
re s u lt in g  NPV's f o r  each o f  th e  th re e  o p tio n s  are  show n in  Tab le  7-
3. A l l  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  are  s p e c if ie d  f o r  th e  same tim e  p e r io d  (t) . 
The in i t i a l  da te  o f  e n try  in to  a fo re ig n  m a rke t is  d e fin e d  as t e, 
w h ic h  may, o r  may n o t, be tim e  zero. The f irm 's  c o s t o f  c a p ita l is  




THE CHOICE OF MODALITY FOR SERVICING FOREIGN MARKETS
Rt - Ct " M*t
(1 + i)fc
_ _* _ * 
^t ” t ~ t
(1 + i)t
*  _  *
Rt " c t “ ? t
(1 + i)fc
[SOURCE: A dap ted  fro m  Rugman e t a l (1985, p l2 8 )]
F o r th e  NPV o f  each mode to  change i t  is  necessary  to  have a 
th e o ry  ab o u t th e  re la t iv e  va lu e s  o f  th e  costs  fa c in g  th e  MNC o v e r 
tim e. Rugman e t a l assumed th a t  th e  no rm a l cos ts  o f  p ro d u c tio n  (C 
o r  C ) are  more o r  less  th e  same f o r  each a lte rn a t iv e .  They were 
a lso  assumed to  be exogenous to  th e  MNC. The s p e c ia l costs  o f  
p ro d u c tio n , on th e  o th e r  hand, were deemed to  be endogenous to  th e  
MNC and th e re fo re  to  be th e  p r im a ry  d e c is io n  v a r ia b le s  in  th e  
cho ice  o f  e n try  mode.
* * * 
A t th e  o u ts e t, i t  is  assumed th a t  M is  less th a n  A , s ince M
in v o lv e s  c o lle c t in g  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t th e  fo re ig n  p ro d u c t m a rke t 
*
o n ly , w h ile  A in v o lv e s  g a in in g  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t fo re ig n  fa c to r  
m arke ts  ( la b o u r and c a p ita l)  as w e ll as th e  fo re ig n  p ro d u c t m arke t. 
I t  is  a lso  assumed th a t  th e  s p e c ia l cos ts  assoc ia ted  w ith  lic e n s in g , 
D , are g re a te s t a t th e  o u ts e t, due to  th e  h ig h  r is k  o f  th e  MNC's 













in a p p ro p r ia te ly  p r ic e d  lic e n s in g "  (1985, p l27).
_ He H=
So, a t th e  tim e  o f  m a rke t e n try , M is  less th a n  A , w h ich  in
H:
tu rn  is  less th a n  D . A l l  o f  these  costs  are assumed to  decrease
o v e r tim e , b u t  a t d i f fe r e n t  ra te s : D fa l ls  a t th e  m ost ra p id  ra te , A
fa l ls  a t a s lo w e r ra te , w h ile  M fa l ls  a t th e  s lo w e s t ra te . As a
re s u lt  o f  these  s p e c ia l costs  f a l l in g  a t d i f fe r e n t ia l  ra te s , th e  
o p tim a l mode w i l l  change o v e r tim e. The sequence w i l l  in v o lv e
e x p o rt in g  o v e r tim e  OA, FDI o v e r tim e  AB, and lic e n s in g  th e re a f te r ,  
as i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  7-4. The s w itc h o v e r  p o in ts  a re  id e n t if ie d  by 
and S2:
FIGURE 7-4
THE SEQUENCING OF ENTRY MODES OVER TIME
P ro f its
1 /
0 Time
[SOURCE: Rugman e t a l (1985, p l3 5 )]
I t  sh o u ld  be n o te d  th a t  th e  p re d ic t io n s  o f  th e  m odel p roposed  
by  Rugman e t a l a re  w h o lly  dependent upon th e  assum ptions made 
a b o u t th e  le v e l o f  cos ts  assoc ia ted  w ith  each mode and th e  changes 
in  these  costs  o v e r tim e. D if fe re n t  assum ptions may y ie ld  a 
d i f fe r e n t  sequence o f  e n try  modes o v e r tim e. The reason f o r  
fo c u s in g  upon th is  m odel is  to  i l lu s t r a te  the  use fu leness  o f  th e  
"NPV app roach" in  gene ra l, nam ely th a t  i t  in v o lv e s  a dynam ic
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e v a lu a tio n  o f  the  costs  and revenues o f  each mode. I t  is  th e re fo re  
a u s e fu l supp lem ent to  th e  s ta t ic  m odel p roposed  by Teece (1982, 
1983) w h ich  has th e  m e r it  o f  fo c u s in g  upon tra n s a c tio n  costs  as w e ll 
as p ro d u c tio n  costs.
A lth o u g h  tra n s a c tio n  cos ts  are  a necessary in p u t  in to  any 
m odel o f  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n , e m p ir ic a l te s t in g  o f 
tra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o r ie s  has been h in d e re d  by in adeq ua te  
d e f in it io n s  o f  w h a t tra n s a c tio n  costs  a c tu a lly  are. F o r exam ple, 
W illiam so n  (1979) s ta te d  th a t  "headw ay w ith  th e  s tu d y  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  
cos t issues  has been im peded by la c k  o f  v e rb a l d e f in it io n s "  (p261). 
N icho las  (1982) a lso  c r i t ic is e d  th e  im p re c is io n  o f  much t ra n s a c tio n  
co s t th e o r iz in g , w h ich  he blam ed f o r  i t s  tendency  to  degenera te  in to  
mere ta u to lo g y . The n e x t s e c tio n  th e re fo re  cons ide rs  how 
tra n s a c tio n  costs may be more p re c is le y  d e fin e d .
7.2.4 T ra n s a c tio n  Costs in  In te rn a t io n a l M arke ts
W illiam son  h im s e lf a tte m p te d  to  r e c t i f y  th e  la c k  o f  v e rb a l 
d e f in it io n s  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  by id e n t ify in g  th re e  d im ensions fo r  
d e s c r ib in g  tra n s a c tio n s : u n c e r ta in ty ,  fre q u e n c y  o f  exchange and th e  
degree to  w h ich  in ve s tm e n ts  are  t ra n s a c t io n -s p e c if ic  (1979, pp239-
247). N everthe less , th e  b e h a v io u ra l u n d e rp in n in g s  o f  h is  
o rg a n iz a tio n a l fa i lu re s  fra m e w o rk  are  d i f f i c u l t  to  o p e ra tio n a lis e . 
Phenomena such as bounded r a t io n a l i t y  and o p p o rtu n is m  are n o t 
e a s ily  observed  in  th e  re a l w o rld , a lth o u g h  th e  re c e n t a d o p tio n  o f 
p sych o m e tr ic  te ch n iq u e s  as a means o f  m easuring  these  phenomena 
appears to  o f fe r  some p rom ise  [see A nderson  (1988)].
The re d u c tio n  o f  th e  im p re c is io n  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  th e  
tra n s a c tio n  cos t app roach  is  a necessary p re - re q u is ite  f o r  i t s  
o p e ra tio n a lis a t io n . The re m a in d e r o f  th is  se c tio n  b u ild s  upon th e  
ideas o f  Casson (1982), who has done much to  im p ro ve  th e  p re c is io n  
o f  tra n s a c tio n  cos t a n a ly s is  by  s p e c ify in g  th e  tra n s a c tio n  costs  
assoc ia ted  w ith  p a r t ic u la r  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s .
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In  th e  l i te ra tu r e ,  t ra n s a c tio n  cos ts  a re  som etim es id e n t if ie d  as 
th e  cause o f  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s . A cc o rd in g  to  Casson, th is  is  n o t 
s t r i c t l y  c o rre c t. He d e fin e d  m a rk e t im p e rfe c tio n s  as "obs tac les  to  
tra d e "  (1982, p25). I t  is  o n ly  in  a tte m p tin g  to  overcom e these
obs ta c le s  th a t  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  are  in c u rre d . Tab le  7-4 id e n t if ie s  
some obs tac les  to  tra d e  (m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s )  and in d ic a te s  th e  
"m a rke t-m a k in g " a c t iv i t ie s  ( tra n s a c t io n  costs) re q u ire d  to  overcom e 
them.
TABLE 7-4





No contact between buyer Contact-making via search or
and seller advertisement
No Knowledge of reciprocal Specification of the trade
wants and communication of the 
details to each party
No agreement over price Negotiation
Need to exchange cusody of 
goods
Transport
No confidence that goods Monitoring of quality and/or
correspond to specification quantity
Government intervention Payment of taxes, tariffs, 
etc.; or avoidance/evasion of(taxes, tariffs, etc.)
taxes, tariffs, etc.
[SOURCE: A dapted fro m  Casson (1982, p26)]
The tra n s a c tio n  costs  d e ta ile d  in  Tab le  7-4 are  p re v a le n t in  a l l  
types  o f  e x te rn a l m a rke t (know ledge , p ro d u c t and fa c to r) .  In  
a d d it io n  to  these u b iq u ito u s  t ra n s a c tio n  costs , w h ic h  may v a ry  
g re a t ly  fro m  m arke t to  m a rke t, th e re  are  tra n s a c tio n  costs  w h ich  are 
u n iq u e  to , o r  fo u n d  m o s tly  in , c e r ta in  m arke ts . Im p e rfe c tio n s  and 
assoc ia ted  tra n s a c tio n  costs  w h ic h  are  c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  know ledge  









Inadequate legal protection Cost of maintaining
for patents secrecy
Information impactedness, Increase disclosure & risk
causing buyer uncertainty dissipation of knowledge; or 
accept lcwer price for 
knowledge
Lack of absorptive capacity Transfer personnel to
in recipient firm recipient firm
Small number of buyers Bargaining costs; risk of
(bilateral monopoly) default
[SOURCE: A u th o r ]
I t  s h o u ld  be n o ted  th a t  th e  f in a l  im p e r fe c tio n  in  th e  Tab le  7-5, 
b i la te r a l m onopoly, is  n o t to  be fo u n d  e x c lu s iv e ly  in  know ledge 
m a rke ts ; i t  can a lso  e x is t  in  fa c to r  m arke ts , e s p e c ia lly  in  m arke ts  
f o r  raw  m a te ria ls . H i l l  and Chan Kim  (1988, p95) have suggested th a t  
th e  tra n s a c tio n  costs  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  th e  lic e n s in g  o f  know ledge can 
be tra c e d  to  tw o  m ain sources: th e  "e x -a n te  cos ts " o f  com posing a 
lic e n s in g  agreem ent (eg b a rg a in in g  costs) and th e  "e x -p o s t cos ts " 
a r is in g  fro m  licensee  o p p o rtu n is m  (eg e a rn ings  lo s t  fro m  know ledge  
d is s ip a tio n ) .  The la t t e r  o f  these  costs  d i f fe r s  fro m  Casson's 
co n ce p tio n  o f  a tra n s a c tio n  co s t as a m a rk e t-m a k in g  a c t iv i t y  in  th a t  
i t  a r is e s  fro m  even ts  w h ic h  o c cu r a f te r  a m a rke t has been made.
I f  reasonab le  a p p ro x im a tio n s  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  can be made, 
these  can be in te g ra te d  w ith  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  p ro d u c tio n  costs  to  
de te rm ine  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  mode. However, an 
a n a ly t ic a l fra m e w o rk  w h ich  in c lu d e s  tra n s a c tio n  and p ro d u c tio n  
costs  may n o t in  i t s e l f  be s u f f ic ie n t  to  e x p la in  th e  bus iness mode 
chosen fo r  a p a r t ic u la r  m a rke t because i t  ig n o re s  th e  e ffe c t w h ich  a 
f irm 's  bus iness s tra te g y  m ig h t have on i t s  d e c is io n -m a k in g . The
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p o s s ib le  im p a c t o f  bus iness s tra te g y  c o n s id e ra tio n s  on th e  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  are cons ide red  in  th e  fo llo w in g  se c tio n .
7.2.5 B usiness S tra te g y  C o n s id e ra tio n s
I f  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  is  ana lysed  fro m  a bus iness  
s tra te g y  p e rs p e c tiv e  th e n  th e  o b je c t iv e  w h ich  is  a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  
f irm  d i f fe r s  fro m  th a t  w h ich  is  a t t r ib u te d  to  i t  u n d e r th e  e c le c tic  
fra m e w o rk  o u t lin e d  e a r l ie r  in  th is  ch a p te r. The e c le c tic  v ie w p o in t 
p o s its  th a t  f irm s  tra n s a c t by  th e  mode w h ic h  m in im izes th e  sum o f  
p ro d u c tio n  and tra n s a c tio n  costs ; th e  bus iness  s tra te g y  v ie w p o in t,  
on th e  o th e r  hand, h o ld s  th a t  f irm s  tra n s a c t b y  th e  mode w h ich  
m axim ises p r o f i t s  th ro u g h  th e  im provem en t o f  t h e ir  c o m p e tit iv e  
p o s it io n  v is - a - v is  r iv a ls  [K o g u t (1988, p320)]. The tw o  v ie w p o in ts  
c o u ld  th e re fo re  p roduce  c o n f l ic t in g  dec is io n s ; i t  is  p o ss ib le , f o r  
exam ple, th a t  lic e n s in g  may re p re s e n t a more c o s t ly  mode o f  
t ra n s a c tin g  th a n  FDI o r  e x p o rts , b u t n e v e rth e le s s  one th a t  is  more 
p r o f i ta b le  i f  i t  p re -em p ts  c o m p e tit io n  fro m  r iv a l  f irm s .
The f ie ld  o f  bus iness s tra te g y  has been h e a v ily  in flu e n c e d  
o v e r th e  la s t  decade by th e  ideas o f  M ichae l P o r te r  (1980, 1985, 1986). 
P o r te r  deve loped  a fra m e w o rk  f o r  s tra te g ic  p la n n in g , th e  c o m p e tit iv e  
p o s it io n in g  model, w h ich  is  based upon concep ts d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  
in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iz a tio n  t ra d it io n ,  e x e m p lif ie d  in  th e  w o rk  o f  Joe 
B a in  (1956) and Edward Mason (1939). They deve loped  w ha t became 
know n as th e  s tru c tu re -c o n d u c t-p e r fo rm a n c e  (S-C-P) parad igm ; th is  
h e ld  th a t  in d u s t ry  s t ru c tu re  de te rm ined  th e  co n d u c t (ie  s tra te g y ) o f  
f irm s , whose jo in t  cond uc t th e n  d e te rm ined  th e  c o lle c t iv e  
pe rfo rm an ce  o f  th e  f irm s  in  th e  in d u s try .  The p rob lem  w ith  th is  
app roach  was th a t  i t  assigned a pass ive  ro le  to  th e  f irm ; i t 's  
co n d u c t m ere ly  re f le c te d  the  in d u s t ry  in  w h ich  i t  ope ra ted  and i t 's  
pe rfo rm an ce  c o u ld  th e re fo re  be e x p la in e d  by lo o k in g  d ir e c t ly  a t  th e  
in d u s t ry  s tru c tu re .
The resea rch  conducted  u n d e r th e  S-C-P pa rad igm  had been 
v e ry  much p u b lic -p o lic y  o r ie n te d , c o n c e n tra tin g  on how  c o m p e tit io n  
c o u ld  be in c rea sed  in  o rd e r to  enhance consum er w e lfa re . W hat 
P o r te r  d id , e s s e n tia lly , was to  tu rn  th e  S-C-P pa rad igm  on i t s  head
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by  d e m o n s tra tin g  how f irm s  c o u ld  e re c t e n try  b a r r ie rs  to  r e s t r ic t  
c o m p e tit io n , th e re b y  enhanc ing  p r o f i ts .  He th e re fo re  s w itch e d  th e  
fo cu s  o f  a t te n t io n  to w a rd s  th e  p o te n t ia l f o r  f irm s  to  change th e  
in d u s t ry  s t ru c tu re  in  t h e ir  fa v o u r .^
D unn ing  (1988) recogn ised  th e  fa c t  th a t  h is  e c le c tic  parad igm  
o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n  was d e f ic ie n t  because i t  d id  n o t ta k e  
accoun t o f  bus iness s tra te g y  c o n s id e ra tio n s ; he acknow ledged th a t  
" f irm -s p e c if ic  b e h a v io u ra l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  may be a c ru c ia l 
d e te rm in a n t o f  th e  response by MNCs to  any p a r t ic u la r  OLI 
c o n f ig u ra t io n "  (p6). D unn ing  drew  a t te n t io n  to  th e  c lose  s im ila r it ie s  
betw een th e  te rm in o lo g y  used by bus iness  s t ra te g is ts  (eg P o rte r)  and 
by p ro p o n e n ts  o f  th e  e c le c tic  parad igm , and p roposed  th a t  more 
a t te n t io n  s h o u ld  be p a id  to  in te g ra t in g  th e  m odern th e o ry  o f  
bus iness  s tra te g y  w ith  th e  e c le c tic  parad igm . An in d ic a t io n  o f  th e
p o s s ib le  fu tu re  d ire c t io n  o f  such th e o ry  in te g ra t io n  is  p ro v id e d  by
Reve (1990), who suggested a co m b in a tio n  o f  P o r te r ’s th e o ry  o f  
c o m p e tit iv e  p o s it io n in g  w ith  W illia m so n 's  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry .
7.3 CONCLUSIONS
I t  has been a rgued  in  th is  c h a p te r th a t  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  a n a ly t ic a l 
fra m e w o rk  f o r  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  is  an e c le c tic  one w h ic h  
in c lu d e s  in d u s t r ia l  o rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry , lo c a t io n  th e o ry  and
tra n s a c tio n  cos t th e o ry .
The a n a lys is  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  in v o lv e s  c o n s id e ra tio n  
o f  th e  costs  assoc ia ted  w ith  o p e ra tin g  in  fo u r  c lasses o f
in te rn a t io n a l m arke ts :
(1) The a rm 's - le n g th  te c h n o lo g y  m a rke t ( ie  th e  m a rke t f o r  
licences)^ ;
(2) The a rm 's - le n g th  c a p ita l and la b o u r  m arke ts ;
(3) The a rm 's - le n g th  p ro d u c t m arke t;
(4) The MNC's in te rn a l m arke ts .
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In  a d d it io n  to  th e  te c h n o lo g y  m arke t, p ro d u c t and fa c to r  
m arke ts  are  re le v a n t because FDI and e x p o rt in g  are a lte rn a tiv e s  to  
lic e n s in g . The MNC's in te r n a l m a rke t m ust a lso  be cons ide red  
because th e  a d o p tio n  o f  FDI o r  e x p o r t in g  w i l l  e x te n d  i t s  scope. The 
re la t io n s h ip  between these  fo u r  m arke ts  and th e  s tra te g ic  (ie  
m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g )  cho ices fa c in g  th e  MNC are i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  7-
5.
I f  im p e rfe c tio n s  in  th e  a rm 's - le n g th  te c h n o lo g y  m a rke t g iv e  r is e  
to  tra n s a c tio n  costs , th e  MNC w i l l  c o n s id e r u t i l is in g  i t s  te c h n o lo g y  
in te r n a l ly  to  genera te  i t s  own p ro d u c ts . I f  i t  chooses to  p roduce  
abroad, th is  w o u ld  in v o lv e  tra n s a c tin g  in  a rm 's - le n g th  fa c to r  
m arke ts  to  o b ta in  lo c a l la b o u r, and a lso  lo c a l c a p ita l i f  th e re  was 
an in s u f f ic ie n t  s u p p ly  w ith in  th e  MNC. I f  th e  MNC chooses to  
p rodu ce  a t home and e x p o rt i t s  p ro d u c ts , th is  w o u ld  n e ce ss ita te  
in v o lv e m e n t in  a rm 's - le n g th  p ro d u c t m arke ts .
As a l l  th re e  o f  these  e x te rn a l m arke ts  a re  l ik e ly  to  e x h ib it  
im p e rfe c tio n s , th e  MNC w i l l  have to  w e igh  up th e  r e la t iv e  
t ra n s a c tio n  costs  in c u rre d  in  each o f  them  in  d e c id in g  how  to  
e x p lo it  i t s  tech n o lo g y . In  c o n s id e r in g  th e  FDI and e x p o rt in g  o p tio n s  
i t  w i l l  have to  ta k e  in to  a ccou n t th e  a d d it io n a l cos ts  w h ich  w o u ld  
r e s u lt  fro m  th e  expans ion  o f  i t s  own in te rn a l m a rke t, such as e x tra  
in fo rm a tio n -g a th e r in g  costs . Thus, th e  ex is te n ce  o f  im p e rfe c tio n s  in  
a m a rke t do no t, p e r se, ru le  o u t th e  use o f  th a t  m a rke t. I t  is  o n ly  
when th e  tra n s a c tio n  costs  in c u r re d  in  a p a r t ic u la r  m arke t, n e t o f  
f irm  tra n s a c tio n  costs , a re  g re a te r  th a n  those  w h ic h  w o u ld  be 
in c u rre d  in  a lte rn a t iv e  m a rke ts  th a t  th e  use o f  th a t  p a r t ic u la r  
m a rke t may n o t be o p tim a l.
H owever, co m p a ra tive  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t a n a lys is  is  n o t by  i t s e l f  
s u f f ic ie n t  to  p re d ic t  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  mode w h ic h  w i l l  p re v a il.  
T h is  w i l l  a lso  be in f lu e n c e d  by  lo c a t io n a l fa c to rs , such as th e  h o s t-  
c o u n try  in f r a s t ru c tu re ,  w h ich  may o f fs e t  th e  d isadvan tages  o f  fa c to r  
m a rke t t ra n s a c tio n  costs  and lead  to  FDI be ing  chosen. I t  is  
necessary, th e re fo re , to  ta k e  accou n t o f  th e  p ro d u c tio n  costs  a r is in g  
in  d i f fe r e n t  lo c a tio n s , as w e ll as tra n s a c tio n  c o s ts .^  In  a d d it io n , 















cos ts  o v e r  tim e; these  are  l ik e ly  to  be assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  l i f e ­
cyc les  o f  p ro d u c ts , and the  te c h n o lo g ie s  used to  p roduce  them.
F in a lly ,  i t  is  necessary to  c o n s id e r the  s tra te g ic  b e h a v io u r o f  
f irm s  in  a n a ly s in g  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  as s itu a t io n s  may 
a r is e  in  w h ic h  th e  mode o f  bus iness  chosen is  m ore c o s t ly  in  te rm s 
o f  t ra n s a c t io n  and p ro d u c tio n  cos ts , b u t is  n e v e rth e le s s  the  m ost 
p r o f i ta b le  o p t io n  when th e  c o m p e tit iv e  p o s it io n  o f  th e  f irm  is  ta k e n  





1. A sepa ra ta  c h a p te r  has n o t been devo ted  to  e x p la in in g  th e  
fa c to rs  a ffe c t in g  th e  e x p o r t in g  d e c is io n  because' these are  
cove red  in  th e  d is c u ss io n s  o f  FDI th e o ry  and th e  th e o ry  o f  th e  
MNC in  ch a p te rs  4 and 5.
2. The in f lu e n c e  o f  b i la te r a l m onopo ly  on th e  cho ice  between FDI 
and lic e n s in g  was f i r s t  id e n t i f ie d  by  Hymer (1960).
3. T h is  d is t in c t io n  betw een o w n e rs h ip  and t ra n s a c tio n  advantages 
was o r ig in a l ly  made b y  D u nn ing  (1983a, 1983b).
4. Taece (1982, p l3 )  d e p ic te d  the  in i t i a l  G C cp j as lo w e r  th a n  th e  
i n i t i a l  GC^ i f  FDI d id  n o t in v o lv e  *de novo e n try .
5. F o r  exam ple, Teece suggested  th a t ,  f o r  any g iv e n  le v e l o f  
c o m p le x ity  o f  know -h ow , th e  h ig h e r  was th e  fre q u e n c y  o f  
tra n s a c tio n s  th e  lo w e r w o u ld  be th e  governance  costs  assoc ia ted  
w ith  FDI. T h is  is  because, once an overseas s u b s id ia ry  is  
e s ta b lis h e d , th e  m a rg in a l gove rnance  co s t o f  a d d it io n a l t ra n s fe rs  
is  q u ite  lo w  (1982, p l7 ).
6. Rugman e t a l's  (1985) m odel is  e s s e n tia lly  a re -s ta te m e n t o f  th e  
m odel w h ich  appeared in  Rugman (1981) and G iddy  and Rugman 
(1979). They a re  a i l ,  in  tu rn ,  e x te n s io n s  o f  th e  m odel deve loped  
b y  H irs c h  (1976) to  e x p la in  th e  cho ice  between e x p o r t in g  and FDI.
7. The assum ption  o f  e q u a l revenues fro m  each o f  th e  th re e  m a rke t 
s e rv ic in g  modes was based upon the  p re su m p tio n  th a t  the  m a rke t 
be in g  served by th e  MNC is  i t 's  home m arke t. Such a "g lo b a l 
scann e r " th e re fo re  has to  choose between home p ro d u c tio n , 
p ro d u c in g  ab road  f o r  e x p o rt to  the  home m arke t, o r  lic e n s in g  a 
fo re ig n  f irm  to  p roduce  f o r  e x p o r t  to  the  home m a rke t [Rugman 
e t a l (1985, ?124)].
8. P o r te r 's  c o m p e tit iv e  p o s it io n in g  m odel ho lds  th a t  th e re  are f iv e  
b a s ic  c o m p e tit iv e  fo rc e s  a t w o rk  in  an in d u s t ry  w h ich  de te rm ine  
th e  p o te n t ia l f o r  f irm s  to  ea rn  excess p ro f i t s :  r iv a l r y  among 
e x is t in g  firm s , th e  th re a t  o f  new e n tra n ts , th e  th re a t  o f  
s u b s t itu te  p ro d u c ts  o r  s e rv ice s , the  b a rg a in in g  pow er o f  
s u p p lie rs , and th e  b a rg a in in g  pow er o f  buyers.
9. The th e s is  is  concerned, s p e c if ic a l ly ,  w ith  th a t  s e c tio n  o f  th e  
a rm 's - le n g th  te c h n o lo g y  m a rke t w h ic h  is  com prised  o f  p a te n ts  
and know -how . (The te c h n o lo g y  m a rke t i t s e l f  is  p a r t  o f  a w id e r  
m a rke t in  know ledge).
10. P ro d u c tio n  cos ts  s h o u ld  be ta k e n  to  in c lu d e  re la te d  costs such 
as m a rk e tin g  and d is t r ib u t io n  cos ts , ie  the  to ta l  costs  in c u rre d
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PART III THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
1
INTRODUCTION
The fo llo w in g  ch a p te rs  d e sc rib e  th e  e m p ir ic a l s tu d y  w h ich  was 
u n d e rta k e n . The s tu d y  in v o lv e d  tw o  stages: th e  f i r s t  was an
a n a ly s is  o f  o f f i c ia l  gove rnm en t d a ta  to  d e te rm ine  th e  re la t iv e  
s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  lic e n s in g  v is - a - v is  FDI and e x p o rt in g . T h is  p ro v id e d  
a c o n te x t f o r  th e  m a jo r p a r t  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l s tu d y , w h ich  com prised  
th e  a n a ly s is  o f  da ta  gene ra ted  fro m  a m a iled  q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  
o f  UK-based MNCs.
C h a p te r E ig h t d e sc rib es  th e  re se a rch  m e thodo logy  em ployed. 
I t  d e ta ils  th e  p ro ce d u re  used to  s e le c t th e  p o p u la t io n  o f  f irm s
w h ic h  w ere su rveyed  by means o f  th e  m a iled  q u e s tio n n a ire , and th e  
responses o b ta in e d . I t  a lso  d iscusses th e  p ro s  and cons o f u s in g  
p a ra m e tr ic  and n o n p a ra m e tr ic  s ta t is t ic a l  p roced u re s  on th e  (m a in ly ) 
o rd in a l- le v e l da ta  gene ra ted  fro m  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , and o u t lin e s  
th e  s ta t is t ic a l  p roced u re s  w h ic h  were used to  ana lyse  th e  da ta . The 
c h a p te r  conc ludes w ith  a sum m ary o f  th e  advan tages and lim ita t io n s  
o f  th e  re se a rch  m ethodo logy.
C h a p te r N ine c o n ta in s  th e  p re lim in a ry  p a r t  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l 
s tu d y , nam ely th e  a n a ly s is  o f  o f f i c ia l  gove rnm en t da ta  on th e  
in v o lv e m e n t o f  UK com panies in  FDI, e x p o r t in g  and lic e n s in g  o v e r 
th e  p e r io d  1964-1984. I t  p ro v id e s  an in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  re la t iv e  
s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  l ic e n s in g  and th e  b reakd ow n  o f  a l l  th re e  fo rm s o f 
a c t iv i t y  by  in d u s t ry  and by g e o g ra p h ic a l area.
C h a p te r Ten c o n ta in s  a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  key  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
o f  th e  sam ple o f  com panies w h ich  p ro v id e d  useab le  q u e s tio n n a ire
responses. I t  p ro f i le s  th e  re la t iv e  size o f  th e  com panies, th e  n a tu re  
o f t h e ir  in d u s t r ia l  a c t iv i t ie s ,  and th e i r  le v e l o f  in v o lv e m e n t in  R&D. 
I t  a lso  ana lyses th e  com panies' own ra n k in g s  o f  t h e ir  in v o lv e m e n t in  
d i f fe r e n t  fo rm s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness , and o f  how these  were 
fo re c a s t to  change in  th e  fu tu re .  F in a lly ,  th e  c h a p te r describes  th e  
n a tu re  o f  th e  com pany sam ple 's in v o lv e m e n t in  lic e n s in g , ie  th e  ty p e  
o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  lic e n s e d  and th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  re la te d  o r  
u n re la te d  concerns were in v o lv e d .
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C h a p te r E leven  ana lyses q u e s tio n n a ire  d a ta  concerned  w ith  th e  
d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n . I t  d is c o v e rs  th e  e x te n t to  
w h ic h  th e  com panies e v a lu a te  th e  lic e n s in g  o p t io n  a g a in s t the  
a lte rn a t iv e s  a v a ila b le , and th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  lic e n s in g  is  chosen 
p u re ly  as a consequence o f  h o s t-g o v e rn m e n t c o n tro ls  on these  
a lte rn a t iv e s .  I t  a lso  ana lyses th e  r e la t iv e  ra n k in g s  w h ich  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  re sp o n d e n ts  a t t r ib u te d  to  tw e n ty  one v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  
w ere id e n t i f ie d  fro m  th e  l i t e r a tu r e  re v ie w  as in flu e n c e s  upon th e  
lic e n s in g  d e c is io n . In  a d d it io n ,  i t  ana lyses th e  in te rc o r re la t io n s  
be tw een these  v a r ia b le s  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r a s m a lle r s u b -s e t o f  
v a r ia b le s  can be used to  e x p la in  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n .
B o th  C h a p te r Tw e lve  and C h a p te r T h ir te e n  te s t  a num ber o f 
h ypo theses  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  l i t e r a tu r e  re v ie w . In  C h ap te r Tw elve  
m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  is  a p p lie d  to  s u ita b ly  tra n s fo rm e d  da ta  
to  te s t  n in e  hypo theses  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  l i te r a tu r e  on in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g . These hypo theses  l in k  c o rp o ra te  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  such as 
size and re se a rch  in te n s ity  to  in v o lv e m e n t in  lic e n s in g . C h a p te r 
T h ir te e n  em ploys n o n p a ra m e tr ic  s ta t is t ic a l  te c h n iq u e s  to  te s t  ten  
hypo the ses  d e r iv e d  fro m  tra n s a c t io n  co s t th e o ry . These hypo theses 
are  conce rned  w ith  a n t ic ip a te d  d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  
th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  p re s e n t in  a rm 's - le n g th  and in t r a - f i r m  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The f in a l  c h a p te r  o f  th e  th e s is , C h a p te r F o u rte e n , sum m arises 
th e  m ain  f in d in g s  o f  th e  re se a rch , o u t lin e s  i t s  l im ita t io n s  and i t s  
im p lic a t io n s , and a lso  p roposes areas f o r  fu tu re  resea rch .
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CHAPTER EIGHT - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In  o rd e r  to  meet th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f  th e  re se a rch  a c a re fu l ly  se lec te d  
sam ple o f  com panies l is te d  in  The Times 1000 f o r  1983-84 (A lle n , 1984) 
w ere su rve ye d  by means o f  a m a iled  q u e s tio n n a ire . The p ro ce d u re  
used to  s e le c t these  com panies, and th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  
p o p u la t io n  fro m  w h ic h  th e y  w ere d raw n , a re  d e s c rib e d  in  th is  
c h a p te r. In  a d d it io n , th e  d a ta -c o l le c t io n  m ethod and th e  p ro ce d u re  
fo r  c a lc u la t in g  th e  sam ple response  ra te  are e x p la in e d . The bas ic  
s ta t is t ic a l  m ethods used f o r  a n a ly s in g  th e  d a ta  are  a lso  se t o u t, and 
th e  advan tages and l im ita t io n s  o f  th e  re se a rch  m e th odo logy  are 
describ ed .
8.2 SURVEY POPULATION SELECTION PROCEDURE
As th e  re se a rch  was concerned  w ith  UK-owned MNCs th a t  were 
in v o lv e d  in  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g , i t  was necessary to  
e xc lude  fro m  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la t io n  those  com panies l is te d  in  The 
Times 1000 w h ich  were e ith e r  fo re ig n -o w n e d , had no overseas 
s u b s id ia r ie s , o r  d id  n o t lic e n s e  te c h n o lo g y  to  overseas com panies.
F o re ig n -o w n e d  com panies and com panies th a t  had no overseas 
s u b s id ia r ie s  were id e n t i f ie d  u s in g  p u b lic ly  a v a ila b le  sources o f 
in fo rm a tio n . No such in fo rm a tio n  was a v a ila b le  to  enab le  com panies 
n o t engaged in  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  to  be id e n t if ie d ,  
so s u rro g a te  measures had to  be em ployed em ployed to  d is t in g u is h  
these  com panies. The m easures chosen were in v o lv e m e n t in  th e  
m a n u fa c tu r in g  and c o n s tru c t io n  se c to rs , and in v o lv e m e n t in  resea rch  
and deve lopm en t (R&D). Thus, any com panies w h ic h  were n o t a c t iv e  
in  these  in d u s t r ia l  se c to rs  o r  d id  n o t devo te  e x p e n d itu re  to  R&D 
were e xc luded  s ince  such com panies were deemed u n l ik e ly  to  possess 
any p ro p r ie ta ry  te ch n o lo g y , and th e re fo re  u n l ik e ly  to  have th e  
p o te n t ia l to  be in v o lv e d  in  lic e n s in g . In  a d d it io n , any com panies 
w h ich  had gone in to  l iq u id a t io n ,  o r  had been ta k e n  o v e r s ince  the  
p u b lic a t io n  o f  The Times 1000 fo r  1983-84, were e lim in a te d .
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CHAPTER 8
A com pany was th e re fo re  d e fin e d  as b e lo n g in g  to  th e  s u rv e y  
p o p u la t io n  i f  i t  was l is te d  in  The Times 1000 and possessed th e  
fo llo w in g  f iv e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s :
(a) H e a d q u a rte rs  lo c a te d  in  th e  UK;
(b) N o t in  l iq u id a t io n ,  o r  th e  s u b s id ia ry  o f  a n o th e r  company;
(c) In v o lv e m e n t in  m a n u fa c tu r in g  o r  c o n s tru c t io n ;
(d) M u lt in a t io n a l i ty ;
(e) In v o lv e m e n t in  R&D.
The num ber o f  com panies possess ing  a l l  f iv e  o f  these  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  was fo u n d  to  be 322, and a l l  were se n t a copy o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire .
Because th e  p ro ce d u re  f o r  d e f in in g  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n  
in v o lv e d  th e  use o f  s u rro g a te  measures ( in v o lv e m e n t in  
m a n u fa c tu r in g  o r  c o n s tru c t io n , and a com m ittm en t to  R&D) i t  was 
re co g n ise d  th a t  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la t io n  w o u ld  in c lu d e  a num ber o f  
com panies th a t  w ere n o t a c tu a lly  in v o lv e d  in  in te rn a t io n a l 
te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g . A lth o u g h  such com panies were l i k e ly  to  
possess p ro p r ie ta ry  te c h n o lo g y  as a r e s u lt  o f  t h e ir  R&D e f fo r t  th e re  
was no g u a ra n te e  th a t  th e y  w o u ld  n e c e s s a r ily  choose lic e n s in g  as a 
means o f  e x p lo it in g  th is  te c h n o lo g y . The q u e s tio n n a ire  was 
th e re fo re  des igned to  id e n t i f y  these  in e l ig ib le  com panies by  th e  
in c lu s io n  o f  a q u e s tio n  a t th e  b e g in n in g  o f th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  w h ich  
asked w h e th e r o r  n o t th e  re sp o n d e n ts  had any te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents w ith  overseas com panies.
The com panies w h ic h  answ ered 'no ' to  th is  q u e s tio n  and 
re tu rn e d  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  id e n t i f ie d  them se lves as be ing  o u tw ith  
th e  scope o f  th e  su rve y ; by s u b tra c t in g  these  in e l ig ib le  com panies 
fro m  th e  in i t ia l ,  in e x a c t, s u rv e y  p o p u la t io n  an amended s u rv e y  
p o p u la t io n  was o b ta in e d  w h ic h  gave a more a ccu ra te  e s tim a te  o f  th e  
t ru e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n . The com panies w h ich  responded  p o s it iv e ly  
to  th is  q u e s tio n  and com ple ted  th e  re m a in d e r o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  
c o n s t itu te  th e  sam ple o f  com panies upon w h ic h  th e  s ta t is t ic a l  
a n a ly s is  has been conducted  and fro m  w h ic h  in fe re n c e s  are  d raw n  
c o n ce rn in g  th e  amended s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n .
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CHAPTER 8
The way in  w h ic h  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n  came to  be chosen is  
i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  8-1. In fo rm a tio n  co n ce rn in g  th e  f i r s t  tw o  
c r i t e r ia  were o b ta in e d  d i r e c t ly  fro m  The Times 1000. A company was 
deemed to  be U K-based i f  i t  was l is te d  on th e  London S tock  
Exchange, and i t s  u lt im a te  h o ld in g  company was lo c a te d  in  th e  UK. 
A l l  com panies q u o te d  o n ly  on overseas s to c k  m arke ts  were 
th e re fo re  e lim in a te d  fro m  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n . T h is  le f t  a t o ta l  
o f  709 UK-based com panies. Any company l is te d  in  The Times 1000 
w h ic h  had been ta k e n  o v e r by  a n o th e r company o r  had gone in to  
l iq u id a t io n  b e fo re  th e  s u rv e y  commenced, was exc luded . The num ber 
o f  com panies in  th is  c a te g o ry  num bered 31.
The f in a l  th re e  stages in  th e  s e le c tio n  p ro ce d u re  in v o lv e d  th e  
p ro ce ss in g  o f  in fo rm a tio n  co n ta in e d  in  th e  m ost re c e n t A n n u a l 
R e po rts  and A ccoun ts  o f  th e  re m a in in g  com panies. A com pany w h ic h  
had no in v o lv e m e n t in  e i th e r  m a n u fa c tu rin g  o r  c o n s tru c t io n  was 
e lim in a te d  fro m  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la t io n  because i t  was u n l ik e ly  to  be 
in v o lv e d  in  R&D. Thus, 159 com panies o p e ra tin g  in  se c to rs  such as 
r e ta i l in g ,  p ro p e rty , le is u re  and f in a n c ia l se rv ice s  were exc luded .
A com pany was c la s s if ie d  as m u lt in a t io n a l i f  i t  had a t le a s t one 
s u b s id ia ry  in c o rp o ra te d  in  a c o u n try  o th e r  th a n  th e  UK. One 
h u n d re d  and tw e n ty  fo u r  com panies fa ile d  to  meet th is  re q u ire m e n t 
and w ere exc luded . In fo rm a tio n  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  A n n u a l R e po rts  
and A ccoun ts  o f  th e  com panies w h ich  rem a ined a f te r  th is  stage was 
used to  a s c e rta in  i f  th e y  were in v o lv e d  in  R&D. The presence o f  an 
R&D c a p a b il i ty  was used as a s u rro g a te  f o r  th e  l ik e ly  possess ion  o f 
p a te n ts  and know -h ow , and th u s  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  th e  company be ing  
in v o lv e d  in  lic e n s in g  tra n s a c tio n s .
F o llo w in g  G ray (1983), com panies were ta ke n  to  be a c t iv e  in  R&D 
i f  t h e ir  accoun ts  possessed any o f  th e  fo llo w in g :
-  a s ta te m e n t o f  an a c co u n tin g  p o lic y  f o r  R&D;
-  any o th e r  re fe re n c e  to  R&D (u s u a lly  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  
C ha irm an 's  S ta tem en t o r  th e  D ire c to rs ' R e po rt);
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CHAPTER 8
O f th e  395 com panies re m a in in g  a f te r  th e  p re v io u s  s e le c tio n  
stage, 73 were fo u n d  to  have no in v o lv e m e n t in  R&D. T h is  le f t  a 
f in a l  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n  o f  322 com panies.
F o r m ost o f  th e  com panies in  th e  p o p u la tio n , in fo rm a tio n  
co n ce rn in g  c r i t e r ia  (c), (d) and (e) was o b ta in e d  d ir e c t ly  fro m  A n n u a l 
R e p o rt and A ccoun ts . However, f o r  86 o f  th e  com panies A n n u a l 
R e po rts  and A ccoun ts  c o u ld  n o t be o b ta in e d  because these  com panies 
were u n d e r no o b lig a t io n  to  make them  p u b lic ly  a v a ila b le  s ince  th e y  
were n o t quo ted  on th e  s to c k  m a rke t. The re le v a n t in fo rm a tio n  f o r  
these  com panies was th e re fo re  o b ta in e d  fro m  "E x te l"  ca rds, w h ic h  
p ro v id e  a sum mary o f  com panies' A n n u a l R e po rts  and A ccoun ts  based 
upon a n n u a l re tu rn s  s u b m itte d  to  Companies House. In  p a r t ic u la r ,  
"E x te l"  ca rds  l i s t  th e  m ain a c t iv i t ie s  o f  com panies, and th e  c o u n try  
o f  in c o rp o ra t io n  o f  t h e ir  s u b s id ia r ie s , th u s  a llo w in g  s e le c tio n  
c r i t e r ia  (c) and (d) to  be m easured. From  th is  source , 71 com panies 
were c la s s if ie d .
H ow ever, because "E x te l"  ca rds  do n o t l i s t  a c c o u n tin g  p o lic ie s , 
th e  f in a l  c r i te r io n  f o r  in c lu s io n  in  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n , 
in v o lv e m e n t in  R&D, c o u ld  n o t be m easured u s in g  th is  in fo rm a tio n  
source . The re m a in in g  15 com panies had th e re fo re  to  be c la s s if ie d  
u s in g  p e rs o n a l ju dgem ent re g a rd in g  th e ir  l i k e ly  in v o lv e m e n t in  R&D, 
supp lem en ted  w here p o s s ib le  by  th e  use o f  "M acC arthy" ca rds, w h ich  
p ro v id e d  re c e n t in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t th e  a c t iv i t ie s  o f  some o f th e  
com panies in  th e  fo rm  o f  p ress c u tt in g s . O f these  com panies, 6 were 
in c lu d e d  in  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n .
8.3 POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
The c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  com ple te  Times 1000 p o p u la t io n  are  
sum m arised in  Tab le  8-1, w h ic h  d isagg rega tes  th e  p o p u la t io n  by  th e  
f iv e  e x c lu s io n  c r i t e r ia  d e sc rib e d  e a r lie r .
T h is  ta b le  i l lu s t r a te s  th e  stages in  th e  s e le c tio n  p ro ce d u re  a t 
w h ic h  com panies were e lim in a te d  fro m  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n . I t  










f o r  exam ple, a fo re ig n -b a s e d  com pany c o u ld  a lso  possess th e  
c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  h a v in g  no in v o lv e m e n t in  R&D. H owever, once i t  
had been e s ta b lis h e d  th a t  a com pany was n o t U K -based th e re  was no 
need to  use th e  in fo rm a tio n  co n ta in e d  in  i t s  A n n u a l R e po rt and 
A ccoun ts . S im ila r ly ,  a f irm  n o t in v o lv e d  in  m a n u fa c tu rin g  o r  
c o n s tru c t io n  m ig h t a lso  have been u n in a t io n a l,  b u t  once th e  f i r s t  
c r i t e r io n  had been s a t is f ie d  i t  was n o t necessary  to  d is c o v e r 
w h e th e r i t  had any overseas s u b s id ia r ie s . Thus, because o f  th e  
s e q u e n tia l n a tu re  o f  th e  s e le c tio n  p ro ce d u re  ( i l lu s t r a te d  in  F ig u re  
8-1) each com pany is  d e fin e d  as b e lo n g in g  to  o n ly  one ca tegory .
8.4 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE
8.4.1 In tro d u c t io n
D ata f o r  th is  s tu d y  were c o lle c te d  by  means o f  a m a il s u rv e y  
cond uc te d  d u r in g  th e  au tum n o f  1984. The q u e s tio n n a ire s  were 
m a iled  to  s p e c if ic  in d iv id u a ls  w ith in  each company. Because 
com pany e xe c u tiv e s  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  lic e n s in g  a re  n o t g e n e ra lly  
id e n t i f ie d  in  a nn ua l re p o r ts  and bus iness  d ire c to r ie s ,  a num ber o f 
d i f fe r e n t  ca te g o rie s  o f  e x e c u tiv e  were co n tac ted .
Those e xe c u tiv e s  th a t  were know n to  be members o f th e  
'L ic e n s in g  E xe cu tive s  S o c ie ty ' were f i r s t  cho ice . I f  a company d id  
n o t have  an e x e c u tiv e  l is te d  in  th e  D ire c to ry  o f  th is  o rg a n is a tio n , 
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  was sen t to  those  e x e c u tiv e s  know n  to  be w o rk in g  
in  p a te n t and lic e n s in g  depa rtm en ts . These e x e c u tiv e s  were l is te d  
in  th e  R e g is te r p u b lis h e d  by 'The C h a rte re d  In s t i tu te  o f  P a te n t 
A gen ts '. A n nua l R e po rts  were used to  id e n t i f y  s u ita b le  e xe c u tiv e s  
f o r  th e  re m a in in g  com panies. M ost o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e s  chosen fro m  
th is  sou rce  occup ied  b o a rd - le v e l p o s it io n s . Where bus iness 
deve lopm en t o r  com m erc ia l d ire c to rs  were id e n t if ie d ,  these  were 
f i r s t  cho ice . O the rw ise , th e  q u e s tio n n a ire s  were m a iled  to  m anaging 
d ire c to rs ,  f in a n c e  d ire c to rs  o r  company s e c re ta rie s . Where th e  
la t t e r  was a lso  le g a l d ire c to r ,  th is  in d iv id u a l was chosen in  
p re fe re n c e  to  th e  o th e r  tw o  s ince  c o rp o ra te  le g a l depa rtm en ts  are 
o fte n  c lo s e ly  in v o lv e d  in  the  a d m in is tra t io n  o f  lic e n s in g .
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A l l  e x e c u tiv e s  co n ta c te d  were asked to  fo rw a rd  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  to  an a p p ro p r ia te  pe rson  in  t h e ir  com pany i f  th e y  
were unab le  to  com ple te  i t  them se lves. Each q u e s tio n n a ire  was 
accom panied by  tw o  c o ve r le t te r s  and a s tam p-add ressed  enve lope  
f o r  re tu rn in g  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  to  th e  sender.
8.4.2 C over L e tte rs
C opies o f  th e  tw o  c o ve r le t te r s  a re  co n ta in e d  in  A p p e n d ix  A. The 
le t te r s  were in d iv id u a l ly  addressed to  each e x e c u tiv e  and s igned  by 
th e  p ro je c t  s u p e rv is o r  and a u th o r  re s p e c tiv e ly .
The f i r s t  is  a le t t e r  o f  in t r o d u c t io n  fro m  th e  p ro je c t  s u p e rv is o r  
w h ic h  b r ie f ly  o u t lin e d  th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f  th e  s tu d y  and re q u e s te d  th e  
c o -o p e ra tio n  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e . The second is  a m ore le n g th y  le t t e r  
fro m  th e  a u th o r  w h ic h  e x p la in e d  th e  aims o f  th e  re se a rch  in  g re a te r  
d e ta il.  In  p a r t ic u la r ,  i t  s p e c if ie d  th e  ty p e  o f  lic e n s in g  w ith  w h ich  
th e  s tu d y  was concerned  and i t  d e fin e d  w h a t was m eant by 
te c h n o lo g y  f o r  th e  pu rposes  o f  th e  s tu d y . The le t t e r  a lso  assu red  
re c ip ie n ts  th a t  t h e ir  re p lie s  w o u ld  be tre a te d  as c o n f id e n t ia l.
8.4.3 The Q u e s tio n n a ire
The co n te n ts  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  w h ic h  p ro v id e d  th e  da ta  used f o r  
th is  s tu d y  are  re p ro d u c e d  in  A p p e n d ix  B. B e fo re  co m p le tin g  th e  
f i r s t  s e c tio n  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  re spon den ts  had to  answ er a f i l t e r  
q u e s tio n  designed to  d is c o v e r  w h e th e r o r  n o t t h e ir  com pany was 
in v o lv e d  in  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g . I f  so, th e  q u e s tio n  
a lso  asked i f  th e  com pany's lic e n s in g  agreem ents were w ith  
u n re la te d  overseas com panies, o r  w ith  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s , o r  
b o th . Respondents who in d ic a te d  th a t  t h e ir  com pany had no 
in v o lv e m e n t in  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  w ere asked to  tu rn  
to  th e  back  page o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , and use th e  space a llo c a te d  
f o r  comments to  b r ie f ly  s ta te  w hy t h e ir  com pany had no such 
in v o lv e m e n t. They were th e n  asked to  re tu rn  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  
w ith o u t  f u r th e r  com p le tion .
The in c lu s io n  o f  th is  f i l t e r  q u e s tio n  th e re fo re  id e n t i f ie d
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com panies th a t  had been m is -s p e c if ie d  as members o f  th e  s u rv e y  
p o p u la tio n . By re tu rn in g  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , r a th e r  th a n  d is c a rd in g  
i t  because o f  i t s  la c k  o f  re le va n ce  to  t h e ir  c o rp o ra te  a c t iv i t ie s ,  
these  respon den ts  enab led  th e  't ru e ' s u rv e y  p o p u la t io n  to  be more 
a c c u ra te ly  es tim a ted , and th u s  enab led  a m ore m e a n in g fu l sam ple 
response  ra te  to  be c a lc u la te d .^
R espondents who answ ered th a t  th e ir  com panies were o n ly  
in v o lv e d  in  th e  lic e n s in g  o f  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  w ere in s tru c te d  to  
s ta r t  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  fro m  S e c tio n  I I I ,  s ince  th e  f i r s t  tw o  se c tio n s  
are  conce rned  s o le ly  w ith  th e  lic e n s in g  o f  u n re la te d  overseas f irm s .
The f i r s t  s e c tio n  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , t i t le d  'The In te rn a t io n a l 
L ic e n s in g  D e c is io n 1, is  concerned  w ith  th e  fa c to rs  w h ic h  in f lu e n c e  
c o rp o ra te  a t t i tu d e s  to w a rd s  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g . The second s e c tio n , 
headed 'In te rn a t io n a l L ic e n s in g  A c t iv i t y ' ,  g a th e re d  in fo rm a tio n  ab o u t 
th e  c h a ra c te r  and c o n te n t o f  these  lic e n s in g  agreem ents. The 
s e c tio n  is  d iv id e d  in to  tw o  p a r ts . The f i r s t ,  P a rt A, dea ls  w ith  
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents w h ic h  p ro v id e  e ith e r  p a te n ts  on th e ir  own o r 
p a te n ts  com bined w ith  kn o w -h o w  a n d /o r  tra d e m a rk s . The second, 
P a rt B, dea ls  w ith  l ic e n s in g  agreem ents w h ich  c a te r  e x c lu s iv e ly  fo r  
tra n s fe rs  o f  know -h ow , o r  k n o w -h o w  com bined w ith  tra d e  m arks.
In te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  tra n s a c tio n s  c a r r ie d  o u t w ith in  
com panies, ie  be tw een s u b s id ia r ie s  o f  th e  same company, were 
exam ined in  th e  t h i r d  s e c tio n  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , t i t le d  'I n t r a -  
G roup L ic e n s in g '. The f in a l  s e c tio n  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , t i t le d  
'G enera l In fo rm a tio n ',  o b ta in e d  d a ta  on fo u r  m a jo r c o rp o ra te  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s :  sa les tu rn o v e r ,  re s e a rc h  and deve lopm en t, p a te n ts ,
and o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re .
8.4.3 Q u e s tio n n a ire  P re - te s t
F o u r m onths b e fo re  th e  s u rv e y  commenced, a d r a f t  v e rs io n  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  was sen t to  n in e  com panies in  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n . 
I t  was made c le a r  in  th e  accom panying  c o v e r le t t e r  th a t  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  was o n ly  in  d r a f t  fo rm  and th a t  a lte ra t io n s  w o u ld  be 
made in  th e  l ig h t  o f  any su g g e s tio n s  made by th e  re c ip ie n ts .
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P e rson a l in te rv ie w s  were co n d u c te d  w ith  th e  e x e c u tiv e s  who 
com p le ted  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . A l l  th e  com panies se le c te d  f o r  th e
p re - te s t  were chosen because t h e ir  h e a d q u a rte rs  were lo c a te d  in
S co tland , th u s  m aking  i t  c o n v e n ie n t f o r  c o n d u c tin g  th e  fo llo w -u p
in te rv ie w s .
O f th e  n in e  com panies s u rve ye d  in  th e  p re - te s t ,  fo u r  re tu rn e d  
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  and were w i l l in g  to  d iscuss  t h e ir  responses, th re e  
in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  s u b je c t m a tte r  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  was n o t
a p p lic a b le  to  t h e ir  o p e ra tio n s , and th e  re m a in in g  tw o  fa i le d  to  
re p ly .  A f te r  th e  com ple ted  q u e s tio n n a ire s  had been re c e iv e d  fro m  
th e  fo u r  re s p o n d in g  com panies a s t ru c tu re d  in te rv ie w  schedu le  was 
d raw n  up f o r  each com pany on th e  bas is  o f  th e  re p lie s  g ive n  in  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire , and in te rv ie w s  w ere su b s e q u e n tly  h e ld  w ith  th e  
e x e c u tiv e s  concerned. Th ree  o f  these  in te rv ie w s  were conducted  
fa c e - to - fa c e , th e  o th e r  was cond uc te d  o v e r th e  te lep hone . T h is  
la t t e r  case was n e c e s s ita te d  by  th e  busy schedu le  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  
concerned.
The o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  p re - te s t  s u rv e y  was to  id e n t i f y  any 
in a d e q u a c ie s  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  and any u s e fu l a d d it io n s  w h ich  
c o u ld  be made. S p e c if ic a lly ,  i t  se t o u t to  d is c o v e r  th e  fo llo w in g : 
w h e th e r th e  q u e s tio n s  w o u ld  be in te rp re te d  c o r re c t ly ;  w h e th e r th e  
in fo rm a tio n  be ing  re q u e s te d  was r o u t in e ly  a v a ila b le , and i f  n o t, how 
much tim e  and e f fo r t  w o u ld  have to  be expended to  o b ta in  i t ;  
w h e th e r th e  te rm in o lo g y  used th ro u g h o u t th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  was 
u n d e rs to o d ; and w h e th e r re sp o n d e n ts  f e l t  th a t  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  
to o k  to o  lo n g  to  com ple te , o r  re q u e s te d  in fo rm a tio n  w h ic h  was 
re g a rd e d  as c o n f id e n t ia l.
As a r e s u lt  o f  th e  p re - te s t  a num ber o f  changes were made to  
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . Among th e  m ost im p o r ta n t o f  these  was th e  
a l te ra t io n  o f  s e v e ra l q u e s tio n s  in  S ections I I  and I I I  to  in c lu d e  a 
sca le  o f  response ca te g o rie s  f o r  respon den ts  to  t ic k .  These scales 
re p la c e d  re q u e s ts  f o r  e xa c t f ig u re s  co n ta in e d  in  the  d r a f t  
q u e s tio n n a ire . I t  was re co g n ise d  th a t  th is  change w o u ld  r e s u lt  in  
o r d in a l- le v e l da ta  be ing  gen e ra te d  ra th e r  th a n  in te r v a l- le v e l da ta , 
b u t th is  change was n e v e rth e le s s  rega rded  as a n e c e s s ity  as th e
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absence o f  sca les w o u ld  p ro b a b ly  have  re s u lte d  in  v e ry  l i t t l e  da ta  
be ing  gene ra ted  fro m  th e  q u e s tio n s  concerned.
None o f  th e  re sp o n d e n ts  re p o r te d  any d i f f i c u l t y  in  a d ju s t in g  
th e ir  answ ers to  th e  d i f fe r e n t  m easurem ent sca les used th ro u g h o u t 
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  (s e v e n -p o in t, f iv e - p o in t  and fo u r - p o in t  scales are  
used in  v a r io u s  p laces) and none expressed  any p re fe re n c e  f o r  one 
p a r t ic u la r  m easurem ent sca le  o v e r a n o th e r. A n o th e r  change 
re s u lt in g  fro m  comments by th e  p re - te s t  s u b je c ts  was th e  a d d it io n  
o f  tw o  in t r o d u c to r y  p a ra g ra p h s  a t th e  s ta r t  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  
e x p la in in g  th e  te rm s used th ro u g h o u t.
A l l  th re e  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e s  w ith  whom fa c e - to - fa c e  in te rv ie w s  
were conducted  agreed to  com p le te  th e  f in a l  v e rs io n  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  i f  i t  was se n t to  them , and a l l  d u ly  o b lig e d . In  
a d d it io n  to  th e  n in e  com panies c o n ta c te d  in  S co tland , th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  p re - te s t  a lso  in v o lv e d  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  an 
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  la w y e r fro m  a le a d in g  London -base d  la w  f irm  
and a lic e n s in g  e x e c u tiv e  fro m  one o f  th e  la rg e s t UK m u lt in a t io n a ls .  
B o th  o f  these in d iv id u a ls  o f fe re d  comments, by  co rrespondence , on 
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire .
8.4.4 F o llo w -u p  P rocedu re
In  o rd e r  to  in c rea se  th e  sam ple response  ra te  tw o  fo llo w -u p  le t te r s  
were sen t o u t, a t in te r v a ls  o f  f iv e  and te n  weeks a f te r  th e  f i r s t  
m a ilin g , to  those  e x e c u tiv e s  th a t  had  s t i l l  to  re p ly .
The in i t i a l  m a ilin g  p ro d u ce d  reponses fro m  164 com panies. 
These reponses f e l l  in to  one o f  th re e  c a te g o rie s : e ith e r  th e
q u e s tio n n a ire  was com ple ted  by  th e  resp o n d e n ts , o r  th e y  in d ic a te d  
th a t  i t  was n o t a p p lic a b le  to  them , o r  e lse th e y  s ta te d  th a t  th e y  
were u n w il l in g  to  co -o p e ra te . The f i r s t  fo l lo w -u p  le t t e r  (re p ro d u ce d  
in  A p p e n d ix  A) was th e re fo re  p o s te d  to  th e  re m a in in g  158 com panies. 
T h is  le t t e r  em phasized th e  need f o r  a la rg e  response  to  ach ieve  
v a l id  and m e a n in g fu l re s u lts .  I t  a lso  re -a s s u re d  re c ip ie n ts  o f  th e  
c o n f id e n t ia l i t y  o f  t h e ir  re p lie s , and was accom panied by  a n o th e r 
copy o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  in  case th e  f i r s t  one had been m is la id .
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A fu r th e r  80 re p lie s  were re c e iv e d  as a r e s u lt  o f  th e  second 
m a ilin g , so the  f in a l  fo l lo w -u p  le t t e r  (see A p p e n d ix  A) was sen t to  
th e  re m a in in g  78 com panies. Once aga in , th e  assurance o f 
c o n f id e n t ia l i t y  was s tresse d , and a n o th e r copy o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  
was in c lu d e d . A f u r th e r  32 re p lie s  were re c e iv e d  a f te r  th is  t h i r d  
m a ilin g , y ie ld in g  a t o ta l  response o f 276. T h is  le f t  46 f irm s  w h ic h  
fa i le d  to  respond  in  one way o r  a n o th e r to  th e  su rve y .
8.5 QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE
The responses to  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  are  ana lysed  in  Tab le  8-2.
TABLE 8-2




international technology licensing 97
Insignificant involvement in







Percent of positive responses to
eligible firms (86/182) 47%
Percent of total responses to
total possible responses (276/322) 86%
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As Tab le  8-2 shows, th e  num ber o f  p o s it iv e  responses to ta lle d  
86. These are th e  com panies w h ic h  re tu rn e d  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  
e ith e r  f u l l y  o r  p a r t ia l ly  com ple ted . These 86 p o s it iv e  responses 
re p re s e n t 27 p e r cen t o f  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n . T h is  f ig u re  is  n o t, 
how ever, th e  sample response ra te  because th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n  
was fo u n d  to  c o n ta in  140 com panies th a t  s h o u ld  n o t have been 
in c lu d e d . These are  th e  com panies th a t  responded  to  th e
q u e s tio n n a ire  by  in d ic a t in g  th a t  i t s  s u b je c t m a tte r  was n o t
a p p lic a b le  to  them.
A lth o u g h  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  o n ly  asked i f  com panies had any 
in v o lv e m e n t in  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g , th e  'in e l ig ib le ' 
responses were b ro k e n  down in to  tw o  sepa ra te  ca te g o rie s  on th e  
bas is  o f  th e  re p lie s  re ce ive d : th o se  com panies w h ich  had no
in v o lv e m e n t in  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g , and th o se  
com panies w h ic h  were in v o lv e d , b u t whose le v e l o f  in v o lv e m e n t was 
in s ig n if ic a n t  when com pared to  t h e ir  o v e ra l l o p e ra tio n s . O f th e  140 
responses c la s s if ie d  as 'in e l ig ib le ',  97 f e l l  in to  th e  f i r s t  ca te g o ry  
and 43 in to  th e  second ca tego ry .
A d e c is io n  was made n o t to  in c lu d e  a q u e s tio n  in  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  w h ich  gave com panies th e  o p p o r tu n ity  o f  s ta t in g  th a t  
t h e ir  in v o lv e m e n t in  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  was 
in s ig n if ic a n t ,  s ince  such a q u e s tio n  m ig h t have in d u ce d  some f irm s  
to  answ er in  th e  a f f i rm a t iv e  when th e ir  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  was in  
fa c t  s ig n if ic a n t ,  th e re b y  a v o id in g  th e  need to  answ er th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire . I t  was deemed to  be more a p p ro p r ia te  to  le t  f irm s  
s ta te  them se lves, w ith o u t  p ro m p tin g , w h e th e r th e y  th o u g h t th a t  
t h e ir  in v o lv e m e n t was in s ig n if ic a n t ,  and 43 d u ly  d id  so.
When th e  140 com panies w h ic h  w ere fo u n d  to  be o u tw ith  th e  
scope o f  th e  s u rv e y  are  s u b tra c te d  fro m  th e  in i t i a l  s u rv e y
p o p u la t io n  o f  322, an amended s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n  o f  182 com panies is  
o b ta in e d . T h is  amended f ig u re  o f  182 e l ig ib le  com panies was used as 
th e  benchm ark  fo r  c a lc u la t in g  th e  sam ple response ra te  fo r ,  as 
H o in v i l le  e t a l (1978, p71) p o in t  o u t, " th e  base fo r  c a lc u la t in g  th e  
response  ra te  is  th e  num ber o f  'in -s c o p e ' e lem ents se lec te d  (n o t th e  
num ber in i t i a l l y  se lec te d )".
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The sam ple response  ra te  was th e re fo re  47 p e r cen t, o b ta in e d  
by e x p re ss in g  th e  86 p o s it iv e  responses as a pe rcen tage  o f  th e  182 
e l ig ib le  f irm s . The 46 f irm s  th a t  n e ve r responded in  any way were 
in c lu d e d  in  th e  to ta l  num ber o f  e l ig ib le  f irm s  s ince  th e re  was no 
way o f  d e te rm in in g  th a t  th e y  were in e lig ib le .  The o v e ra l l response  
ra te  to  th e  s u rv e y  was 86 p e r cen t. T h is  ra te  was o b ta in e d  by 
d iv id in g  th e  num ber o f  t o ta l  responses ( in e l ig ib le  f irm s , p o s it iv e  
and n e g a tiv e  re p lie s , and in a d e q u a te ly  com ple ted  q u e s tio n n a ire s ) by 
th e  num ber o f  t o ta l  p o s s ib le  responses.
These response  ra te s  com pare fa v o u ra b ly  w ith  those  fro m  
o th e r  q u e s tio n n a ire  su rve ys  o f  MNCs. In  a s tu d y  o f  pe rfo rm an ce  
e v a lu a t io n  p ra c t ic e s  in  US chem ica l MNCs, M o rs ica to  (1980) ach ieved  
an o v e ra l l response ra te  o f  72 p e r cen t, and a response  ra te  o f  36 
p e r cen t f o r  e l ig ib le  f irm s . K e lly  (1981) o b ta in e d  an o v e ra l l
response  ra te  o f  61 p e r cen t f o r  h e r  s u rv e y  on th e  fo re ig n
in v e s tm e n t e v a lu a tio n  p ra c tic e s  o f  US MNCs, and a response  ra te  o f  
54 p e r cen t f o r  e l ig ib le  f irm s . An in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  
fo re ig n  c u rre n c y  t ra n s la t io n  re q u ire m e n ts  on th e  fo re ig n  in v e n to r ie s  
o f  US MNCs by B indon  (1983) a t ta in e d  an o v e ra ll response  ra te  o f  93 
p e r cen t, w ith  60 p e r  cen t o f  e l ig ib le  f irm s  re sp o n d in g .
The q u e s tio n n a ire  su rve ys  a g a in s t w h ic h  i t  is  m ost a p p ro p r ia te
to  com pare response  ra te s  are  th o se  concerned s p e c if ic a l ly  w ith
in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g . Adam's (1985) su rv e y  o f  th e  costs  and 
b e n e fits  o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  among UK f irm s  o b ta in e d  an o v e ra l l 
response  ra te  o f  80 p e r cen t, and a response ra te  o f  58 p e r cen t f o r  
e l ig ib le  f irm s . A s u rv e y  by  th e  OECD o f  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  
lic e n s in g  among i t s  member c o u n tr ie s  [V ic k e ry  (1988)] ach ieved  an 
o v e ra l l response ra te  o f  61 p e r cen t, o f  w h ich  47 p e r cen t were 
useab le . These response ra te s  are re a so n a b ly  s im ila r  to  those  
o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  p re s e n t su rvey .
Tab le  8-3 d e ta ils  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  responses o b ta in e d  fro m  
each o f  th e  th re e  sepa ra te  m a ilin g s . I t  shows how  im p o r ta n t th e  
fo llo w -u p  re q u e s ts  were in  in c re a s in g  th e  response to  th e  su rve y . A 
to ta l  o f  164 re p lie s  were o b ta in e d  fro m  the  f i r s t  m a ilin g , 80 were 
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a f te r  th e  t h i r d  m a ilin g . Thus 41 p e r cen t o f  th e  to ta l  response was 
a ch ieved  fro m  th e  tw o  fo llo w -u p  m a ilin g s .
A p a rt  fro m  th e  86 e l ig ib le  f irm s  c la s s if ie d  as 'p o s it iv e  
responses ', 2 are c la s s if ie d  as 'in a d e q u a te ly  com p le ted ', 48 as 
'n e g a tiv e  responses ', w h ile  th e  re m a in in g  46 f irm s  d id  n o t respond  a t 
a l l.  The tw o f irm s  w h ic h  f e l l  in to  th e  'in a d e q u a te ly  com ple ted ' 
c a te g o ry  d id  n o t answ er enough o f  th e  q u e s tio n s  to  make i t  
w o r th w h ile  cod ing  th e ir  re p lie s  f o r  a n a lys is . The 48 f irm s  fa l l in g  
in to  th e  'n e g a tive  responses ' ca te g o ry  re p lie d  by  in d ic a t in g  th a t  
th e y  were u n w il l in g  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  su rve y . Some o f these  
f irm s  gave reasons f o r  t h e ir  n o n -p a r t ic ip a t io n  and some d id  no t. 
These responses are  show n in  Tab le  8-4, ra n ke d  in  o rd e r  o f  th e  m ost 
f re q u e n t ly  c ite d .
The m ost f re q u e n t ly  c ite d  reason  f o r  n o n -p a r t ic ip a t io n  was 
'p re s s u re  o f  w o rk '. O f th e  13 e x e c u tiv e s  who gave th is  reason , 5 
a t t r ib u te d  th e  p re ssu re  to  com pany re o rg a n is a t io n , w h ile  3 s ta te d  
th a t  th e ir  need to  t r a v e l e x te n s iv e ly  overseas s e v e re ly  l im ite d  th e  
tim e  th a t  th e y  had a v a ila b le  w h ile  in  th e  UK. O f th e  e ig h t com pany 
e x e c u tiv e s  who c ite d  th e  d e c e n tra lis e d  n a tu re  o f  t h e ir  com panies as 
th e  reason  f o r  t h e ir  n o n -p a r t ic ip a t io n ,  one s ta te d  th a t  p lans  were 
be ing  con tem p la te d  to  c e n tra lis e  th e  lic e n s in g  fu n c t io n  by 
c o m p u te r is in g  lic e n s in g  in fo rm a tio n  fro m  s u b s id ia r ie s , w h ile  a n o th e r 
e x e c u tiv e  s ta te d  th a t  th e  c o m p u te r is a tio n  o f  lic e n s in g  da ta  a t HQ 
le v e l was c u r re n t ly  ta k in g  p lace  in  h is  o rg a n is a tio n .
O f th e  fo u r  e x e c u tiv e s  who d id  n o t c o -o p e ra te  because th e y  
th o u g h t th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  w o u ld  ta k e  up too  much o f  t h e ir  tim e , tw o  
chose to  w r ite  a le t t e r  in s te a d , o u t l in in g  t h e ir  com pany's g e n e ra l 
a t t i tu d e  to w a rd s  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g . O f th e  
e x e c u tiv e s  who gave reasons c la s s if ie d  as m isce llaneous, one fo u n d  
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  to o  com plex, one re fu s e d  to  com ple te  a second 
q u e s tio n n a ire  a f te r  th e  f i r s t  one was lo s t  in  th e  po s t, and th e  
t h i r d  d e c lin e d  to  ta k e  p a r t  as h is  com pany had ju s t  gone in to  




REASONS CITED BY COMPANIES UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SURVEY
Reasons Number of Companies %
Pressure of work 13 27
No reason given 10 21
Company too decentralised 8 17
Confidentiality 4 8
Questionnaire too time-consuming 4 8
Miscellaneous reasons 3 6
Complex organisational structure 2 4
Company policy not to answer questionnaires 2 4
Inadequate resources to answer questionnaire 2 4
N o t e :  The p e r c e n t a g e s  do n o t  add up t o  100  b e c a u s e  o f  r o u n d i n g .
8.6 STATISTICAL PROCEDURES
8.6.1 In tro d u c t io n
The pu rpo se  o f  th is  s e c tio n  is  to  ju s t i f y  th e  s ta t is t ic a l  te ch n iq u e s  
w h ic h  were chosen to  ana lyse  th e  da ta  gen e ra te d  fro m  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  su rve y . T h is  cho ice  was n o t a s t ra ig h t fo rw a rd  one, 
f o r  th e re  e x is ts  a d iv is io n  o f  o p in io n  among s ta t is t ic ia n s  and among 
re se a rch e rs  in  th e  s o c ia l sc iences a b o u t th e  te c h n iq u e s  th a t  are  
a p p ro p r ia te  to  a p a r t ic u la r  d a ta  se t. The debate  ce n tre s  a ro u n d  th e  
issu e  o f  th e  le v e l o f  m easurem ent o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  u n d e r s tu d y .
One schoo l o f  th o u g h t h o ld s  th a t  the  s ta t is t ic a l  p roced u re s  
th a t  can be a p p lie d  to  any d a ta  se t are dependent upon th e  le v e l o f  
m easurem ent o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  th a t  c o n s t itu te  th a t  da ta  set. The 
o th e r  sch o o l o f  th o u g h t argues th a t  s ta t is t ic a l te c h n iq u e s  are n o t
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dependent upon th e  sca le  o f  m easurem ent o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  u n d e r 
s tu d y .
In  th is  s e c tio n  th e  argum ents o f  these  o pp os in g  schoo ls  are 
cons ide red . F ir s t ly ,  th e  p ro p e r t ie s  o f  d i f fe r e n t  le v e ls  o f
m easurem ent are described . The d is t in c t io n  betw een p a ra m e tr ic  and 
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  p roced u re s  is  th e n  in tro d u c e d , and th e
a p p ro p ria te n e s s  o f  these  p ro ce d u re s  a t d i f fe r e n t  le v e ls  o f
m easurem ent are cons ide red . The argum ents o f  th e  o th e r  schoo l o f  
th o u g h t are th e n  o u t lin e d , and th e  c u r re n t  s ta te  o f  th e  debate is  
sum m arized. F in a lly ,  th e  advan tages and d isadvan tag es  o f
p a ra m e tr ic  and n o n p a ra m e tr ic  p ro ce d u re s  are  d e sc rib e d , and th e  typ e  
o f  s ta t is t ic a l  p roced u re s  em ployed in  th e  e m p ir ic a l s tu d y  are th e n  
o u t lin e d .
8.6.2 L e ve ls  o f  M easurem ent
The w id e ly  accepted c la s s if ic a t io n  scheme fo r  le v e ls  o f  m easurem ent 
is  th a t  dev ised  by S tevens (1946). I t  c o n ta in s  fo u r  le v e ls : nom ina l,
o rd in a l,  in te r v a l and r a t io .  These c a te g o rie s  d i f f e r  fro m  each o th e r  
in  te rm s o f  th re e  p r in c ip a l fa c to rs :  w h e th e r th e  va lu e s  on a scale 
can be o rd e red , w h e th e r th e  d is ta n c e  betw een them  has any meaning, 
and w h e th e r the  o r ig in  has a u n iq u e  m eaning. These d iffe re n c e s  are 
sum m arised in  Tab le  8-5.




Leve l  o f  
Measu rement
Does t h e  ORDER o f  
V a l u e s  have mean ing?
Does t h e  
V a l u e s
DISTANCE between  
have mean i ng?
Does t h e  
u ni q u e
ORIGIN have  
meaning?
Nomi nal No No No
O r d i n a l Yes No No
I n t e r v a l Yes Yes No
R a t i o Yes Yes Yes
[SOURCE: A dapted fro m  M ills  (1977, p4)]
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A t th e  nom in a l le v e l o f  m easurem ent, a se t o f  m u tu a lly
e x c lu s iv e  and c o l le c t iv e ly  e x h a u s tiv e  c a te g o rie s  are  id e n t i f ie d  in to  
w h ic h  da ta  may be c la s s if ie d . A v a r ia b le  d e r iv e d  fro m  a YES/NO 
typ e  q u e s tio n  in  a q u e s tio n n a ire , f o r  exam ple, is  m easured a t th e  
n o m in a l le v e l.  The n o m in a l le v e l is  th e  w eakes t o f  th e  fo u r
m easurem ent scales because i t  makes no assum ptions  a b o u t th e  
o rd e r in g  o f  th e  va lu e s  as igned to  c a te g o rie s , o r  a b o u t th e  d is ta n c e  
betw een th e  ca te g o rie s , and i t  has no a r ith m e tic  o r ig in .
When num bers are  ass igned  to  th e  c a te g o rie s  o f  a n o m in a l sca le  
th e y  have no num eric  m eaning; th e y  are  s im p ly  a c o n v e n ie n t way o f  
la b e ll in g  o r  cod ing  th e  in fo rm a tio n . In  th is  s tu d y , f o r  exam ple, th e
num bers '1' to  '8' were ass igned  to  th e  responses d e r iv e d  fro m  th e
la s t  q u e s tio n  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , w h ich  concerns th e  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re  o f  com panies. T h is  was done so th a t  th e  
responses c o u ld  be e a s ily  read  by th e  com pute r. The p ro p e r t ie s  o f  
th e  re a l num ber system  cann o t be ass igned  to  these  num bers; th e y  
c a n n o t be added, s u b tra c te d , m u lt ip l ie d  o r  d iv id e d . T h e ir  fu n c t io n  
is  p u re ly  to  id e n t i f y  c a te g o rie s  th a t  a re  d if fe re n t .
The o rd in a l le v e l o f  m easurem ent in c o rp o ra te s  th e  c la s s ify in g  
and la b e ll in g  fu n c t io n  o f th e  n o m in a l sca le , b u t in  a d d it io n  b r in g s  
to  i t  a sense o f  o rd e r. When i t  is  p o s s ib le  to  say th a t  one ca te g o ry  
has more o r  less o f  a p a r t ic u la r  p ro p e r ty  th a n  a n o th e r ca tego ry , 
va lu e s  can th e n  be ass igned to  these  c a te g o rie s  to  in d ic a te  th e ir  
r e la t iv e  ra n k in g s . L ik e  th e  n o m in a l le v e l o f  m easurem ent, th e  
o rd in a l sca le  makes no assum p tio n  a b o u t th e  d is ta n c e  betw een th e  
va lu e s  ass igned to  d i f fe r e n t  ca te g o rie s . Thus, th e  re a l d iffe re n c e  
betw een th e  ra n k s  '1 ! and '2', f o r  exam ple, may be more o r  less th a n  
th e  d iffe re n c e  betw een ra n k s  '2' and '3'. I t  is  th e re fo re  n o t 
m e a n in g fu l to  use th e  o p e ra tio n s  o f  a r ith m e tic  on such num bers. 
S im ila r ly ,  no m eaning can be a tta c h e d  to  th e  shape o f  th e  fre q u e n c y  
d is t r ib u t io n  d e r iv e d  fro m  an o rd in a l scale.
The in te r v a l le v e l o f  m easurem ent has th e  pow ers o f  n o m in a l 
and o rd in a l scales p lu s  one a d d it io n a l p ro p e r ty :  i t  assumes th a t  th e  
in te r v a l (o r  d is ta n ce ) betw een any tw o  ad ja ce n t va lu e s  on th e  sca le  
is  th e  same. Thus, the  d is ta n ce  betw een '1' and '2' equa ls  th e
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d is ta n c e  between '2' and '3'. M eaning can th e re fo re  be a tta ch e d  to  
th e  s lope  o f  a fre q u e n c y  d is t r ib u t io n  d e r iv e d  fro m  an in te r v a l scale. 
In te rv a l scales a lso  p e rm it c e r ta in  a r ith m e tic  p ro ce d u re s  w h ich  are 
u n te n a b le  a t th e  n om in a l and o rd in a l le v e ls  o f  m easurem ent; va lu e s  
can be added o r  s u b tra c te d , o r  th e y  can be m u lt ip l ie d  o r  d iv id e d  by 
c o n s ta n ts . I t  is  n o t p o s s ib le , how ever, to  m u lt ip ly  tw o  va lu e s  o r  
d iv id e  one v a lu e  by  a n o th e r, because th e  in te r v a l scale has no 
a b s o lu te  zero p o in t.  I t  cann o t be assumed, f o r  exam ple, th a t  th e  
n in th  p o in t  on an in te r v a l sca le  is  th re e  tim es th a t  o f  th e  t h i r d  
p o in t.
The s tro n g e s t le v e l o f  m easurem ent is  th e  r a t io  le v e l,  f o r  i t  
has a l l  th e  p ro p e r t ie s  o f  th e  in te r v a l le v e l and a lso  in c lu d e s  an 
a b s o lu te  zero p o in t.  As a re s u lt ,  r a t io  com parisons can be made as 
w e ll as d is ta n c e  com parisons. I t  is  th u s  m e a n in g fu l to  say th a t  th e  
n in th  p o in t  on a r a t io  sca le  is  th re e  tim es th a t  o f  th e  th i r d  p o in t.  
A t th is  le v e l o f  m easurem ent, a l l  o f  th e  a r ith m e tic  p roced u re s  o f  
a d d it io n ,  s u b tra c t io n , m u lt ip l ic a t io n  and d iv is io n  are  fe a s ib le .
A case can be made f o r  d e f in in g  one f u r th e r  ca te g o ry  o f 
m easurem ent le v e l:  th e  d icho tom ous  le v e l.  D icho tom ous v a r ia b le s  
are  th o se  w h ic h  have o n ly  tw o  p o s s ib le  va lu e s ; th e y  can th u s  be 
re g a rd e d  as a s u b -c a te g o ry  o f  n o m in a l- le v e l v a r ia b le s . They are 
d i f fe r e n t  fro m  o th e r  n o m in a l- le v e l v a r ia b le s  because th e y  can be 
tre a te d  as th o u g h  th e y  are m easured a t th e  o rd in a l o r  in te r v a l 
le v e l.
D icho tom ous v a r ia b le s  can be t re a te d  as o rd in a l- le v e l 
v a r ia b le s  because th e y  s a t is fy  th e  m a th em a tica l re q u ire m e n ts  o f  
o rd e r in g ; a lth o u g h  a ra n k  o rd e r  may n o t be in h e re n t  in  th e  way in  
w h ic h  th e  tw o  va lu e s  o f  a d ich o to m y  are d e fin e d , one v a lu e  can 
n e v e rth e le s s  be con s id e re d  as th e  "h ig h ” end o f  a ra n k in g  and the  
o th e r  as th e  " lo w ” end. The re q u ire m e n t o f  a d is ta n ce  measure 
based on e q u a l-s ize d  in te rv a ls  is  a lso  s a t is f ie d  because th e re  is  
o n ly  one in te rv a l,  n a tu ra l ly  equ a l to  i t s e l f .  A d ich o to m y  can 




8.6.3 P a ra m e tric  o r  N o npa ram e tric  S ta t is t ic s ?
The o ld e s t and m ost h e a v ily  used m ethods o f  s ta t is t ic a l  in fe re n c e  
are  th o se  w h ich  depend upon kn o w in g  o r  assum ing c e r ta in  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  p o p u la tio n  fro m  w h ic h  sam ple d a ta  is  d raw n  
(u s u a lly  th a t  th e  p o p u la tio n  is  n o rm a lly  d is tr ib u te d ) .  Because th e  
m easures w h ic h  d esc rib e  p o p u la tio n  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  are  know n as 
pa ram e te rs , these  s ta t is t ic a l  te ch n iq u e s  have come to  be la b e lle d  as 
'p a ra m e tr ic '.
N o npa ram e tric  s ta t is t ic s ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, a re  n o t based upon  
s t r in g e n t  assum ptions a b o u t p o p u la t io n  pa ram ete rs . As a r e s u lt  
th e y  do n o t re q u ire  th a t  th e  shape o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  d is t r ib u t io n  be 
know n, and th e y  are  th e re fo re  som etim es c a lle d  'd is t r ib u t io n - f r e e ' 
s ta t is t ic s .  They are a lso  re fe r re d  to  as 'ra n k in g ' o r  'o rd e r ' 
s ta t is t ic s ,  because th e y  are u n iq u e ly  s u ite d  to  v a r ia b le s  th a t  are 
m easured on an o rd in a l s c a le d  T h is  a rise s  fro m  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e y  
do n o t re q u ire  th e  use o f  s ta n d a rd  a r ith m e tic  o p e ra tio n s .
As no te d  in  th e  p re v io u s  se c tio n , th e  d is ta n ce s  betw een va lu e s  
on an o rd in a l sca le  have no in h e re n t m eaning, so th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f  
any a r ith m e tic  p roced u re s  to  such va lu e s  w o u ld  o n ly  d is to r t  th e  
in fo rm a tio n  ga ined  by th e  o rd in a l m easurem ent. F o r exam ple, th e  
co m p u ta tio n  o f th e  mean f o r  o rd in a l- le v e l d a ta  w o u ld  be im p ro p e r, 
s ince  i t  in v o lv e s  a d d it io n  and th e n  s u b tra c t io n . The e q u iv a le n t 
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  measure o f  c e n tra l tendency, th e  m edian, re q u ire s  
o n ly  c o u n tin g .
The id ea  th a t  p a ra m e tr ic  s ta t is t ic s  are o n ly  a p p ro p r ia te  to  
v a r ia b le s  m easured a t th e  in te r v a l and r a t io  le v e ls , and th a t  
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  p roced u re s  sh o u ld  be used f o r  o rd in a l and n o m in a l-  
le v e l v a r ia b le s  was o r ig in a l ly  p roposed  by S tevens in  h is  1946 
a r t ic le ,  and e la b o ra te d  fu r th e r  by  S iege l (1956). However, th is  
v ie w p o in t  has been cha lle nged  by a num ber o f  s ta t is t ic ia n s  and 
b e h a v io u ra l resea rche rs , m ost n o ta b ly  by  L o rd  (1953), Savage (1957), 
A nde rson  (1961), Baker, H a rdyck  and P e tr in o v ic h  (1966) and L a b o v itz  
(1967, 1970). The h is to ry  o f  th e  c o n tro v e rs y , w h ich  rem a ins
u n re s o lv e d , has been co g e n tly  sum m arised by G ardner (1975).
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The c o u n te r-a rg u m e n ts  to  S tevens ' and S iege l's  p o s it io n  f a l l  
in to  tw o  bas ic  ca te g o rie s : th e o re t ic a l and e m p ir ic a l. The f i r s t  k in d  
o f  c o u n te r-a rg u m e n t is  based upon  an a n a ly s is  o f  th e  m a th em a tica l 
assum ptions u n d e r ly in g  th e  v a r io u s  s ta t is t ic a l  p ro ce d u re s . The 
second is  fo u n d e d  upon  e m p ir ic a l ev idence  co n ce rn in g  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  
t ra n s fo rm a tio n s  o f  d a ta  upon th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  le v e ls  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  
th e  v a lu e s  o f  v a r io u s  s ta t is t ic s .
The essence o f  th e  f i r s t  k in d  o f  c o u n te r-a rg u m e n t was n e a tly  
sum m arised by  B ake r e t a l (1966) in  t h e ir  s ta te m e n t th a t  " s ta t is t ic s  
a p p ly  to  num bers r a th e r  th a n  th in g s "  (p292). These re se a rch e rs  were 
r e ite r a t in g  a p o in t,  f i r s t  made by  L o rd  (1953) and su b s e q u e n tly  by  
A nderson  (1961), th a t  s ta t is t ic a l  te s ts  cann o t be co g n iza n t o f  th e  
e m p ir ic a l m eaning o f  th e  num bers w ith  w h ic h  th e y  dea l. 
C onsequen tly , i t  is  a rgued, th e  v a l id i t y  o f  a s ta t is t ic a l  in fe re n c e  
does n o t depend on th e  ty p e  o f  m easuring  sca le  used.
T h is  c o n c lu s io n  was s tro n g ly  cha lle n g e d  by S tevens (1968) who, 
a lth o u g h  conced ing  th e  bas ic  p rem ise  o f  th e  c o u n te r-a rg u m e n t, d id  
n o t agree w ith  th e  c o n c lu s io n  d raw n. As he p u t i t :
" .....  how eve r much we may agree th a t  th e
s ta t is t ic a l  te s t  ca n n o t be cogn izan t o f  th e  
e m p ir ic a l m eaning o f  th e  num bers, th e  same 
p r in c ip le  can s c a rc e ly  be ex tended  to
e x p e rim e n te rs ............. F o r m athem atics, l i k e  a
com pute r, obeys commands and asks no q u e s tio n s .
I t  w i l l  p rocess any in p u t ,  h o w eve r d e v o id  o f  
s c ie n t i f ic  sense, and i t  w i l l  bedeck in  fo rm u la s  
b o th  th e  m e a n in g fu l and th e  absu rd . In  th e  
b e h a v io u ra l sc iences, w here  th e  d isce rn m e n t f o r  
nonsense is  pe rhaps  less  s h a rp ly  honed th a n  in  
th e  p h y s ic a l sc iences, th e  v ig i l  m ust rem a in  
e s p e c ia lly  a le r t  a g a in s t th e  in t r u s io n  o f  a 
d e fe c t iv e  th e o ry  m e re ly  because i t  c a r r ie s  a 
m a th em a tica l v is a ."^
The bas is  f o r  th e  second ca te g o ry  o f  c o u n te r-a rg u m e n t a g a in s t 
th e  S tevens/S iege l p o s it io n  is  th a t ,  i f  th e  sca le  o f  m easurem ent is  
a lte re d  and th e  same c o n c lu s io n  is  reached re g a rd le s s  o f  w h e th e r 
th e  da ta  have been tra n s fo rm e d  o r  n o t, th e n  th e  sca le  o f 
m easurem ent is  o f  l i t t l e  im po rtance . T h is  re a so n in g  fo rm ed  th e  
bas is  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  conducted  by B aker e t a l (1966) and
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L a b o v itz  (1967, 1970). In  h is  1967 a r t ic le ,  f o r  exam ple, L a b o v itz
in v e n te d  some h y p o th e tic a l e x p e rim e n ta l da ta  o f  o rd in a l s tre n g th  
and tra n s fo rm e d  th e  d a ta  a cco rd in g  to  seven d i f fe r e n t  a r b it r a r y  
s c o r in g  system s, each c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  ra n k  o rd e r  o f  th e  da ta . 
He th e n  a p p lie d  p a ra m e tr ic  s ta t is t ic s  and fo u n d  th a t  th e  re s u lts  
o b ta in e d  were l i t t l e  d i f fe r e n t  fro m  those  ach ieved  by  a p p ly in g  th e  
a p p ro p r ia te  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  p ro ce d u re  to  th e  o r ig in a l da ta .^
In  h is  1970 s tu d y , L a b o v itz  ana lysed  d a ta  co n ce rn in g  th e
re la t io n s h ip  betw een o c c u p a tio n a l p re s tig e  and s u ic id e  ra te s  as a 
bas is  f o r  d e te rm in in g  th e  degree o f  e r ro r  when t re a t in g  o rd in a l 
v a r ia b le s  as i f  th e y  w ere in te r v a l.  Tw en ty  d i f fe r e n t  s c o r in g  system s 
were ass igned to  th e  va lu e s  o f  o c c u p a tio n a l p re s t ig e , e ig h te e n  o f 
them  genera ted  ra n d o m ly  by com pute r. Once aga in , each s c o r in g  
system  was c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  m ono ton ic  (o rd e re d ) n a tu re  o f  th e  
ca te g o rie s . The re la t io n s h ip  betw een s u ic id e  ra te s  and o c c u p a tio n a l 
p re s tig e , as m easured by these  d i f fe r e n t  s c o r in g  system s, was
de te rm in e d  by c a lc u la t in g  th e  Pearson p ro d u c t-m o m e n t c o r re la t io n  
c o e f f ic ie n t.  I t  was fo u n d  th a t  th e  v a lu e  o f  th is  p a ra m e tr ic  s ta t is t ic  
was l i t t l e  a ffe c te d  by th e  ty p e  o f  s c o r in g  system  used, a llo w in g  
L a b o v itz  to  conc lude  th a t  o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  can be tre a te d  as i f
th e y  con fo rm  to  in te r v a l scales.
The re s u lts  o f  such e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  s tre n g th e n e d  th e  p o s it io n  
o f  those  who re g a rd  th e  le v e l o f  m easurem ent as be in g  o f  l i t t l e  
im p o rta n ce  in  d e te rm in in g  p e rm is s ib le  s ta t is t ic a l  o p e ra tio n s . A f te r  
re v ie w in g  th e  ev idence  fro m  these  s tu d ie s  G ardner (1975) conc luded  
th a t  t re a t in g  o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  as i f  th e y  were in te r v a l w o u ld  be 
u n l ik e ly  to  lead  to  im p ro p e r c o n c lu s io n s  due to  th e  ro b u s tn e ss  o f 
p a ra m e tr ic  te ch n iq u e s  (ie  t h e ir  a b i l i t y  to  m a in ta in  t h e ir  lo g ic a lly  
deduced co n c lu s io n s  when one o r  more assum ptions have been 
v io la te d ) .  As a re s u lt ,  he a rgued  th a t  " th e  p a ra m e tr ic /n o n p a ra m e tr ic  
issu e  is  n o t as c r i t ic a l  as i t  was th o u g h t to  be tw o  decades ago" 
(1975, p52).
Even S tevens m odera ted  h is  o r ig in a l p o s it io n  in  th e  l ig h t  o f  
such evidence . A lth o u g h  s t i l l  f i r m ly  re je c t in g  th e  th e o re t ic a l 
a rgum ents posed by h is  c r i t ic s ,  he conceded th a t  i t  may be
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a p p ro p r ia te  in  some in s ta n ce s  to  use p a ra m e tr ic  p roced u re s  on 
o rd in a l da ta . F o r S tevens, th e  issu e  had been re d e fin e d , so th a t  i t  
now tu rn e d :
n o t on w h e th e r th e  m easurem ent sca le  
de te rm ines  th e  cho ice  o f  s ta t is t ic a l  p ro ce d u re , b u t  
on how  and to  w h a t degree an in a p p ro p r ia te
s ta t is t ic  may le a d  to  a d e v ia n t c o n c lu s io n   By
s p e llin g  o u t th e  cos ts , we may c o n v e rt th e  issu e  
fro m  a seem ing p ro s c r ip t io n  to  a c a lc u la te d  
r is k . ” 7
I f  one adop ts  th e  s t r i c t  S tevens/S iege l p o s it io n , th e n  th e  
a p p ro p r ia te  s ta t is t ic a l  p ro ce d u re s  f o r  th e  o rd in a l da ta  gene ra ted  
fro m  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  are  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  ones. H owever, as 
c r i t ic s  o f  th e  S tevens /S iege l p o s it io n  argue, th e  r is k  in v o lv e d  in  
u s in g  p a ra m e tr ic  p roced u re s  on such da ta  may n o t be v e ry  g re a t.
The n a tu re  o f  th is  r is k  can be assessed by c o n s id e r in g  th e  
r e la t iv e  m e rits  o f  b o th  ca te g o rie s  o f  s ta t is t ic s ,  w h ich  re v o lv e  
a ro u n d  th e  concepts o f  'p o w e r', and 'pow er e f f ic ie n c y '.  The pow er o f  
a s t a t is t ic a l  te s t  is  d e f in e d  as th e  p r o b a b il i t y  o f  c o r re c t ly  re je c t in g  
th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is , ie  re je c t in g  i t  when i t  is  in  fa c t  fa ls e . I t  is  
re p re s e n te d  as fo llo w s :
Pow er = 1 -  p
O
w here p  is  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a Type I I  e r ro r .
On th is  c r i te r io n ,  p a ra m e tr ic  te s ts  w in  o u t. T h e ir  s u p e r io r ity  
in  te rm s o f  pow er is  h a rd ly  s u rp r is in g  s ince  th e y  u t i l is e  more 
assum ptions ab o u t th e  p o p u la t io n  th a n  do n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te s ts . 
A lso , because th e y  dea l w ith  a c tu a l n u m e rica l va lu e s  ra th e r  th a n  
ra n k  o rd e rs  th e y  use m ore in fo rm a tio n  th a n  e q u iv a le n t 
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te s ts .
The degree o f w a s te fu ln e ss  o f  a n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te s t  can be 
expressed  by th e  concep t o f  pow er e ff ic ie n c y , w h ic h  is  concerned 
w ith  th e  am ount o f  in c rea se  in  sample size necessary to  make one 
te s t  as p o w e r fu l as a n o th e r. I t  is  c a lc u la te d  fro m  th e  fo llo w in g  




Power e f f ic ie n c y  o f  te s t  B = (100)—  p e r cen t
Nb
w here is  th e  am ount o f  cases needed by  te s t  B to  ach ieve  th e
same pow er as te s t  A when i t  ( te s t A) has Na cases.
The concep t o f  pow er e f f ic ie n c y  dem onstra tes  th a t ,  even when 
a l l  th e  re q u ire m e n ts  f o r  a p a ra m e tr ic  te s t  a re  s a t is f ie d ,  by  
in c re a s in g  th e  sam ple size by  an a p p ro p r ia te  am ount i t  is  p o s s ib le  
to  use a n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te s t  r a th e r  th a n  a p a ra m e tr ic  one and y e t 
re ta in  th e  same pow er to  re je c t  th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is . Emory (1980) 
p o in te d  o u t th a t ,  a lth o u g h  "p a ra m e tr ic  te s ts  have  g re a te r  pow er
e f f ic ie n c y  when t h e ir  use is  a p p ro p r ia te  .......  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te s ts
o fte n  ach ieve  a pow er e f f ic ie n c y  o f  as h ig h  as 95 p e r cent. T h is
means th a t  th e  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te s t  w i l l  p ro v id e  th e  same s ta t is t ic a l
te s t in g  pow er w ith  a sam ple o f  100 as a p a ra m e tr ic  te s t  w ith  a 
sam ple o f  95" (p413).
Thus, even i f  a re s e a rc h e r was c o n fid e n t th a t  th e  da ta  be ing  
ana lysed  c o u ld  be t re a te d  as in te r v a l- le v e l da ta , th e  am ount o f  
pow er lo s t  by  em p loy ing  a n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te s t  r a th e r  th a n  a 
p a ra m e tr ic  te s t  may n o t be v e ry  la rg e . And, i f  th is  assum ption  is  
n o t ju s t i f ie d ,  th e  use o f  a n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te s t  w i l l  y ie ld  a r e s u lt  
w h ich  has g re a te r  v a l id i t y  s ince  no assum ption  is  made abou t th e  
d is ta n ce  between sca le  in te r v a ls  o r  a b o u t p o p u la t io n  param eters.
8.6.4 C o nc lu s ion
A f te r  re v ie w in g  th e  p a ra m e tr ic /n o n p a ra m e tr ic  issue , K e r lin g e r  (1973) 
recommended th a t  th e  bes t p ro ce d u re  f o r  b e h a v io u ra l re se a rch e rs  to  
a do p t "w o u ld  seem to  be to  t re a t  o rd in a l m easurem ents as th o u g h  
th e y  were in te r v a l m easurem ents, b u t to  be c o n s ta n t ly  a le r t  to  th e  
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  g ross in e q u a lity  o f  in te rv a ls "  (p441). A d i f fe r e n t  v ie w  
on th e  issue  was expressed by Em ory (1980), who fa v o u re d  an 




In  th is  s tu d y  a b ro a d ly  n e u tra l app roach  is  adop ted , w ith  b o th  
p a ra m e tr ic  and n o n p a ra m e tr ic  p roced u re s  used. By and la rg e , 
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  m ethods have been p re fe rre d , w ith  p a ra m e tr ic  m ethods 
used w here  th e  c ircum stances  c o u ld  be ju s t i f ie d .  The reasons 
b e h in d  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  th e  s ta t is t ic a l  m ethods used are  now 
desc rib e d , on a c h a p te r -b y -c h a p te r  bas is .
The a n a lys is  o f  th e  gove rnm en t s ta t is t ic a l  d a ta  in  C h a p te r 
N ine uses s im p le  d e s c r ip t iv e  s ta t is t ic s  to  id e n t i f y  tre n d s  in  th e  use 
o f  FDI sa les, e x p o rts  and lic e n s e d  sales o v e r th e  p e r io d  1964-1984. 
The degree o f  c o r re la t io n  betw een th e  th re e  fo rm s o f  overseas sa les 
across in d u s tr ie s  and g e o g ra p h ic a l areas was a lso  assessed. D esp ite  
th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  raw  gove rnm en t da ta  were o f  in te r v a l s tre n g th , 
Spearman ra n k -o rd e r  c o r re la t io n s  were c a lc u la te d  ra th e r  th a n  
Pearson p ro d u c t-m o m e n t c o r re la t io n s  because o f  th e  ra th e r  c rude  
e s tim a tin g  p rocedu res  w h ich  were used to  d e te rm ine  th e  va lu e s  o f 
overseas sa les a r is in g  fro m  FDI and lic e n s in g .
The a n a lys is  in  C h a p te r Ten o f  th e  key  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  
sam ple o f  com panies w h ic h  responded  to  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  is  a lso  
b ro a d ly  d e s c r ip t iv e  in  n a tu re . A num ber o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  are 
c ro s s ta b u la te d  a g a in s t one o th e r  and s im p le  c h i squa re  s ta t is t ic s  
a re  c a lc u la te d  to  de te rm ine  th e  degree o f  a s s o c ia tio n  between them. 
The ra n k in g s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  m ethods by th e  com panies are 
ana lysed  u s in g  F riedm an 's  tw o -w a y  a n a lys is  o f  v a r ia n c e  te s t,  in  
accordance w ith  th e  o rd in a l n a tu re  o f  th e  da ta .
In  C h a p te r E leven q u e s tio n n a ire  d a ta  co n ce rn in g  th e  p o s s ib le  
d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  are ana lysed . 
The d a ta  c o n s is t o f  ra t in g s  g ive n  to  a num ber o f  v a r ia b le s , on a 
s e v e n -p o in t scale. The a n a ly s is  in v o lv e d  th e  use o f  b o th  
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  and p a ra m e tr ic  s ta t is t ic a l  m ethods. In  th e  f i r s t  s tage 
o f  th e  a n a ly s is  th e  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  K e n d a ll c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  concordance 
was used to  de te rm ine  th e  r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  o f  th e  ra n k in g s  
a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  v a r ia b le s  d e fin e d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire .
The second stage o f th e  a n a ly s is  in v o lv e d  an e x a m in a tio n  o f  
th e  in te rc o r re la t io n s  betw een th e  v a r ia b le s , u s in g  th e  p a ra m e tr ic
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te c h n iq u e  o f  fa c to r  a n a lys is , to  a s c e rta in  i f  a s m a lle r num ber o f  
u n d e r ly in g  v a r ia b le s  c o u ld  be used to  e x p la in  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g  dec is io n . I t  may be a rgued  th a t  th e  use o f  fa c to r  a n a lys is  
is  in a p p ro p r ia te  s ince  th e  v a r ia b le s  are m easurem ents o f o p in io n s , 
w h ich  are  in h e re n t ly  o rd in a l.  N eve rthe less , fa c to r  a n a lys is  is  
com m only a p p lie d  to  such v a r ia b le s  in  bus iness re se a rch  [see eg 
Johansson and Nebenzahl (1986), Tansuha j and G e n try  (1987), B a rk e r 
(1987), B lack  (1988)].9 T h is  use stems fro m  a common assum ption  th a t  
o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  may be ass igned num eric  va lu e s  w ith o u t  d is to r t in g  
th e ir  u n d e r ly in g  p ro p e r t ie s  [K im  and M u e lle r  (1978, p73)].
The le g it im a c y  o f  u s in g  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  on o rd in a l da ta  is  
re in fo rc e d  by th e  ex is te n ce  o f  ev idence  w h ich  suggests  th a t  th e  
bas ic  in p u ts  f o r  fa c to r  a n a lys is , c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts ,  are f a i r l y  
ro b u s t w ith  re sp e c t to  o rd in a l d is to r t io n s  in  t h e ir  m easurem ent 
[L a b o v itz  (1967, 1970), Kim (1975)]. N e ve rthe less , to  l im i t  th e
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  any d is to r t io n s  be ing  in tro d u c e d  in  th is  s tu d y , 
Spearman ra n k -o rd e r  c o r re la t io n s  were used ra th e r  th a n  Pearson 
p ro d u c t-m o m e n t c o r re la t io n s , as recommended by  Rummel (1970).
The re se a rch  m ethods em ployed in  C h a p te r E leven  are a m ix tu re  
o f  th e  d e d u c tiv e  and th e  in d u c t iv e ,  w ith  th e  em phasis p r im a r ily  
upon th e  fo rm e r. The n o n p a ra m e tr ic  a n a ly s is  is  d e d u c tiv e  in  n a tu re  
as i t  is  conducted  upon  v a r ia b le s  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  l i te r a tu r e
re v ie w . The fa c to r  a n a ly s is , on th e  o th e r  hand, is  in d u c t iv e  in  
n a tu re  as i t  a tte m p ts  to  p rodu ce  a s m a lle r subse t o f  v a r ia b le s  to  
accoun t f o r  th e  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  de c is io n .
In  C h a p te r Tw elve  th e  a n a ly s is  is  e n t ir e ly  d e d u c tiv e , as i t  
in v o lv e s  th e  te s t in g  o f  hypo theses  ab o u t th e  typ e s  o f  com panies
l ik e ly  to  be in v o lv e d  in  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g . As th e  p o te n t ia l
e x p la n a to ry  pow er o f  n in e  v a r ia b le s  were te s te d , th e  p a ra m e tr ic  
te c h n iq u e  o f  m u lt ip le  l in e a r  re g re s s io n  was used in  o rd e r  to  ca p tu re  
th e  s im u lta n e o u s  e f fe c t  o f  a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s , d e s p ite  th e  fa c t  th a t  
some o f  them  were o n ly  m easured a t th e  nom ina l and o rd in a l le v e ls . 
The use o f  m u lt ip le  l in e a r  re g re s s io n  had th e  added b e n e fit  th a t  i t  
ensu red  c o m p a ra b ility  w ith  p re v io u s  s tu d ie s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g  w h ic h  a lso  em ployed th is  te ch n iq u e . N eve rthe less , th e
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o rd in a l c h a ra c te r o f  th e  da ta  was u t i l is e d  when assessing th e  e x te n t 
o f  any m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  among th e  in depe nden t v a r ia b le s  th ro u g h  
th e  use o f  a Spearman ra n k -o rd e r  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix .
C h a p te r T h ir te e n  a lso  te s te d  a num ber o f hypo theses , a lth o u g h  
in  th is  case n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te ch n iq u e s  were em ployed as th e  da ta , 
d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , were a l l  o f  o rd in a l s tre n g th . The 
b u lk  o f  th e  da ta  m easures th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  p a te n ts , know -h ow  
and tra d e m a rks  were p re s e n t in  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
w ith  in d e p e n d e n t f irm s  and w ith  s u b s id ia r ie s . The a n t ic ip a te d  
d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  c o n te n t o f  these  tw o  
ca te g o rie s  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ent p ro v id e d  th e  bas is  f o r  n in e  
hypo theses , each o f  w h ich  was te s te d  u s in g  th e  W ilcoxon  m atched- 
p a irs  s ig n e d -ra n k s  te s t.  A fu r th e r  h y p o th e s is  was te s te d  u s in g  th e  
th e  K o lm o g o ro v -S m irn o v  one-sam ple te s t  because i t  was o n ly  
concerned  w ith  a c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  one ca te g o ry  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g  agreem ent (ie  know -h ow  agreem ents w ith  in d e p e n d e n t 
f irm s ) .
8.7 ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
B u ck le y  e t a l (1976) commented th a t  "no resea rch  m e thodo logy  is
p e r fe c t.  In  fa c t  .....  i t  is  p o s s ib le  to  c r i t iq u e  any re se a rch  e f fo r t "
(p33). In  th is  s e c tio n  a c r i t iq u e  o f  th e  re se a rch  m e thodo logy  
em ployed in  th is  s tu d y  is  p ro v id e d .
W ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  th e  gove rnm en t s ta t is t ic a l  da ta  ana lysed  
in  th e  n e x t ch a p te r, th e  da ta  fo r  th is  s tu d y  were genera ted  u s in g  
th e  s u rv e y  m ethod. A cco rd in g  to  K e r lin g e r  (1973) th is  m ethod 
"s tu d ie s  p o p u la tio n s  by  s e le c tin g  and s tu d y in g  samples chosen fro m  
th e  p o p u la tio n s  to  d is c o v e r th e  re la t iv e  in c ide nce , d is t r ib u t io n  and 
in te r re la t io n s  among v a r ia b le s "  (p410 ).^  In  th is  s u rv e y  th e  
p o p u la t io n  co n s is ts  o f  th e  186 f irm s  d e fin e d  as e l ig ib le ,  w h ile  th e  
sam ple co n s is ts  o f  th e  86 p o s it iv e  responses re ce ive d . The 
p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  f irm s  in  th is  s e lf-s e le c te d  
sam ple may d i f f e r  fro m  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  f irm s  w h ic h  d id  
n o t re p ly  in tro d u c e s  th e  r is k  th a t  th e  re s u lts  may c o n ta in  n o n -
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response  b ias.
The s u rv e y  re se a rch  m ethod fa l ls  u n d e r th e  g e n e ra l c a te g o ry  o f  
'ex  p o s t fa c to ' resea rch , d e fin e d  by  K e r lin g e r  (1973) as "sys te m a tic  
e m p ir ic a l e n q u iry  in  w h ic h  th e  s c ie n t is t  does n o t have d ire c t  
c o n tro l o f  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  because th e ir  m a n ife s ta tio n s  have 
a lre a d y  occu red  o r  because th e y  are  in h e re n t ly  n o t m a n ip u la b le " 
(p379). T h is  ty p e  o f  re se a rch  was c o n tra s te d  by  K e r lin g e r  w ith  
e x p e rim e n ta l resea rch , in  w h ich  th e  re s e a rch e r has some degree o f  
c o n tro l o v e r in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s . R e la tio n s h ip s  id e n t i f ie d  by  
s u rv e y  resea rch  are  th e re fo re  w eake r th a n  th o se  o b ta in e d  by 
e x p e rim e n ta l resea rch . H owever, th e  im p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  c o n t ro ll in g  th e  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  in  th is  s tu d y  n e ce ss ita te d  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  th e  
s u rv e y  approach.
The m ain advan tage  o f  th e  s u rv e y  m ethod is  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  
g a th e r  a g re a t dea l o f  da ta  fro m  a la rg e  sample. A w ide  v a r ie ty  o f  
s ta n d a rd  s ta t is t ic a l  p roced u re s  can th e n  be used on th is  d a ta  to  
make in fe re n c e s  to  la rg e  p o p u la tio n s . The p a r t ic u la r  ty p e  o f  s u rv e y  
m ethod em ployed in  th is  s tu d y  was th e  m a il q u e s tio n n a ire . T h is  was 
fa v o u re d  o v e r o th e r  s u rv e y  m ethods (p e rso n a l in te rv ie w s , te le p h o n e  
in te rv ie w s , and th e  pan e l te c h n iq u e ) because i t  has th e  a b i l i t y  to  
reach  th e  la rg e s t sam ple a t th e  lo w e s t cost. A n o th e r  advantage o f 
th is  m ethod is  th a t  th e re  is  no in te rv ie w e r  p re se n t. As a r e s u lt  
th e re  is  no in te rv ie w e r  b ias , th u s  rem ov ing  one o f  th e  m ost 
im p o r ta n t d isadvan tag es  o f  in te rv ie w  m ethods.
The m a il q u e s tio n n a ire  does, how ever, have a num ber o f 
l im ita t io n s  as a s u rv e y  m ethod. F ir s t ly ,  th e re  is  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
g e t t in g  a p o o r response ra te . In  o rd e r  to  im p rove  th e  response ra te  
in  th is  s tu d y  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  was d ire c te d  to  a ta rg e tte d  
in d iv id u a l in  each com pany in  th e  s u rv e y  p o p u la tio n . In  a d d it io n , 
tw o  fo llo w -u p  re q u e s ts , w ith  a d d it io n a l q u e s tio n n a ire s , were m a iled  
to  com panies th a t  had n o t answ ered, a t in te rv a ls  o f  f iv e  and te n  
weeks, a f te r  th e  i n i t i a l  m a ilin g .
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A second l im ita t io n  o f  th e  m a il q u e s tio n n a ire  concerns th e  
r e l ia b i l i t y  o f  th e  responses o b ta in e d . S ince, in  m ost cases, a c tu a l 
b e h a v io u r  w ith in  f irm s  cann o t be obse rved , m ost o f  th e  da ta  w h ic h  
comes fro m  respon den ts  are  n o t v e r if ia b le .  In  th is  s tu d y  th e  o n ly  
in fo rm a tio n  w h ich  c o u ld  be v e r i f ie d  was c e r ta in  fa c tu a l responses 
(eg in fo rm a tio n  co n ce rn in g  R&D) and where p o s s ib le  these were 
checked w ith  in fo rm a tio n  c o n ta in e d  in  ann ua l re p o r ts .
A n o th e r l im i ta t io n  o f  th e  m a il q u e s tio n n a ire  concerns th e  
v a l id i t y  o f  th e  m easurem ents o b ta in e d . Because th e  re s e a rc h e r has 
no o p p o r tu n ity  to  a m p lify  o r  c la r i f y  q u e s tio n s  f o r  th e  re spon den t, 
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  m ust be des igned  so th a t  a l l  q u e s tio n s  have  a 
c le a r  and common m eaning. In  o rd e r  to  s a t is y  th is  re q u ire m e n t a 
p re - te s t  s u rv e y  was conducted , d e ta ils  o f  w h ic h  were p ro v id e d  





1. I t  is ,  o f  course , p o s s ib le  th a t  some com panies may possess 
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  even i f  th e y  are n o t a c t iv e  in  R&D, eg 
com panies in  th e  f in a n c ia l s e rv ice s  s e c to r may a c q u ire  know -h ow  
co n ce rn in g  th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  e le c tro n ic  paym ents te c h n o lo g y  
pu rcha sed  fro m  a s u p p lie r .
2. The 't ru e ' s u rv e y  p o p u la t io n  c o u ld  have been de te rm ined  e x a c tly  
by  a lso  send ing  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  to  th e  678 f irm s  de le te d  fro m  
th e  o r ig in a l p o p u la tio n  o f  1000 f irm s , and a sk in g  these  f irm s  to  
c o n firm  th a t  th e y  were c o r re c t ly  exc luded  fro m  th e  su rve y . 
H ow ever, th e  a d d it io n a l resou rces  w h ich  th is  ta s k  w o u ld  have 
consumed w ere n o t deemed to  be w o rth  the  p a y -o f f ,  e s p e c ia lly  
s ince  th e  in fo rm a tio n  used to  assess a num ber o f  th e  e x c lu s io n  
c r i t e r ia  (eg w h e th e r a com pany was UK-based) were n o t in  
d is p u te .
3. As M o s te lle r  and R o u rke  (1973) p o in te d  o u t, th e  te rm  
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  is  a c tu a lly  som eth ing  o f  a m isnom er because 
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  s ta t is t ic s  do in  fa c t  dea l w ith  p o p u la tio n  
pa ram ete rs , such as th e  m edian.
4. Some n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te c h n iq u e s  are  a lso  a p p lic a b le  to  v a r ia b le s  
m easured a t th e  nom in a l le v e l.
5. S tevens, 1968, p 's  849 & 853.
6. The p a ra m e tr ic  p ro ce d u re s  w h ic h  L a b o v itz  a p p lie d  to  h is  da ta  
were p o in t  b is e r ia l c o r re la t io n  and S tude n ts ' t - te s t .  The re s u lts  
w ere fo u n d  to  be g e n e ra lly  c o n s is te n t w ith  those  o b ta in e d  fro m  
th e  n o n p a ra m e tr ic  p ro c e d u re  used, th e  W ilcoxon  m a tch e d -p a irs  
s igned  ra n k s  te s t.
7. S tevens, 1968, p852; a lso  c ite d  in  G ardner, 1975, p53.
8. A Type I I  e r ro r  re fe rs  to  th e  m is take  o f a cce p tin g  th e  n u l l  
h y p o th e s is  when in  fa c t  i t  is  fa ls e . C onverse ly , a Type I  e r ro r  
is  com m itted  when th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  is  re je c te d  when in  fa c t  i t  
is  tru e .
9. There  is  no n o n p a ra m e tr ic  e q u iv a le n t to  fa c to r  an a lys is .
10. T h is  q u o te  has been s l ig h t ly  p a rap h ra sed  in  o rd e r  to  enhance 
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CHAPTER NINE -  THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF
UK COMPANIES: 1964 -  1984
9.1 INTRODUCTION
9.1.1 The A v a ila b le  D ata
T h is  c h a p te r p re se n ts  an a n a lys is  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  
a c t iv i t ie s  o f  UK com panies o v e r th e  tw e n ty  ye a r p e r io d  up to  and 
in c lu d in g  1984, when th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  was c a r r ie d  ou t. The 
a n a lys is  was c a r r ie d  o u t on da ta  c o lle c te d  by th e  UK G overnm ent 
S ta t is t ic a l S e rv ice  (GSS).
The le v e ls  o f  e x p o r t in g  and FDI are m easured a n n u a lly  by th e  
GSS fo r  ba lance o f  paym ents purposes. The f ig u re s  are  re p o r te d  in  
some d e ta il,  d isagg rega ted  by c o u n try  o f  d e s t in a t io n  and in d u s t r ia l  
c la s s if ic a t io n .  FDI, f o r  exam ple, is  re co rd e d  by  c a p ita l f lo w s , 
e a rn ings , and, eve ry  th re e  years, book  va lu e s  o f  overseas assets.
U n fo r tu n a te ly , no such d e ta ile d  in fo rm a tio n  is  g a th e re d  on th e  
e x te n t to  w h ich  UK com panies engage in  a lte rn a t iv e  fo rm s o f 
in te rn a t io n a l bus iness : jo in t  v e n tu re s  are in c lu d e d  in  FDI s ta t is t ic s  
w ith o u t  be ing  s e p a ra te ly  id e n t if ie d ,  w h ile  th e  v a r io u s  fo rm s o f  non­
e q u ity  a rrangem ents  are n o t in d iv id u a l ly  id e n t if ie d  and reco rded .
N eve rthe less , some es tim a te  o f th e  m agn itude  o f  n o n -e q u ity  
in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  g e n e ra lly , and lic e n s in g  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  can be 
g a th e re d  fro m  th e  a n n u a l su rve ys  o f  overseas tra n s a c tio n s  c a rr ie d  
o u t by  th e  D epartm en t o f  T rade and In d u s try  (DTI). In  a d d it io n  to  
re c o rd in g  th e  vo lum e o f  e x p o rts  and d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t f lo w s  and 
ea rn ings , th e  DTI a lso  c a rr ie s  o u t a s u rv e y  o f "overseas ro y a lt ie s  
and s im ila r  t ra n s a c tio n s "  f o r  the  in v is ib le s  accou n t o f  th e  UK 
ba lance o f  paym ents. D e ta ile d  f ig u re s  fro m  th e  e n q u iry  are 
p u b lis h e d  each ye a r by th e  Business S ta t is t ic s  O ff ic e  in  Business 
M o n ito r  MA4, O verseas T ra n s a c tio n s . A lth o u g h  these  da ta  on 
overseas ro y a lty  t ra n s a c tio n s  are crude , th e y  are th e  o n ly  da ta  
a v a ila b le , and th e y  do g ive  u s e fu l c lues on th e  e x te n t, s t ru c tu re  
and d ire c t io n  o f n o n -e q u ity  tra n s a c tio n s .
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The tra n s a c tio n s  covered  by th e  te rm  " ro y a lt ie s "  in c lu d e  
lice n ce s  c o n fe r r in g  th e  r ig h t  to  use "p a te n ts , tra d e m a rks , des igns, 
c o p y r ig h ts , m a n u fa c tu rin g  r ig h ts ,  use o f  te c h n ic a l 'kn o w -h o w ' and 
te c h n ic a l ass is tance , and ro y a lt ie s  on p r in te d  m a tte r, sound 
re c o rd in g s  and p e rfo rm in g  r ig h ts "  [HMSO (1983, p4 )]. F ilm  ro y a lt ie s  
are  a lso  c o lle c te d  and d isc lo se d  u n d e r sepa ra te  " f ilm s  and 
te le v is io n "  s ta t is t ic s .
The f ig u re s  fo r  " ro y a lt ie s "  re ce ive d  by UK com panies are b ro k e n  
down in to  fo u r  com ponents. The f i r s t  tw o  com ponents d e fin e  th e  
typ e  o f  company fro m  w h ich  paym ent is  re ce ive d : e ith e r  a " re la te d "  
o r  an "u n re la te d "  overseas concern . The fo rm e r is  e s s e n tia lly  a 
com pany in  w h ic h  th e  re c ip ie n t  has some fo rm  o f  o w n e rsh ip  
co n n e c tio n ; tra n s a c tio n s  may th e re fo re  ta ke  p lace  a t t ra n s fe r  
p r ic e s .^  The la t t e r  is  an in d e p e n d e n t company and tra n s a c tio n s  w i l l  
th e re fo re  be accom plished  a t a rm 's - le n g th  p rice s .
The second p a ir  o f  ca te g o rie s  describ e , v e ry  b ro a d ly , th e  n a tu re  
o f  th e  know ledge  f o r  w h ich  ro y a lt ie s  are  re ce ive d : e ith e r
" te c h n o lo g ic a l and m in e ra l"  o r  " p r in te d  m a tte r, sound re c o rd in g s  o r  
p e r fo rm in g  r ig h ts " .
9.1.2 L im ita t io n s  o f  th e  D ata
B e fo re  p ro ce e d in g  to  exam ine th is  da ta  on overseas tra n s a c tio n s  i t s  
d e fic ie n c ie s  re q u ire  to  be p o in te d  o u t. F ir s t  o f  a l l,  th e  coverage 
ache ived  by th e  DTI is  n o t com ple te . Since th e  d a ta  are  d e r iv e d  
fro m  a v o lu n ta ry  e n q u iry , es tim a tes  have to ' be made f o r  n on ­
response  in  o rd e r  to  c a lc u la te  th e  m agn itude  o f tra n s a c tio n s  f o r  a l l  
com panies. In  1981, f o r  exam ple, re tu rn s  f o r  o u tw a rd  d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t were re c e iv e d  fro m  com panies a cco u n tin g  f o r  69 p e r cen t 
o f  t o ta l  n e t e a rn ings  fro m  o u tw a rd  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t. E s tim a tes  f o r  
th e  re m a in in g  com panies were c o n s tru c te d  from  com pany accoun ts  
and any o th e r  a v a ila b le  in fo rm a tio n .
The num ber o f  com panies re sp o n d in g  to  th e  in q u ir y  in to  
overseas ro y a lty  tra n s a c tio n s  in  1981 accounted f o r  a b o u t 70 p e r 
cen t o f  t o ta l  re c e ip ts . As i t  is  n o t p o ss ib le  to  a llo c a te  th e  n o n ­
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response by c o u n try  o r  in d u s try ,  th e  b reakdow n o f  th e  da ta  by 
these tw o  v a r ia b le s  is  based s o le ly  on re tu rn s  re ce ive d  in  th e  
e n q u iry . The coverage o f  th e  e n q u iry  in to  ro y a lt ie s  is  a lso  
ham pered by th e  fa c t  th a t  a la rg e  num ber o f  com panies and 
in d iv id u a ls  re c e iv in g  sm a ll paym ents f o r  ro y a lt ie s  are  n o t 
approached. H owever, an a llow ance  is  made f o r  th is  om iss ion  in  
e s tim a tin g  th e  ro y a lty  re c e ip ts  o f  a l l  UK com panies.
A n o th e r d e fe c t co n ce rn in g  th e  coverage o f  th e  gove rnm en t's  
s u rv e y  o f  overseas r o y a lty  t ra n s a c tio n s  is  th a t  i t  o n ly  encompasses 
those  fo rm s o f  c o lla b o ra t io n  w h ich  in v o lv e  m one ta ry  paym ents. I t  
th e re fo re  exc ludes re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  agreem ents in  w h ic h  b o th  
p a r t ie s  exchange in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts  w ith  one a n o th e r 
w ith o u t  exchang ing  cash. In  a d d it io n , d i f fe r in g  m ethods o f r o y a lty  
paym ents may d is to r t  th e  f ig u re s . F o r exam ple, p a r t  o f  th e  paym ent 
f o r  te c h n o lo g y  may c o n s is t o f  an in i t i a l  lum p sum fee, w ith  
subsequen t y e a r ly  r o y a lty  paym ents p ro p o r t io n a te ly  reduced. A lso , 
re tu rn s  to  fo re ig n  lic e n s in g  may be u n d e rs ta te d  i f  p a r t  o f  th e  
paym ent c o n s is ts  o f  e q u ity  in  th e  licensee . A n o th e r p rob lem  a rise s  
in  s itu a t io n s  w here ro y a lt ie s  are re ce ive d  fro m  re la te d  overseas 
concerns, f o r  these  are  l ik e ly  to  be a ffe c te d  by t ra n s fe r  p r ic in g , f o r  
w h ich  no a llow ance  is  made.
A f in a l  p rob lem  w ith  th e  gove rm en t da ta  is  th a t  i t  does n o t 
make any a llow ance  f o r  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  changes in  dom estic  p r ic e  
le v e ls  and changes in  th e  exchange ra te . C onsequen tly , th e  f ig u re s  
f o r  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t, e x p o r t in g  and ro y a lt ie s  w i l l  be exaggera ted  in  




9.2 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
9.2.1 In tro d u c t io n
The fo llo w in g  a n a lys is  o f  UK gove rnm en t da ta  a tte m p ts  to  e s tim a te  
th e  q u a n t ita t iv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  UK's n o n -e q u ity  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  o ve r tim e, and more s p e c if ic a l ly  to  e s tim a te  th e  r e la t iv e  
share  th a t  has been accoun ted  f o r  by  te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  r e la t iv e  
to  th e  tw o  m ain a lte rn a tiv e s  o f d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g . I t  
b u ild s  upon p re v io u s  s tu d ie s  by B u ck ley  and D avies (1979, 1981),
Byrne (1980), D unn ing  and C a n tw e ll (1981), D avies and R osser (1984), 
C legg (1987) and B u ck ley  and P re s c o tt (1989).^
9.2.2 N o n -E q u ity  In te rn a t io n a l Business
The b e s t a p p ro x im a tio n  o f th e  e x te n t o f  n o n -e q u ity  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  in  gen e ra l is  p ro v id e d  by the  f ig u re s  f o r  " ro y a lt ie s  and 
s im ila r  tra n s a c tio n s " . These f ig u re s  in c lu d e  b o th  " te c h n o lo g ic a l and 
m in e ra l"  ro y a lt ie s  and ro y a lt ie s  f o r  "p r in te d  m a tte r, sound 
re c o rd in g s  and p e rfo rm in g  r ig h ts " .
These ro y a lt ie s  are o b ta in e d  by  com panies th a t  a re  engaged in  
b o th  m a n u fa c tu rin g  and n o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g  a c t iv i t ie s .  The fo rm e r 
can be regarded  as a measure o f  th e  paym ents fro m  lic e n s in g  
a c t iv i t ie s ,  w h ile  th e  la t t e r  can be v iew ed  as th e  paym ents fro m  n on ­
lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t ie s  such as management c o n tra c ts , tu rn k e y  
agreem ents, etc.
The UK re c e ip ts  o f  ro y a lt ie s  and s im ila r  tra n s a c tio n s  fro m  
u n re la te d  and re la te d  overseas concerns, o v e r th e  p e r io d  1964-1984, 
are  show n in  Tab le  9-1. F o llo w in g  D unn ing  and C a n tw e ll (1981) th e  
ba lance  o f  ro y a lt ie s  betw een between u n re la te d  (Ru) and re la te d  (Rr) 
concerns is  m easured by the  r a t io  Ru/R r. I t  is  assumed th a t  UK 
com panies charged th e ir  s u b s id ia r ie s  a m a rk e t-d e te rm in e d  ro y a lty  




UK RECEIPTS OF ROYALTIES AND SIMILAR TRANSACTIONS FRCM 
UNRELATED & RELATED OVERSEAS CONCERNS, 1964-1984 ( million) 1*
Receipts frcm Receipts frcm Ru
Year Unrelated concerns Related Concerns —
(Ru) (Rr) Rr
1964 38.5 19.7 1.95
1965 43.0 21.8 1.97
1966 52.7 23.3 2.26
1967 54.1 27.4 1.97
1968 76.5 32.7 2.34
1969 78.1 38.8 2.01
1970 97.7 44.4 2.20
1971 103.6 43.4 2.39
1972 118.0 48.2 2.45
1973 142.3 59.2 2.40
1974 168.5 76.8 2.19
1975 187.5 86.9 2.16
1976 274.1 112.9 2.43
1977 296.3 127.0 2.33
1978 308.2 151.8 2.03
1979 296.9 170.2 1.74
1980 286.8 200.7 1.42
1981 338.4 237.5 1.42
1982 339.3 229.0 1.48
1983 393.3 307.3 1.27
1984 405.9 340.1 1.19
1. Excluding oil companies, banks and insurance companies. 
[SOURCES: Business Mtonitor MA4 1984 & M4 1973.]
I t  is  e v id e n t fro m  Tab le  9-1 th a t  ro y a lty  re c e ip ts  fro m  
u n re la te d  overseas concerns have exceeded those  fro m  re la te d  
overseas concerns in  each o f  th e  tw e n ty  one years betw een 1964 and 
1984. The R u/R r r a t io  has been f a i r l y  s ta b le  f o r  m ost o f  th is  p e r io d , 
w ith  u n re la te d  ro y a lt ie s  ru n n in g  a t ju s t  o v e r tw ic e  th e  le v e l o f  
re la te d  ro y a lt ie s .  From the  la te  1970s onw ards, how ever, th e re  has 
been a n o tic e a b le  dow nw ard tre n d  in  th e  R u/R r ra t io ,  r e f le c t in g  an 
in c re a se  in  the  le v e l o f  re la te d  ro y a lt ie s  re la t iv e  to  th e  le v e l o f  
u n re la te d  ro y a lt ie s .
43
CHAPTER 9
9.2.3 The R e la tiv e  M agn itude o f  L ice n s in g , E x p o rt in g  and FDI
A ny A tte m p t to  assess th e  m agn itude  o f  lic e n s in g  v is - a - v is  th e  
m ain a lte rn a tiv e s  o f FDI and e x p o rt in g  re q u ire s  a d e c is io n  to  be 
made ab o u t the  a p p ro p ria te  measurem ent bases to  ado p t f o r  each 
mode o f  business. Data on lic e n s in g  is  a v a ila b le  in d ir e c t ly  in  th e  
fo rm  o f  ro y a lty  paym ents, da ta  on e x p o rts  in  th e  fo rm  o f  e x p o r t  
sa les, and da ta  on FDI comes in  the  fo rm  o f  c a p ita l f lo w s , e a rn ings  
o r  th e  book v a lu e  o f assets.
The id e a l way to  compare th e  th re e  m ethods o f  bus iness is  to  
s ta n d a rd is e  the  m easurem ent bas is  f o r  each o f  them . S ince th e y  a l l  
re p re s e n t a lte rn a tiv e  m ethods o f  s e rv ic in g  a fo re ig n  m a rke t th is  is  
b es t ach ieved  by e s tim a tin g  th e  va lu e  o f sales assoc ia ted  w ith  each 
ty p e  o f  o p e ra tio n . T h is  m ethod o f com parison was used by B u ck le y  
and D avies (1979, 1981), Byrne (1980), Davies and R osser (1984), C legg 
(1987) and B uck ley  and P re s c o tt (1989), and i t  is  th e  m ethod w h ich  is  
adop ted  here.
The c a lc u la tio n  o f th e  overseas sales assoc ia ted  w ith  UK 
te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  w h ich  fo llo w s  is  based upon th e  f ig u re s  f o r  
" te c h n o lo g ic a l and m in e ra l ro y a lt ie s " .^  These exc lude  w ha t are  
te rm ed  " a r t is t ic "  ro y a lt ie s ,  ie  ro y a lt ie s  fo r  " p r in te d  m a tte r, sound 
re c o rd in g s  and p e rfo rm in g  r ig h ts " .
F o llo w in g  B uck ley  and Davies (1979, 1981) the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f 
t o ta l  ro y a lty  re c e ip ts  across in d u s tr ie s  was exam ined to  de te rm ine  
th e  p ro p o r t io n  w h ich  came from  n o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g  in d u s tr ie s . 
These n o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g  ro y a lt ie s  were ta ke n  as a p ro x y  f o r  
paym ents from  n o n -lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t ie s  (management c o n tra c ts , 
tu rn k e y  o p e ra tio n s  etc). They were th e n  used to  d e fla te  th e  
te c h n o lo g ic a l and m in e ra l ro y a lt ie s  to  d e r iv e  an es tim a te  o f  th e  
ro y a lt ie s  from  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t ie s  a lone.
The p ro p o r t io n  o f n o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g  ro y a lt ie s  was c a lc u la te d  
f o r  each yea r from  1964—1984. T h is  fo llo w s  the  p ro ce d u re  adop ted  by 
B u ck le y  and P re sco tt (1989), and i t  re p re se n ts  an im provem en t o v e r 
B u ck ley  and Davies (1979, 1981) who used a s ta n d a rd  20 p e r cen t
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f ig u re  f o r  each yea r on the  basis th a t  th is  p ro p o r t io n  was f a i r l y  
s ta b le  o v e r the  tim e p e rio d  o f t h e ir  s tudy .^
H av ing  es tim a ted  the  v a lu e  o f  lic e n s in g  ro y a lt ie s ,  th e  n e x t s tep  
was to  es tim a te  the  sales assoc ia ted  w ith  these ro y a lt ie s .  T h is  was 
done by  assum ing th a t  ro y a lt ie s  averaged 5 p e r cen t o f  sa les 
revenues. The v a lu e  o f  license d  sales was th e re fo re  es tim a ted  by 
m u lt ip ly in g  lic e n s in g  ro y a lt ie s  by 20.5
The estim a te  o f sales a r is in g  from  FDI was based upon th e  book  
v a lu e s  o f  UK overseas assets, w h ich  are es tim a ted  e ve ry  th re e  years  
by  th e  DTI and p u b lis h e d  as Business M o n ito r  MQ4, Census o f  
O verseas A sse ts . To m a in ta in  c o m p a ra b ility  w ith  th e  lic e n s in g  da ta , 
o n ly  th e  overseas asset va lues  o f com panies in v o lv e d  in  
m a n u fa c tu rin g  a c t iv i t ie s  were used.^ Values fo r  th e  sales genera ted  
fro m  these  assets were d e r iv e d  by m u lt ip ly in g  th e  asset va lu e s  by  
an a p p ro p r ia te  sa les/asse ts  ra t io .  In  th e  absence o f  any UK d a ta  on 
sa les /ove rseas  assets ra t io s , i t  has been common p ra c t ic e  to  es tim a te  
UK FDI sales us ing  US sa les/overseas assets ra t io s .  B u ck ley  and 
D avies (1979,1981), Byrne (1980) and Davies and Rosser (1984) used a 
v a lu e  o f  2:1 based upon a s tu d y  by  P o lk , M e is te r and V e it  (1966) 
w h ic h  used th is  r a t io  to  es tim a te  the  sales assoc ia ted  w ith  US FDI 
in  1965.^ A s tu d y  by B e lli (1970) reve a le d  th a t  th e  a c tu a l r a t io  f o r  
1965 was 2.189:1, w h ich  was v e ry  close to  th a t  em ployed by  P o lk  e t 
a l.
An a lte rn a t iv e  m ethod o f  e s tim a tin g  th e  FDI sales o f  UK 
com panies was p roposed by C legg (1987), who a p p lie d  th e  UK's 
dom estic  c a p ita l:o u tp u t  r a t io  to  th e  UK's overseas c a p ita l s to ck . 
H ow ever, th e  approach adopted in  th is  s tu d y  is  to  supp lem ent th e  
d a ta  o f  P o lk  e t a l w ith  more re ce n t da ta  on US sa les /ove rseas assets 
r a t io s ,  d e r iv e d  fro m  B re re to n  (1986), to  es tim a te  th e  sa les assoc ia ted  
w ith  UK FDI.® I t  is  th e re fo re  assumed, in  common w ith  B u ck ley  and 
P re s c o tt (1989), th a t  th e  c o m p a ra b ility  o f  UK FDI is  c lo s e r to  US FDI 
th a n  to  dom estic  UK in ve s tm e n t in  term s o f c a p ita l:o u tp u t  ra t io s .
Tab le  9-2 shows th e  s tru c tu re  o f  UK sales in  fo re ig n  m arke ts  




THE STRUCTURE OF UK SALES ABROAD, 1965-1984 ( mi 11i on)
1965 1968 1971 1974 1978 1981 1984
1. Licensed sa les ( l ) 575 1,023 1,307 2 ,114  3 ,797 4,513 4 ,797
2. O ire c t  investment sales ( I )  3,597 4,772 5,699 8,568 17,299 23,022 34,335
3. Exports (X) 2 ,846 3,762 5,556 9 ,314  19,060 24,142 32 ,434
4. Foreign Production (L + I )  4,172 5,795 7,006 10,682 21,096 27,540 39,132
5. Tota l Foreign Sales (L+I+X) 7,018 9,557 12,562 19,996 40,156 51,732 71,566
6. Exports as a Percentage
of  Tota l Foreign X
Sales L+I+X 40.5 39 .4  44.2 46 .6  47.5 46.6 45 .3
7. Foreign Production as
a Percentage o f  Total L+I
Foreign Sales L+I+X 59 .4  60.6 55.8 53 .4  52.5 53 .4  54 .7
8. D i re c t  investment sales  
as a Percentage of
Total Foreign Sales L+I+X 51 .3  49.9 45 .4  42 .8  43 .0  44.5 48 .0
9. Licensed Sales as a
Percentage o f  Foreign L
Production L+I 13.8 17.7 13.7 19.8 18.0 16.7 12.2
10. Licensed Sales as a
Percentage o f  Total L
Foreign Sales L+I+X 8 .2  10.7 10.4 10.6 9 .5  8 .9  6 .7
[SOURCES: Business Monitor MA4 and M4, and Supplements, Business— Monitor MC4, Annua], 
A b s t r a c t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s  ( V a r i o u s  e d i t i o n s ) ]
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o f  overseas assets, used to  es tim ate  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t sa les, are 
o n ly  es tim a ted  t r ie n ia l ly  by the  DTI, th e  f ig u re s  f o r  a l l  th re e  fo rm s 
o f  fo re ig n  sales were c a lc u la te d  a t th re e  y e a r ly  in te rv a ls ,  fro m  1965 
to  1974 and from  1978 to  1984.^ The va lues  o f  UK e x p o rts  f o r  these  
yea rs  were o b ta in e d  from  the  'E x te rn a l Trade S ta t is t ic s ' p u b lis h e d  
a n n u a lly  as p a r t  o f th e  CSO's A nnua l A b s tra c t o f  S ta t is t ic s . The 
f ig u re s  re la te  to  m anu fac tu red  goods, in  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  
c o m p a ra b ility  w ith  th e  o th e r  d a ta .^  An a d jus tm e n t was made to  
rem ove th e  e xp o rts  from  s u b s id ia r ie s  o f fo re ig n  com panies based in  
th e  UK, s ince  th e  aim was to  de te rm ine  the  v a lu e  o f  th e  e x p o rt 
sa les o f  UK com panies a lone. Th is  was ach ieved  by  u s in g  th e  
f ig u re s  f o r  th e  percentage o f UK e xp o rts  fro m  fo re ig n -o w n e d  
com panies w h ich  were p u b lis h e d  in  Business M o n ito r  MA4 up to  
1981.11
Tab le  9-2 shows th a t  sales from  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t made up th e  
la rg e s t com ponent o f  the  UK's to ta l fo re ig n  sales in  1965, 1968 and 
1971, b u t  were th e n  o ve rta ke n  by e xp o rts  w h ich  made up th e  la rg e s t 
com ponent in  1974, 1978 and 1981. T h is  ra n k in g  was re ve rse d  in  1984, 
when d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t sales o v e rto o k  e xp o rts  once aga in. I t  is  
reasonab le  to  presum e th a t  the  re la t iv e  d e c lin e  in  m a n u fac tu re d  
e x p o rts  between 1981 and 1984 was sym ptom atic  o f  th e  w eaken ing  o f  
th e  UK economy's m a n u fa c tu rin g  base in  th e  e a r ly  1980s, re f le c te d  in  
th e  f i r s t  eve r peacetim e d e fe c it  in  UK m a nu fac tu re d  tra d e  be ing  
re co rd e d  in  1983.
L icensed  sales accounted f o r  the  sm a lles t p ro p o r t io n  o f  t o ta l  
fo re ig n  sales in  a l l  years. However, as B uck ley  and D avies (1979, 
p p l7 -1 8 ) p o in t  o u t, th e  im portance  o f  lic e n s in g  is  l i k e ly  to  be 
u n d e r-e s tim a te d  s ince th e  f ig u re s  fo r  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t are h e a v ily  
w e ig h te d  w ith  lo n g -s ta n d in g  in ves tm en ts , w h ile  th e  g e n e ra lly  s h o r t ­
te rm  n a tu re  o f lic e n s in g  agreements means th a t  lic e n s e d  sales are  
assoc ia ted  a lm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith  r e la t iv e ly  re c e n t v e n tu re s .
The p ro p o r t io n  o f license d  sales to  t o ta l  fo re ig n  sa les 
in c re a se d  between 1965 and 1968 and th e n  appears to  have le v e lle d  
o f f  b e fo re  d e c lin in g  n o tic e a b ly  in  1984. A s im ila r  p a t te rn  is  
re f le c te d  in  th e  tre n d  ove r tim e  o f th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  lice n se d  sales
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to  fo re ig n  p ro d u c tio n . I t  w ou ld  th e re fo re  appear th a t  lic e n s in g  
was less  s ig n if ic a n t  as a fo re ig n  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  s tra te g y  in  th e  
m id-1980s th a n  i t  was in  the  mid-1960s.
The da ta  in  Tab le 9-2 g ives an aggregate p ic tu re  o f  th e  fo re ig n  
sa les o f  UK com panies as a w hole . To f in d  o u t i f  th is  o v e ra l l 
p ic tu re  masked any im p o rta n t d iffe re n c e s  betw een in d u s tr ie s  and 
g e o g ra p h ic a l areas, th e  da ta  was d isagg rega ted  on th e  bas is  o f  these  
tw o  v a r ia b le s . T h is  a n a lys is  o f  th e  in d u s t r ia l  and g e o g ra p h ic a l 
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  overseas sales was conducted  o v e r a s h o r te r  tim e  
se rie s , ie  th e  years 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984.
9.2.4 The In d u s t r ia l C om pos ition  o f  L ice n s in g , E x p o rt in g  and FDI
E s tim a tin g  license d  sales from  th e  d isagg rega ted  d a ta  posed an 
a d d it io n a l p rob lem , w h ich  stems fro m  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  DTI's a n n u a l 
in q u ir y  does n o t co ve r a l l  companies w ith  r o y a lty  tra n s a c tio n s . The 
ro y a lty  d a ta  w h ich  is  d isaggrega ted  by in d u s try  and by g e o g ra p h ic a l 
a rea  o n ly  re p re se n ts  th e  tra n s a c tio n s  o f  com panies w h ich  responded  
to  th e  DTI in q u iry ,  and are re fe rre d  to  as th e  " re tu rn s  re c e iv e d "; 
th e  aggregated ro y a lty  data , on th e  o th e r  hand, re p re s e n ts  es tim a tes  
fo r  a l l  UK companies.
In  us in g  the  d isaggrega ted  da ta  i t  was th e re fo re  necessary to  
'g ro s s -u p ' th e  ro y a lty  f ig u re s  to  ta ke  accoun t o f  non -response . The 
le v e l o f  non -response  assoc ia ted  w ith  te c h n o lo g ic a l and m in e ra l 
ro y a lt ie s  fro m  u n re la te d  concerns was de te rm ined  by  c a lc u la t in g  th e  
p ro p o r t io n  o f " re tu rn s  re ce ive d " f o r  b o th  ca te g o rie s  o f  ro y a lty  to  
th e  es tim ates o f te c h n o lo g ic a l and m in e ra l ro y a lt ie s  f o r  a l l
com pan ies.1^ T h is  r a t io  was th e n  used to  g ross up th e
d isagg rega ted  ro y a lty  data. The v a lu e  o f  lic e n s e d  sa les f o r  each 
in d u s t ry  g roup  was then  es tim a ted  by a p p ly in g  th e  5 p e r cen t 
r o y a lty  es tim a te  (ie  m u lt ip ly in g  th e  g rossed -up  ro y a lt ie s  by  20).14
D ire c t in ve s tm e n t sales were es tim a ted  by m u lt ip ly in g  th e  b o o k  
va lu e s  o f  overseas assets f o r  each in d u s try  g roup  by th e
sa les /ove rseas assets ra t io s  o f  th e  e q u iv a le n t US in d u s tr ie s ,  d e r iv e d  
fro m  th e  1982 Benchm ark S u rvey o f  US FDI [W h icha rd  and Shea
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(1985)]. The use o f  a d i f fe re n t  r a t io  f o r  each in d u s t ry  g ro u p  
a vo id e d  any d is to r t io n  w h ich  w o u ld  have been caused by th e  use o f 
a common r a t io  across a l l  in d u s t r ie s .^
E x p o rts  fo r  1978, 1981 and 1984 were es tim a ted  u s in g  d a ta  d raw n  
fro m  th e  Business M o n ito r  MQ10 se ries  w h ich  ana lyses th e  UK's 
overseas tra d e  in  term s o f in d u s tr ie s . ^  In  th e  absence o f  any d a ta  
fro m  th is  source fo r  1974, e x p o rts  were e s tim a te d  by f i r s t l y  
c a lc u la t in g  the  p ro p o r t io n  o f UK-owned e x p o rts  to  to ta l  e x p o rts  f o r  
each in d u s try  g roup , based upon e x p o rt da ta  p u b lis h e d  in  th e  1974 
e d it io n  o f  Business M o n ito r  MA4. These p ro p o r t io n s  were th e n  
a p p lie d  to  th e  to ta l  va lu e  o f  UK m a n u fa c tu rin g  e x p o rts  f o r  1974 to  
d e r iv e  th e  es tim a ted  in d u s try  b re a k d o w n .^
The es tim a ted  in d u s t r ia l b reakdow n o f lic e n s e d  sa les, d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t sales and e xp o rts , f o r  th e  years 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984, 
is  show n in  Table 9-3. I t  is  a pp a ren t th a t  p a r t ic u la r  fo rm s  o f 
m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  dom inate c e r ta in  in d u s tr ie s . E x p o rts  accoun ted  f o r  
th e  h ig h e s t p ro p o r t io n  o f fo re ig n  sales in  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  in d u s tr ie s  
in  each o f  the  fo u r  years a p a rt from  1984, when i t  was o v e r- ta k e n  
by  d ire c t  in ves tm en t. L ice n s in g  accounted f o r  the  s m a lle s t 
p ro p o r t io n  o f  fo re ig n  sales in  a l l  in d u s tr ie s  in  each o f  th e  fo u r  
yea rs , w ith  the  exce p tio n  o f  s h ip b u ild in g  in  1981, when i t  ra n ke d  
above th e  o th e r  tw o business m ethods.^9
E x p o rts  were th e  most p o p u la r  fo rm  o f  m a rke t p e n e tra t io n  in  
th e  m e ta l m anu factu re , m o to r ve h ic le s , m echan ica l and in s tru m e n t 
e n g in e e rin g , e le c tr ic a l eng ine e ring , and te x t i le s  sec to rs . Sales v ia  
d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t were most p re v a le n t in  th e  fo o d , d r in k  and 
tobacco , chem ica ls and a llie d , paper p r in t in g  and p u b lis h in g , and 
ru b b e r  in d u s tr ie s . A lth o u g h  lic e n s in g  was th e  le a s t im p o r ta n t fo rm  
o f  m a rke t s e rv ic in g , i t  was c le a r ly  more s ig n if ic a n t  in  some s e c to rs  
th a n  in  o th e rs ; in  the  chem ica ls and a llie d , s h ip b u ild in g ,  pa p e r 
p r in t in g  and p u b lis h in g  and o th e r  m a n u fa c tu rin g  se c to rs , i t  o f te n  
accoun ted  fo r  more th a n  10 p e r cen t o f  to ta l  fo re ig n  sales.
The re la t iv e ly  h ig h  va lues  o f lice n se d  sales re co rd e d  f o r  th e  
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v ie w s  expressed by th e o r is ts  who be long to  th e  in te rn a lis a t io n  
sch o o l o f  th o u g h t [eg B uck ley  and Casson (1976), Rugman (1981), 
Magee (1977)]. These a u th o rs  h o ld  th a t  th e  in h e re n t d i f f ic u l t ie s  o f  
e x p lo it in g  the  f r u i t s  o f  R&D v ia  lic e n s in g  agreem ents make in te rn a l 
m a rke ts  s u p e r io r  ve h ic le s  fo r  e x tra c t in g  econom ic re n ts . One 
p o s s ib le  e x p la n a tio n  fo r  the  re la t iv e ly  h ig h  va lues  o f  lice n se d  sa les 
in  th e  chem ica ls and a l l ie d  se c to r is  th e  p reva lence  o f  re c ip ro c a l 
l ic e n s in g  agreements, w h ich  o b lig e  companies to  lic e n s e  any new 
te c h n o lo g ie s  to  th e ir  com pe tito rs .
I t  sh o u ld  be noted, how ever, th a t  the  p a t te rn  o f  overseas 
sa les in  o th e r  sec to rs  cou ld  be used to  s u p p o rt th e  p re d ic t io n s  o f  
th e  in te rn a lis a t io n  th e o r is ts . F o r example, i t  c o u ld  be h y p o th e s ise d  
th a t  com panies in  th e  food , d r in k  and tobacco s e c to r w o u ld  be 
expec ted  to  have a s tro n g  p re fe re nce  fo r  FDI o v e r lic e n s in g ; these  
com panies ty p ic a l ly  in c u r  h ig h  a d v e r t is in g  e x p e n d itu re s  to  
d i f fe r e n t ia te  th e ir  p ro d u c ts , and w o u ld  th e re fo re  have a s tro n g  
p re fe re n c e  fo r  w h o lly -o w n e d  s u b s id ia r ie s  in  o rd e r to  ensure  s t r i c t  
q u a li ty  c o n tro l p rocedures to  p ro te c t th e ir  b ra n d  names. I t  c o u ld  
th e re fo re  be argued th a t  th e  low  p ro p o rt io n s  o f  lic e n s e d  sa les 
re c o rd e d  fo r  th is  sec to r, and th e  c o rre s p o n d in g ly  h ig h  p ro p o r t io n s  
re co rd e d  fo r  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t sales, s u p p o rt th e  in te rn a lis a t io n  
p e rs p e c tiv e .
To de te rm ine  w h e th e r th e re  was any a s s o c ia tio n  betw een th e
th re e  fo rm s o f overseas sales across in d u s tr ie s , Spearman ra n k -
o rd e r  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  were c a lc u la te d  betw een th e  th re e
70p o s s ib le  p a ir in g s  o f overseas sales (see A p pend ix  9.1). O n ly  th e  
Spearman c o e ff ic ie n ts  between d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t sa les and e x p o rts  
were fo u n d  to  be s ig n if ic a n t.  H igh  neg a tive  va lu e s  were c a lc u la te d  
f o r  each o f the  fo u r  years, in d ic a t in g  th a t  a h ig h  le v e l o f  d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t sales was associa ted  w ith  a lo w  le v e l o f  e x p o rts .
The ana lys is  o f  the  in d u s t r ia l b reakdow n o f UK overseas sa les 
was ta k e n  a stage fu r th e r  by id e n t ify in g  sec to rs  in  w h ich  p a r t ic u la r  
modes o f  business were p redom inan t. F o llo w in g  Byrne (1980) i t  was 
dec ided  to  c la s s ify  in d u s tr ie s  as e x p o r t-  o r  F D I-dom ina te d  i f  70 p e r 
cen t o f  th e ir  overseas sales were d e r iv e d  from  e ith e r  o f  these  modes
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o f  bus iness. In d u s tr ie s  were c la s s if ie d  as lic e n s in g -d o m in a te d  i f  
lic e n s e d  sales accounted fo r  more th a n  10 p e r cen t o f  overseas 
sa les, and n e ith e r  o f  th e  o th e r  tw o business modes accoun ted  fo r  
m ore th a n  60 pe r cent in d iv id u a lly .  Any in d u s tr ie s  w h ich  d id  n o t 
f i t  in to  e ith e r  o f  these th re e  ca tego ries  were c la s s if ie d  as h a v in g  
no dom in an t mode o f UK fo re ig n  in vo lve m en t.
The re s u lts  o f th is  c la s s if ic a t io n  exe rc ise  are shown in  Tab le  
9-4. Among the  no tice a b le  fe a tu re s  o f th is  ta b le  is  th e  fa c t  th a t  
fo o d , d r in k  and tobacco was the  o n ly  s e c to r w h ich  was c la s s if ie d  as 
F D I-dom ina ted , a p o s it io n  w h ich  i t  occup ied  in  each o f the  fo u r  
yea rs . A p a rt from  o th e r  m a n u fa c tu rin g  in d u s tr ie s , th e  s e c to r m ost 
f re q u e n t ly  c la s s if ie d  as lic e n s in g -d o m in a te d  was chem ica ls and 
a l l ie d ,  w h ich  was l is te d  unde r th is  heading in  e ve ry  ye a r o th e r  th a n  
1984, when i t  came under the  heading o f  'no dom inan t mode'. T h is  
change in  c la s s if ic a t io n  was due to  a g ra d u a l in c rease  in  th e  
r e la t iv e  share o f overseas sales accounted fo r  by  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t, 
a tre n d  w h ich  is  e v id e n t in  Table 9-3. The paper, p r in t in g  and 
p u b lis h in g  se c to r was c la s s if ie d  as lic e n s in g -d o m in a te d  in  1974, b u t 
was th e n  l is te d  under 'no dom inant mode' in  1978 and 1981. By 1984, 
how ever, the  re la t iv e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  license d  sales had increased  
such  th a t  th e  se c to r was once aga in c la s s if ie d  as lic e n s in g -  
dom ina ted .
A p a rt  from  the  m eta l m anu fac tu re  and m o to r v e h ic le s  sec to rs , 
w h ic h  were c la s s if ie d  as e xp o rt-d o m in a te d  in  m ost years, the  o th e r  
s e c to rs  were more o fte n  th a n  n o t c la s s if ie d  as h a v in g  no dom inan t 
mode o f  business.
9.2.5 The G eograph ica l C om pos ition  o f  L icens ing , E x p o rt in g  And FDI
The e s tim a tio n  o f th e  g e o g raph ica l b reakdow n o f  lice n se d  sales 
in v o lv e d  a num ber o f a d d it io n a l steps o ve r and above those  
in v o lv e d  in  c a lc u la tin g  the  in d u s t r ia l b reakdow n o f  license d  sales. 
T h is  stemmed from  the  fa c t th a t  the  ro y a lty  da ta  was ca te g o rise d  
d if fe r e n t ly ,  and a lso from  the  need to  e lim in a te  ro y a lt ie s  assoc ia ted  






















































































Q  UJ Q O O 
Z  £
0) L. cu • L.
c c cu L. C (U .
UJ •>- z 3 •r- Z O)
01 p P O) P c
• c cd O C  co ■f-
p UJ cu CO UJ cu p
cn p cp p c
c r— 3 r— •r-
M co - C (0 - L.
0 cn CO o  cn Q.
06 •1- <u £ (U
u L. U 1— -  u
p • i- CU i— p L. (U
Z 0 p z (0 O P cu z
0 cu X z p CU X a z
CD 1— CU 3 cu - -  cu ca 3
£  uj t - c r £ UJ I - a . c r






L. -  1_ 
U  L  aj
CJ 0) JQ
d  a z
r -  (0 3
ixi o. cc
h-a tn
O  LU Q. _t 
X  <  
UJ 03
O  03 
UJ UJ
cr >  
w  zQ v-t
aui
03
Z  03 







p  cn cn
a  cu • (U
CO r - p
4- o cn o
3  •>- c  •<-
C Z M  Z
CO (U cu
£  > ofl >
r -  L. ■ l.
ca 0 Z  0
p  p U P
cu 0 a) o





















tj a. z  •
cu cn cu cn
•r- - z ■<- z
<- 0) c r -  c
r -  C !H 1— 1-1
<  - <
P
o8 C 4 - ofl 4 -■T~ 3 3
CO L. C cn c
i-  a. (0 CO
CO £ CO £
u - 0
•1- L. u •i- l.
E a) cu E <D
a) a  z a) z
z  CO p Z  P





u  C 
3  UJ
p  cn 
o  • a) 
co p  <— 
4-  cn o
3  C •»- 
C t-H Z
as cu£ od >
10 Z  O 
P  O -P
a) a> o  












































































































The f i r s t  s tep  taken  in  th e  e s tim a tio n  process was to  c a lc u la te  
th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  to ta l  ro y a lt ie s  in  each area w h ich  were re c e iv e d  
fro m  u n re la te d  concerns. The second s tep  in v o lv e d  m u lt ip ly in g  th e  
va lu e s  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l and m in e ra l ro y a lt ie s  d isc lo se d  f o r  each area 
by  th is  p ro p o r t io n , w h ich  gave va lues  fo r  te c h n o lo g ic a l and m in e ra l 
ro y a lt ie s  fro m  u n re la te d  concerns. The t h i r d  s tep  in v o lv e d
c a lc u la t in g  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  m a n u fa c tu rin g  ro y a lt ie s  to  to ta l
ro y a lt ie s .  On th e  assum ption  th a t  th is  r a t io  was c o n s ta n t across 
a l l  areas i t  was a p p lie d  to  th e  va lues  o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  second s tep  
to  d e r iv e  th e  va lues  o f  u n re la te d  m a n u fa c tu rin g  te c h n o lo g ic a l and 
m in e ra l ro y a lt ie s  in  each area.
The fo u r th  s tep  in v o lv e d  g ro ss in g -u p  these  va lu e s  to  ta k e
accou n t o f  non-response . Th is  was done on th e  bas is  o f  th e  r a t io  
o f  t o ta l  " re tu rn s  rece ive d " f o r  u n re la te d  te c h n o lo g ic a l and m in e ra l 
r o y a lt ie s  to  th e  estim ates o f  to ta l  u n re la te d  te c h n o lo g ic a l and 
m in e ra l ro y a lt ie s  f o r  a l l  companies. The f i f t h  and f in a l  s tep  in  th e  
e s tim a tio n  process in v o lv e d  m u lt ip ly in g  the  va lues  c a lc u la te d  up to  
th is  p o in t  by  20 (on th e  assum ption  o f  an average 5 p e r cen t ro y a lty  
ra te )  to  d e r iv e  va lues  f o r  license d  sales in  each area.
The va lues  o f d ire c t in ves tm en t sales in  each area were
es tim a te d  by m u lt ip ly in g  the  book va lues  o f  overseas m a n u fa c tu rin g
assets by  th e  US sa les/overseas assets ra t io s  fo r  those  areas. These
ra t io s  were d e r iv e d  from  the  1982 Benchm ark S u rvey  o f  US FDI
[W h ich a rd  and Shea (1985)] and i t  was assumed th a t  these ra t io s
w ere c o n s ta n t across the  fo u r  years fo r  w h ich  f ig u re s  w ere 
71c a lc u la te d .
D ata  on th e  v a lu e  o f UK m anu fac tu red  e x p o rts  by  d e s t in a t io n  
were o b ta in e d  from  th e  GSS p u b lic a t io n  Overseas T rade S ta t is t ic s  o f  
th e  U n ite d  K ingdom, now p u b lish e d  a n n u a lly  in  th e  Business M o n ito r  
se rie s  as M A 20.^ The raw  da ta  was d e fla te d  by a common fa c to r  in  
each o f  th e  fo u r  years to  e lim in a te  e xp o rts  by  non-U K -ow ned 
23com panies.
The es tim a ted  geog raph ica l b reakdow n o f lice n se d  sales, d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t sales and e xp o rts  f o r  th e  years 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984
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is  show n in  Table 9-5.24 I t  is  appa ren t th a t  th e  p a tte rn  o f UK 
fo re ig n  in vo lve m e n t va r ie s  across d if fe re n t  m arke ts . E x p o rts  
accoun ted  fo r  the  la rg e s t component o f fo re ig n  sales in  W estern 
Europe and the  Rest o f the  W orld. The p ro p o r t io n  o f  UK e x p o rts  to  
W estern Europe increased  ove r the  years s tu d ie d , m a in ly  due to  an 
in c re a se  in  e xp o rts  to  the  EEC c o u n tr ie s . Commensurate w ith  th is  
in c re a se  in  e xp o rts , d ire c t in ves tm en t sales in  EEC c o u n tr ie s  
d e c lin e d , a f in d in g  w h ich  is  n o t s u rp r is in g  in  v ie w  o f  the  UK's e n try  
to  th e  EEC in  1972 and the  consequent e lim in a tio n  o f th e  common 
e x te rn a l t a r i f f  b a r r ie r .
These tre n d s  in  the  UK's d ire c t in ves tm en t sa les and e x p o rt 
sa les to  EEC co u n tr ie s  are the  opp os ite  o f  those  com monly 
a sso c ia te d  w ith  sales to  co u n tr ie s  w h ich  become p a r t  o f  a custom s 
u n io n . F o r example, th e re  is  evidence w h ich  suggests th a t  the  sales 
ach ieved  by the  European s u b s id ia r ie s  o f US MNCs increased  
r e la t iv e  to  e x p o rt sales in  the  years fo llo w in g  th e  c re a tio n  o f th e  
EEC [see Hood and Young (1979, pp 174-175)]. A s im ila r  tre n d  c o u ld  
be expected  to  be fo u n d  fo r  the  UK's sales to  the  sm a lle r European 
custom s un ion , EFTA, g iven  the  need to  pay an e x te rn a l t a r i f f  on 
e x p o rts  to  EFTA co u n tr ie s . The f ig u re s  do show a g ra d u a l increase  
in  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f d ire c t in ves tm en t sales to  EFTA c o u n tr ie s  and a 
g ra d u a l, th ough  fa r  less m arked, re la t iv e  d e c lin e  in  e x p o rt sales, 
w h ic h  s ta r te d  from  a ve ry  h ig h  base in  1974.
The p ro p o r t io n  o f the  UK's fo re ig n  sales accounted fo r  by 
e x p o rts  in  the  Rest o f the  W orld has rem ained r e la t iv e ly  unchanged 
o v e r th e  p e rio d  under s tudy. The c o u n tr ie s  w h ich  make up th is  
c a te g o ry  are the  less deve loped co u n tr ie s , in c lu d in g  the  new ly  
in d u s t r ia l is in g  co u n tr ie s . I t  is  n o tice a b le  th a t  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  UK 
sa les accounted fo r  by lic e n s in g  in  these c o u n tr ie s  was v i r t u a l ly  
unchanged between 1974 and 1978, and increased  s l ig h t ly  in  1981; 
how eve r, between 1981 and 1984 th e re  was a n o tice a b le  d ec lin e  in  th e  
p ro p o r t io n  o f licensed  sales, from  10.4 pe r cent to  6.3 p e r cent, 
a lm os t e n t ire ly  a t the  expense o f an increase in  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t
sales.
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re p o r te d  by Oman (1981, 1984), th a t  FDI was becoming superceded by
"new" fo rm s o f in ves tm en t in  the  N o rth -S o u th  c o n te x t.25 I t  a lso
le n d s  s u p p o rt to  the  hypo thes is  th a t  the  deb t c r is is  o f  the  e a r ly
1980's reduced the  a b i l i t y  o f LDC's to  fin a n ce  "new" fo rm s o f
in v e s tm e n t, th u s  making e q u ity  in ves tm en t r e la t iv e ly  more 
a t t r a c t iv e .
Sales a r is in g  from  d ire c t in ves tm en t accounted fo r  th e  m a jo r 
p a r t  o f  th e  UK s fo re ig n  sales in  N o rth  Am erica and O th e r D eveloped 
C o u n tr ie s . W ith in  N o rth  Am erica, more UK sales to  Canada were 
f in a n c e d  by d ire c t in ves tm en t th a n  were UK sales to  th e  US, 
a lth o u g h  th is  gap between Canada and th e  US na rrow e d  o v e r th e  
p e r io d  s tu d ie d . O f the  th re e  O the r Developed C o u n trie s , A u s tra la s ia  
( ie  A u s tra lia  and New Zealand) accounted fo r  th e  b u lk  o f  th e  UK's 
d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t sales.
Sales from  lic e n s in g  accounted fo r  the  sm a lles t percen tage o f 
th e  UK's fo re ig n  sales in  a l l  m arke ts w ith  th e  e xce p tio n  o f Japan. 
In  Japan, licensed  sales were o f g rea t s ig n if ic a n c e  to  UK com panies;
in  1974, 1978 and 1981 they  accounted fo r  more th a n  50 p e r cen t o f
? f \t o ta l  sales, a lth o u g h  th is  va lue  dec lined  to  41.4 p e r cen t in  1984. 
The fa c t  th a t  the  Japanese m arke t has been d i f f i c u l t  to  p e n e tra te  by 
means o f  FDI and expo rts , because o f governm ent in te rv e n t io n ,  may 
a cco u n t in  la rg e  measure fo r  the  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f lic e n s in g , a lth o u g h  
c u l tu r a l  d iffe re n c e s  are also l ik e ly  to  have p layed  a ro le  by m aking  
FDI less  a t tra c t iv e .
The le v e ls  o f ra n k -o rd e r  c o r re la t io n  between lice n se d  sa les
and b o th  d ire c t in ves tm en t sales and e xp o rts  were fo u n d  to  be lo w
and n o t s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  when c a lc u la te d  across geo g raph ic
areas; s ig n if ic a n t  Spearman c o rre la t io n s  were o n ly  fo u n d  betw een
27d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t sales and e xp o rts  (see A ppend ix  9.1).
H av ing  estim ated the  breakdow n o f the  UK's overseas sa les by 
g e o g ra p h ic  area, the  ana lys is  was th e n  taken  a stage fu r th e r  by 
c la s s ify in g  these areas accord ing  to  the  dom inan t mode o f bus iness. 
The c la s s if ic a t io n  c r i te r ia  employed were the  same as those  used fo r  
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I t  is  c le a r from  the  tab le  th a t the  m a jo r ity  o f  the  areas had 
no dom in an t mode o f business fo r  th e  p e rio d  unde r s tudy . P resen t 
and p a s t Commonwealth co u n tr ie s  fe a tu re  under the  'F D I-dom ina ted  
c a te g o ry  ; th is  re fle c ts  bo th  the  legacy o f past overseas in ve s tm e n t 
by  UK companies in  Commonwealth co u n tr ie s , and a lso  the  
im p o rta n c e  o f Commonwealth t ie s  in  reduc ing  the  r is k s  assoc ia ted  
w ith  in v e s t in g  overseas.
The ta b le  a lso h ig h lig h ts  the  im portance  o f Japan as a source  
o f  lic e n s in g  revenues. I t  is  in te re s t in g  to  no te  th a t  th e  US was 
a lso  c la s s if ie d  as 'lice n s in g -d o m in a te d ' in  1974 and 1978, b u t 
re v e r te d  to  the  'no dom inant mode' ca tegory  th e re a f te r  as d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t sales became re la t iv e ly  more s ig n if ic a n t.
9.3 CONCLUSIONS
D e sp ite  th e  lim ita t io n s  o f the da ta  w h ich  have been ana lysed, a 
num ber o f  im p o rta n t conc lus ions can be draw n ab o u t th e  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  b e h a v io u r o f UK companies.
F ir s t ly ,  the  income rece ived  by UK companies fro m  n o n -e q u ity  
in te rn a t io n a l business, in s o fa r  as i t  is  re fle c te d  in  ro y a lty  re c e ip ts  
fro m  b o th  u n re la te d  and re la te d  overseas concerns, has g row n 
s te a d ily  s ince 1964. The fo rm er ca tegory  o f ro y a lt ie s  have a lw ays 
exceeded th e  la t te r ,  a ltho ugh  th e re  has been a n o tic e a b le  inc rease  
in  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f ro y a lt ie s  rece ived  from  re la te d  concerns in  th e  
e a r ly  1980s.
Secondly, exp o rts  and d ire c t in ves tm en t sales accounted f o r  
ro u g h ly  s im ila r  amounts o f the  UK's overseas sales o v e r the  e n t ire  
p e r io d  und e r s tudy, w ith  d ire c t in ves tm en t sales becom ing more 
p re v a le n t by 1984. Sales generated from  lic e n s in g  have a lw ays 
c o n s t itu te d  the  sm a lles t p ro p o rt io n  o f to ta l fo re ig n  sales; th is  has 
v a r ie d  o v e r tim e, from  a h igh  o f 10.7 pe r cent in  1968 to  a lo w  o f  6.7 
p e r  ce n t in  1984, b u t is  s t i l l  s u f f ic ie n t ly  la rg e  enough to  m e r it
s e r io u s  a tte n tio n .
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T h ird ly ,  the  re la t iv e  im portance o f sales from  lic e n s in g , FDI 
and e x p o rts  va r ie s  w id e ly  across in d u s tr ie s  and m arke ts , suggesting  
th a t  in d u s try -s p e c if ic  and m a rk e t-s p e c ific  fa c to rs  may have an
in f lu e n c e  on the  fo rm  o f m a rk e t-se rv ic in g . There is  a lso  evidence 
th a t  lic e n s e d  sales are n o t associa ted w ith  e ith e r  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t 
sa les o r  e x p o rt sales, w h ich  suggests th a t they  may re q u ire  sepa ra te  
e x p la n a tio n .
The ana lys is  o f the  in te rn a tio n a l business a c t iv i t ie s  o f UK
com panies w h ich  has been presen ted in  th is  ch a p te r has had to  be
c a s t a t  a h ig h  le v e l o f  aggregation, in  v iew  o f th e  da ta  w h ich  was 
a v a ila b le . N everthe less, these re s u lts  p ro v id e  a u s e fu l backd ro p  fo r  
th e  m ic ro  le v e l ana lys is  o f  UK companies w h ich  fo llo w s  in  th e





1. R e la ted  concerns are de fined  as "overseas p a re n t com panies, 
overseas branches, overseas su b s id ia rie s  o r  overseas associa tes 
o f  th e  re p o r t in g  concern" [HMSO (1983, p4)]. Com parisons w ith  
yea rs  p r io r  to  1979 are d is to r te d  by a change w h ich  occu rre d  
tha t^  ye a r in  the  c la s s if ic a t io n  o f "overseas fe llo w  s u b s id ia r ie s " , 
ie  overseas concerns w h ich  have the  same u lt im a te  overseas 
p a re n t company as overseas owned UK companies and branches, 
b u t  w h ich  have no d ire c t in te re s t in  the  UK concern" (Op c it ,  
p4). P r io r  to  1979 these su b s id ia rie s  were tre a te d  as u n re la te d  
concerns, b u t are now tre a te d  as re la te d  concerns.
2. The 1981 paper by Buckley and Davies is  s im p ly  a re fo rm u la tio n  
o f  t h e ir  1979 paper w ith  da ta  fo r  an a d d it io n a l tw o years 
in c lu d e d  in  th e ir  ana lys is.
3. The ro y a lty  f ig u re s  th a t are pub lished  in  th e  Business M o n ito r  
MA4 se ries  are on an a f te r - ta x  basis, ie  th e y  have had, w here 
a p p ro p ria te , UK o r  overseas ta x  deducted.
4. The p ro p o r t io n  o f ro y a lt ie s  d e rive d  from  n o n -m a n u fa c tu r in g  
a c t iv i t ie s  in  each o f the  seven years between 1965 and 1984 
were as fo llo w s :
1965 -  14.2%
1968 -  14.9%
1971 -  19.1%
1974 -  21.3%
1978 - 27.4%
1981 -  20.0%
1984 -  28.1%
These f ig u re s  were used to  d e fla te  the  te c h n o lo g ic a l and 
m in e ra l ro y a lty  f ig u re s  to  o b ta in  va lues f o r  lic e n s in g  ro y a lt ie s  
in  each o f  these years. The f ig u re s  re ve a l th a t  th e  p ro p o r t io n  
o f  ro y a lt ie s  from  non -m anu fac tu ring  a c t iv it ie s  v a r ie d  between 
14.2% and 28.1% ove r th is  tim e pe riod , w h ich  i l lu s t r a te s  the  f la w  
in  th e  B uck ley and Davies assum ption o f  a co n s ta n t 20% 
p ro p o r t io n  o f ro y a lt ie s  from  n o n -m a n u fa c tu rin g  a c t iv it ie s .
5. The assum ption o f a 5 per cent average ro y a lty  ra te  was 
em ployed by B uckley and Davies (1979,1981), Davies and_ Rosser 
(1984) and B uckley and P resco tt (1989) w ith o u t any  ^ ju s t i f ic a t io n  
be in g  p ro v id e d  fo r  the  app rop ria teness  o f  th is  p a r t ic u la r  
f ig u re .  Byrne (1980) used a 3 per cent f ig u re  on th e  bas is  o f 
T e le s io 's  (1979) re s u lts . The use o f a 5 p e r cen t ro y a lty  ra te  in  
th e  p re se n t s tu d y  is  ju s t i f ie d  on the  basis o f  th e  responses to  
th o se  ques tions  in  Section I I  o f  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  conce rn ing  
ro y a lty  ra te s  (see Append ix B).
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6’ ° v ®rS8aS m a n u fa c tu rin g assets cou ld  n o t be
• i . °5U ^  an<^  1968, so they  were es tim a ted  by
m u lt ip ly in g  the  va lue  o f to ta l overseas assets f o r  these tw o  
yea rs  (w h ich  were ava ila b le ) by the  average o f the  ra t io s  o f 
m a n u fa c tu rin g  to  to ta l overseas assets' in  1971 and 1974. The 
ra t io s  in  bo th  o f these years tu rn e d  ou t to  be 60%, so th is  was 
the^ f ig u re  w h ich  was used in  the  e s tim a tio n  p rocedure . The 
ra t io s  fo r  the  years 1978, 1981 and 1984 were exc luded  from  th e  
c a lc u la t io n  o f the  average ra t io  because th e  num ber o f 
in d u s tr ie s  in c lu d e d  in  the  DTI su rvey was expanded in  1978, 
th e re b y  d is to r t in g  the  ra tio s  ca lcu la ted  from  then  on.
7. B yrne (1980) d id  no t p rov id e  any ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  h is  use o f  a 
2:1 sa les/overseas assets ra tio ,  b u t i t  is  reasonab le  to  presum e 
th a t  i t  was d e rive d  from  P o lk  e t al.
8. B re re to n 's  (1986) a r t ic le  in  the  Survey o f C u rre n t Business
p ro v id e d  da ta  on the  sales and overseas assets o f the  fo re ig n  
a f f i l ia te s  o f  US MNCs fo r  the  years 1977, 1982, 1983 and 1984. 
The sales/overseas assets ra tio s  fo r  these years were 1.322,
1.245, 1.180 and 1.183 respec tive ly . These f ig u re s  are lo w e r th a n  
B e lli 's  (1970) ra t io  fo r  1965 o f 2.189, and seem to  in d ic a te  a
d e c lin e  in  the  ra t io  over tim e. However, because o f  th e  
absence o f any data between 1965 and 1977 i t  was decided to  
use th e  average o f the  f iv e  a va ila b le  US ra tio s , 1.424, and a p p ly  
th is  to  the  fig u re s  fo r  UK overseas assets from  1965 to  1984. 
T h is  r a t io  is  ve ry  close to  the  average ra t io  em ployed by 
B u ck le y  and P resco tt (1989, pl93) o f "a p p ro x im a te ly  1.4:1."
9. The fo u r  yea r gap between 1974 and 1978 was caused by th e
expa ns io n  in  the coverage o f the  in q u iry  in  1978, w h ich
in c lu d e d  re s u lts  from  o i l  companies and banks fo r  the  f i r s t  
tim e  (insu rance  companies were added in  1981).
10. In  th e  A nnua l A b s tra c t o f S ta t is t ic s  e xp o rts  are c la s s if ie d  by 
in d u s t ry  in  accordance w ith  the  S tandard In te rn a t io n a l T rade 
C la s s if ic a t io n  (R evis ion 2), in  w h ich  'm anu fac tu red  goods' 
occupy sections 5 to  8.
11. The percentage o f to ta l UK expo rts  accounted fo r  by UK-owned 
com panies were as fo llo w s  fo r  the  years in d ic a te d  below :
1971 -  71%
1974 - 70%
1978 - 68%
1981 -  69%
The p u b lic a tio n  o f exp o rt f ig u re s  in  Business M o n ito r  MA4 was 
d is c o n tin u e d  a f te r  1981 because the 1981 Companies A c t no 
lo n g e r  re q u ire d  companies to  p u b lis h  the  va lu e  o f th e ir  e x p o rts
in their a c c o u n t s ,  t h u s  making it impossible for the DTI to
in c lu d e  estim ates fo r  companies w h ich  d id  n o t respond to  t h e ir  
v o lu n ta ry  in q u iry . As no c le a r tre n d  is  appa ren t in  the  fo u r  
va lu e s  shown above, the  average va lue  o f these va lues  69.5*, 
was assumed to  rep resen t the  percentage o f  to ta l  e x p o rts  fro m  
UK-owned companies in  1984. T h i s  va lue  was a lso a p p lie d  to  
th e  e x p o rt f ig u re s  fo r  1965 and 1968, in  the  absence o f  da ta  fo r
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these  tw o years.
a tre n d  away from  m a n u fa c tu rin g  e x p o rts
s ir e c t  investm en t sales in  the  e a r ly  1980s is  su p p o rte d
by a re p o r t  w h ich  was p ub lished  in  1983, d is c lo s in g  th a t
overseas p ro d u c tio n  rose by 24% between 1980 and 1982, whereas 
e x p o rts  o n ly  rose by 9.7% ove r the  same p e rio d  [L a b o u r
Research (1983)].
13. The ra t io s  used fo r  g ross ing -up , expressed in  percentage te rm s, 
were as fo llo w s  fo r  the  fo u r  years in d ica te d :




The " re tu rn s  rece ived" from  un re la te d  concerns are n o t s p l i t  up 
in to  the  tw o ro y a lty  categories (" te ch n o lo g ica l and m in e ra l"  
and "p r in te d  m a tte r e tc") and so the  num era to r o f the  r a t io  
used fo r  g ross in g -up  re la tes  to  bo th  a c t iv it ie s .
14. I t  sh o u ld  be noted th a t the  ra th e r  crude assum ption  o f a 5% 
ro y a lty  ra te  across a l l in d u s tr ie s  may p ro v id e  a d is to re d  
p ic tu re  o f the  in d u s tr ia l breakdown o f licensed  sales i f  r o y a lty  
ra te s  v a ry  across d if fe re n t  in d u s tr ie s .
15. US in d u s try  ra tio s  from  the  1982 Benchmark Survey were used 
because o f the  s c a rc ity  o f d isaggregated da ta  from  o th e r  
sources; da ta  from  the  1982 Benchmark Survey were also used 
by  B uck ley  and P resco tt (1989) to  estim ate overseas sales fro m  
UK d ire c t  in ves tm en t ove r the  p e rio d  1975 to  1983. I t  is  
re a lis e d , neve rthe less, th a t the  a p p lic a tio n  o f common US 
in d u s t ry  ra tio s  to  the  years 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984 in  th is  
s tu d y  may have d is to r te d  the va lues o f UK d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t 
sa les o ve r tim e fo r  those in d u s tr ie s  in  w h ich  in d u s try  ra t io s  
a re  l ik e ly  to  have changed.
16. B o th  the  US SIC and the  UK SIC are based upon the  UN's 
In te rn a t io n a l S tandard In d u s tr ia l C la s s if ic a tio n  (ISIC). US 
in d u s t ry  groups are th e re fo re  ve ry  s im ila r  to  UK in d u s try  
g roup s , and so the  US in d u s try  ra tio s  are l ik e ly  to  be c lose  
p ro x ie s  fo r  th e ir  UK equ iva len ts .
17. The e xp o rts  fo r  each in d u s try  group were ad jus ted  dow nw ards 
b y  a common fa c to r  in  each o f the  th re e  years to  e lim in a te  
e x p o rts  from  non UK-owned companies. Th is  was - ach ieved  by 
m u lt ip ly in g  the  e x p o rt va lues by the  ra tio s  o f UK-owned to  




M n n i t o r  m a a  0 ^ anu^a c tu r i ng expo rts  p u b lish e d  in  Business 
^ _ or^ 1974 on ly  re la te d  to  the  re tu rn s  re ce ive d  fro m
4-v,^ -f S lrJ3u^r y* An estim ate o f the  a c tu a l v a lu e  was 
th e re fo re   ^ ob ta ined  by a d ju s tin g  the  v a lu e  o f  to ta l
f -.0 u r in S expo rts  pub lished  in  the  A nnua l A b s tra c t o f  
—a. is  lc s . Th is ad justm ent in v o lv e d  a g ro ss in g -u p  o f th e  da ta
to  a cco u n t_ fo r the  fa c t th a t the  A nnual A b s tra c t o f  S ta t is t ic s
uses the  S tandard In te rn a tio n a l Trade C la s s if ic a t io n  (SITC) 
r a th e r  then  the  SIC.
19. D a ta  on the  e x te n t o f a l l  th ree  form s o f m arke t s e rv ic in g  in
th e  s h ip b u ild in g  sec to r cou ld  on ly  be ob ta ined  fo r  1981.
20. F o r 1974, 1978 and 1981 the  le ve ls  o f c o r re la t io n  between th e
th re e  form s o f m arket s e rv ic in g  were c a lc u la te d  across ten  
in d u s t ry  groups; the s h ip b u ild in g  sec to r was le f t  o u t o f  th e  
1981 c a lc u la tio n s  in  o rde r to  m a in ta in  c o m p a ra b ility  w ith  th e  
p re v io u s  tw o years. In  1984, data  was a v a ila b le  fo r  o n ly  seven 
se c to rs .
21. S ince i t  was im possib le  to  ca lcu la te  a sa les/overseas assets 
r a t io  fo r  the  US from  the  1982 Benchmark S urvey da ta , th e  
sa les/overseas assets ra t io  fo r  the  UK was used ins tea d . I t  was 
th e re fo re  assumed th a t UK companies genera ted  the  same 
am ount o f  sales from  th e ir  US assets as US companies genera ted  
fro m  th e ir  UK assets.
22. The e xp o rts  data  fo r  1984 were d e rive d  from  the  A n nua l 
S ta tem ent o f the  Overseas Trade o f the U n ited  K ingdom , w h ich  
was d isco n tin u e d  a f te r  1985. Data fo r  the  subsequen t years 
w ere d e rive d  from  it s  replacem ent, the  Overseas Trade 
S ta t is t ic s  o f the  U n ited  Kingdom . Both p u b lic a tio n s  use th e  
SITC to  ca tegorise  in d u s tr ie s , so UK m a n u fa c tu rin g  e x p o rts  were 
d e fin e d  as sections 5 to  8 o f the  SITC.
23. T h is  e lim in a tio n  o f m anu fac tu ring  exp o rts  by non-U K -ow ned 
com panies was achieved using a p p ro p ria te  da ta  from  th e  
Business M o n ito r MA4 series (see note 11).
24. The va lues re la t in g  to  the  EEC and EFTA are based upon th e  
m em bership o f these customs un ions fo r  the  years in  q u e s tio n . 
Thus, the  EEC da ta  is  based the  fo llo w in g  c o u n tr ie s : Belgium , 
Luxem bourg, Denmark, France, I r is h  R epub lic , I ta ly ,  N e the rlands  
and West Germany, w ith  Greece added on in  1984. The da ta  
re la t in g  to  EFTA is  based upon the  fo llo w in g  c o u n tr ie s : A u s tr ia ,  
F in la n d , Norway, P o rtuga l, Sweden and S w itze rland , w ith  Ice la n d  
added on in  1984.
25. Oman (1984, p32) argued th a t the  hypo thes is  th a t  new fo rm s o f 
in v e s tm e n t were superced ing FDI in  the  N o rth -S o u th  c o n te x t 
had  "ye t to  be p roved". He also surm ised (p33) th a t  many o f 
th e  LDCs w h ich  in  the  1970s had adopted s tra te g ie s   ^ o f  d e b t-  
f in a n c e d  g row th  and g re a te r use o f the  new fo rm s o f in ve s tm e n t 
w ere more l ik e ly  to  p lace a g re a te r re lia n ce  on t r a d it io n a l FDI 
in  th e  1980s as i t  w ou ld  become the  more cost e f fe c t iv e  means 





UK's Ja 1p<? Pres^ 0 t t  (1989)> who analysed the  s tru c tu re  o f  th e  
fnnnH t h a t  o ln d iv id u a l co u n tr ie s  w ith in  the  EEC and EFTA, 
SPa in  and I ta ly  were im p o rta n t m arke ts  fo r  UK 
Japan a lthough  bo th  were much less s ig n if ic a n t  th a n
In  c a lc u la tin g  the  Spearman ra n k -o rd e r  c o r re la t io n s  across
g e o g raph ic  areas, seven categories were used: EEC, EFTA, O th e r
e s te rn  Europe, Canada, US, O the r Developed C o u n trie s  and 
Rest Of th ft Wo-rlH
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APPENDIX 9.1 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FORMS OF UK OVERSEAS SALES
SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS ACROSS INDUSTRIES
1974. Direct Investment Export Licensed
Sales Sales Sales
L ice n se d  Sales 0.309 -0.406
E x p o rt  Sales -0.879*
D ire c t In v e s tm e n t Sales
1978 D ire c t Investm en t E x p o rt L icensed
Sales Sales Sales
L ice n se d  Sales -0.148 -0.142
E x p o rt  Sales -0.915*
D ire c t  In v e s tm e n t Sales
1981 D ire c t Investm en t E x p o rt L icensed
Sales Sales Sales
L ice n se d  Sales 0.285 -0.467
E x p o r t  Sales -0.964
D ire c t  In v e s tm e n t Sales
1984 D ire c t Investm en t E x p o rt L icensed
Sales Sales Sales
L ice n se d  Sales 0.607 -0.607
3
E x p o rt  Sales -1.000
D ire c t  In v e s tm e n t Sales
S ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.01 le v e l ( tw o - ta ile d  tes t).
A l l  o th e r  va lues  n o t s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.05 o r  0.01 le v e l. 
Num ber o f  in d u s tr ie s , N=10 (except 1984, N=7).
*
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SPEARMAN RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS ACROSS GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS
•^974 D ire c t Investm en t E x p o rt L icensed
Sales Sales Sales
L icensed  Sales —0.214 0 071 _
E x p o rt Sales -0.964*
D ire c t  In ve s tm e n t Sales
1978 D ire c t Investm en t E x p o rt L icensed
Sales Sales Sales
L ice n se d  Sales -0.027 -0.098
E x p o rt  Sales -0.964
D ire c t  In ve s tm e n t Sales
1981 D ire c t Investm en t E x p o rt L icensed
Sales Sales Sales
L ice n se d  Sales 0.036 -0.143
E x p o rt  Sales -0.964*
D ire c t  In ve s tm e n t Sales
1984 D ire c t Investm en t E x p o rt L icensed
Sales Sales Sales
L ice n se d  Sales -0.286 0.286
$
E x p o rt  Sales -1.000
D ire c t  In ve s tm e n t Sales
* S ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  0.01 le v e l ( tw o - ta ile d  te s t).
A l l  o th e r  va lues  n o t s ig n if ic a n t a t th e  0.05 o r  0.01 le v e l. 
N um ber o f  areas, N=7.
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CHAPTER TEN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPANY SAMPLE
10.1 INTRODUCTION
T h is  c h a p te r p resen ts  the  key c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  sample o f  
com panies w h ich  answered the  q u e s tio n n a ire  and d e p ic ts  th e  n a tu re  
o f  t h e ir  in vo lve m e n t in  in te rn a tio n a l business g e n e ra lly , and 
lic e n s in g  in  p a r t ic u la r .  The data  w h ich  are p resen ted  were o b ta in e d  
fro m  b o th  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  and secondary sources.
The bas ic  research  questions addressed in  th is  c h a p te r a re  as 
fo llo w s :
. W hat k in d s  o f companies were in  the  sample?
More s p e c if ic a lly ,  how la rge  were the  com panies, w h a t 
in d u s tr ie s  d id  th e y  opera te  in , and how a c tiv e  were th e y  
in  R&D?
. W hat was the  n a tu re  o f the  companies' in v o lv e m e n t in  
in te rn a t io n a l business?
More s p e c if ic a lly ,  w hat im portance d id  th e y  a tta c h  to  FDI, 
jo in t  ven tu res , e x p o rtin g  and lice n s in g . Were these l ik e ly  
to  change in  the  fu tu re , and d id  they  v a ry  in  accordance 
w ith  the  type  o f co u n try  w ith  w h ich  th e  com panies 
conducted business?
. W hat k in d  o f lice n s in g  agreements were th e  com panies 
in v o lv e d  in?
More s p e c if ic a lly ,  were the  agreements w ith  in depe nden t 
f irm s  o r  overseas su b s id ia rie s , to  w ha t e x te n t d id  th e y  
in v o lv e  pa ten ts , know -how  and tradem arks, and w ha t were 
th e  re la t iv e  incom e-genera ting  capa c ities  o f these th re e  
fo rm s o f in te l le c tu a l p rope rty?
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10.2 SIZE, INDUSTRY AND R&D PROFILES
10.2.1 Size P ro f ile
The t o ta l  p o p u la tio n  was de fined  to  be those companies m aking up 
Times 1000 l i s t  o f the  la rg e s t UK companies fo r  1983-84, fro m  
w h ic h  a sm a lle r su rvey  p o p u la tio n  o f 322 companies was co n s tru c te d . 
The s ize d is t r ib u t io n  o f the  86 companies from  w h ich  f u l l y  com ple ted  
q u e s tio n n a ire s  were rece ived  is  shown in  Table 10-1. The ta b le  
shows th e  num ber o f companies fa l l in g  in to  each d e c ile  o f  the  to ta l  
p o p u la t io n  o f  1000 companies.
TABLE 10-1


















I t  is  e v id e n t from  Table 10-1 th a t  the  responden t com panies are  
c lu s te re d  tow ards  the  upper dec iles o f the  T imes— 1000- T h is  
c lu s te r in g  p a r t ly  re fle c ts  the  fa c t th a t  most o f  the  322 com panies 
co m p ris in g  the  su rvey  p o p u la tio n  were re s id e n t in  th e  up p e r reaches
o f  th e  Times 1000.
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The size d is t r ib u t io n  o f the  respondent companies by th e ir  
w o rld w id e  tu rn o v e r  is  shown in  Table 10-2.^
TABLE 10-2





Per Cent of 
Companies
Less than 100m (small) 20 23.3
100m - 300m (medium) 21 24.4
300m - 1 bn (large) 23 26.7
1 bn and over (very large) 22 25.6
Total 86 100.0
The fo u r  size ca tegories in  Table 10-2 were chosen as th e y  
p ro v id e d  fo u r  g roups o f a pp ro x im a te ly  equal size. I t  sh o u ld  be 
reco g n ise d , how ever, th a t  the  companies were g e n e ra lly  la rg e  in  size, 
and th e  ca tego ry  la be ls  (sm all, medium, la rge  and v e ry  la rge ) sh o u ld  
be u n d e rs to o d  in  th is  con tex t.
The size d is t r ib u t io n  o f the  respondent companies by th e ir
2num ber o f  w o rld w id e  employees is  shown in  Table 10-3.
TABLE 10-3
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY EMPLOYEES
Number of 
Employees
Less than 3,000 (small)
3.000 - 10,000 (medium)
10.000 - 30,000 (large)













Once again, the  size ca tegories were chosen in  o rd e r to  p ro v id e  
f o u r  g roup s  o f app ro x im a te ly  the same size. In  a d d it io n , i t  s h o u ld  
be n o te d  th a t  the  numbers o f employees in  the  size ca tego ries  are 
g re a te r  th a n  are u s u a lly  associated w ith  the  term s sm a ll, medium 
and la rg e  because the  company sample is  b iased tow a rds  la rg e  
com panies. F o r example, Lowe and C raw fo rd 's  (1984) s tu d y  o f 
lic e n s in g  by  sm all and medium sized UK companies covered  employee 
num bers ra n g in g  up to  on ly  500.
10.2.2 In d u s try  P ro f ile
The m ain in d u s tr ie s  in  w h ich  the  respondent companies ope ra ted  are  
show n in  Table 10-4. The companies have been c la s s if ie d  in  
accordance  w ith  the  F in a n c ia l Times A c tua rie s  (FTA) groups, w h ich  
fo rm  th e  basis fo r  the  UK S tock Exchange's c la s s if ic a t io n  o f 
in d u s tr ie s .
I t  is  e v id e n t from  the  t h i r t y  e ig h t FTA groups in  the  ta b le  th a t  
th e  com panies spanned a w ide range o f in d u s tr ie s . The FTA g roup  
w i th in  w h ich  most companies were c la s s if ie d  is  'M isce llaneous 
M echan ica l E ng ineering ', w h ich is  de fined  as encom passing 
"e n g in e e rin g  c o n tra c to rs  e rec ting  p la n t and system s", and w h ich  
a ccou n te d  fo r  tw e lve  o f the  companies.^ The n e x t most p o p u la r  FTA 
g ro u p s  were 'M o to r Components' and 'P harm aceu tica l P ro d u c ts ', 
a c c o u n tin g  fo r  s ix  companies each.
In  o rd e r to  p ro v id e  a more aggregate p ic tu re  o f th e  in d u s t r ia l  
b re a kd o w n  o f the  companies, the  FTA groups were re -c la s s if ie d  in to  
one o f  fo u r  b road e r ca tegories: 'p rocessing ', 'e n g in e e rin g  , te x t i le s  
and 'o th e rs '.  These fo u r  categories were proposed by P ra tte n  (1971) 
as a means o f c la s s ify in g  m anu fac tu ring  in d u s tr ie s  on the  bas is  o f  
th e  p ro d u c tio n  processes w h ich  they  employed. These ca tego ries  are 
a lso  s im ila r  to  the  "m eta-groups" proposed by Sudersanam (1984) as a 
means o f  c la s s ify in g  companies in to  b roader in d u s t r ia l g roups such 
th a t  th e  c o n s titu e n t companies e x h ib it  hom ogeneity in  term s o f  a 




























General Food Manufacturing 
Milling 8c Flour 
Publishing 8c Printing 


























































The way in which the thirty eight F T A  industry groups were re­
classified into the four broader categories of 'processing , 




DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY BROAD INDUSTRY GROUP
fSS^i-T-v frnnn Number.of Per Cent of
  Code Companies Companies
PROCESSING
Building Materials 14 3 35
Cement & Concrete 15 1 1'2
Metallurgy 32 2 2’3
Special Steels 33 1 12
Breweries 45 1 1*2
General Food Manufacturing 49 3 3*5
Milling & Flour 50 1 1*2
Packaging Sc Paper 54 1 1 2
Tobacco 63 1 1.2
Plastic Sc Rubber Fabricators 66 1 1.2
Pharmaceutical Products 67 6 7.0
General Chemicals 68 3 3.5
Oil 70 1 1.2
Total 25 29.1
ENGINEERING
Electricals (Excl Radio & TV) 19 3 3.5
Industrial plant etc 22 1 1.2
Mechanical Handling 23 1 1.2
Pumps Sc Valves 24 3 3.5
Steel Sc Chemical Plant 25 2 2.3
Misc Mechanical Engineering 27 12 14.0
Misc Engineering Contractors 29 2 2.3
Heating Sc Ventilating 30 2 2.3
Radio & TV 36 1 1.2
Household Appliances 39 1 1.2
Motor Components 41 6 7.0
Motor Vehicles 43 1 1.2
Total 35 40.7
TEXTILES „ „
Clothing 59 1 1.2
Miscellaneous Textiles 62 2
Total
OTHERS _ c p
Industrial Holding Company 11 5 j -o
Contracting Sc Construction 18 8 9
Kitchen Sc Tableware 49 t  10
Motor Distributors
Publishing Sc Printing 53 1 ^
Stores, Multiple 58 2
Office Equiguent §9 1 j*-
Industrial conglomerate /3 f
Laundries Sc Cleaners 74 1




















































*  i*  d e a r  f a *  Tabie 10_- ^  ^  q . ,e n s in e e r in „,
^  per c e o tj  aud "pressing' (25 p e r  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^
d e  a c t i v e s  o i  th e  companies. The 'te x t i le s ’ ca tego ry  accounted 
t o r  a  v e ry  s m a ll p ro p o r t io n  o i the  companies (o n ly  3.5 p e r cent). 
The  f o u r th  ca te g o ry , rep resen ted  by  the  la b e l ’o th e rs ', is  e s s e n tia lly
a  re s id u a l g ro u p in g  f o r  those companies th a t d id  n o t f i t  in to  any  o f
t h e  o th e r  th r e e  c a te g o rie s .
10.23  R e se a rc h  an d  D evelopm ent P ro file
T he  b reak d o w n  o f  th e  company sam ple according  to  a b so lu te  R&D 
e x p e n d i tu re  i s  show n in  Table 10-6, which re p o r ts  th e  d a ta  o b ta in e d  
fro m  Q uestion . 2(a) in  S ection  I¥  o f th e  q u estio n n a ire . T his q u e s tio n  
a s k e d  com p an ies  to  e s tim a te  th e  am ount devoted, to  R&D e x p e n d itu re  
in  th e  " la s t” a cco u n tin g  y e a r  (is  1983/84). Ic was answ ered  by 78 o f  
th e  86 co m p an ies  in  th e  samole.
'TABLE 10-6  
OTfflM lES BSf m m rn m BSD EXPE3SDDTIDRE
M l Mniser o f Bar Gent o f
ffi^endxtaie (£ ) Oampani^ Companies
le s s  them 1 m IB 23.1
1 1  — 10 i 43 55.1
10 ml — 50 a 11 14.1
50 a  -  100 am 5 6 .4
100 m armd over 1 1.3
T o ta l 78 100.0
ex p en d itu re  was a lso  m easured  by a sk in g  
cnrnparrnii ga<g to  iinTKrilTiir^ atfP th e  num ber o f  th e i r  em ployees engaged in  R&D 




DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY NUMBER OF 
EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN R&D ACTIVITIES
Employees engaged Number of Per Cent of
in R&D activities Companies Companies
Less than 100 40 54.8
100 - 500 27 37.0
500 - 1,000 3 4.1
5,000 and over 3 4.1
Total 73 100.0
In  o rd e r  to  p ro v id e  an in d ic a tio n  o f the  im portance  o f  R&D 
e x p e n d itu re  re la t iv e  to  company size, companies were a lso asked to  
exp ress  t h e ir  R&D e xp e n d itu re  as a percentage o f  th e ir  sa les 
tu rn o v e r .  The da ta  d e rive d  from  th e  71 companies w h ich  answ ered 
th is  q u e s tio n  are d isp la ye d  in  Table 10-8.
TABLE 10-8
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY LEVEL OF R&D 
EXPENDITURE RELATIVE TO SALES TURNOVER
R&D Expenditure/ Number of Per Cent of
Sales Turnover Companies Companies
Less than 1 % 19 26.8
1 - 2.5 % 32 45.1
2.5 - 5 % 10 14.1
5 - 7.5 % 4 5.6
7.5 - 10 % 3 4.2
10 % and over 3 4.2
Total 71 100.0
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In  o r^ e r  to  *~nd o u t now tne  R&D in te n s ity  o f  the  com oanies
n.measured by R&D e xp e n d itu re  re la t iv e  to  sales tu rn o v e r)  v a r ie d  in
accordance  w ith  company size (measured by sales tu rn o v e r) ,  these
„wo v a r ia b le s  were c ross ta b u la te d . The re s u lt  is  shown in  Tab le  
IQ-9.
TABLE 10-9
CHOSSTABULATI'CN OF CCWPANY SIZE AGAINST R&D INTENSITY
BSD INTENSITY COMPANY 5IZE
3 nall Madiun large Very large Chi Square
l**nber Percent Nlinber Percent Ntzober Percent number Percent (S ig n if.)
< 1% 2 14.3 5 23.3 9 40.9 3 21.4
-  2.5% 3 57.1 12 57.1 5 27.3 5 42.9
> 2.51 4 28.5 4 19.0 7 31.3 5 35.7
Total 14 100.0 21 100.0 22 100.0 14 100.0
5.37811
(0.3822)
In  Tab le  10-9, R&D in te n s ity  has been c la s s if ie d  in to  th re e  
c a te g o r ie s  (by am algam ating the  th re e  upperm ost ca tego ries  in  Tab le  
10-3) w h ile  company size rem ains c la s s if ie d  in to  fo u r  ca tego ries  (as 
in  Tab le  10-2). Each 'c e ll ' in  th e  ta b le  con ta ins  tw o  va lues . The 
f i r s t  o f  these is  s im c ly  the num ber o f companies th a t  f a l l  In to  th e  
c e ll,  w h ile  the  second is  the  num ber ox companies in  each size 
c a te g o ry  (the  colum ns) expressed as a percen tage or a l l  the  
com pan ies in  each size ca tegory.
The o a t te m  o f the  da ta  in  Table 10-9 appears to  suggest th a t  
th e  s m a ll and medium sized companies were more R&D in te n s iv e  th a n  
th e  la rg e  and v e ry  la rge  companies.^ A ltn o u g n  tm s  resu lt, 
re in fo rc e s  the  f in d in g s  o f  V ic k e ry  (1988, ?47) i t  m ust n e ve rth e le ss  be 
re g a rd e d  as a te n ta t iv e  cr.e as th e  c h i square s ta t is t ic  o i 5.3/811 
was n o t s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t.3 A n o th e r p rob lem  w ith  the  
c ro s s ta b u la t io n  is  th a t  i t  d id  n o t meet the  c o n d it io n  s p e c if ie d  by 
C och ran  (1954) f o r  the  c h i square te s t to  be m ean ing fu l, nam ely th a t  
fe w e r  th a n  20 p e r cant o f ce ils  have an expected v a lu e  o f  less th a n  
3. H ow ever, th is  c o n d it io n  has been cha llenged by C onover (1980,
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p l5 6 ) who c ite d  s tud ie s  w h ich  have shown i t  to  be "o v e r ly  
c o n s e rv a tiv e  . He concluded th a t  expected freq uenc ies  cou ld  be as 
lo w  as one w ith o u t endangering the  v a l id i ty  o f the  c h i square te s t.  
On th is  c r ite r io n ,  th e re fo re , the  re s u lt  re p o rte d  above can be 
re g a rd e d  as m ean ing fu l, a lth o u g h  n o t s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t.
10.3 INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
In  o rd e r  to  f in d  o u t th e  n a tu re  o f UK MNCs' in vo lve m e n t in  
in te r n a t io n a l business, the  q u e s tio n n a ire  con ta ined  a q u e s tio n  
(S e c tio n  I, Q uestion  6) w h ich  asked companies to  ra n k -o rd e r  fo u r  
p r in c ip a l methods o f in te rn a tio n a l business in  accordance w ith  th e  
e x te n t  o f  th e ir  adop tion . The methods ranked  were d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t, jo in t  ve n tu re s , lic e n s in g  and e xp o rtin g .
Companies were asked to  ra n k  these fo u r  m ethods in  term s o f  
t h e i r  e x is t in g  a d o p tio n  (ie  as o f 1984) and also in  term s o f t h e ir  
a n t ic ip a te d  a d o p tio n  ove r the  n e x t decade (ie  o ve r the  p e r io d  to  
1994). The da ta  has th e re fo re  been d icho tom ised  in to  'c u r re n t ' and 
'fu tu r e ' ra n k in g s . Companies were also asked to  ra n k  the  fo u r  
m ethods o v e r th re e  d if fe re n t  ca tegories o f overseas m arke ts : 
deve lop ed  c o u n tr ie s  (DCs), new ly in d u s tr ia liz in g  c o u n tr ie s  (NICs) and
n
le ss  deve loped  c o u n tr ie s  (LDCs).
The o v e ra ll ra n k in g s  ach ieved by each o f th e  bus iness m ethods 
a re  show n in  Table 10-10. These were a rr iv e d  a t by c a lc u la tin g  th e  
mean ra n k  fo r  each m ethod o ve r a l l  o f  the  companies and th e n  
ra n k in g  th e  m ethods from  fo u r  (most use) to  one ( le a s t use) on th e  














(Rating Scale: 4=most use; 1=least use)
Direct Investment 3 1 1
Joint Venture 1 2 2
Licensing 2 3 3
Exporting 4 4 4
FUTURE
Direct Investment 3 1 1
Joint Venture 1 2 2
Licensing 2 3 3
Exporting 4 4 4
Two fe a tu re s  are im m ed ia te ly  obv ious from  an e xa m in a tio n  o f  
th e  o v e ra l l ra n k in g s  in  Table 10-10. The f i r s t  is  th a t  th e re  is  no 
d if fe re n c e  between the  rank in gs  associa ted w ith  'c u r re n t ' and 
'fu tu r e ' overseas business methods. The second is  th a t  th e  ra n k in g s  
asso c ia te d  w ith  the  NICs are id e n t ic a l to  those assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  
LDCs.
E x p o rt in g  emerged as the  most p o p u la r overseas bus iness 
m ethod o v e r a l l  th re e  ca tegories o f c o u n try  and o v e r b o th  tim e
p e r io d s . D ire c t in ves tm en t ranked  second in  p o p u la r ity ,  b u t o n ly
f o r  th e  DCs; f o r  the  NICs and LDCs lic e n s in g  was ra n ke d  in  second 
p lace . L ice n s in g  was ranked  in  t h ir d  p lace fo r  th e  DCs, w h ile  jo in t  
v e n tu re s  occup ied  th is  p o s it io n  fo r  the  NICs and LDCs. The le a s t
p o p u la r  business m ethod fo r  the  DCs was jo in t  v e n tu re s , w h ile  f o r  
th e  NICs and LDCs d ire c t in ves tm en t tu rn e d  o u t to  be th e  le a s t
p o p u la r . The o v e ra ll rank in gs  in  Table 10-10 te n d  to  suggest, 
th e re fo re ,  th a t  th e re  are d iffe re n ce s  in  the  re la t iv e  a d o p tio n  (b o th  
c u r re n t  and fu tu re )  o f d ire c t inves tm en t, jo in t  v e n tu re s  and 
lic e n s in g  between DCs and NICs/LDCs.
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I t  is  u s e fu l to  compare the  'c u rre n t ' (ie  1984) ra n k in g s  in  
Tab le  10 10 w ith  the  rank in gs  o f business methods w h ich  are im p l ic i t  
in  th e  governm ent s ta t is t ic s  re p o rte d  in  C hap te r Nine. The 
co m pa riso n  can be made us ing  the  1984 data  re p o rte d  in  Tab le 9-5, 
fro m  w h ic h  ra n k in g s  can be d e rive d  fo r  d ire c t in ve s tm e n t sa les, 
e x p o r ts  and licensed  sales fo r  bo th  DCs and non-DCs (ie  NICs and 
LDCs). J o in t  ve n tu re s  are excluded from  the  com parison s ince  no 
g o ve rn m en t s ta t is t ic s  on them were a va ila b le .^  The com parison  
be tw een th e  tw o sets o f rank in gs  revea ls  tw o m ain d iffe re n c e s , 
re la t in g  to  DCs and non-DCs. F irs t ly ,  fo r  the  DCs, d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t 
is  ra n k e d  as th e  most p o p u la r method on th e  bas is  o f  th e  
gove rn m en t data, whereas i t  is  ranked  second to  e x p o rts  on th e  
b a s is  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  responses; lic e n s in g  ra n ks  be low  th e  
o th e r  tw o  m ethods in  bo th . Secondly, fo r  the  non-DCs, lic e n s in g  is  
ra n k e d  in  th ir d  p o s it io n  accord ing  to  the  governm ent da ta , b u t is  
acco rde d  second ra n k  on the  basis o f the  q u e s tio n n a ire  responses; 
e x p o r t in g  is  ranked  f i r s t  in  both .
I t  is  a lso o f in te re s t to  compare the  ra n k in g s  in  Tab le 10-10 
w ith  th o se  produced  by McGreevy (1978) from  h is  s u rve y  o f  100 US 
MNCs. The ra n k  o rd e r o f business methods expected to  be used by 
h is  sam ple o f  US MNCs d u rin g  the  1980s in  LDCs is  id e n t ic a l to  th e  
'c u r re n t ' ra n k in g s  fo r  LDCs produced by the  p resen t su rv e y  o f  UK 
MNCs.9 However, the  ra n k  o rd e r o f business methods expected to  be 
used b y  US MNCs in  DCs d u rin g  the  1980s d if fe rs  from  th a t  p rodu ced  
by th e  p re se n t su rvey  (McGreevy d id  n o t g a th e r da ta  fo r  NICs). In  
M cG reevy's su rve y  lic e n s in g  was p re d ic te d  to  be the  m ost p o p u la r  
m ethod  o f  expansion  in  the  1980s, w ith  d ire c t in ve s tm e n t th e  le a s t 
p o p u la r . A cco rd ing  to  the  p resen t su rvey, e x p o rt in g  is  th e  m ost 
p o p u la r  'c u r re n t ' method used by UK MNCs, fo llo w e d  by d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t, w ith  lic e n s in g  occupying  th ir d  p lace. I t  w o u ld  th u s  
a pp ea r th a t  US and UK MNCs have a s im ila r  approach to  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  in  LDCs, b u t d i f f e r  in  th e ir  approach to  DCs.
CHAPTER 10
A lth o u g h  th e re  is  no d iffe re n c e  between the  c u rre n t and fu tu re  
o v e ra l l  ra n k in g s  re p o rte d  in  Table 10-10, com parisons o f  th e  mean 
ra n k s  (w h ich  were used to  determ ine the  o v e ra ll ra n k in g s ) re ve a le d  
changes in  the  expected p o p u la r ity  o f th e  fo u r  bus iness m ethods 
o v e r  th e  tw o pe riods . The tren ds  are in d ic a te d  in  Tab le 10-11, 
w h ic h  re p o r ts  th e  mean ranks  fo r  each o f the  fo u r  business m ethods 
o v e r  th e  th re e  ca tegories  o f coun try .
TABLE 10-11










CURRENT FUTURE TREND CURRENT FUTURE TREND CURRENT FUTURE TREND
Di re c t Investm ent 2.72 2.78 0 1.88 1. 98 + 1. 77 1. 72 0
J o in t  Venture 2.01 2 .17 + 2.25 2.34 0 2 .17 2. 28 +
Li censi ng 2.21 2.19 0 2.56 2.59 0 2. 62 2. 76 +
E xp o rti ng 3.06 2.86 3.30 3.09 3 .4 4 3 .2 4
Trends: + in c re as in g ; -  decreasing; 0 s ta b le .
A change in  the  mean rank in gs  o f 0.1 o r  g re a te r  has been 
in te rp re te d  as re p re se n tin g  a tre n d  (e ith e r  in c re a s in g  o r  decreas ing) 
w h ile  any change below  th is  le v e l has been regarded  as be ing  to o  
s m a ll to  suggest the  ex is tence  o f a tren d .
The d a ta  in  Table 10-11 suggest th a t  e x p o rt in g  is  a n t ic ip a te d  to  
be used less in  the  fu tu re  in  a l l  th re e  ca tego ries  o f c o u n try , 
a lth o u g h  i t  is  s t i l l  expected to  rem ain as the  most p o p u la r  bus iness 
m ethod. B o th  lic e n s in g  and jo in t  ven tu res  are expected to  be used 
m ore in  LDCs, w h ile  d ire c t in ves tm en t is  expected to  become more 
p o p u la r  in  NICs. In  DCs, jo in t  ven tu res  are expected to  be used
more.
In  o rd e r  to  de term ine w he th e r the  d iffe re n c e s  between th e  mean 
ra n k in g s  were s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t,  the  Friedm an te s t was 
em ployed (Friedm an, 1937). Th is te s t, a lso commonly re fe rre d  to  as
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tw o  way an a lys is  o f va rian ce  (ANOVA) by ranks , was used fo r  tw o  
reasons: f i r s t l y ,  because o f the  o rd in a l n a tu re  o f th e  da ta  and,
secon d ly , because the  da ta  come from  re la te d  ( ra th e r  th a n
in d e p e n d e n t) samples since the  same respondent ra n ke d  each m ethod 
o f  bus iness  fo r  each company.
The re s u lts  o f the  Friedman te s t are shown in  Table 10-12 
w h ic h  re p o r ts  th e  Friedm an ch i square te s t s ta t is t ic s  and th e ir  
a s s o c ia te d  s ig n if ic a n c e  le ve ls  fo r  each o f the  th re e  ca tego ries  o f  
c o u n try ,  and fo r  each o f the  two tim e p e rio d s .10
TABLE 10-12 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RANKINGS OF OVERSEAS BUSINESS METHODS: 
FRIEDMAN TWO-WAY ANOVA RESULTS
Categories Degrees of Friedman Signif­
of Country Freedom Chi Square icance
CURRENT
Developed Countries 3 32.0884 .0000
Newly industrializing Countries 3 50.0605 .0000
Less Developed Countries 3 72.5201 .0000
FUTURE
Developed Countries 3 18.4253 .0004
Newly industrializing Countries 3 28.9253 .0000
Less Developed Countries 3 57.9669 .0000
Since a l l  o f  the  te s t s ta t is t ic s  in  Table 10-12 are s ig n if ic a n t  a t 
th e  .05 le v e l i t  can be concluded th a t th e re  were s ig n if ic a n t  
d if fe re n c e s  between the  companies in  th e ir  ra n k in g  o f b o th  c u r re n t  
and fu tu r e  business methods fo r  a l l th re e  ca tegories  o f c o u n try .
The Friedm an te s t was also used to  te s t tw o  f u r th e r  
hypo the ses . The f i r s t  o f these was th a t th e re  e x is te d  s ig n if ic a n t  
d if fe re n c e s  between the  rank in gs  a t tr ib u te d  to  c u r re n t and fu tu re  
b u s in e ss  m ethods. Testing  fo r  th is  in v o lv e d  c o n v e rt in g  the  va lu e s  
g iv e n  to  c u r re n t and fu tu re  business methods in to  a ra n k  o f e ith e r  
one o r  tw o  (co rrespond ing  to  the tw o tim e pe riods) and th e n  te s t in g
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f o r  any s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe re n ce s  between the  means o f  these ra n ks
o v e r a l l  o f  the  companies fo r  each o f the  th re e  ca tego ries  o f  
c o u n try .
The re s u lts  in  Table 10-13 show th a t none o f th e  F riedm an c h i 
squa res  were s ig n if ic a n t  a t the  .05 le ve l, so i t  can be conc luded  
th a t  th e re  were no s ig n if ic a n t d iffe re n ce s  between th e  c u r re n t and 
fu tu r e  ra n k in g s  o f any o f the  business methods. The la c k  o f  any 
s ta t is t ic a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  is  no t s u rp r is in g , however, s ince each te s t  
s t a t is t ic  had o n ly  one degree o f freedom .11 N everthe less, th e  re s u lts  
suggest th a t  none o f  the  trends in d ic a te d  in  Tab le 10-11 are 
s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t.
TABLE 10-13
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RANKINGS OF CURRENT AND FUTURE OVERSEAS 




























































I t  is  in te re s t in g  to  note  from  Table 10-13 th a t  lic e n s in g  in  
d eve lop ed  c o u n tr ie s  had a Friedm an ch i square o f zero (p=1.0000) 
in d ic a t in g  th a t  a l l  o f  the  companies ranked  th is  m ethod id e n t ic a l ly  
f o r  c u r re n t  and fu tu re  a d o p tio n .12 I t  is  also w o rth  n o tin g  th a t  
jo in t  v e n tu re s  in  less developed co u n tr ie s  came c lo se s t to  be ing  
s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  (p=.1083).
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The second a d d it io n a l hypo thes is  to  be tes te d  was th a t  th e re  
e x is te d  s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe re n ce s  between the  ra n k in g s  a t t r ib u te d  to  
th e  bus iness  methods in  each o f the  th re e  ca tego ries  o f c o u n try . 
T e s tin g  fo r  th is  in v o lv e d  co n ve rtin g  the  va lues a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  
bus in e ss  m ethods in to  ranks  o f one, two o r th re e  (s ince  th e re  were 
th re e  ca tego ries  o f co u n try ) and then  com puting th e  te s t s ta t is t ic  
fro m  th e  re s u lt in g  mean rank ings . The re s u lts  are g ive n  in  Tab le  
10-14.
TABLE 10-14
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RANKINGS OF OVERSEAS BUSINESS METHODS 










Direct Investment 2 41.1491 .0000
Joint Venture 2 7.1946 .0274
Licensing 2 3.4543 .1778
Exporting 2 2.5907 .2738
FUTURE
Direct Investment 2 35.8356 .0000
Joint Venture 2 5.3699 .0682
Licensing 2 3.4726 .1762
Exporting 2 2.2808 .3197
As fa r  as c u rre n t overseas business methods are concerned, i t  
is  c le a r  th a t  th e re  were s ig n if ic a n t d iffe re n ce s  between the  ra n k in g s  
a t t r ib u te d  to  d ire c t in ves tm en t and jo in t  ve n tu re s  in  each o f  th e  
th re e  c o u n tr ie s . There were no s ig n if ic a n t d iffe re n c e s  between th e  
ra n k in g s  a t t r ib u te d  to  the  o th e r business methods. L o o k in g  a t th e  
fu tu r e  overseas business methods, o n ly  d ire c t in ve s tm e n t had 
s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe re n c e s  between it s  rank in gs  o v e r th e  th re e  
c a te g o r ie s  o f  co u n try .
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10.4 INVOLVEMENT IN LICENSING
10.4.1 R e la ted  and U n re la ted  L icens ing
S ince th e  reasons fo r  lice n s in g  may d i f fe r  co n s id e ra b ly  depend ing  
upon  w h e th e r o r  n o t the  licensee is  independent o f  th e  lic e n s o r, 
com panies were asked to  in d ic a te  i f  th e ir  lic e n s in g  agreements were 
w ith  u n re la te d  overseas companies, w ith  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  
(d e fin e d  as companies in  w h ich the  pa ren t had a minimum e q u ity  
s ta k e  o f  51 p e r cent) o r  w ith  bo th .
In  c la s s ify in g  th e ir  lice n s in g  agreements in to  one o f these  
ca te g o rie s , companies were asked to  regard  the  lic e n s in g  o f  
a sso c ia te d  companies and o f jo in t  ven tu res  in  w h ich  th e y  had no 
o v e ra l l  c o n tro l as be long ing  to  the  'u n re la te d ' lic e n s in g  ca te g o ry  
r a th e r  th a n  the  're la te d ' category. The breakdow n o f th e  sample o f 
e ig h ty  s ix  companies accord ing  to  the  type o f company to  w h ic h  
in te l le c tu a l  p ro p e rty  was licensed  is  shown in  Table 10-15.
TABLE 10-15











I t  is  e v id e n t from  Table 10-15 th a t most lic e n s in g  a c t iv i ty  by 
UK MNCs in v o lv e s  b o th  re la te d  and u n re la te d  licensees. J u s t o v e r 
tw o - th ir d s  o f  th e  company sample were in v o lv e d  m  b o th  fo rm s o f  
lic e n s in g . Th is  f ig u re  is  ve ry  close to  the  OECD average re p o rte d  
by  V ic k e ry  (1988, p22). By co ns tras t, o n ly  two o f the  company sample
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w ere in v o lv e d  s o le ly  in  the  lice n s in g  o f re la te d  com panies, a 
p ro p o r t io n  w e ll below  the OECD average. The p ro p o r t io n  o f 
com panies in v o lv e d  so le ly  in  un re la te d  lice n s in g  is  a lso be low  th e  
OECD average, b u t n o t by so much.
10.4.2 In te lle c tu a l P ro p e rty  C ontent o f L icens ing  Agreem ents
S ince th e  m otives fo r  and c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
a re  l ik e ly  to  d i f f e r  accord ing  to  the  type  o f in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
t h a t  is  license d , companies were asked to  p ro v id e  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t 
t h e i r  in vo lve m e n t in  lice n s in g  accord ing  to  w h e th e r o r  n o t th e y  
lic e n s e d  p a te n ts , know -how , tradem arks, o r some com b in a tion  o f 
them . They were asked to  p ro v id e  th is  in fo rm a tio n  fo r  t h e ir  
l ic e n s in g  agreements w ith  un re la te d  companies in  S ection  I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  and fo r  re la te d  companies in  S ection  I I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire .
U n re la te d  L icens ing
S e c tio n  I I  o f  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  was s p l i t  in to  tw o  p a rts : th e  f i r s t
was com ple ted  by companies th a t were in v o lv e d  in  'p a te n t lic e n s in g ',  
d e fin e d  as the  lic e n s in g  o f pa ten ts  on th e ir  own, o r  in  co m b in a tio n  
w ith  know -how  and /o r tradem arks; the  second was com ple ted by  
com panies in v o lv e d  in  'know -how  lic e n s in g ', d e fin e d  as th e  
lic e n s in g  o f know -how  on it s  own, o r in  com b in a tion  w ith  
tra d e m a rk s
The breakdow n o f the  83 companies p ro v id in g  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t 
th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty  con ten t o f  th e ir  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents (as de fined  in  the  q u e s tio n n a ire ) is  shown in  Tab le  10-
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TABLE 10-16
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 











The ta b le  shows th a t a lm ost h a lf  o f th e  UK MNCs were 
in v o lv e d  in  b o th  'p a te n t lic e n s in g 1 and 'know -how  lic e n s in g '. These 
com panies th e re fo re  had lic e n s in g  agreements co ve rin g  p a te n ts  (o r  
p a te n ts  in  com b ina tion  w ith  know -how  and /o r tradem arks) and a lso  
lic e n s in g  agreements covering  know -how  (o r know -how  in  
c o m b in a tio n  w ith  tradem arks). Of the  rem a in ing  com panies, a lm ost 
tw ic e  as many were in v o lv e d  in  'know -how  lic e n s in g ' as were 
in v o lv e d  in  'p a te n t lic e n s in g '. I t  w ould  thus  appear th a t  know -how  
is  a m ore s ig n if ic a n t  component o f lice n s in g  agreements th a n  p a te n ts  
f o r  UK MNCs.
R e la te d  L ice n s in g
S ince MNCs may n o t nece ssa rily  p ro v id e  th e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  
w ith  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty , the  f i r s t  ques tion  in  S ection  I I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  asce rta ined  the  e x te n t to  w h ich  companies in  th e  
sam ple d id  a c tu a lly  p ro v id e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty  ( in  the  fo rm  o f 
p a te n ts  and know -how ) to  th e ir  licensees. Once th is  was 
e s ta b lis h e d , the  n ex t ques tion  ascerta ined  the  e x te n t to  w h ich  those  
com panies th a t d id  p ro v id e  pa ten ts  and know  how to  th e ir  
s u b s id ia r ie s  enacted the  t ra n s fe r  by means o f fo rm a l lic e n s in g  
agreem ents. I t  was im p o rta n t to  f in d  o u t th is  m io rm a tio n  as 
p a re n ts  may a llo w  s u b s id ia rie s  to  use th e ir  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
w ith o u t  o b ta in in g  rem unera tion  in  the  fo rm  o f lic e n s in g  ro y a lt ie s .
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The d is t r ib u t io n  o f the  company sample acco rd ing  to  th e  e x te n t 
to  w h ic h  p a ten ts  and know -how  were made a v a ila b le  to  t h e ir  
ove rseas  s u b s id ia r ie s  is  shown in  Table 10-17 .^
TABLE 10-17
EXTENT OF PATENT AND KNOW-HOW PROVISION TO OVERSEAS SUBSIDIARIES
PATENTS KNOW-HOW
Number of Per Cent of Number of Per Cent of
Companies Companies Companies Companies
In all cases 29 38.2 36 44.4
In most cases 25 32.9 26 32.1
Sometimes 10 13.2 9 11.1
Very rarely 1 1.3 2 2.5
Never 11 14.5 8 9.9
Total 76 100.0 81 100.0
Question: To what extent are the company' s patents and know-how
made available to overseas subsidiaries?
I t  is  appa ren t from  the  Table 10-17 th a t  the  v a s t m a jo r ity  o f  
th e  com panies d id  make th e ir  pa ten ts  and know -how  a v a ila b le  to  
t h e i r  overseas su b s id ia rie s : ove r seven ty  pe r cent o f  the  responses 
r e la t in g  to  b o th  pa ten ts  and know -how  fe l l  in to  th e  'in  a l l  cases' o r  
' in  m ost cases' ca tegories. I t  is  also c le a r from  th e  ta b le  th a t  th e  
d is t r ib u t io n  o f responses across the  f iv e  ca tegories  is  v e ry  s im ila r  
f o r  th e  tw o  types o f in te lle c tu a l p ro p e rty . The s tre n g th  o f th e  
c o r re la t io n  between the  responses fo r  pa ten ts  and know -how  can be 
gauged fro m  the  fa c t th a t the  Spearman ra n k  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n t  
was com puted a t 0.8116 (s ig n if ic a n t a t the  .05 le ve l).
The b reakdow n o f the  companies accord ing  to  the  e x te n t to  
w h ic h  th e y  used fo rm a l lice n s in g  agreements to  t ra n s fe r  pa te n ts  and 





EXTENT OF PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING TO OVERSEAS SUBSIDIARIES
PATENTS KNOW-HOW
Number of Per Cent of Number of Per Cent of
Companies Companies Companies Companies
In all cases 13 20.6 15 21.1
In most cases 20 31.7 22 31.0
Sometimes 11 17.5 14 19.7
Very rarely 8 12.7 10 14.1
Never 11 17.5 10 14.1
Total 63 100.0 71 100.0
Question: To the extent that patents and know-how are made
available to overseas subsidiaries, how far is this dealt with 
by means of formal licensing agreements?
The respones show th a t the  m a jo r ity  o f  companies d id  p ro v id e  
p a te n ts  and know -how  to  th e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  by means o f  
lic e n s in g  agreements: ju s t  over f i f t y  per cent o f  companies f e l l  in to  
th e  ' in  a l l  cases' o r  'in  most cases' ca tegories. I t  is  a lso c le a r th a t  
a n o t in s ig n if ic a n t  m in o r ity  o f companies e ith e r  'v e ry  r a re ly 1 o r  
'n e v e r ' en te re d  in to  fo rm a l lice n s in g  agreements w ith  th e ir  overseas 
s u b s id ia r ie s . A n o th e r obvious fe a tu re  o f the  responses in  Tab le 10- 
18 is  th e  s im ila r i ty  o f the  d is tr ib u t io n  across th e  f iv e  ca tego ries  
f o r  p a te n ts  and know -how : the  Spearman ra n k  c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  
be tw een th e  responses fo r  these two types o f in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
was c a lc u la te d  to  be 0.9244 (s ig n if ic a n t a t the  .05 le ve l).
10.4.3 U n re la te d  P a ten t L icens ing
A num be r o f  fe a tu re s  o f the u n re la ted  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
possessed by the  sample o f companies were exam ined i n  S ection  I I ,  
P a rt A, o f  the  que s tionna ire . The f i r s t  o f these was th e  e x te n t to  
w h ic h  u n re la te d  pa te n t lice n s in g  was the  outcome o f v o lu n ta ry  
n e g o t ia t io n  between pa ten t ho lde rs  and fo re ig n  licensees.
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V o lu n ta ry  P a ten t L icens ing
The fa c t  th a t  a company possesses a pa ten t lice n s in g  agreement w ith  
an in d e p e n d e n t fo re ig n  company does no t necessa rily  im p ly  th a t  i t  
has come by i t  o f  i t s  own v o lit io n .  Companies may be fo rc e d  by 
fo re ig n  p a te n t a u th o r it ie s  to  g ran t a licence to  lo c a l companies i f  
th e y  have n o t w orked a pa ten t w ith in  a ce rta in  tim e p e rio d  a f te r  i t s  
r e g is t r a t io n  (u s u a lly  th ree  years) o r i f  they have n o t w orked  i t  as 
f u l l y  as po ss ib le  w ith in  the coun try  concerned (eg by im p o rt in g  
goods w h ich  u t i l is e  the  pa ten t ra th e r  than  m a n u fa c tu rin g  them  
lo c a lly ) .  Th is  type  o f licence, ca lled  a 'com pulsory lice n ce ', may 
a lso  be g ra n te d  i f  i t  can be shown th a t the  p a te n t h o ld e r is  n o t 
w i l l in g  to  g ra n t a licence on reasonable terms, o r  i f  a lice n ce  is  
re fu s e d  fo r  a pa ten ted  p rodu c t th a t is  necessary to  w o rk  a n o th e r 
p a te n te d  p ro d u c t.
There  are circum stances, however, in  which a company's fa i lu r e  
to  e x p lo i t  i t s  pa ten ts  in  fo re ig n  m arkets may no t be a re s u lt  o f  i t s  
own d e lib e ra te  p o licy . I t  may be th a t a company does n o t possess 
th e  resou rces  i t  re q u ire s  to  w o rk  its  pa ten ts  in  a l l  the  c o u n tr ie s  
w here  th e y  are reg is te red , o r i t  may no t have fo u n d  any lo c a l 
com pan ies in te re s te d  in  doing so. In  these c ircum stances a company 
can re g is te r  i t s  pa ten ts  as ones fo r  w h ich 'licences o f r ig h t ' w i l l  be 
made a v a ila b le . In  doing so i t  undertakes to  ne g o tia te  a lice n ce  
w ith  any in te re s te d  p a r ty  and to  a llow  the lo c a l p a te n t a u th o r it ie s  
to  f i x  th e  term s i f  the re  is  any disagreement.
I f  th e  p a te n t licences gran ted  by a company cannot be
c la s s if ie d  as com pulsory licences o r as licences o f r ig h t  then  th e y
! 16m ust co rre spond  to  w hat are termed 'v o lu n ta ry  licences  . These 
a re  lice n ce s  th a t  are fre e ly  nego tia ted  between tw o p a r t ie s  f o r  th e  
use o f  p a te n ts  fo r  w h ich  a licence w i l l  no t a u to m a tic a lly  be g ran ted .
I t  was im p o rta n t to  asce rta in  the  e x ten t to  w h ich  the  p a te n t 
lic e n c e s  g ra n te d  by the  companies f e l l  in to  each o f these th re e  
ca te g o rie s . A h ig h  p ro p o rt io n  o f companies s ta tin g  th a t  th e ir  
lic e n c e s  were no t V o lu n ta ry  licences ' w ould have im p lie d  th a t
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p a te n t lic e n s in g  cou ld  no t have been fre e ly  eva lu a te d  as an 
a lte r n a t iv e  to  o th e r methods o f in te rn a tio n a l business. The 
q u e s tio n n a ire  th e re fo re  conta ined a question  (Section I I ,  Q uestion  2) 
w h ic h  asked companies to  estim ate the  percentage o f th e ir  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g  agreements w h ich fe l l  in to  each o f the  th re e  ca tego ries . 
The re s u lts  are summarised in  Table 10-19.17
TABLE 10-19
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY CATEGORY OF UNRELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS: 
VOLUNTARY LICENCES, LICENCES OF RIGHT, OR COMPULSORY LICENCES
Per Cent VOLUNTARY LICENCES LICENCES OF RIGHT COMPULSORY’ LICENCES
o f P aten t
Li censi ng Number o f Per Cent of Number of Per Cent of Number o f Per Cent o f
Agreements Compani es Compan i es Compani es Compani es Compani es Compani es
0 0 0.0 44 84.6 49 94.2
1 - 2 0 1 1.9 6 11.5 2 3 .8
21 -  40 0 0.0 1 1.9 1 1.9
41 -  60 1 1.9 0 0 .0 0 0 .0
61 -  80 1 1.9 1 1.9 0 0 .0
81 -  99 5 9.6 0 0.0 0 0 .0
100 44 84.6 0 0 .0 0 0 .0
T o ta l 52 100.0 52 100.0 52 100.0
I t  is  appa ren t from  Table 10-19 th a t the vas t m a jo r ity  o f  p a te n t 
lic e n c e s  possessed by UK MNCs are 'v o lu n ta ry  licences . A v e ry  h ig h  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e  companies (84.6 per cent) in d ic a te d  th a t  100 p e r 
ce n t o f  t h e ir  p a te n t lice n s in g  agreements corresponded to  'v o lu n ta ry  
lic e n c e s '. The same p ro p o rt io n  o f companies (84.6 p e r cent) in d ic a te d  
th a t  none o f  th e ir  p a te n t lice n s in g  agreements cou ld  be c la s s if ie d  as 
'lic e n c e s  o f  r ig h t ',  w h ile  an even g rea te r p ro p o rt io n  (94.2 p e r cent) 
r e p lie d  th a t  th e y  possessed no 'com pulsory licences .
The evidence from  Table 10-19 th a t p a te n t lic e n s in g  is  
o v e rw h e lm in g ly  a v o lu n ta ry  a c t iv i ty  a llow s one to  conclude th a t  the  
com pan ies d id  have the  o p tio n  o f us ing p a te n t lic e n s in g  as an 
a l te rn a t iv e  to  o th e r methods o f m arket p e n e tra tio n .
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The n a tu re  o f the  v o lu n ta ry  pa ten t licences possessed by th e  
com pan ies was also exp lored in  the study. F re e ly -n e g o tia te d  
agreem ents d i f f e r  from  one ano ther in  accordance w ith  th e  
b a rg a in in g  s tre n g th  o f the  p a rtie s  concerned and the  n a tu re  o f th e  
c o m p e tit io n  w h ich  they  bo th  face. A lthough  a w ide v a r ie ty  o f  
p o te n t ia l agreements are possib le , most v o lu n ta ry  agreements can be 
p la ce d  in to  one o f th re e  categories: a 'sole ' agreement, an 'e x c lu s iv e ' 
agreem ent o r  a 'no n -e xc lus ive ' agreement [M addison (1981, p48)].
They d i f f e r  from  one ano the r in  terms o f the e x te n t to  w h ich  th e y  
p ro te c t  th e  licensee from  com petition  from  the  lic e n s o r  and fro m  
o th e r  lo c a l f irm s .
I f  a 'so le ' licence  is  negotia ted, the lic e n s o r agrees n o t to  
lic e n s e  o th e r  any o th e r firm s  in  the te r r i t o r y  covered by th e  
lic e n c e , th u s  a llo w in g  the  licensee a fre e  ru n  aga ins t th e  
c o m p e tit io n  . An 'e xc lu s ive ' licence also ob liges th e  lic e n s o r n o t to  
lic e n s e  o th e r  f irm s  in  the  te r r i to r y  covered by the  licence , b u t i t  
a d d it io n a lly  re s tr ic ts  the  lice n so r from  com peting d ire c t ly  a g a in s t 
th e  lice n se e  in  th a t  te r r i to r y .  A 'no n -e xc lus ive ' lice n ce  g ives th e  
lic e n s o r  the  most f le x ib i l i t y  since i t  does n o t co n ta in  e ith e r  o f  
th e se  o b lig a tio n s .
To a sc e rta in  the  re la t iv e  p o p u la r ity  o f these th re e  types o f
v o lu n ta r y  agreements, Q uestion 3 in  Section I I  o f th e  q u e s tio n n a ire
asked  th e  companies to  estim ate the  percentage o f th e ir  v o lu n ta ry
agreem ents w h ich  corresponded to  each o f the  th re e  ca tegories . The
18re s u lts  a re  g iven  in  Table 10-20.
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TABLE 10-20
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY CATEGORY OF VOLUNTARY UNRELATED PATENT LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS: SOLE LICENCES, EXCLUSIVE LICENCES, OR NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENCES
Per Cent 
o f P aten t  
Li censi ng 
Agreements
SOLE LICENCES
Number o f Per Cent of 





Per Cent o f Number o f Per Cent o f 
Compan i es Compan i es Compan i es
0 23 45.0 17 33.2 18 35.2
1 - 2 0 13 25.4 12 23.5 6 11 .8
21 -  40 4 7.9 4 7.9 4 7 .9
41 -  60 3 5 .9 4 7.9 5 9 .3
61 -  80 2 4 .0 2 4 .0 7 13. 7
81 -  99 0 0 .0 3 5.9 5 9 .3
100 6 11.8 9 17.5 6 11 .8
T ota l 51 100.0 51 100.0 51 100.0
The responses in  Table 10-20 are f a i r ly even ly d is tr ib u te d
across th e  th re e  ca tegories o f v o lu n ta ry  agreement, in d ic a t in g  th a t  
none was dom inant. Sole licences appear to  have been th e  m ost 
u n p o p u la r, w ith  45 p e r cent o f th e  companies in d ic a t in g  th a t  th e y  
had no such agreements. The p a tte rn  o f responses fo r  e x c lu s iv e  and 
n o n -e x c lu s iv e  licences is  v e ry  s im ila r , a lth o u g h  th e  la t t e r  appear to  
have been m a rg in a lly  more popu la r. O ve ra ll, the  da ta  in  Tab le 10-20 
suggest th a t  UK companies have no d is t in c t  p re fe re nce  f o r  a 
p a r t ic u la r  typ e  o f v o lu n ta ry  agreement.
K now -how  and T radem ark C ontent
The e x te n t to  w h ich  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents a lso  
p ro v id e d  f o r  th e  su p p ly  o f  know -how  and the  use o f  trad em a rks  is




KNOW-HOW AND TRADE MARK CONTENT OF UNRELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
SUPPLY OF KNOW-HOW
P ro p o rti on IN THE TECHNICAL SUPPLY OF KNOW-HOW USE OF COMPANY
o f FIELD OF THE PATENT ON A BROADER BASIS TRADE MARKS
P aten t
Li censi ng Number o f Per Cent of Number o f Per Cent of Number o f Per Cent o f
Agreements Compan i es Compan i es Compan i es Compan i es Compan i es Compan i es
None 0 0.0 13 25.5 8 15. 7
A Few 6 11.8 13 25.5 19 37.3
About h a l f 4 7.8 6 11.8 4 7.8
Most 17 33.3 8 15. 7 12 23 .5
A11/V i r t u a l 1y A ll 24 47. 1 11 21.5 8 15. 7
T o ta l 51 100.0 51 100.0 51 100.0
The da ta  were de rive d  from  Q uestion 4 in  S ection  I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire . The companies were asked to  estim ate  the  p ro p o r t io n  
o f  t h e i r  p a te n t lice n s in g  agreements w h ich p ro v id e d  fo r  tw o  
s e p a ra te  ca tego ries  o f know -how : th a t w h ich  re la te d  to  the  te c h n ic a l 
f ie ld  o f  th e  p a te n t and th a t w h ich  was supp lied  on a b ro a d e r basis. 
T h is  d is t in c t io n  was made so th a t those agreements in  w h ich  know ­
how  was s u p p lie d  to  enable the  pa ten t to  be p ro p e rly  u t i l is e d  c o u ld  
be d is c r im in a te d  from  those agreements in  w h ich  th e  s u p p ly  o f  
k n o w -h o w  was u n re la te d  to  the  pa tent.
I t  is  e v id e n t from  Table 10-21 th a t agreements th a t  p ro v id e d  f o r  
th e  s u p p ly  o f  know -how  in  the  te c h n ica l f ie ld  o f  the  p a te n t 
s u b s ta n t ia l ly  outnum bered those th a t p ro v id e d  fo r  i t s  su p p ly  on a 
b ro a d e r bas is . Thus, 80.4 pe r cent o f companies sa id  th a t  'm ost' o r  
'a l l / v i r t u a l l y  a l l ' o f th e ir  agreements p ro v id e d  fo r  the  s u p p ly  o f  
k n o w -h o w  in  the  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f the  pa ten t, w h ile  51 p e r cen t o f  
com pan ies sa id  th a t  'none' o r 'a few ' o f th e ir  agreements s u p p lie d  
kn o w -h o w  on a b road e r basis. This p a tte rn  is  co n s is te n t w ith  th a t  
fo u n d  by T a y lo r  and S ilb e rs to n  in  th e ir  (1973) in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  the  
econom ic im pact o f the  UK p a ten t system.
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The d is t r ib u t io n  o f responses across the  f iv e  ca tego ries  
re la t in g  to  th e  use o f company tradem arks is  more sym m etrica l th a n  
th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f responses re la t in g  to  the  two types o f know -how . 
Thus, th e  same num ber o f companies (15.7 per cent) in d ic a te d  th a t  
none o f  th e ir  agreements in v o lv e d  the  use o f company tradem arks
as in d ic a te d  th a t  'a l l / v i r tu a l ly  a l l ' o f th e ir  agreements in v o lv e d
tra d e m a rk s . The e x te n t to  w h ich company tradem arks were in c lu d e d  
in  agreem ents appears, th e re fo re , to  v a ry  q u ite  w ide ly .
I t  is  o f  in te re s t  to  note from  Table 10-21 th a t th e re  were no
com panies in  th e  sample th a t on ly  possessed what may be d e fin e d  as 
'p u re ' p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreements, ie  agreements th a t  d id  n o t 
in v o lv e  th e  s u p p ly  o f e ith e r  know -how  o r tradem arks. A lth o u g h  15.7 
p e r  ce n t o f  companies re po rte d  th a t none o f th e ir  agreements 
in v o lv e d  tradem arks , and 25.5 per cent re p o rte d  th a t  none o f th e ir  
agreem ents in v o lv e d  the  supp ly  o f know -how  on a b road e r bas is , 
th e re  were no companies w h ich re po rte d  th a t none o f th e ir  
agreem ents in v o lv e d  the  supp ly  o f know -how  in  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  
o f  th e  p a te n t.
Num ber o f L icen s in g  Agreements
In  o rd e r  to  ga in  an im press ion  o f the  e x te n t o f th e ir  in vo lve m en t in  
u n re la te d  p a te n t lice n s in g , the  companies were asked (S ection  I I ,  
Q u e s tio n  5) to  in d ic a te  the  number o f agreements w h ich  th e y  
possessed. The re s u lts  ob ta ined  from  the  f i f t y  companies w h ich  




DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY NUMBER OF 





Per Cent of 
Companies
1 - 5 14 28.0
5 - 2 0 19 38.0
20 - 50 9 18.0
50 - 100 6 12.0
100 - 200 2 4.0
200 and over 0 0.0
Total 50 100.0
I t  is  apparen t from  th e  ta b le  th a t  most o f  th e  com panies 
possessed a r e la t iv e ly  sm all num ber o f  agreem ents: tw o - th ird s
in d ic a te d  th a t  th e y  had tw e n ty  agreements o r  less. N everthe less, i t  
is  p o s s ib le  f o r  the  income earned from  a sm all num ber o f  agreem ents 
to  be q u ite  s u b s ta n tia l. There fo re , to  ga in  an im p ress ion  o f  th e  
v a lu e  o f  th e ir  lic e n s in g  agreements, th e  companies were asked to  
in d ic a te  th e  broad range w ith in  w h ich  th e ir  a n n u a l, p o s t- ta x , incom e 
fro m  lic e n s in g  f e l l  in  the  p re v io u s  accoun ting  ye a r (ie  1983-84).
L ic e n s in g  Income
The d a ta  from  the  fo r t y  seven companies w h ich  answered th e  
q u e s tio n  conce rn ing  lic e n s in g  income (S ection  I I ,  Q uestion  6) are 
d is p la y e d  in  Table 10-23.
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TABLE 10-23
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY INCCME GENERATED 





Per Cent of 
Canpanies
Less than 0.1m 13 27.7
0 .1 - 1m 21 44.7
1 - 5m 10 21.3
5 - 10m 1 2 .1
10 - 20m 1 2.1
20m and over 1 2 .1
Total 47 100.0
I t  is  apparen t th a t  the  va s t m a jo r ity  o f companies (72.4 p e r 
cen t) earned less than  £1 m ill io n  from  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  in  1983-84, 
w ith  fe w  companies earn ing  over £5 m ill io n  (o n ly  th re e  o u t o f  th e  
47).
In  a d d it io n  to  in d ic a tin g  the  ca tegory in to  w h ich  th e ir  le v e l o f
l ic e n s in g  income fe l l ,  the  companies were also asked to  g ive  an
e xa c t f ig u re  fo r  th e ir  le v e l o f lice n s in g  income. They were
o b v io u s ly  re lu c ta n t to  d isc lose  th is  in fo rm a tio n  (o r were n o t aware
20o f  th e  exa c t f ig u re )  as on ly  f iv e  d id  so.
T rend  in  L icens ing  Income
In  o rd e r  to  e s ta b lis h  w he the r the  income generated from  lic e n s in g  
had  been in c re a s in g  o r decreasing ove r the  e a r ly  1980s, com panies 
w ere  asked to  in d ic a te  how th e ir  most recen t lic e n s in g  ea rn ings  
( re p o r te d  in  1983/84) compared w ith  the  amount earned f iv e  years 
p re v io u s ly .  In  doing so they  were asked to  take  accoun t o f  th e  
e f fe c t  o f  in f la t io n  ove r th is  pe riod .
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The re s u lts  ob ta ined  from  the  fo r ty  n in e  companies w h ich  
answ ered  th e  q ue s tion  on the  change in  th e ir  lic e n s in g  income 
(S e c tio n  I I ,  Q uestion  7) are re p o rte d  in  Table 10-24.
TABLE 10-24
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY TREND IN  INCCME 





Per Cent of 
Canpanies
Significantly more 14 28.6
Slightly more 16 32.7
Approximately the same 13 26.5
Slightly less 3 6.1
Significantly less 3 6.1
Total 49 100.0
I t  w o u ld  appear th a t, fo r  most companies, income was in c re a s in g  
in  th e  e a r ly  1980s: 61.3 pe r cent o f respondents re p o rte d  th a t  th e ir  
com pany's income was e ith e r  's ig n if ic a n t ly  more' o r  's l ig h t ly  more' 
com pared w ith  the  amount earned f iv e  years p re v io u s ly . W hile ju s t  
o v e r  a q u a r te r  o f respondents in d ica te d  th a t th e ir  company's income 
was 'a p p ro x im a te ly  the  same', on ly  12.2 pe r cent o f  respondents  
re p o r te d  th a t  th e ir  company's income was e ith e r  's l ig h t ly  less o r  
's ig n i f ic a n t ly  less '.
In d u s try ,  Size and R&D Breakdown o f L icens ing  Income
In  o rd e r  to  a sce rta in  w hether the  le v e l o f u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  
incom e was re la te d  to  the  in d u s tr ie s  in  w h ich  th e  companies 
o p e ra te d , o r  th e ir  size, o r re la t iv e  le v e l o f R&D e xp e n d itu re , these 
th re e  v a r ia b le s  were c ross ta bu la te d  aga inst lic e n s in g  income.
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The b reakd ow n  o f u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  incom e by in d u s t ry  
is  show n in  Tab le  10-25. The com panies were c la s s if ie d  in to  one o f  
th e  th re e  b ro a d  in d u s try  g roups d e fin e d  e a r l ie r  in  th e  ch a p te r. The 
te x t i le s  ca te g o ry  was amalgamated w ith  th e  'o th e rs ' ca te g o ry  s ince  
i t  o n ly  co n ta in e d  th re e  companies. L ice n s in g  incom e was c la s s if ie d  
in to  th re e  g roups  by com bin ing  th e  th re e  uppe rm ost ca te g o rie s  
c o n ta in e d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire .
TABLE 10-25
CROSSTABULATION OF UNRELATED PATENT LICENSING INCOME AGAINST INDUSTRY
LICENSING INCOME (£) INDUSTRY
Processi ng Engi neeri ng Others Chi Square
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent (S ign i f . )
< 0 .1  m 0 0 .0 8 40 .0 5 31 .3
0 .1  -  1 m 5 45.5 6 30.0 10 62.5
> 1 m 6 54. 5 6 30.0 1 6 .3
11.88733
T o ta l 11 100.0 20 100.0 16 100.0 (0 .0 1 8 2 )
The size o f  th e  expected va lues  in  each c e ll conform ed to  
C o n o ve r's  (1980) c o n d it io n  th a t  no expected va lues be less th a n  one, 
and th e  c h i square  s ta t is t ic  o f 11.88733 was s ig n if ic a n t  a t the  .05 
le v e l.  We can conclude , th e re fo re , th a t  the  b road  in d u s try  g roups  
in to  w h ic h  th e  companies f e l l  were associa ted  w ith  th e  le v e l o f  
u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  income w h ich  they  earned.
The p a t te rn  o f  the  da ta  in  Table 10-25 in d ic a te s  th a t  companies 
in  th e  'p ro ce ss in g ' ca tego ry  earned more from  th e ir  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents th a n  companies in  the  o th e r two in d u s try  g roups: a
h ig h e r  pe rcen tage  o f  companies in  th is  ca tegory earned more th a n  £1 
m il l io n ,  and a lo w e r percentage earned less th a n  £1 m ill io n , 
com pared to  th e  o th e r  tw o in d u s try  groups. No c le a r conc lu s io n  
c o u ld  be d raw n  abo u t the  re la t iv e  ea rn ing  pow er o f the  rem a in ing  
tw o  in d u s t r y  g roups because o f the  in co n s is te n cy  o f the  tre n d s  in
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th e  d a ta  across th e  th re e  le v e ls  o f  lic e n s in g  income.
The b reakd ow n  o f  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  incom e by com pany 
size, as m easured by g lo b a l tu rn o v e r ,  is  shown in  Tab le  10-26. 
Com panies were g roup ed  in to  th e  fo u r  size c a te g o rie s  d e sc rib e d  
e a r l ie r  in  th e  c h a p te r. A lth o u g h  tw o  o f the  c e lls  in  the  ta b le  were 
n o t o ccu p ie d  by  any o f  the  com panies, these c e lls  d id  have expected  
va lu e s  g re a te r  th a n  o n e ,'th u s  e n a b lin g  C onove r’s c o n d it io n  to  be 
s a t is f ie d .
TABLE 10-25
CROSSTABULATION OF UNRELATED PATENT LICENSING INCCME 
AGAINST COMPANY SIZE
LICENSING INCCME (£) COMPANY SIZE
Small Median laiye Very large Chi Square
Jfcmfaer Per Cent timber Per Cent Number Per Cent NOnber Per Cent (S ign if.)
< 0.1 in 5 55.6 4 33.3 4 26.7 0 0.0
0.1 -  1 m 4 44.4 5 41.7 7 46.7 5 45.5
> 1 m 0 0.0 3 25.0 4 26.7 5 54.5
11.15900
Total 9 100.0 12 100.0 15 100.0 11 100.0 (0.0856)
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  the  da ta  in  Tab le 10-26 suggests the  
e x is te n c e  o f  an a s s o c ia tio n  between company size and the  le v e l o f  
u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  income. Thus, the  percen tage o f  
com pan ies e a rn in g  m ore th a n  £1 m illio n  inc reased  as company size 
in c re a s e d , w h ile  th e  pe rcen tage  o f  companies e a rn in g  less th a n  £0.1 
m il l io n  decreased as company size increased . A lth o u g h  th is  
r e la t io n s h ip  is  n o t s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  .05 le v e l, the  c h i 
squa re  s ta t is t ic  o f  11.1590 is  n e ve rth e le ss  c lose to  be ing  s ig n if ic a n t  
a t  th is  le v e l.  By re d u c in g  company size to  tw o  ca tego ries  
( 's m a ll/m e d iu m 1 and 'la rg e /v e ry  la rg e ')  th e  s ta t is t ic a l s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  
th e  c h i squa re  s ta t is t ic  was in c rea sed  to  0.0592.
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The b reakd ow n  o f  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  incom e by R&D 
in te n s ity  ( ie  R&D as a p ro p o r t io n  o f sa les tu rn o v e r )  is  show n in  
Tab le  10-27. R&D in te n s ity  was c la s s if ie d  in to  th e  same th re e  
c a te g o rie s  used e a r l ie r  in  Tab le  10-9.
TABLE 10-27
CROSSTABULATION OF UNRELATED PATENT LICENSING INCOME AGAINST R&D INTENSITY
LICENSING INCOME (£ ) R&D INTENSITY
< 1% 1 - 2.555
*mCMA Chi Square
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent (Si gni f . )
< 0 .1  m 5 41. 7 2 14.3 3 20 .0
0 .1  -  1 m 7 58.3 7 50 .0 5 33 .3
> 1 m 0 0 .0 5 35. 7 7 46. 7
8.39592
T ota l 12 100.0 14 100.0 15 100.0 (0 .0 7 8 1 )
A lth o u g h  th e  da ta  in  Tab le 10-27 s a t is fy  C onover's  c o n d it io n , 
th e  c h i squa re  s ta t is t ic  o f  8.39592 fa l ls  a l i t t l e  s h o r t  o f  m eeting 
th e  .05 s ig n if ic a n c e  le v e l. N everthe less , th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f th e  
com pan ies across these  tw o  v a r ia b le s  appears to  suggest th a t  th e  
le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  income increased  in  lin e  w ith  R&D in te n s ity .  
T h e re fo re , com panies w h ich  spen t a h ig h e r  p ro p o r t io n  o f  t h e ir  
tu rn o v e r  on R&D g e n e ra lly  earned more from  th e ir  u n re la te d  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g  agreem ents th a n  com panies w h ich  spen t a lo w e r p ro p o r t io n  
o f  t h e i r  tu rn o v e r  on R&D.
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10.4.4 U n re la te d  K now -how  L ic e n s in g
In  S e c tio n  I I ,  P a rt B o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  a num ber o f  aspects o f  th e  
u n re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  agreem ents o f  th e  company sam ple 
were exam ined.
T radem ark  C o n te n t
The e x te n t to  w h ic h  th e  r ig h t  to  use company tra d e m a rks  were 
in c lu d e d  in  u n re la te d  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  agreem ents is  shown in  
T ab le  10-28.
TABLE 10-28
TRADEMARK CONTENT OF UNRELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS




Per Cent of 
Canpanies
None 17 25.4
A Few 17 25.4
About half 8 11.9
Most 10 14.9
All/Virtually All 15 22.4
Total 67 100.0
I t  is  a p p a re n t th a t  th e  com panies are f a i r ly  e ve n ly  d is tr ib u te d  
across  th e  f iv e  ca te g o rie s , in d ic a t in g  th a t  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  
tra d e m a rk s  were in c lu d e d  in  agreem ents v a r ie d  q u ite  w id e ly  across 
th e  com panies.
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  responses in  Tab le 10-28 is  s im ila r  to  th a t  
re p o r te d  in  Tab le  10-21 fo r  th e  use o f tradem arks  in  u n re la te d  
p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents. The Spearman ra n k  c o r re la t io n  
c o e f f ic ie n t  was com puted to  de te rm ine  the  e x te n t to  w h ich  the  tw o  
c lasses o f  response were c o rre la te d . The c a lc u la tio n  was based 
upon  responses fro m  37 com panies, d esp ite  the  fa c t  67 companies had 
p ro v id e d  in fo rm a tio n  abo u t the  tra d e m a rk  co n te n t o f th e ir  know -how
105
CHAPTER 10
agreem ents. T h is  was because o f  th e  sm a lle r num ber o f  com panies 
engaged in  p a te n t lic e n s in g , and the  ex is ten ce  o f  m iss ing  va lues  fo r  
b o th  typ e s  o f  agreement.
The v a lu e  o f  th e  c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  was c a lc u la te d  to  be 
0.9294 (s ig n if ic a n t  a t the  .05 le v e l) . T h is  h ig h  degree o f  c o r re la t io n  
in d ic a te s  th a t  th e re  was v e ry  l i t t l e  d iffe re n c e  between th e  
tra d e m a rk  c o n te n t o f  th e  p a te n t and know -how  lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
possessed by th e  com panies in v o lv e d  in  b o th  fo rm s  o f  lic e n s in g  
a c t iv i ty .
As tra d e m a rks  are o fte n  in c lu d e d  in  lic e n s in g  agreem ents as a 
means o f  m a in ta in in g  c o n tro l o ve r th e  q u a li ty  o f  th e  lice n se e 's  
o u tp u t ,  i t  may be hyp o th e s ise d  th a t  th e  com panies p e rc e iv e d  no 
d if fe re n c e  betw een u n re la te d  p a te n t and know -h ow  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents in  te rm s o f th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e y  were lik e ly  to  g iv e  
r is e  to  q u a li ty  c o n tro l prob lem s.
Num ber o f  L ic e n s in g  Agreem ents
The in v o lv e m e n t o f  th e  companies in  u n re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g , 
as m easured by th e  num ber o f  agreem ents th e y  had  e n te re d  in to ,  is  
show n in  Tab le  10-29.
TABLE 10-29
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY NUMBER OF 
UNRELATED KNCW-rCW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Number
of Agreements
Number of Per Cent of 
Companies Canpanies
100 -  200 
200 and over
1 - 5  
5 - 2 0  
















The ta b le  re ve a ls  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  v a s t m a jo r ity  o f  com panies 
possessed a r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll num ber o f agreem ents. J u s t o v e r e ig h ty  
p e r ce n t o f  th e  com panies w h ich  answered th e  re le v a n t q u e s tio n  
(S ec tion  I I ,  Q ues tion  15) in d ic a te d  th a t  th e y  had tw e n ty  agreem ents 
o r  less . T h is  is  g re a te r  th a n  the  p ro p o r t io n  o f com panies in v o lv e d  
in  p a te n t lic e n s in g  w h ich  re p o rte d  tw e n ty  agreem ents o r  less (66 p e r 
cen t).
In  fa c t  i t  w o u ld  appear, from  a com parison o f  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  
in  T ab le  10-29 w ith  th a t  in  Tab le 10-22, th a t  com panies in v o lv e d  in  
k n o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  tended  to  have fe w e r agreem ents th a n  those  
in v o lv e d  in  p a te n t lic e n s in g . Th is  is  d esp ite  th e  fa c t  th a t  one 
k n o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  company re p o rte d  th a t  i t s  num ber o f agreem ents 
f e l l  in to  th e  '200 o r  more' ca tegory , a ca tego ry  w h ich  was n o t 
o ccu p ie d  by  any o f th e  companies in v o lv e d  in  p a te n t lic e n s in g .
The Spearman ra n k  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n t  betw een th e  tw o  
c lasses o f  response was com puted to  be 0.7017 (s ig n if ic a n t  a t 
th e  .05 le v e l) . T h is  va lu e  was based upon responses fro m  36 
com panies in v o lv e d  in  b o th  p a te n t lic e n s in g  and know -h ow  lic e n s in g .
L ic e n s in g  Income
D a ta  on th e  le v e l o f  a f te r - ta x  income earned fro m  u n re la te d  kn o w ­
how  lic e n s in g  was o b ta in e d  from  Q uestion  16 in  S ec tion  I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire . The d is t r ib u t io n  o f the  62 respond ing  com panies o v e r 




DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY INCCME GENERATED 





Per Cent of 
Companies
Less than 0.1m 22 35.5
0 .1 - Im 29 46.8
1 - 5m 9 14.5
5 - 10m 0 0.0
10 - 20m 2 3.2
20m and over 0 0.0
Total 62 100.0
I t  is  e v id e n t th a t  the  b u lk  o f  th e  com panies re p o rte d  th e ir  
le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  incom e in  th e  lo w e r ca tego ries : 82.3 p e r cen t
in d ic a te d  th a t  th e ir  know -h ow  earn ings f e l l  in to  one o f  th e  f i r s t  
tw o  ca te g o rie s  (less th a n  £1 m ill io n ) . Th is  is  a g re a te r  p ro p o r t io n  
o f  com panies th a n  re p o r te d  th e ir  le v e l o f  p a te n t lic e n s in g  income as 
less  th a n  £1 m il l io n  (72.4 p e r cent).
Indeed , com paring  th e  b reakdow n o f know -how  lic e n s in g  income 
in  T ab le  10-30 w ith  th a t  f o r  p a te n t lic e n s in g  incom e in  Table 10-23, 
i t  w o u ld  appear th a t  th e  companies earned less from  know -how  
lic e n s in g  th a n  th e y  d id  from  p a te n t lic e n s in g . To de te rm ine  th e  
degree o f  c o r re la t io n  between th e  tw o classes o f  responses the  
Spearman ra n k  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n t  was c a lcu la te d . A va lu e  o f
0.6611 (s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  .05 le v e l)  was o b ta ined  from  responses fro m  
t h i r t y  tw o  com panies th a t  were in v o lv e d  in  b o th  p a te n t and know ­
how  lic e n s in g .
C om paring  th is  v a lu e  w ith  th a t  re la t in g  to  the  num ber o f  
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents (0.7017), i t  can be concluded th a t  th e re  was less 
s im i la r i t y  betw een th e  tw o  sets o f  companies in  term s o f th e ir  
lic e n s in g  incom e and more s im ila r i ty  in  term s o f th e  num ber o f 
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents w h ich  th e y  possessed.
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The su p p le m e n ta ry  p a r t  o f  Q uestion  16 w h ich  asked com panies 
to  g iv e  a p re c ise  f ig u re  fo r  know -how  earn ings  drew  a v e ry  lo w  
response , w ith  o n ly  te n  com panies p ro v id in g  th e  in fo rm a tio n  
re q u e s te d .
T rend  in  L ic e n s in g  Income
The change in  th e  le v e l o f  income earned fro m  u n re la te d  know -h ow  
lic e n s in g  o v e r th e  f iv e  years p r io r  to  1983/84 is  show n in  Tab le  10- 
31.
TABLE 10-31
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY TREND IN INCOME 





Per Cent of 
Companies
Significantly more 23 35.9
Slightly more 15 23.4
Approximately the same 18 28.1
Slightly less 8 12.5
Significantly less 0 0.0
Total 64 100.0
I t  w o u ld  appear from  the  ta b le  th a t  the  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  
incom e earned by m ost o f  th e  companies had been in c re a s in g  in  th e  
e a r ly  1980s. O f th e  s ix ty  fo u r  companies w h ich  answered th e  
re le v a n t  q u e s tio n , 59.3 p e r cen t o f  them re p o rte d  th a t  th e ir  incom e 
was e ith e r  's ig n i f ic a n t ly  more' o r  's l ig h t ly  more' th a n  th e  am ount 
ea rned  f iv e  yea rs  p re v io u s ly . A t th e  o th e r  end o f th e  scale, none o f  
th e  com panies re p o r te d  th a t  th e ir  income was 's ig n if ic a n t ly  less 
th a n  b e fo re , w h ile  o n ly  12.5 p e r cent re p o rte d  th a t  t h e ir  incom e was 
's l ig h t ly  le ss ' th a n  be fo re .
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C om paring th e  b reakdow n o f  th e  com panies in v o lv e d  in  kn o w ­
how lic e n s in g  in  Tab le  10-31 w ith  th e  b reakdow n o f th e  com panies 
in v o lv e d  in  p a te n t lic e n s in g  in  Tab le 10-24, th e re  appears to  be v e ry  
l i t t l e  d iffe re n c e  between th e  tw o  sets o f com panies in  term s o f  the  
t re n d  in  incom e w h ich  th e y  experienced . However, th is  a p p a re n t 
s im i la r i t y  was n o t co n firm e d  by the  Spearman ra n k  c o r re la t io n  
c o e f f ic ie n t  betw een th e  tw o  sets o f  da ta , w h ich  was com puted a t 
o n ly  0.4999 (s ig n if ic a n t  a t the  .05 le v e l) . The r e la t iv e ly  lo w  
c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  is  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  the  fa c t  th a t  i t  was 
com puted  fro m  o n ly  t h i r t y  fo u r  cases (once a l l  th e  m iss ing  va lu e s  
had been ta k e n  in to  account).
I t  can be conc luded , th e re fo re , th a t  th e re  was l i t t l e  c o r re la t io n  
be tw een th e  tre n d s  in  lic e n s in g  income expe rienced  by com panies 
in v o lv e d  in  b o th  p a te n t lic e n s in g  and know -how  lic e n s in g , d e sp ite  
th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  tre n d s  expe rienced  by a l l  com panies in v o lv e d  in  
p a te n t lic e n s in g  and a l l  companies in v o lv e d  in  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  
w ere v e ry  s im ila r .
In d u s try ,  Size and R&D Breakdown o f L icens ing  Income
The b reakd ow n  o f  u n re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  incom e by the  th re e  
in d u s t r y  g roups  d e fin e d  e a r lie r  in  the  ch a p te r is  shown in  Tab le  10- 
32.
TABLE 10-32
CROSSTABULATION OF UNRELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING INCOME AGAINST INDUSTRY
LICENSING INCOME (£ ) INDUSTRY
Processing Engineering Others Chi Square
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent Number Per Cent ( S ig n i f . )
< 0.1 m 4 20 .0  8 36 .4  10 50 .0
0 .1  -  1 m 12 60 .0 10 45.5 7 35 .0
> 1 m 4 20 .0  4 18.2 3 15.0
T ota l
4.03733
20 100.0 22 100.0 20 100.0 (0 .40 10 )
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The d a ta  in  Tab le  10-32 s a t is fy  C onover's  c o n d it io n , b u t th e
s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  c h i square  s ta t is t ic  fa i ls  w e ll s h o r t  o f  th e  .05
le v e l.  We can conc lude , th e re fo re , th a t  th e re  was no a s s o c ia tio n  
be tw een th e  le v e l o f  u n re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  incom e earned by 
th e  com panies and the  b road  in d u s try  g roups in  w h ich  th e y  were
c la s s if ie d .
The b reakd ow n  o f  u n re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  incom e by
com pany size is  show n in  Tab le  10-33.
TABLE 10-33
CSOSSTABULATIQN OF UNRELATED KNOf-HOW LICENSING INCCME 
AGAINST COMPANY SIZE
LICENSING INCCMB (£) COMPANY SIZE
Small Median large Very large Chi Square
Number Per Cent Nlxnber Per Cent Number Per cent Number Per Cent (S ignif.)
< 0.1 ra 10 66.7 5 33.3 4 23.5 3 20.0
0.1 -  I n 4 26.7 9 60.0 9 52.9 7 46.7
> 1 m 1 5.7 1 6.7 4 23.5 5 33.3
12.27424
Total 15 100.0 15 100.0 17 100.0 15 100.0 (0.0561)
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  companies across these  tw o v a r ia b le s  
suggests  th a t ,  in  genera l, know -how  lic e n s in g  incom e increased  in  
lin e  w ith  com pany size. A lth o u g h  Conover's c o n d it io n  was s a t is f ie d , 
th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  c h i square  s ta t is t ic  f e l l  ju s t  s h o r t o f  th e  .05 
le v e l.  However, by re d u c in g  company size to  tw o ca tego ries  
( 'sm a ll/m ed ium ' and 'la rg e /v e ry  la rg e ')  a c h i square s ta t is t ic  
s ig n if ic a n t  a t the  0.0222 le v e l was produced.
The b reakd ow n  o f  know -how  lic e n s in g  income by R&D in te n s ity  




CROSSTABULATION OF UNRELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING INCOME AGAINST R&D INTENSITY
LICENSING INCOME (£ ) R&D INTENSITY
< 1% 1 - 2.5% > 2.5% Chi Square
Number Per Cent Number P e r  Cent Number Per Cent (Si gni f . )
< 0 . 1 m 7 43 .8 7 30 .4 3 23 .1
0 .1  -  1 m 8 50.0 11 47.8 7 53 .8
> 1 m 1 6 .3 5 21 .7 3 23 .1
2.70342
T ota l 16 100.0 23 100.0 13 100.0 (0 .6 0 8 6 )
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  com panies in  Tab le 10-34 appears to  suggest 
th a t  th e  le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  income g e n e ra lly  in c reased  in  l in e  w ith  
R&D in te n s ity .  However, a lth o u g h  th e  da ta  s a t is fy  C onover's  
c o n d it io n , th e  c h i square  s ta t is t ic  fa l ls  fa r  s h o r t  o f  be ing  
s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  .05 le v e l. There is  th e re fo re  no bas is  f o r  
c o n c lu d in g  th a t  th e re  was an a sso c ia tio n  between c o rp o ra te  R&D 
in te n s ity  and th e  le v e l o f  income earned from  u n re la te d  know -how  
lic e n s in g .
10.4.5 R e la te d  P a te n t L ice n s in g
The c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
possessed by  th e  com panies were exp lo re d  in  S ec tion  I I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire , t i t le d  'In tra -G ro u p  L icens ing '.
K n ow -how  and T radem ark  C on te n t
The e x te n t  to  w h ic h  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreements a lso  





KNOW-HOW AND TRADE MARK CONTENT OF RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
SUPPLY OF KNOW-HOW
P ro p o rti on IN THE TECHNICAL SUPPLY OF KNOW-HOW USE OF COMPANY
o f FIELD OF THE PATENT ON A BROADER BASIS TRADEMARKS
P aten t
Li censi ng Number o f Per Cent o f Number o f Per Cent o f Number o f Per Cent o f
Agreements Compan i es Compan i es Companies Companies Companies Companies
None 2 4 .4 5 11. 6 6 13.3
A Few 2 4 .4 4 9 .3 7 15. 6
About hal f 1 2 .2 1 2 .3 1 2 .2
Most 9 20 .0 13 30.2 10 22.2
Al 1 /V i  r t u a l1y AT 1 31 69.0 20 46. 6 21 46. 7
T o ta l 45 100.0 43 100.0 45 100.0
The d a ta  c le a r ly  in d ic a te  th a t  the  v a s t m a jo r ity  o f  re la te d  
p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents a lso in v o lv e d  th e  s u p p ly  know -how . 
A lm o s t n in e ty  p e r cen t o f  the  companies w h ich  answ ered th e  
re le v a n t q u e s tio n  (S ection  I I I ,  Q uestion  3) in d ic a te d  th a t  'm ost' o r  
'a l l / v i r t u a l l y  a l l '  o f  t h e ir  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv e d  th e  
s u p p ly  o f  know -how  in  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  p a te n t, w h ile  a 
s m a lle r  p ro p o r t io n  (76.7 p e r cent) in d ic a te d  th a t  know -how  was 
s u p p lie d  on a b ro a d e r bas is  in  'm ost' o r  'a l l / v i r t u a l ly  a l l '  o f  t h e ir  
agreem ents.
The s u p p ly  o f  trad em a rks  was less p re v a le n t th a n  e ith e r  o f  
these  tw o  ca tego ries  o f  know -how , w ith  o n ly  68.9 p e r cen t o f  
com pan ies in d ic a t in g  th a t  'm ost' o r  ' a l l / v i r t u a l ly  a l l '  o f  t h e ir  
agreem ents in v o lv e d  the  t ra n s fe r  o f  th is  p ro p e r ty  r ig h t .
C om paring  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f reponses fo r  re la te d  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g  in  Tab le  10-35 w ith  those  fo r  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  in  
T ab le  10-21, i t  is  appa ren t th a t  th e  su p p ly  o f  know -how  and 
tra d e m a rk s  were more p re v a le n t in  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  
agreem ents. The reasons fo r  th is  are e xp lo red  in  C hap te r T h irte e n .
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L ic e n s in g  Income
Q u e s tio n  6 in  S e c tion  I I I  o f  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  asked com panies to  
in d ic a te  w h ic h  one o f  s ix  ca tego ries  co rresponded  m ost c lo s e ly  to
th e  revenu e  genera ted  from  th e ir  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g
agreem ents. T w en ty  seven companies answered th is  q u e s tio n , and
th e  re s u lt in g  b reakdow n  is  shown in  Tab le 10-36.
TABLE 10-36
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY TNOCME GENERATED 





Per Cent of 
Companies
Less than 0.1m 17 60.7
0 .1 - 1m 7 25.0
1 - 5m 4 14.3
5 - 10m 0 0.0
10 - 20m 0 0.0
20m and over 0 0.0
Total 28 100.0
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f companies across income ca tego ries  suggests 
th a t  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  is  a re la t iv e ly  low  incom e-ea rne r, w ith  
60.7 p e r  ce n t o f  com panies c la im ing  th a t  th e y  earned less th a n  £1 
m il l io n .
A com parison  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f companies in v o lv e d  in  re la te d  
p a te n t lic e n s in g  in  Tab le  10-36 w ith  the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  companies 
in v o lv e d  in  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  in  Table 10-23 suggests th a t  
re la te d  lic e n s in g  was less p ro f ita b le .  However, th is  m ust be 
q u a l i f ie d  by  th e  fa c t  th a t  a much sm a lle r set o f da ta  was a v a ila b le  
f o r  re la te d  lic e n s in g  income.
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In  a d d it io n , i t  is  p o ss ib le  th a t  th e  com panies may have been 
u t i l is in g  th e ir  re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents as a means o f  e x tra c t in g  
ro y a lty  incom e fro m  c o u n tr ie s  in  s itu a t io n s  w here d iv id e n d  
re p a t r ia t io n s  were re s tr ic te d  o r  more c o s tly . In  such a scena rio  the  
re m u n e ra tio n  fro m  re la te d  lic e n s in g  w o u ld  be d if fe r e n t  fro m  th a t  
gen e ra te d  fro m  e q u iv a le n t u n re la te d  agreem ents in v o lv in g  th e  same 
p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts .  A fu r th e r  fa c to r  w h ich  c louds  th e  com parison  
betw een u n re la te d  and re la te d  ro y a lty  f ig u re s  is  th e  p o te n t ia l use 
o f  t r a n s fe r  p r ic in g  by MNCs to  lo w e r re p o rte d  ro y a lt ie s  in  h ig h - ta x  
c o u n tr ie s  and in c rea se  re p o rte d  ro y a lt ie s  in  lo w - ta x  c o u n tr ie s .
I t  w o u ld  appear th a t  th e re  was a g re a te r re lu c ta n c e  among th e  
com panies to  d isc lo se  exact f ig u re s  fo r  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  
incom e th a n  th e re  was to  d isc lose  exac t f ig u re s  fo r  u n re la te d  p a te n t 
l ic e n s in g  incom e. O n ly  tw o companies re p o rte d  p re c ise  f ig u re s  fo r  
t h e ir  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  income (e q u iv a le n t to  4.3 p e r cen t o f  
com panies th a t  c o u ld  have p ro v id e d  such in fo rm a tio n ) . The 
co m p a ra tiv e  p ro p o r t io n  o f e lig ib le  companies re p o r t in g  p re c ise  
f ig u re s  f o r  t h e ir  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  income was 9.1 p e r cen t 
(5 com panies).
T rend  in  L ic e n s in g  Income
The change in  th e  am ount o f  income earned fro m  re la te d  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g , a llo w in g  f o r  in f la t io n ,  o ve r th e  f iv e  ye a r p e r io d  p r io r  to  




DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY TREND IN INCOME 
FROM RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Trend in Number of Per Cent of
Licensing Income Companies Companies
Significantly more 4 12.1
Slightly more 9 27.3
Approximately the same 16 48.5
Slightly less 2 6 .1
Significantly less 2 6 .1
Total 33 100.0
The d a ta  in  Tab le  10-37 in d ic a te  th a t,  fo r  a s u b s ta n t ia l num ber 
o f  com panies, re m u n e ra tio n  from  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  was 
c o n s ta n t o v e r th e  e a r ly  1980s: 48.5 pe r cent o f  com panies re p o r te d  
th a t  t h e i r  incom e had rem ained 'a p p ro x im a te ly  th e  same'. O f th e  
re m a in in g  com panies, a p p ro x im a te ly  th re e  tim es as many re p o r te d  an 
in c re a se  as re p o r te d  a decrease.
C om paring  th is  tre n d  w ith  th e  tre n d  in  u n re la te d  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g  incom e o ve r th e  same p e rio d  (see Tab le  10-24) i t  is  
a p p a re n t th a t  a g re a te r p ro p o r t io n  o f the  companies in v o lv e d  in  
u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  re p o rte d  a p o s it iv e  income g ro w th  tre n d .
10.4.6 R e la ted  K now -how  L icens ing
D a ta  on th e  incom e genera ted  from  re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g , and 
th e  t re n d  in  th is  income, were also ob ta ined  from  S ection  I I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire .
L ic e n s in g  Income
F o r ty  com panies p ro v id e d  in fo rm a tio n  on the  income th e y  earned 
fro m  re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  in  1983/84. Th is  is  d isp la ye d  in  




DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY INCOME GENERATED 





Per Cent of 
Companies
Less than 0.1m 15 40.0
0 .1 - 1m 16 40.0
1 - 5m 7 17.5
5 - 10m 0 0.0
10 - 20m 1 2.5
20m and over 0 0.0
Total 40 100.0
The m a jo r ity  o f  companies re p o rte d  th e ir  lic e n s in g  incom e in  
th e  lo w e r  ca tego ries : e x a c tly  80 pe r cent in d ic a te d  th a t  t h e ir
e a rn in g s  were be low  £1 m ill io n . The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  f o r t y  
com panies across the  s ix  income ca tegories  in  Tab le 10-38 is  v e ry  
s im ila r  to  th a t  re p o rte d  fo r  the  62 companies in v o lv e d  in  u n re la te d  
kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  income in  Table 10-30, a lth o u g h  re la te d  know ­
how lic e n s in g  appears to  have been s l ig h t ly  less p ro f ita b le .
C om paring  the  d is t r ib u t io n  fo r  re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  in  
Tab le  10-38 w ith  the  d is t r ib u t io n  fo r  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  in  
Tab le  10-36, i t  w o u ld  appear th a t re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  
g e n e ra te d  more income th a n  re la te d  p a te n t lice n s in g . In te re s t in g ly ,  
th is  t re n d  is  the  o p p os ite  o f  th a t  w h ich  was fo u n d  to  e x is t  between 
u n re la te d  know -how  and p a te n t lice n s in g  (compare Tables 10-30 and 
10-23). T h is  d iffe re n c e  is , how ever, most l ik e ly  e xp la ined  by th e  
fa c t  th a t  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreements had a g re a te r know ­
how  c o n te n t th a n  u n re la te d  p a te n t lice n s in g  agreements (compare 
Tab les  10-35 and 10-21).
O n ly  e ig h t companies chose to  re p o r t an exact f ig u re  fo r  th e ir  
re la te d  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  income, accoun ting  fo r  14.5 pe r cen t o f 
com panies th a t  cou ld  have p ro v id e d  th is  in fo rm a tio n . Th is  is
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e x a c t ly  th e  same p ro p o r t io n  o f e l ig ib le  com panies th a t  re p o r te d  a 
p re c is e  f ig u re  f o r  t h e ir  u n re la te d  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  income, w h ic h  
suggests  th a t  th e re  was no d iffe re n c e  between th e  com panies in  
te rm s o f  t h e ir  re lu c ta n c e  to  d isc lose  exact e a rn ings  f ig u re s  fo r  
u n re la te d  and re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g .
T rend  in  L ic e n s in g  Income
The change in  re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  ea rn ings  o v e r th e  f iv e  
ye a r p e r io d  p r io r  to  1983/84, ta k in g  accoun t o f  in f la t io n ,  is  shown in  
T ab le  10-39.
M ost o f  th e  com panies re p o rte d  a p o s it iv e  tre n d : 46.5 p e r cen t 
in d ic a te d  th a t  t h e ir  income was e ith e r  's ig n i f ic a n t ly  m ore' o r  
's l ig h t ly  m ore ', w h ile  o n ly  13.9 p e r cent re p o rte d  th a t  th e ir  incom e 
was 's l ig h t ly  le ss ' o r  's ig n if ic a n t ly  less '. The re m a in d e r (39.5 p e r 
cen t) re p o r te d  th a t  t h e ir  income le v e l had rem ained 'a p p ro x im a te ly  
th e  same'.
TABLE 10-39
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY TREND IN  INCCME 





Per Cent of 
Companies
Significantly more 11 25.6
Slightly more 9 20.9
Approximately the same 17 39.5
Slightly less 5 11.6
Significantly less 1 2.3
Total 43 100.0
In  com parison  w ith  th e  tre n d  in  u n re la te d  know  how income 
(see T ab le  10-31) th e  tre n d  in  re la te d  know -how  income was in  the  
same p o s it iv e  d ire c t io n , b u t was less pronounced. However, the  
p o s it iv e  tre n d  in  re la te d  know -how  income was much more
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p ro n o u n ce d  th a n  th a t  re p o r te d  f o r  re la te d  p a te n t incom e (see Tab le  
10-37).
10.5 CONCLUSIONS
From  th e  fo re g o in g  a n a lys is  we may draw  th e  fo llo w in g  co n c lu s io n s  
c o n ce rn in g  th e  key  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  company sample.
The com panies were g e n e ra lly  la rg e  in  size, and ope ra ted  in  a 
w ide  range  o f  in d u s tr ie s . The m a jo r ity  o f  them  spen t betw een 
£1 m il l io n  and £10 m il l io n  on R&D, w ith  th e  s m a lle r com panies 
spen d in g  more o f t h e ir  tu rn o v e r  on R&D th a n  the  la rg e r  ones.
O f th e  fo u r  p r in c ip a l m ethods o f s e rv ic in g  overseas m arke ts , 
th e  com panies ra n ke d  e x p o rt in g  as the  m ethod w h ich  th e y  'c u r r e n t ly 1 
used m ost f re q u e n t ly  in  deve loped c o u n tr ie s  (ie  as o f  1984). T h is  
was fo llo w e d  by d ire c t  in ves tm en t, lic e n s in g  and jo in t  v e n tu re s . In  
n e w ly  in d u s t r ia l iz in g  and less deve loped c o u n tr ie s  e x p o rt in g  was 
a lso  th e  m ost p o p u la r  business mode 'c u r re n t ly ' em ployed, b u t 
lic e n s in g  was ra n ke d  in  second p lace, fo llo w e d  by jo in t  v e n tu re s  and 
f in a l ly  by  d ire c t  in ves tm en t.
The o v e ra ll ra n k in g s  a t t r ib u te d  to  the  bus iness m ethods
e xpe c ted  to  be used in  th e  'fu tu re ' (ie  o ve r the  ensu ing  decade) 
w ere th e  same as those  th a t  were 'c u r re n t ly ' adopted in  each 
c a te g o ry  o f  c o u n try . I t  can be th e re fo re  be concluded th a t  lic e n s in g  
was used more f re q u e n t ly  by UK companies in  NICs and LDCs th a n  i t  
was is  in  DCs, and th a t  th is  p a tte rn  is  l ik e ly  to  have p re v a ile d  
th ro u g h o u t th e  1980s.
The n a tu re  o f  th e  company sample's in vo lve m en t in  lic e n s in g  is  
sum m arised in  F ig u re  10-1, w h ich  s u b -d iv id e s  th e  companies 
a c c o rd in g  to  w h e th e r o r  n o t th e y  were in v o lv e d  in  re la te d  o r  
u n re la te d  lic e n s in g , and a lso accord ing  to  w he th e r o r  n o t th is  
in v o lv e m e n t cons is te d  o f p a te n t o r  know -how  lic e n s in g  (as d e fin e d  
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th e  86 com panies, w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f tw o , were 
in v o lv e d  in  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g , and ju s t  o ve r tw o - th ir d s  o f them  
were a lso  in v o lv e d  in  re la te d  lic e n s in g . O n ly  25 were in v o lv e d  
s o le ly  in  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g . F o r b o th  ca te g o rie s  o f lic e n s in g  
( re la te d  and u n re la te d ) know -how  agreem ents were more common th a n  
p a te n t agreem ents, a lth o u g h  th e  m a jo r ity  o f com panies possessed 
b o th  typ e s  o f  agreem ent. O f the  companies in v o lv e d  in  e ith e r  
p a te n t agreem ents o r  know -how  agreements on t h e ir  own, th e  la t t e r  
w ere m ore num erous th a n  the  fo rm er.
The p ic tu re  w h ich  emerged was th e re fo re  one in  w h ich  m ost 
com panies were a c tiv e  in  b o th  u n re la te d  and re la te d  lic e n s in g , and 
in  w h ic h  know -h ow  p layed  a more p rom ine n t ro le  th a n  p a te n ts . The 
in c lu s io n  o f  tra d e m a rks  was a lso a common com ponent o f  p a te n t and 
k n o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  agreements.
The u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreements possessed by th e  
com panies were fo u n d  to  co n s is t a lm ost e n t ir e ly  o f  ’v o lu n ta ry  
lic e n c e s ' ( ra th e r  th a n  'licences  o f r ig h t ' o r  'com pu lso ry  lic e n ce s ') 
w h ic h  in d ic a te d  th a t  the  v a s t m a jo r ity  o f the  com panies chose to  
lic e n s e  t h e i r  p a te n ts , as opposed to  h av ing  th is  o p t io n  fo rc e d  upon 
them . The v o lu n ta ry  licences  possessed by th e  companies were 
f a i r l y  e v e n ly  spread between 'so le ' licences, 'e x c lu s iv e ' licences  and 
'n o n -e x c lu s iv e ' licences .
T he re  was l i t t l e  d iffe re n c e  between th e  e x te n t o f  th e  
com pan ies ' in v o lv e m e n t in  u n re la te d  p a te n t and know -how  lic e n s in g  
when m easured by th e  num ber o f agreements w h ich  th e y  possessed; 
m ost o f  th e  com panies possessed a r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll num ber o f  
agreem ents, t y p ic a l ly  less th a n  tw en ty . However, when income was 
used as th e  y a rd s t ic k ,  u n re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  appeared to  be 
less  s ig n if ic a n t  th a n  u n re la te d  p a te n t lice n s in g . F o r th e  m a jo r ity  o f  
com pan ies, income from  b o th  ca tegories  o f lic e n s in g  was on an 
u p w a rd  t re n d  in  the  e a r ly  1980s.
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The le v e ls  o f  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  incom e earned by th e  
com panies were fo u n d  to  be s ig n if ic a n t ly  re la te d  to  the  b road  
in d u s t r y  g roups  in to  w h ich  th e y  were c la s s if ie d , w ith  th e  
'p ro c e s s in g ' g roup  assoc ia ted  w ith  the  h ig h e s t incom e le v e ls . No 
s ig n if ic a n t  re la t io n s h ip  was fo u n d  to  e x is t  between th e  le v e ls  o f  
u n re la te d  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  income and the  same in d u s try  g roups.
The c ro s s ta b u la tio n s  o f company size w ith  the  le v e ls  o f  
u n re la te d  p a te n t and know -how  lic e n s in g  income suggested th a t  th e  
la rg e r  com panies tended  to  earn more income. The s ig n if ic a n c e  o f 
these  re la t io n s h ip s  were c lose enough to  the  .05 le v e l f o r  them  to  
be c o n s id e re d  as m a te ria l. The s ig n if ic a n c e  o f the  re la t io n s h ip  
be tw een u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  income and R&D in te n s ity  was 
a lso  f a i r l y  c lose to  th e  .05 le v e l, a llo w in g  the  te n ta t iv e  co n c lu s io n  
o f  a p o s it iv e  re la t io n s h ip  between these tw o v a r ia b le s  to  be d raw n. 
H ow ever, no such co n c lu s io n  cou ld  be draw n abou t th e  re la t io n s h ip  
be tw een u n re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  income and R&D in te n s ity  as 
th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  le v e l was too  fa r  removed from  th e  c u t - o f f  le v e l.
F in a lly ,  th e  fo llo w in g  conc lus ions  can be made abou t th e
? 0com pan ies ' re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreements. R e la ted  know -how
agreem ents appeared to  genera te  more income th a n  re la te d  p a te n t 
agreem ents. Both  ca tego ries  o f re la te d  lic e n s in g  appeared to  be less 
p r o f i ta b le  in  com pa ris ion  w ith  th e ir  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  e q u iv a le n ts . 
The t re n d  in  income earned from  re la te d  know -how  lic e n s in g  was 
m ore p o s it iv e  th a n  th a t  fo r  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g , a lth o u g h  b o th  
w ere  less  p ronounced  th a n  the  tre n d s  id e n t if ie d  in  ea rn ings fro m  





1. T u rn o v e r  f ig u re s  were ob ta in e d  fro m  A n nua l R e po rts  p u b lis h e d  in  
1984 (and th e re fo re  re la t in g  to  t ra d in g  a c t iv i t ie s  o v e r the  
p re v io u s  year).
2. The num bers o f employees were a lso o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  1984 
A n n u a l R eports .
3. T h is  d e f in i t io n  is  taken  from  th e  London S tock  Exchange 
Y e a rb o o k  1983-84, p926.
4. Sudersanam  used m u lt ip le  d is c r im in a n t a n a lys is  to  in v e s tig a te  
th e  degree o f  hom ogene ity  e x h ib ite d  by FTA g roups  w ith  re sp e c t 
to  a num ber o f economic v a r ia b le s  re la te d  to  in d u s t r ia l  
s t ru c tu re ,  such as p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and f in a n c ia l gea ring . From h is  
a n a ly s is  he id e n t if ie d  fo u r  b road  "m eta- g roup s" w h ich  e x h ib ite d  
th e  h ig h e s t degree o f hom ogeneity, ie  p rocess ing , e ng ine e ring , 
te x t i le s  and food . (A lth o u g h  the  la t te r  is  c la s s if ie d  as a sepa ra te  
m e ta -g ro u p , i t  d id  e x h ib it  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  w h ich  p laced  i t  c lose  
to  th e  p rocess ing  m eta -group).
5. A v e ry  s im ila r  p a tte rn  was ob ta ined  when th e  num ber o f 
em ployees was used as a su rro g a te  fo r  company size in  p lace  o f 
sa les tu rn o v e r .
6. When th e  size ca tego ries  were reduced to  tw o ('sm a ll/m ed ium ' and 
'la rg e /v e ry  la rg e ')  th is  had the  e ffe c t o f  in c re a s in g  the  
s ig n if ic a n c e  o f the  c h i square s ta t is t ic  to  0.1286.
7. D eve loped  c o u n tr ie s  were de fin ed  in  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  as those  
n a tio n s  w h ich  belonged to  the  OECD, w h ile  new ly  in d u s t r ia l iz in g  
c o u n tr ie s  were d e fin e d  as those n a tio ns  from  th e  non-com m unis t 
d e v e lo p in g  w o rld  w h ich  were s ig n fic a n t e x p o rte rs  on a w o rld  
sca le  (such as M exico and Ind ia ). Less deve loped c o u n tr ie s  were 
d e fin e d  as those  n a tio n s  w h ich  com prised the  rem a ind e r o f  th e  
n o n -co m m un is t deve lop ing  na tio ns  (such as C h ile  and Egypt).
8. The ra n k in g s  d e r iv e d  from  the  governm ent s ta t is t ic s  re p o rte d  in  
T ab le  9-5 were as fo llo w s  (where 3=most used; l= le a s t used):
DCs non-DCs
D ire c t in ve s tm e n t sales 3 2
L icensed  sales 1 1
E x p o rts  2 3
9. M cG reevy's (1978) s tu d y  produced ra n k in g s  fo r  th e  fo u r  bus iness 
m ethods used in  the  p resen t su rvey  and also fo r  management 
c o n tra c ts . However, since management co n tra c ts  a lways ach ieved 
th e  lo w e s t o v e ra ll ra n k in g s  from  h is  sample o f US MNCs h is  
re s u lts  can be u s e fu lly  compared w ith  those from  the  p re se n t 
su rv e y .
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10. F riedm an (1937) dem onstra ted  th a t  when th e  num ber o f row s 
a n d /o r   ^ co lum ns is  n o t too  sm a ll th e  te s t  s ta t is t ic  is  
a p p ro x im a te d  by th e  c h i square  d is t r ib u t io n ,  ra th e r  th a n  by th e  
F d is t r ib u t io n  used fo r  p a ra m e tric  a n a lys is  o f  v a ria n ce .
11. When th e re  are o n ly  tw o ra n ks  the  F riedm an te s t  becomes 
e q u iv a le n t to  th e  s ign  te s t, and has a r e la t iv e ly  low  pow er 
e f f ic ie n c y  (64 p e r cent) compared to  i t s  p a ra m e tr ic  e q u iv a le n t. 
The co rre s p o n d in g  pow er e ff ic ie n c ie s  fo r  F riedm an te s ts  
in v o lv in g  fo u r  ra n ks  and th re e  ranks  are 76 p e r cen t and 72 p e r 
ce n t re s p e c t iv e ly  [ f o r  fu r th e r  d e ta ils  see B la lo c k  (1972, p353)].
12. The mean ra n k in g s  fo r  lic e n s in g  in  deve loped c o u n tr ie s  are 
s l ig h t ly  d i f fe r e n t  in  Tab le 10-11 because th e re  were more cases 
f o r  th e  c u r re n t  ra n k in g  (78) th a n  fo r  the  fu tu re  ra n k in g  (74).
13. D a ta  are  n o t p resen ted  fo r  th re e  o f the  86 com panies in  th e  
sam ple: tw o  o f  th e  them d id  n o t com plete S ec tion  I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  as th e y  were o n ly  in v o lv e d  in  re la te d  lic e n s in g , 
w h ile  th e  th i r d  d id  n o t answer Q uestion  10 in  S ec tion  I I  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  conce rn ing  i t s  in vo lve m e n t in  know -h ow  lic e n s in g .
14. O n ly  76 responses were a v a ila b le  fo r  pa ten ts  s ince  fo u r  o f  th e  
sam ple com panies had no pa ten ts  (o r a n e g lig ib le  num ber o f  
them ) and s ix  d id  n o t p ro v id e  an answer to  th e  q u e s tio n . F ive
com panies d id  n o t answ er the  p a r t o f the  q u e s tio n  re la t in g  to
kn o w -h o w , re s u lt in g  in  a to ta l o f 81 responses fo r  th is  ca te g o ry  
o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e rty .
15. O f th e  23 m iss ing  responses fo r  p a te n t lic e n s in g , e leven were
accoun ted  fo r  by companies th a t never made th e ir  p a te n ts
a v a ila b le  to  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s , fo u r  were accoun ted  fo r  by 
com panies h a v in g  no pa ten ts  (o r an in s ig n if ic a n t  num ber o f them ) 
w h ile  th e  rem a in ing  e ig h t were accounted fo r  by com panies 
fa i l in g  to  answ er th e  ques tion . O f the  15 m iss ing  responses fo r  
kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g , e ig h t were a t tr ib u ta b le  to  companies th a t  
n e v e r made th e ir  know -how  a v a ila b le  to  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s , 
w h ile  th e  rem a in ing  seven arose from  companies th a t  d id  n o t 
p ro v id e  an answ er to  th e  ques tion .
16. The c a te g o r is a tio n  o f lic e n s in g  agreements as e ith e r  'v o lu n ta ry  
lic e n c e s ', 'licen ces  o f r ig h t ' o r 'com pulsory licence s ' is  d e r iv e d  
fro m  M addison (1981, pp 47-48).
17. O f th e  34 com panies th a t  d id  no t p ro v id e  d e ta ils   ^ o f  th e  
b re a kd o w n  o f th e ir  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreements, 28 were^ in v o lv e d  
s o le ly  in  know -how  lic e n s in g , tw o were in v o lv e d  s o le ly  in  re la te d  
lic e n s in g , w h ile  the  rem a in ing  fo u r  d id  n o t answer th e  q u e s tion .
18. The reason  why th e re  are 51 responses in  Table 10-20, com pared 
w ith  a t o ta l  o f  52 in  Table 10-19, is  th a t an a d d it io n a l company 




1 . The re s u lts  o f  T a y lo r  and S ilb e rs to n 's  (1973) s tu d y  o f  th e
econom ic im pac t o f  the  UK p a te n t system  were based upon  a
q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  o f  (and fo llo w -u p  in te rv ie w s  w ith )  t h i r t y
q u o te d  UK com panies. These com panies ope ra ted  in  f iv e  b road
ln  -|C ass.es* chem ica ls, o i l  re f in in g ,  e le c tr ic a l e n g in e e rin g ,
m echan ica l e n g in e e rin g  and te x t i le s .
The in te r v a l le v e l da ta  on u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  incom e 
w ere  n o t ana lysed  because o f th e  v e ry  sm a ll num ber o f  cases 
a v a i a e. S im ila r ly , th e  in te r v a l- le v e l da ta  on u n re la te d  k n o w ­
how  lic e n s in g  incom e ( re fe rre d  to  in  S ec tion  10.4.4.) and on 
re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  income (S ection  10.4.5) and re la te d  k n o w -
ow ice n s in g  incom e (S ection  10.4.6) were n o t ana lysed  f o r  th e  
same reason.
21. O f th e  86 com panies in  the  sample, 24 d id  n o t answ er th e  
q u e s tio n  co n ce rn in g  know -how  and tra d e m a rk  c o n te n t because 
th e y  were n o t in v o lv e d  in  re la te d  lic e n s in g , w h ile  a f u r th e r  11 
d id  n o t respond  because th e y  o n ly  lice n se d  kn o w -h o w  to  
oversea.s s u b s id ia r ie s . Any a d d it io n a l non -responses arose fro m  
com panies th a t  were in v o lv e d  in  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  and 
chose n o t to  p ro v id e  an answer.
22. Some o f  th e  s u b - to ta ls  in  F ig u re  10-1 do n o t co rre spond  w ith  th e  
to ta ls  re p o r te d  above them  because o f the  in f lu e n c e  o f  m iss ing  
v a lu e s .
23. R e la te d  lic e n s in g  income was n o t c ro s s ta b u la te d  a g a in s t th e  
in d u s try ,  company size and R&D in te n s ity  v a r ia b le s  because th e  
s m a lle r  num ber o f cases a v a ila b le  fo r  re la te d  lic e n s in g  incom e 
w o u ld  have made i t  v e ry  u n lik e ly  th a t  any s ta t is t ic a l ly  
s ig n if ic a n t  re la t io n s h ip s  w ou ld  be fo u n d  to  e x is t  between these  
v a r ia b le s .
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LICENSING DECISION
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The bas ic  resea rch  q u e s tio n  ta c k le d  in  th is  ch a p te r is  as fo llo w s : 
w h a t is  th e  re la t iv e  im po rtance  a tta ch e d  by the  sample o f  com panies 
to  th e  v a r ia b le s  fo u n d  in  th e  l i te r a tu r e  on th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  (h e re a fte r  re fe r re d  to  s im p ly  as the  lic e n s in g  
dec is ion )?  An a d d it io n a l q u e s tio n  addressed is  w h e th e r o r  n o t th e re  
e x is ts  a sm a lle r g ro u p in g  o f  v a r ia b le s , d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  la rg e r  se t 
e x is t in g  in  th e  l i te ra tu re ,  w h ich  e xp la in s  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  
com panies to  o p t f o r  lic e n s in g  ra th e r  th a n  FDI o r  e x p o rts .
The da ta  ana lysed are d e r iv e d  from  the  f i r s t  f iv e  que s tio n s  in  
S e c tion  I  o f  the  q u e s tio n n a ire . The f i r s t  aspect o f  th e  lic e n s in g  
d e c is io n  to  be e xp lo re d  was the  's tra te g ic ' c o n te x t w ith in  w h ich  i t  
is  made. T h is  in v o lv e d  f in d in g  o u t w h e th e r o r  n o t the  lic e n s in g  
o p t io n  was e va lu a te d  a ga ins t a lte rn a tiv e  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness 
s tra te g ie s , o r  w h e th e r i t  was cons ide red  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  them. 
Those com panies th a t  d id  ta ke  a 's tra te g ic  v ie w ' o f  the  lic e n s in g  
d e c is io n  (ie  d id  e va lu a te  i t  a ga ins t the  a v a ila b le  a lte rn a tiv e s )  were 
th e n  asked to  d e fin e  the  e x te n t to  w h ich  lic e n s in g  was chosen 
s o le ly  as a re s u lt  o f  h o s t governm ent c o n tro ls  on these a lte rn a tiv e s .
The an a lys is  th e n  focused on those  companies w h ich  were fo u n d  
to  ta k e  a s tra te g ic  v ie w  o f lic e n s in g  and fo r  w h ich  the  d e c is io n  to  
o p t f o r  lic e n s in g  was n o t s o le ly  a consequence o f  gove rnm en ta l 
r e s t r ic t io n s  on the  a lte rn a tiv e s . The companies were asked to  ra te  
a l i s t  o f  key  v a r ia b le s  in  term s o f  th e ir  s ig n if ic a n c e  in  in f lu e n c in g  
th e ir  d e c is io n  to  license . These v a r ia b le s  were draw n from  th e  
re v ie w  o f  th e  e x ta n t l i te ra tu r e  on in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  and th e  
MNC, and c la s s if ie d  acco rd ing  to  w h e th e r o r n o t th e y  were l ik e ly  to  
in d ir e c t ly  prom ote  th e  lic e n s in g  o p tio n  (by r u lin g  o u t th e  
a lte rn a t iv e s  o f d ire c t  in ves tm en t and e x p o rtin g ) o r  w h e th e r th e y  
w ere l ik e ly  to  be more d ire c t ly  assoc ia ted  w ith  the  lic e n s in g  o p tio n  
i t s e l f .
The a n a lys is  o f  these v a r ia b le s  cons is ted  o f tw o stages. 
F ir s t ly ,  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f responses to  the  va r ia b le s  was exam ined
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to  assess th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e y  were pe rce ive d  to  be im p o r ta n t
by  th e  re spon d ing  companies. The (n onp a ra m e tric ) K e n d a ll
c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  concordance was th e n  used to  de te rm ine  th e  r e la t iv e  
im p o rta n ce  a tta ch e d  to  these v a r ia b le s  by the  com panies.
The second stage cons is te d  o f an a n a lys is  o f  th e
in te rc o r re la t io n s  between these v a r ia b le s . G iven th e  la rg e  num ber 
o f  v a r ia b le s  in v o lv e d  (tw e n ty  one in  to ta l)  and th e  much g re a te r  
num ber o f  re s u lt in g  c o rre la t io n s  among them, i t  w o u ld  have been 
d i f f i c u l t  to  ana lyse a l l  th e  in tr ic a c ie s  o f the  v a r io u s
in te r re la t io n s h ip s  us ing  th e  in te rc o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  alone. F a c to r 
a n a ly s is  was th e re fo re  em ployed in  o rd e r to  id e n t i f y  a sm a ll num ber 
o f  u n d e r ly in g  c o n s tru c ts  w h ich  cou ld  be used to  e x p la in  th e  
in te rc o r re la t io n s  among the  v a r ia b le s . The te ch n iq u e  is  based upon 
th e  p re su m p tio n  th a t  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  have s u b s ta n t ia l 
in te rc o r re la t io n s  w ith  one a n o th e r o ve rla p  in  w ha t th e y  measure, 
and th a t  th e re  th e re fo re  e x is t  some u n d e r ly in g  c o n s tru c ts  w h ich  
can se rve  as s a t is fa c to ry  s u b s titu te s  fo r  the  much la rg e r  num ber o f 
in te rc o r re la te d  v a r ia b le s .
The fa c to r  c o n s tru c ts  w h ich  were id e n t if ie d  were then  exam ined 
to  assess th e ir  f i t  w ith  the  modern th e o ry  o f th e  MNC, re p resen ted  
by  th e  a ll-e m b ra c in g  e c le c tic  parad igm  o f in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n , 
as re c e n t ly  re s ta te d  by D unn ing  (1988). A cco rd ing  to  the  parad igm , a 
f irm  w i l l  choose to  license  i t s  techno logy  (an ow nersh ip  advantage) 
in  th e  absence o f any lo c a tio n a l and in te rn a lis a t io n  advantages.
Because each o f the  tw e n ty  one v a r ia b le s  th a t  were chosen fo r  
in c lu s io n  in  Q uestions 3 and 4 in  S ection I o f the  q u e s tio n n a ire
co rre s p o n d  to  e ith e r  ow nersh ip , lo c a tio n a l o r  in te rn a lis a t io n  
pa ram e te rs , i t  was o n ly  to  be expected th a t  the  fa c to r  c o n s tru c ts
w o u ld  a lso  be c o n s is te n t w ith  D unn ing 's  e c le c tic  parad igm . However,
th e  q u e s tio n  e xp lo re d  was th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  the  g roup ings  o f 
v a r ia b le s  w h ich  com prised these fa c to r  c o n s tru c ts  had some common 
c h a ra c te r is t ic  w h ich  w ou ld  enable them to  be m e a n in g fu lly
e x p la in e d .
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The an a lys is  o f  these tw e n ty  one v a r ia b le s  was, how ever, n o t in  
i t s e l f  s u f f ic ie n t  to  f u l l y  e x p la in  the  p ro p e n s ity  o f  companies to  o p t 
f o r  lic e n s in g  ra th e r  th a n  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t o r  e x p o rt in g . The 
reasons f o r  th is  are tw o fo ld . F ir s t ly ,  some o f the  m otives fo r  
l ic e n s in g  cannot be e a s ily  a r t ic u la te d  in  te rm s o f ow nersh ip , 
lo c a t io n a l o r  in te rn a lis a t io n  c h a ra c te r is t ic s , eg the  m o tive  o f 
a d o p tin g  lic e n s in g  to  d iv e rs ify  the  fo rm  o f company income as a 
means o f  re d u c in g  r is k .  Secondly, the  response o f any tw o 
com panies faced  w ith  the  same set o f ow nersh ip , lo c a tio n a l and 
in te r n a lis a t io n  param eters are l ik e ly  to  d i f f e r  acco rd ing  to  th e  
p a r t ic u la r  bus iness s tra te g ie s  th a t  th e y  are p u rs u in g , eg a company 
may be p re p a re d  to  lice n se  its  techno logy  in  c ircum stances where 
in te r n a lis a t io n  advantages e x is t i f  in  do ing  so i t  p re -em p ts  the  
deve lop m en t o f  com peting techno log ies , th e re b y  m ax im is ing  p r o f i t s  in  
th e  lo n g e r term .
F o r these  reasons Q uestion  5 asked companies to  in d ic a te  th e  
im p o rta n c e  w h ich  th e y  a ttached  to  a num ber o f o b je c tiv e s  w h ich  
t h e ir  p u rs u it  o f  lic e n s in g  may have been in te n d e d  to  ach ieve. 
These o b je c tiv e s  were then  ana lysed in  the  tw o -s ta g e  manner 
d e s c r ib e d  above. The da ta  were d e rive d  from  a l l  the  sample 
com pan ies excep t those  fo r  w h ich  lic e n s in g  was s im p ly  a re s u lt  o f  
g o ve rn m en t re s tr ic t io n s  on a lte rn a tiv e  business methods.
11.2 THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LICENSING 
DECISION
The f i r s t  q u e s tio n  in  the  Section I  o f the  q u e s tio n n a ire  sough t to  
d is c o v e r  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  the  lice n s in g  o p tio n  was compared 
a g a in s t th e  a lte rn a tiv e s  o f e q u ity  in vestm en t (ie  d ire c t in ves tm en t 
and jo in t  v e n tu re s ) and e x p o rtin g .
T ab le  11-1 revea ls  the  e x te n t to  w h ich  companies eva lua ted  
lic e n s in g  as an a lte rn a tiv e  to  FDI, jo in t  ven tu res  and e xp o rtin g . Of 
th e  86 com panies w h ich  answered the  q ue s tionna ire , 84 re p lie d  to  
th is  q u e s tio n . The q ue s tion  was n o t app licab le  to  the  o th e r tw o 
com pan ies because th e y  o n ly  licensed  technology to  th e ir  overseas
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s u b s id ia r ie s .
TABLE 11-1 
LICENSING AS A STRATEGIC DECISION
Frequency Per cent
Always 9 10.7
In most cases 24 28.6
In seme cases 34 40.5
Very rarely 10 11.9
Never 7 8.3
Total 84 100.0
Question: In approximately how many instances does the 
company evaluate licensing as an alternative to direct 
investment, joint ventures and exporting, rather than 
consider it independently of these other methods of 
servicing a foreign market?
As th e  ta b le  shows, o n ly  10.7 pe r cent o f the  companies 'a lw ays ' 
e v a lu a te d  lic e n s in g  aga ins t the  a lte rn a tiv e  m ethods o f in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness . The m a jo r ity  o f companies (40.5 pe r cent) answered th a t  
th e y  e v a lu a te d  lic e n s in g  aga ins t o th e r methods 'in  some cases', w h ile  
o n ly  8.3 p e r cent o f  the  companies in d ic a te d  th a t  th e y  'ne ve r' 
e v a lu a te d  lic e n s in g  in  th is  manner. F o r th is  la t t e r  g roup  o f 
com panies, lic e n s in g  was n o t v iew ed as a s tra te g ic  dec is io n  as i t  
was co n s id e re d  in d e p e n d e n tly  o f the  a lte rn a tiv e  methods o f  fo re ig n  
m a rk e t s e rv ic in g .
I t  is  appa ren t from  the  da ta  in  Table 11-1 th a t the  v a s t 
m a jo r ity  o f  th e  sample o f companies v iew ed lic e n s in g  as a 's tra te g ic  
d e c is io n , a t le a s t fo r  a p ro p o r t io n  o f th e ir  fo re ig n  m arke t s e rv ic in g  
d e c is io n s . The n e x t q u e s tio n  in  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  exp lo re d  th e  
e x te n t to  w h ich  lic e n s in g  was adopted s o le ly  as a response to  h o s t 
gove rn m en t c o n tro ls  on d ire c t in vestm en t, jo in t  ve n tu re s  o r  e xp o rts . 




LICENSING AS A RESPONSE TO HDST-GOVERNMENT CONTROLS
Frequency Per cent
Always 6 7.8
In most cases 16 20.8
In sane cases 32 41.6
Very rarely 14 18.2
Never 9 11.7
Total 77 100.0
Question: To what extent is international licensing
used by the company solely as a substitute for direct 
investment, joint ventures and/or exports when these 
methods are not possible because of host-govemment 
controls?
The num ber o f companies answ ering th is  q u e s tio n  is  seven 
fe w e r th a n  th e  num ber answ ering  the  f i r s t  q u e s tion . T h is  is  
because seven com panies answered the  f i r s t  q u e s tio n  by in d ic a t in g  
th a t  th e y  ne ve r e va lua ted  lic e n s in g  aga ins t a lte rn a tiv e  m ethods o f  
in te rn a t io n a l business. The second que s tion  was th e re fo re  n o t 
a p p lic a b le  to  these companies.
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f responses to  th is  que s tio n  is  v e ry  s im ila r  
to  th a t  o b ta in e d  fro m  the  f i r s t  ques tion . The m a jo r ity  o f  com panies 
(41.6 p e r cent) answered th a t  th e y  were fo rce d  to  adop t lic e n s in g  
because o f  h o s t-gove rnm en t c o n tro ls  'in  some cases'. A s l ig h t ly  
s m a lle r  percen tage  o f companies (7.8 per cent) answered th a t  
l ic e n s in g  was 'a lw ays ' adopted because o f th is  reason, w h ile  a 
s l ig h t ly  la rg e r  percen tage o f companies (11.7 per cent) in d ic a te d  th a t  
th is  reason  was 'ne ve r' respon s ib le  fo r  th e ir  dec is ion  to  license .
The da ta  in  Tab le 11-2 suggest th a t  those companies w h ich  do 
e v a lu a te  lic e n s in g  aga ins t a lte rn a tiv e  business methods are u n l ik e ly  
to  o p t f o r  lic e n s in g  s o le ly  because o f host-governm ent c o n tro ls  on
th e  a lte rn a tiv e s .
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11.3 NONPARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LICENSING 
DECISION
11.3.1 In tro d u c t io n
H a v ing  id e n t if ie d  and f i l t e r e d - o u t  those  com panies w h ic h  d id  n o t 
e v a lu a te  lic e n s in g  a g a in s t the  a lte rn a tiv e s  a v a ila b le , o r  w h ich  o n ly  
adop ted  lic e n s in g  as a response to  h o s t-g o ve rn m e n t c o n tro ls  on 
e q u ity  in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rts , th e  n e x t q u e s tio n  so u g h t to  d is c o v e r 
th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  w h ich  the  rem a in ing  companies a tta ch e d  to  a num ber 
o f  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  c o u ld  p o s s ib ly  ru le  o u t th e  FDI and e x p o rt in g  
o p tio n s  in  fa v o u r  o f  lic e n s in g .^
The q u e s tio n  asked these companies to  ra te  each v a r ia b le , on a 
sca le  o f  one to  seven, to  in d ic a te  th e ir  r e la t iv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  in  
m aking  lic e n s in g  the  fa v o u re d  o p tio n . Companies c o u ld  a lso  in d ic a te  
i f  a p a r t ic u la r  fa c to r  was n o t a p p lic a b le  to  them. (F o r exam ple, a 
com pany p ro d u c in g  a v e ry  l ig h t -w e ig h t  p ro d u c t c o u ld  in d ic a te  th a t  
'h ig h  t ra n s p o r t  costs ' were n o t a p p lic a b le  in  the  d e c is io n  to  fo re g o  
e x p o r t in g  in  fa v o u r  o f  lic e n s in g .)
The re la t iv e  im po rtance  o f the  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  Q uestion  3 
was de te rm ined  us ing  th e  K e n d a ll c o e ff ic ie n t o f  concordance 
(K e n d a ll, 1948). T h is  s ta t is t ic ,  W, p ro v id e s  a measure o f  th e  degree 
o f  a s s o c ia tio n  among th e  ra n k in g s  a t t r ib u te d  to  each o f  th e  
v a r ia b le s  by the  com panies. The best estim ate  o f th e  t ru e  ra n k in g  
o f  any num ber o f  v a r ia b le s  is  p ro v id e d , when W is  s ig n if ic a n t,  by  
th e  o rd e r  o f  the  v a r io u s  sums o f  ranks  [S ie ge l (1956, p238)].
A lte rn a t iv e ly ,  the  mean ra n ks  (ie  th e  sums o f the  ra n ks  d iv id e d  by 
th e  num ber o f o b s e rva tio n s ) may be used since th e y  w i l l  p roduce  th e  
same ra n k -o rd e r in g .
S ince W was fo u n d  to  be s ig n if ic a n t,  th e  va lues  o f  th e  mean 
ra n k s  were used to  ra n k -o rd e r  the  v a r ia b le s  in  term s o f  th e ir  
r e la t iv e  im po rtance . These mean ranks  were fo u n d  us ing  th e  
N o n p a ra m e tric  Tests p rocedu re  on SPSSX w h ich  com putes th e  K e n d a ll 
c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  concordance. T h is  p rocedure  ranked  each o f  th e  N 
v a r ia b le s  fro m  N to  1 fo r  each company and then  fo u n d  th e  mean o f
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these  ra n k s  across a l l  th e  companies fo r  each v a r ia b le . F o r 
exam ple, th e  n ine  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  und e r 'D ire c t In ve s tm e n t' in  
Q u e s tio n  3 were assigned a ra n k  from  9 to  1 acco rd in g  to  th e  mean 
ra n k in g s  w h ich  th e y  o b ta in e d  (where 9=most in f lu e n t ia l  and l= le a s t 
in f lu e n t ia l) .  Thus the  v a r ia b le  a ch ie v in g  the  h ig h e s t mean ra n k  was 
ra n k e d  as 9 th . The v a r ia b le  w ith  the  n e x t h ig h e s t mean ra n k  was 
ra n k e d  as 8th , and so on, u n t i l  a l l  the  fa c to rs  were ranked .
The mean ra n k  a t t r ib u te d  to  each v a r ia b le  sh o u ld  n o t be 
co n fu se d  w ith  the  mean ra t in g , w h ich  is  s im p ly  th e  average ra t in g  
o b ta in e d  by each v a r ia b le  on the  ra t in g  scale zero to  seven. T h is  
s ta t is t ic  c o u ld  have been used to  ra n k -o rd e r  the  v a r ia b le s  in  te rm s 
o f  t h e ir  r e la t iv e  im portance . (The h ig h e r th e  mean ra t in g  o f  a 
p a r t ic u la r  v a r ia b le , th e  g re a te r w ou ld  have been i t s  re la t iv e  
im p o rta n ce  to  the  responden ts  in  the  sample). A lth o u g h  the  use o f  
th e  mean to  describ e  o rd in a l- le v e l da ta  is  common in  bus iness 
re se a rch  [eg Y u n ke r (1982), Mascarenhas (1984), Newton (1984)] i t s  
c a lc u la t io n  in v o lv e s  th e  use o f a r ith m e tic  o p e ra tio n s  w h ich , as was 
p o in te d  o u t in  C hap te r E ig h t, may n o t be s u ita b le  fo r  v a r ia b le s  
m easured a t th e  o rd in a l le v e l. As a re s u lt  i t  was n o t used in  th is  
s tu d y .
A n o th e r  a lte rn a t iv e  to  us ing  the  mean to  ra n k -o rd e r  th e  
v a r ia b le s  w o u ld  have been to  use the  median, w h ich  does n o t 
in v o lv e  th e  use o f any a r ith m e tic  ope ra tions . However, because 
th e re  were o n ly  e ig h t va lues  on th e  ra t in g  scale i t  w ou ld  n o t have 
been p o s s ib le  to  o b ta in  un ique  va lues o f the  median fo r  each 
v a r ia b le .  O f the  f i f te e n  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  Q uestion  3, none w ere 
fo u n d  to  have a m edian v a lu e  th a t  was no t a lso  possessed by 
a n o th e r  v a r ia b le . Thus, whereas th e  mean w ou ld  have enabled a l l  
th e  v a r ia b le s  to  be ranked  in  o rd e r o f re la t iv e  im portance , th e  use 
o f  th e  m edian w o u ld  have produced  a number o f v a r ia b le s  w ith  th e  
same score , so i t  w o u ld  n o t have been poss ib le  to  d is c r im in a te  
be tw een v a r ia b le s .^
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The p re c ise  s teps in v o lv e d  in  th e  co m p u ta tio n  o f  th e  K e n d a ll 
c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  concordance are  as fo llo w s . F ir s t ly ,  th e  ra t in g s  
ass igned  to  each o f  th e  N v a r ia b le s  by th e  k  re sp o n d in g  com panies 
are used to  ra n k  th e  v a r ia b le s  fro m  N to  1 f o r  each company. Thus, 
f o r  th e  9 v a r ia b le s  l is te d  un d e r 'D ire c t In ves tm en t' each is  ass igned 
a ra n k  fro m  9 to  1 depend ing  upon th e  ra t in g  i t  o b ta in e d  on th e  
ra t in g  sca le  (somewhere between 0 and 7). S im ila r ly , th e  s ix  
v a r ia b le s  l is te d  un d e r 'E x p o rtin g ' are each g iven  a ra n k  fro m  6 to  1 
based upon  th e ir  ra tin g s .
The n e x t s tep in  th e  co m pu ta tion  o f  W is  th e  sum m ation o f  th e  
ra n k s  ass igned to  each o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  by  th e  k  com panies. These 
sums (R j 's) are th e n  added to g e th e r  and d iv id e d  by th e  num ber o f  
v a r ia b le s , N, to  p roduce  th e  mean v a lu e  o f  th e  R: ls across a l l
J
v a r ia b le s . The in d iv id u a l Rj 's f o r  each v a r ia b le  are  th e n  expressed  
as d e v ia t io n s  from  th is  mean va lue . When th e  sum o f  th e  squares o f  
these  d e v ia tio n s , s, is  com puted, th e  v a lu e  o f  W may be d e r iv e d  fro m  
th e  fo llo w in g  fo rm u la :
s
w = ------------------------------
J .  k 2 (N3 -  N)
12
w here  th e  denom ina to r rep re se n ts  th e  maximum p o s s ib le  sum o f  th e  
squa red  d e v ia tio n s , ie  th e  sum, s, w h ich  w ou ld  occu r w ith  p e r fe c t 
agreem ent among th e  k  ra n k in g s . (Where t ie d  ra n k in g s  occu r, t h e ir  
e f fe c t  is  to  depress the  v a lu e  o f  W. SPSSX th e re fo re  uses a 
c o r re c t io n  fa c to r  to  in crease  s l ig h t ly  th e  va lu e  o f  W o v e r w h a t i t  
w o u ld  have  been i f  un co rre c te d .) ^
The v a lu e  o f  W ranges between zero and one. I f  th e re  is  
com ple te  agreem ent (concordance) among the  responden ts  ab o u t th e  
ra n k s  ass igned to  v a r ia b le s , th e  c o e ff ic ie n t w i l l  have a v a lu e  o f  
one; i f  th e re  is  com plete d isagreem ent i t  w i l l  ta ke  a v a lu e  o f  zero.
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11.3.2 A n a ly s is  o f  D ire c t In ve s tm e n t and E x p o rtin g  V a ria b le s
The re s u lts  o f  th e  ra n k -o rd e r in g  o f  the  da ta  fro m  Q ues tion  3 are 
show n in  Tab le  l l - 3 a .  The v a r ia b le s  l is te d  und e r "D ire c t Investm en t" 
and E x p o rt in g  are ranked  in  o rd e r o f  re la t iv e  im po rtance  fro m  m ost 
im p o r ta n t to  le a s t im p o rta n t. The f i r s t  colum n o f th e  ta b le  re p o r ts  
th e  o v e ra l l ra n k  a t t r ib u te d  to  each v a r ia b le , w h ile  th e  f in a l  co lum n 
re p o r ts  th e  mean ra n ks  used to  de te rm ine  these o v e ra l l ra n k in g s .
F o r each v a r ia b le  lis te d ,  the  percentage o f com panies t ic k in g  
each p o in t  on the  ra t in g  scale from  zero to  seven is  shown (n o t 
a p p lic a b le 's  were coded as zero 's) a long w ith  th e  num ber o f  
com panies respond ing ."3 The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  responses a long  th e  
ra t in g  scale g ives an in d ic a t io n  o f each v a r ia b le ’s s ig n if ic a n c e  in  
p ro m o tin g  th e  use o f lic e n s in g  o ve r d ire c t in ve s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g .
I t  sh o u ld  be no ted  th a t  the  mean ranks  o f th e  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  
u n d e r "D ire c t Investm ent" in  Table l l - 3 a  cannot be com pared w ith  th e  
mean ra n k s  o f th e  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  under "E xporting", s ince  th e  
num ber o f  v a r ia b le s  in  each g roup  is  d if fe re n t .  Because th e re  are 
n in e  v a r ia b le s  in  th e  f i r s t  g roup  the  mean ranks  o f  these v a r ia b le s  
are , on average, h ig h e r  th a n  the  mean ranks  o f th e  s ix  v a r ia b le s  
l is te d  in  th e  second group .
So th a t  a l l  th e  v a r ia b le s  cou ld  be compared w ith  one a n o th e r 
T ab le  l l - 3 b  was co n s tru c te d  us ing  a l l  f i f te e n  o f  them. Thus, f o r  
each company, th e  v a r ia b le  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t ra t in g  was assigned a 
ra n k in g  o f  15, and so on, u n t i l  the  lo w e s t ra n k  was assigned. The 
mean ra n k s  re p o rte d  in  Table l l - 3 b  are th e re fo re  h ig h e r  th a n  those  
re p o r te d  in  Tab le l l - 3 a .
I t  is  c le a r from  b o th  tab le s  th a t  the  K enda ll c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  
conco rdance  is  h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t  fo r  the  v a r ia b le s  grouped u n d e r 
"D ire c t Investm en t" and "E xporting", and fo r  a l l  the  v a r ia b le s  g rouped  
to g e th e r . A cco rd ing  to  S iege l (1956) ”a h igh  o r  s ig n if ic a n t  v a lu e  o f  
W may be in te rp re te d  as meaning th a t  the  observers o r  judges a_e 
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u n d e r s tu d y  (p237). A lth o u g h  the  va lues  o f  W re p o r te d  a t th e  fo o t  
o f  th e  ta b le s  are f a i r ly  low , th e y  are n e ve rth e le ss  h ig h ly  
s ig n if ic a n t ,  th e re b y  a llo w in g  one to  conclude th a t  th e re  e x is ts  a 
com m un ity  o f  p re fe re nce  among the  companies in  th e  ra n k in g s  w h ich  
th e y  have assigned to  the  v a r ia b le s . The K e n d a ll c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  
conco rdance  is  s l ig h t ly  h ig h e r fo r  the  v a r ia b le s  g rouped u n d e r 
D ire c t In v e s tm e n t1 th a n  fo r  the  v a r ia b le s  grouped und e r 'E x p o r t in g 1, 
w ith  th e  concordance c o e ff ic ie n t fo r  a l l  the  v a r ia b le s  fa l l in g  in  
be tw een these  tw o va lues.
I t  is  appa ren t from  Table l l - 3 b  th a t  th e  a c tio n s  o f h o s t 
gove rnm en ts  have a s tro n g  in flu e n c e  upon the  d e c is io n  to  fa v o u r  
l ic e n s in g  o v e r the  o th e r tw o methods o f in te rn a t io n a l business. The 
fo u r  to p -ra n k e d  v a r ia b le s  are a l l  caused by the  in te rv e n t io n  (o r  
th re a te n e d  in te rv e n tio n )  o f governm ents in  the  m arke tp lace .^  The 
o th e r  tw o  v a r ia b le s  caused by governm ent in te r fe re n c e , 'h ig h  le v e l 
o f  ta x a t io n 1 and 'd i f fe re n t  lo c a l p ro d u c t s tanda rds ', are ra n ke d  
n in th  and e le ve n th  re s p e c tiv e ly . Taken to g e th e r, these f iv e  
v a r ia b le s  p roduce  a s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t K e nda ll c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  
conco rdance  o f 0.1796, w h ich  is  h ig h e r than  any o f the  c o e ff ic ie n ts  
re p o r te d  in  Tables l l - 3 a  and l l - 3 b .
The v a r ia b le s  re p re se n tin g  the  size o f the  h o s t m arke t (ranked  
5 th) and th e  le v e l o f t ra n s p o r t  costs (ranked 6th) appear to  be 
m o d e ra te ly  in f lu e n t ia l  in  p rom o ting  the  use o f lic e n s in g , ju d g in g  
fro m  th e  f a i r ly  even d is t r ib u t io n  o f responses across the  ra t in g  
sca le  f o r  these  tw o v a ria b le s .
O f th e  tw o v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  Q uestion 3 concerned w ith  
re s o u rc e  c o n s tra in ts , 's c a rc ity  o f management personne l (ranked  7th) 
was o f  g re a te r  im portance  in  m aking lice n s in g  the  p re fe rre d  o p tio n  
th a n  's h o rta g e  o f in ves tm en t fu n d s ' (ranked 10th). Th is is  n o t a 
s u rp r is in g  f in d in g ,  g iven  th a t  i t  is  easie r (and less tim e-consum ing) 
f o r  m u lt in a t io n a ls  to  acqu ire  c a p ita l than  i t  is  fo r  them to  acq u ire  
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The v a r ia b le  's tro n g  lo c a l c o m p e tit io n 1 occup ies  the  m idd le  
p o s it io n  in  Tab le  l l - 3 b  and has a re a so n a b ly  sym m etric  d is t r ib u t io n  
o f  responses across th e  ra t in g  scale, pea k ing  a t th e  m id -p o in t o f 
th e  sca le . T h is  suggests th a t  th e  v a r ia b le  has a m oderate  degree o f 
in f lu e n c e  upon th e  lic e n s in g  de c is io n . The tw o  v a r ia b le s  concerned 
w ith  th e  p re fe re n ce  o f  lo c a l consum ers and th e  q u a li ty  o f  lo c a l 
d is t r ib u t io n  f a c i l i t ie s  occupy th e  p e n u ltim a te  tw o  p o s it io n s  in  th e  
ta b le . W ith  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  responses c lu s te re d  to w a rd s  th e  m idd le  
o f  th e  ra t in g  scale, i t  w o u ld  appear th a t  these tw o  v a r ia b le s  a lso  
have a m oderate  degree o f  in flu e n c e  upon th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n .
The m ost in s ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le  in f lu e n c in g  th e  d e c is io n  to  
ad o p t lic e n s in g  is  c le a r ly  th e  p r ic e  o f la b o u r  in  lo c a l ( ie  fo re ig n )  
m a rke ts , f o r  th is  was ra n ke d  the  lo w e s t o f  the  f i f te e n  v a r ia b le s  
l is te d  in  Q uestion  3. None o f th e  companies th o u g h t i t  was 'V e ry  
S ig n if ic a n t ',  w h ile  30 p e r cen t o f  them  b e lie ve d  th a t  i t  was 'O f no 
S ig n if ic a n c e '. The d is ta n ce  between th is  mean ra n k  and the  th e  n e x t 
h ig h e s t mean ra n k  is  la rg e r  th a n  the  d is tan ce  betw een the  mean 
ra n k in g s  o f  a l l  the  o th e r  ad jacen t v a r ia b le s  in  th e  ta b le .
The co s t o f  p ro d u c tio n  in  th e  UK was ra n ke d  12th by  the  
com panies, in d ic a t in g  th a t  th is  v a r ia b le  was s l ig h t ly  more im p o r ta n t 
in  m ak ing  lic e n s in g  a p re fe rre d  o p tio n  o ve r e x p o r t in g  th a n  th e  
e x is te n ce  o f  h ig h  fo re ig n  la b o u r  costs  were in  m aking  lic e n s in g  a 
p re fe r re d  o p tio n  o v e r FDI.
11.3.3 A n a ly s is  o f  L ic e n s in g  V a ria b le s
t
H a v ing  d isco ve re d  the  re la t iv e  im po rtance  o f v a r ia b le s  assoc ia ted  
w ith  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g  in  the  lic e n s in g  dec is io n , th e  
n e x t q u e s tio n  aimed to  f in d  o u t th e  re la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  o f  a g roup  
o f  v a r ia b le s  assoc ia ted  w ith  lic e n s in g  i t s e l f .  I t  th e re fo re  asked th e  
com panies to  ra te  s ix  v a r ia b le s  in  term s o f th e ir  re la t iv e  
s ig n if ic a n c e  in  p ro m o tin g  th e  use o f lic e n s in g  ra th e r  th a n  d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rts . The re s u lts  are shown in  Tab le  11-4, w h ich  
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I t  is  c le a r  fro m  th is  ta b le  th a t  th e  v a r ia b le  w h ich  has th e  m ost 
im p a c t in  m aking lic e n s in g  more a t t r a c t iv e  th a n  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t 
and e x p o rts  is  th e  a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a lly  com petent lo c a l 
f irm s . A to ta l  o f  54.9 p e r cen t o f  re sp o n d in g  com panies gave th is  
v a r ia b le  a ra t in g  o f e ith e r  '6' o r  '7' ( the  'V e ry  S ig n if ic a n t ' end o f 
th e  sca le) w h ile  o n ly  4.2 p e r cen t o f  th e  com panies t ic k e d  e ith e r  th e  
f i r s t  o r  th e  second boxes on th e  scale. The d is ta n ce  between th e  
mean ra n k  o f th is  v a r ia b le  and th e  mean ra n k  o f  th e  n e x t m ost 
s ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le , 'L im ite d  lo c a l m a rke t know ledge ', is  g re a te r  
th a n  th e  d is tan ces  betw een th e  mean ra n ks  o f  th e  o th e r  a d ja ce n t 
v a r ia b le s  in  th e  ta b le .
The fo u r  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  are due to  governm ent in te rv e n t io n  
are  th e  lo w e s t ra n ke d  v a r ia b le s  in  th e  ta b le . The m ost im p o r ta n t o f  
these  is  th e  s tre n g th  o f  exchange c o n tro ls  on ro y a lt ie s  com pared to  
those  on d iv id e n d s , fo llo w e d  by th e  com pa ra tive  ta x  tre a tm e n t o f  
ro y a lt ie s  and d iv id e n d s . The tw o  le a s t im p o r ta n t v a r ia b le s  are  
those  re la t in g  to  p a te n t p ro te c t io n  le g is la t io n  and a n t i - t r u s t  law s 
re s p e c tiv e ly .
I t  is  e v id e n t fro m  th e  ta b le  th a t  the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f responses 
to  th e  la t t e r  tw o  v a r ia b le s  are  skewed tow a rds  the  lo w e r end o f  th e  
ra t in g  scale. T h is  suggests  th a t  th e  presence o f weak p a te n t 
p ro te c t io n  le g is la t io n  and weak a n t i - t r u s t  le g is la t io n  in  h o s t 
c o u n tr ie s  are n o t s ig n if ic a n t  in flu e n c e s  upon the  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n .
11.3.4 A n a ly s is  o f  D ire c t In ve s tm e n t, E x p o rt in g  and L ice n s in g  
V a ria b le s
In  o rd e r  to  compare th e  mean ra n k s  o f th e  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  Tab le  
11-4 w ith  th e  mean ra n ks  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  th e  p re v io u s  tw o  
ta b le s , a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  fro m  Q uestions 3 and 4 in  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  were ra n k -o rd e re d . The re s u lts  are shown in  Tab le  
11-5, w h ic h  l is ts  a l l  o f  th e  tw e n ty  one v a r ia b le s  fro m  these tw o 
q u e s tio n s , in  o rd e r o f  r e la t iv e  im po rtance . I t  a lso re p o r ts  th e  mean 
ra n k  and the  num ber o f  re sp o n d in g  companies fo r  each v a r ia b le , 





OVERALL RANK-ORDER OF VARIABLES PROMOTING THE USE OF LICENSING




1 Technologically canpetent local firms 71 16.58
2 Trade restrictions 69 14.97
3 High political risk 71 14.04
4 Exchange controls on dividends 70 13.70
5 High currency risk 70 13.36
6 Small size of market 69 12.58
7 High transport costs 69 11.98
8 Limited local market knowledge 71 11.84
9 Scarcity of management personnel 71 11.00
10 Weaker exchange controls on royalties 70 10.58
11 Strong local competition 70 10.57
12 Lower tax level on royalties than dividends 70 10.36
13 High level of taxation 70 10.12
14 Shortage of investment funds 71 9.94
15 Different local product standards 68 9.83
16 High production costs in UK 70 9.72
17 Different local preferences 68 9.25
18 Poor local distribution facilities 68 8.92
19 Weak patent protection legislation 70 7.80
20 Weak anti-trust legislation 70 7.02
21 High local labour costs 70 6.83
KENDALL COEFFICIENT DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE SAMPLE SI2E 
OF CONCORDANCE
W = .1927 20 .0000 65
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Tab le  11-5 shows th a t  th e  m ost s ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le  a f fe c t in g  
th e  d e c is io n  to  adop t lic e n s in g  ra th e r  th a n  any o f  th e  a lte rn a tiv e s  
is  th e  same v a r ia b le  th a t  was ra n ke d  f i r s t  in  Tab le 11-4: th e
a v a i la b l i l i t y  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a lly  com peten t ca nd ida te  licensees. The 
n e x t s ix  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  Tab le  11-5 are the  same s ix  v a r ia b le s  
l is te d  a t th e  to p  o f  Tab le  l l - 3 b .  The v a r ia b le  a t the  bo ttom  o f 
T ab le  11-5 is  a lso  p o s it io n e d  a t th e  b o ttom  o f Tab le  l l - 3 b ,  w h ile  th e  
tw o  v a r ia b le s  ra n ke d  im m ed ia te ly  above i t  occupy th e  bo ttom  tw o 
p o s it io n s  in  Tab le  11-4.
An in te re s t in g  fe a tu re  o f  th e  ra n k in g s  in  Tab le  11-5 is  th a t  
g re a te r  im p o rta n ce  is  a tta ch e d  to  th e  ex is tence  o f  exchange c o n tro ls  
on d iv id e n d s  (ra n ke d  fo u r th )  th a n  th e  ex is tence  o f w eaker exchange 
c o n tro ls  on ro y a lt ie s  (ran ked  te n th ). I t  w ou ld  th u s  appear th a t  th e  
sam ple o f  com panies were less r e l ia n t  upon ro y a lt ie s  as a means o f 
r e p a t r ia t in g  incom e fro m  fo re ig n  licensees th a n  th e y  were upon  
d iv id e n d s  as a means o f  re p a tr ia t in g  income from  fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s .
T h is  fe a tu re  may be e xp la in e d  by the  fa c t th a t  ro y a lt ie s  are 
o n ly  one means o f o b ta in in g  re m u n e ra tio n  from  lic e n s in g  agreem ents. 
L ic e n s o rs  may e x tra c t  a re tu rn  v ia  lum p-sum  fees, re c ip ro c a l 
te c h n o lo g y  exchanges, m arg ins on com ponents s u p p lie d  to  th e  
lice n se e , e tc. The responses to  Q uestions 8 and 18 in  S ection  I I  o f  
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  re v e a l th a t  o n ly  23 p e r cent o f companies o b ta in e d  
a l l  o f  t h e ir  p a te n t and know -how  lic e n s in g  income in  th e  fo rm  o f 
a n n u a l ro y a lt ie s  based upon licensee  sales.
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11.4 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LICENSING DECISION
11.4.1 In tro d u c t io n
The te rm  'fa c to r  a n a ly s is ' encompasses a num ber o f  c o m p u ta tio n a l 
te c h n iq u e s  th a t  a re  used to  id e n t i f y  a r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll num ber o f  
c o n s tru c ts  (ie  fa c to rs )  th a t  can be used to  re p re s e n t re la t io n s h ip s  
among a la rg e r  num ber o f  in te r - r e la te d  v a r ia b le s . F a c to r a n a ly s is  is  
th u s  a means w hereby re la t io n s h ip s  among v a r ia b le s  are re p re se n te d  
as p a rs im o n io u s ly  as p o s s ib le . T h is  re d u c tio n  in  th e  num ber o f  
v a r ia b le s  re ve a ls  th e  u n d e r ly in g  fa c to rs  th a t  are be ing  m easured.
F a c to r a n a lys is  is  based upon th e  prem ise th a t  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  
are  c o rre la te d  w ith  one a n o th e r sha re  common fa c to rs .  A se t o f  
v a r ia b le s  m ust th e re fo re  be s u f f ic ie n t ly  in te r - c o r re la te d  fo r  common 
fa c to rs  to  be id e n t if ie d .  I t  is  assumed th a t  each v a r ia b le  can be 
re p re s e n te d  by a l in e a r  c o m b in a tio n  o f these common fa c to rs ,  p lu s  a 
u n iq u e  fa c to r  to  re p re s e n t any p a r t  o f  the  v a r ia b le  th a t  canno t be 
e x p la in e d  by the  common fa c to rs .
The m a th em a tica l m odel f o r  w h a t is  term ed 'c la s s ic a l' fa c to r  
a n a ly s is  is  know n as th e  'common fa c to r  m odel'. I t  s ta te s  th a t  th e  
i t h  v a r ia b le ,  , may be re p re s e n te d  as a lin e a r  fu n c t io n  o f common 
and u n iq u e  fa c to rs , as fo llo w s :
X i -  a-jjF^ + 3.j,2^2 + + ai k Fk  + ^ i
w here  th e  F's are th e  common fa c to rs ,  th e  U is  th e  u n iq u e  fa c to r ,  
and th e  a's are th e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  used to  com bine th e  k  fa c to rs . The 
u n iq u e  fa c to rs  are assumed to  be u n c o rre la te d  w ith  each o th e r  and 
w ith  th e  common fa c to rs . A good fa c to r  s o lu t io n  is  ach ieved  when 
each v a r ia b le  possesses a la rg e  c o e f f ic ie n t  f o r  ju s t  one o f  th e  
common fa c to rs .
The te ch n iq u e  w h ich  was used in  th is  s tu d y  is  based upon the  
'p r in c ip a l com ponents m odel'. T h is  can be regarded  as a s p e c ia l 
case o f  th e  common fa c to r  m odel as i t  assumes th a t  th e re  are no
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u n iq u e  fa c to rs .  The m odel may th e re fo re  be expressed as fo llo w s :
X i  = ai l F l  + ai2 F 2 + -  + ai k Fk
The advan tage  o f  th e  p r in c ip a l com ponents m odel o v e r th e  
common fa c to r  m odel is  th a t  i t  enables th e  fa c to rs  to  be expressed  
as u n iq u e  l in e a r  fu n c t io n s  o f  th e  o r ig in a l v a r ia b le s . The j t h  fa c to r ,  
F j , may th e re fo re  be deno ted  as fo llo w s :
P
Fj = <T WjiXi = W jlXl + Wj2X2 ♦ ... ♦ WjpXp
i= l
w here  th e  's are  re g re s s io n -ty p e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  c a lle d  'fa c to r  
lo a d in g s ',  and p re p re s e n ts  th e  num ber o f  v a r ia b le s .
The pu rpose  o f  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  based upon  th e  p r in c ip a l 
com ponents m odel is  to  e x p la in  as much o f th e  t o ta l  va r ia n c e  in  a 
d a ta s e t as p o s s ib le  w ith  as few  fa c to rs  (ie  p r in c ip a l com ponents) as 
p o s s ib le . The f i r s t  fa c to r  to  be e x tra c te d  is  th e  w e igh ted  l in e a r  
c o m b in a tio n  o f  v a r ia b le s  th a t  accoun ts  f o r  th e  la rg e s t am ount o f  th e  
t o ta l  v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta . The second fa c to r  to  be e x tra c te d  is  th e  
w e ig h te d  l in e a r  c o m b in a tio n  o f  v a r ia b le s  th a t  accoun ts  f o r  th e  
maximum am ount o f  th e  re m a in in g  v a r ia n c e  n o t a lre a d y  accounted f o r  
by  th e  f i r s t  fa c to r .  In  a d d it io n , th is  second fa c to r  is  u n c o rre la te d  
w ith  th e  f i r s t  fa c to r .
T h is  p rocess o f  e x tra c t in g  m u tu a lly  u n c o rre la te d  (ie  o rth o g o n a l)  
fa c to rs  fro m  th e  d a ta  c o n tin u e s  u n t i l  a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  is  
a ccoun ted  fo r .  A t th is  p o in t ,  how ever, th e  num ber o f  fa c to rs  
gen e ra te d  equa ls  th e  num ber o f  o r ig in a l v a r ia b le s , so n o th in g  has 
been ga ined . H owever, s ince  most o f  th e  va r ia n c e  in  th e  d a ta  is  
u s u a lly  accoun ted  f o r  by th e  f i r s t  few  fa c to rs , these  are u s u a lly  
deemed to  be adequate enough to  re p re s e n t the  da ta . These fa c to rs  
are th e n  re ta in e d  fo r  fu r th e r  e xa m in a tio n  and th e  o th e r  fa c to rs  are 
d ropp ed  fro m  th e  an a lys is .
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The fa c to r  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  da ta  re p o rte d  in  th is  
c h a p te r fa l ls  u n d e r th e  ca te g o ry  o f  w h a t is  com monly term ed 'R type  
a n a ly s is ' ( ra th e r  th a n  'Q typ e  a n a ly s is ')  s ince  th e  aim was to  
exam ine th e  re la t io n s h ip s  betw een v a r ia b le s  ra th e r  th a n  th e  
re la t io n s h ip s  betw een com panies.
11.4.3 A n a ly s is  o f  D ire c t In v e s tm e n t and E x p o rt in g  V a ria b le s
F a c to r a n a ly s is  g e n e ra lly  proceeds in  th re e  steps. F ir s t ly ,  th e  
c o r re la t io n s  betw een v a r ia b le s  are exam ined to  de te rm ine  i f  th e  use 
o f  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  is  w a rra n te d . Assum ing th is  is  th e  case, fa c to rs  
a re  th e n  e x tra c te d  fro m  th e  d a ta  to  re p re s e n t g ro u p in g s  o f  
v a r ia b le s . F in a lly ,  th e  fa c to rs  w h ic h  accoun t f o r  th e  b u lk  o f  th e  
v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta  are  tra n s fo rm e d  by means o f  ro ta t io n ,  in  o rd e r  
to  make them  more in te rp re ta b le .
Each o f  these  s teps is  now de sc rib e d  f o r  th e  f i f te e n  d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g  v a r ia b le s .
Step One: E xa m in a tio n  o f  C o rre la t io n  M a trice s
The f i r s t  s tep  c o n s is te d  o f  an e xa m in a tio n  o f  th e  s im p le  c o rre la t io n s  
and p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n s  p rodu ced  by th e  v a r ia b le s , to  de te rm ine  i f  
th e y  w ere s u ita b le  f o r  fa c to r  a n a lys is .
T h is  began w ith  an assessm ent o f  th e  s tre n g th  o f  the  s im p le  
c o r re la t io n s  betw een th e  v a r ia b le s . The pu rpose  o f  th is  was to  
d e te rm in e  i f  th e re  were enough c o r re la t io n s  o f s u f f ic ie n t  s tre n g th  
to  suggest th a t  th e  v a r ia b le s  sha red  common fa c to rs . I t  can be seen 
fro m  th e  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  in  A p p e n d ix  11.1 th a t  a lm ost h a lf  (49 p e r 
cen t) o f  th e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  were g re a te r  th a n  0.3 in  abso lu te  va lu e , 
w h ic h  suggested th a t  th e re  were l ik e ly  to  be some common fa c to rs  
w h ic h  c o u ld  e x p la in  g ro u p in g s  o f these  v a r ia b le s .
B a r t le t t 's  te s t o f  s p h e r ic ity  was th e n  a p p lie d  to  the  da ta  in  the  
c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  to  de te rm ine  i f  th e  m a tr ix  c o u ld  be cons trued  as 
an ' id e n t i t y ' m a tr ix , ie  a m a tr ix  in  w h ich  a l l  d iagon a l term s are one
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and a l l  o f f -d ia g o n a l te rm s are zero. I f  th is  was fo u n d  to  be th e  
case th e  use o f  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  w o u ld  have been in a p p ro p r ia te  
[N o ru s is  (1985, p l2 8 )]. However, B a r t le t t 's  te s t s ta t is t ic ,  w h ich  is  
based upon  th e  c h i-s q u a re  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  o f the  d e te rm in a n t o f  th e  
c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix ,  had a la rg e  v a lu e  and a c o rre s p o n d in g ly  sm a ll 
s ig n if ic a n c e  le v e l (see th e  f o o t  o f th e  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  in  
A p p e n d ix  11.1). I t  was th e re fo re  conc luded  th a t  th e  c o r re la t io n  
m a tr ix  was n o t s u f f ic ie n t ly  c lose  to  an an id e n t i t y  m a tr ix  to  ru le  
o u t th e  use o f  fa c to r  an a lys is .
The s tre n g th  o f  th e  re la t io n s h ip  among v a r ia b le s  was assessed 
u s in g  p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts .  I f  v a r ia b le s  share  common 
fa c to rs  th e  p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  betw een p a irs  o f  
v a r ia b le s  s h o u ld  be sm a ll when th e  l in e a r  e ffe c ts  o f  th e  o th e r  
v a r ia b le s  are rem oved. These p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n s  are th e n  es tim a tes  
o f  th e  c o r re la t io n s  betw een th e  u n iq u e  fa c to rs . I f  th e  assum ptions 
o f  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  are  met th e y  s h o u ld  be c lose to  zero, s ince  
u n iq u e  fa c to rs  are assumed to  be o rth o g o n a l.
To assess w h e th e r th e  p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  were 
s u f f ic ie n t ly  c lose  to  zero, th e  'a n ti- im a g e ' c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix
O
p ro d u ce d  by th e  v a r ia b le s  was exam ined. A n ti- im a g e  c o r re la t io n s  
are s im p ly  n e g a tive s  o f  p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts . I f  a h ig h  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  la rg e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  was fo und , the  use o f  the  fa c to r  
a n a ly s is  m odel w o u ld  have had to  be reco n s id e re d  [N o ru s is  (1985, 
p l2 9 ) ]. However, as no such p a t te rn  was e v id e n t in  th e  a n ti- im a g e  
c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  (see A p pend ix  11.1) th e re  were no g rounds fo r  
q u e s tio n in g  th e  use o f  a fa c to r  a n a ly t ic  m odel on th e  bas is  o f  th is  
c r i te r io n .
A n o th e r m ethod o f assessing th e  s u i ta b i l i t y  o f  the  fa c to r  m odel 
to  a se t o f  v a r ia b le s  is  to  com pute a s ta t is t ic  know n as th e  K a is e r-  
M e y e r-O lk in  (KMO) measure o f sam pling  adequacy. T h is  is  an in d e x  
w h ich  compares th e  m agn itudes o f s im p le  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  
w ith  th e  m agn itudes o f  p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts . The in d e x  
ranges in  v a lu e  fro m  zero to  one. I t  is  close to  one when th e  sum 
o f  th e  squa red  p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  between a l l  p a irs  o f
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v a r ia b le s  is  sm a ll in  com parison  to  th e  sum o f  the  squa red  
c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts .
I f  sm a ll va lu e s  o f  th e  KMO in d e x  are o b ta in e d  fa c to r  a n a lys is  
may be in a p p ro p r ia te ,  s ince  sm a ll va lu e s  in d ic a te  th a t  c o r re la t io n s  
betw een p a irs  o f  v a r ia b le s  cann o t be e x p la in e d  by o th e r  v a r ia b le s . 
A ru le  o f  thum b fo r  d e te rm in in g  when th e  v a lu e  o f  a KMO s ta t is t ic  
is  s u f f ic ie n t ly  lo w  to  ru le  o u t the  use o f  fa c to r  a n a lys is  has been 
p ro v id e d  by K a is e r (1974), who suggested th a t  va lu e s  be low  0.5 are 
una ccep tab le .^  As th e  v a lu e  o f th e  KMO s ta t is t ic  was c a lc u la te d  as 
0.73, th e  use o f  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  was deemed to  be ju s t i f ia b le .
KMO s ta t is t ic s  were a lso  c a lc u la te d  fo r  each in d iv id u a l v a r ia b le  
to  d e te rm ine  w h e th e r any o f  them  o u g h t to  have been e lim in a te d  
fro m  th e  fa c to r  a n a lys is . The m ethod o f c a lc u la tin g  these  in d iv id u a l 
s ta t is t ic s  is  s im ila r  to  th e  m ethod used fo r  c a lc u la t in g  the  o v e ra l l 
KMO s ta t is t ic ;  r a th e r  th a n  in c lu d in g  a l l  p a irs  o f  v a r ia b le s  in  th e  
c a lc u la t io n , o n ly  c a lc u la tio n s  in v o lv in g  an in d iv id u a l v a r ia b le  are 
in c lu d e d . The KMO in d ic e s  o f  sam pling  adequacy f o r  each in d iv id u a l 
v a r ia b le  are  p r in te d  on th e  d ia g o n a l o f  the  a n ti- im a g e  c o r re la t io n  
m a tr ix  in  A p p e n d ix  11.1. As none o f these  in d ice s  f e l l  be low  0.5, no 
v a r ia b le s  were rem oved fro m  th e  fa c to r  model.
Step Two: E x tra c t io n  o f  F ac to rs
To beg in  w ith ,  fa c to rs  (ie  p r in c ip a l com ponents) w h ich  accounted f o r  
a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta  were ob ta ined . The re s u lts  o f  th is  
e xe rc ise  are  shown in  th e  t h i r d  ta b le  in  A ppend ix  11.1. The f i r s t  
co lum n o f  th is  ta b le  s im p ly  l is t s  these in i t i a l  fa c to rs , in  descending 
o rd e r  o f  im po rtance . The num ber o f  fa c to rs  ( f i f te e n )  co rresponds to  
th e  num ber o f  v a r ia b le s , s ince  th e  fa c to rs  accoun t f o r  a l l  o f  th e  
v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta .
The second colum n o f th e  ta b le  con ta ins  th e  ’e igenva lues ' o f  
each fa c to r .  These s ta t is t ic s  measure the  percen tage o f  to ta l  
v a r ia n c e  w h ich  a fa c to r  accoun ts fo r .  Fo r s im p lic ity ,  a l l  v a r ia b le s  
and fa c to rs  were expressed in  s ta n d a rd ize d  fo rm , w ith  a mean o f
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zero and a s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n  o f  one. S ince th e re  were f i f te e n  
v a r ia b le s  and each was s ta n d a rd iz e d  to  have a v a r ia n c e  o f one, th e  
t o ta l  v a r ia n c e  e x p la in e d  by a l l  o f  th e  fa c to rs  was f if te e n .  The 
p e n u lt im a te  co lum n c o n ta in s  th e  pe rcen tage  o f  to ta l  v a r ia n c e  
a t t r ib u ta b le  to  each fa c to r ,  w h ile  th e  f in a l  co lum n re p o r ts  th e  
c u m u la tiv e  percen tage.
H a v ing  e s ta b lis h e d  how much v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta  was 
accoun ted  fo r  by  each o f  th e  fa c to rs ,  th e  n e x t s tep  in v o lv e d  
d e c id in g  how many o f  these  fa c to rs  to  e x tra c t  f o r  fu r th e r  a n a lys is . 
T h is  d e c is io n  was made u s in g  th e  ru le  o f  thum b know n  as 'K a is e r 's  
c r i t e r io n ' [ a f te r  K a is e r (1974)]. T h is  s ta te s  th a t  o n ly  fa c to rs  th a t  
a ccou n t f o r  v a ria n ce s  g re a te r  th a n  one (ie  th a t  possess e igenva lues  
g re a te r  th a n  one) s h o u ld  be e x tra c te d . T h is  c r i te r io n  d e rive s  fro m  
th e  o b s e rv a tio n  th a t  fa c to rs  w ith  e igenva lues  be low  one are  no 
b e t te r  th a n  s in g le  v a r ia b le s , s ince  each v a r ia b le  has a va r ia n c e  o f  
one. F iv e  fa c to rs  s a t is f ie d  th e  K a is e r c r i te r io n  and were th u s  
se le c te d  f o r  fu r th e r  a n a lys is .
The r e la t iv e  m agn itudes o f  th e  e igenva lues  possessed by a l l  o f  
th e  fa c to rs  are re p re s e n te d  in  th e  'scree ' p lo t,  d e p ic te d  in  A p pend ix  
11.1. T h is  p lo t  was p roposed  b y  C a tte ll (1966) as a means o f  v is u a lly  
id e n t if y in g  th e  maximum num ber o f  fa c to rs  to  be e x tra c te d ; h is  
'scree  te s t ' s ta te s  th a t  th is  num ber can be id e n t i f ie d  fro m  the  p o in t  
a t w h ic h  th e  cu rve  beg ins  to  le v e l o f f .  Beyond th is  p o in t th e re  
e x is ts  w h a t C a tte ll d e sc rib e d  as " fa c to r ia l l i t t e r  o r  scree" (a f te r  th e  
g e o lo g ic a l te rm  fo r  th e  d e b ris  w h ich  c o lle c ts  on th e  lo w e r p a r ts  o f  
ro c k y  s lopes).
E xa m in a tio n  o f  th e  scree p lo t  in  A p pend ix  11.1 re ve a ls  th a t  th e  
a c tu a l p o in t  a t w h ic h  th e  p lo t  beg ins to  le v e l o f f  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  
id e n t ify ,  s ince  i t  apppears to  be k in k e d  in  one o r  tw o  p laces. F o r 
th is  reason  th e  scree p lo t  was n o t used to  id e n t i f y  th e  num ber o f  
fa c to rs  to  e x tra c t.  I t  does, how ever, h ig h l ig h t  th e  fa c t  th a t  the  
f i r s t  fa c to r  accoun ts f o r  th e  b u lk  o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  th e  data.
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The in i t i a l  'fa c to r  m a tr ix ' w h ic h  was d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  f iv e  
fa c to rs  w h ich  s a t is f ie d  th e  k a is e r  c r i te r io n  is  shown in  Tab le  1 1 -6 .^  
I t  c o n ta in s  th e  re g re s s io n -ty p e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  know n as 'fa c to r  
lo a d in g s ', w h ich  in d ic a te  th e  w e ig h t assigned to  each o f th e  f iv e  
fa c to rs  by  th e  f i f te e n  s ta n d a rd iz e d  v a r ia b le s . Because th e  fa c to rs  
a re  u n c o rre la te d  w ith  one a n o th e r, th e  fa c to r  lo a d in g s  a lso  
re p re s e n t th e  c o r re la t io n s  betw een th e  fa c to rs  and th e  v a r ia b le s .
TABLE 11-S
IN IT IA L  FACTOR MATRIX: DIRECT INVESTMENT & EXPORTING VARIABLES
VARIABLE FACTOR I FACTOR I I FACTOR I I I FACTOR IV FACTOR V h2
RULFDI03 .73498 - .3 5 3 0 1 .00363 .32883 .07386 .77840
RULEXP06 .70701 . 17737 - .148 29 - . A9925 - .2 2 4 5 4 .85299
RULFDI06 .70088 - .4 6 2 3 9 - .0 8 4 6 3 .10581 .14013 .74305
RULEXP04 .66022 .30293 .05530 -.025 72 - .137 36 .55030
RULFDI04 .63936 - .0 1 1 1 4 .15377 - .331 76 .21251 .58938
RULEXP05 .62845 .45394 - .  16954 - .34915 - .33229 .86208
RULFDI05 .596 75 - .3 9 7 6 9 .17420 -.271 72 .05234 .62118
RULFDI08 .58618 .14764 .22815 .14068 .35337 .56212
RULF0I09 .57904 - .3 8 4 5 5 - .0 4 1 3 1 .15765 -.450 11 .71236
RULFDI02 .55419 .22055 .54890 . 32397 - .069 07 .76678
RULEXP03 .52419 - .4 8 0 6 7 - .2 8 8 5 3 .14854 -.274 75 .68662
RULEXP02 .52001 .40696 - .4 6 0 0 3 .25719 .16370 .74060
RULEXP01 .50645 .50886 - .2 6 6 6 6 .44196 -.01079 .78199
RULFDI01 .42845 .14966 .69246 - .032 28 -.009 56 .68661
RULFDI07 .52066 - .0 9 6 6 0 - .3 0 5 0 4 - .2 4 2 8 4 .57389 .78179
EIGENVALUES 5.36938 1.73163 1.41016 1.15824 1.01584 10.69625
% VARIANCE 35.8 11.5 9 .4 7.8 5 . 8 71.3
The f in a l  co lum n o f  th e  fa c to r  m a tr ix  headed by h , c o n ta in s  
th e  'c o m m u n a litie s ' o f  th e  v a r ia b le s . They were o b ta in e d  by 
c a lc u la t in g  th e  sum o f  th e  squared  fa c to r  lo a d in g s  f o r  each 
v a r ia b le  o v e r a l l  th e  e x tra c te d  fa c to rs . These s ta t is t ic s  re p re s e n t 
th e  p ro p o r t io n s  o f  th e  v a r ia n ce s  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  th a t  can be 
a ccou n te d  fo r  by th e  f iv e  fa c to rs . A v a r ia b le 's  com m una lity  is  
th e re fo re  a measure o f i t s  'common v a r ia n c e ', ie  th e  va ria n ce  th a t  i t  
shares in  common w ith  th e  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  in  the  m a tr ix . The 
p ro p o r t io n  o f the  to ta l  v a r ia n c e  th a t  is  n o t shared in  common w ith
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th e  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  (1 -h^) re p re s e n ts  a v a r ia b le 's  'u n iq u e  v a r ia n c e '.
C om m una lities  range in  v a lu e  fro m  zero ( in d ic a t in g  th a t  a 
v a r ia b le  possesses no v a r ia n c e  in  common w ith  o th e r  v a r ia b le s )  to  
one ( in d ic a t in g  th a t  a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  a v a r ia b le  is  common to  
th e  o th e r  v a r ia b le s ) . C om m una litie s  are u s e fu l f o r  d e te rm in in g  
w h e th e r o r  n o t a v a r ia b le  is  am enable to  fa c to r  a n a lys is . A lo w  
com m una lity , in d ic a t in g  a h ig h  p ro p o r t io n  o f u n iq u e  va ria n ce , 
suggests  th a t  a v a r ia b le  cann o t be e x p la in e d  v e ry  w e ll by the  se t o f  
common fa c to rs  th a t  are e x tra c te d , and th a t  i t  th e re fo re  shares 
l i t t l e  in  common w ith  th e  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  be ing  s tu d ie d .
The c u to f f  le v e l used in  th is  s tu d y  fo r  re je c t in g  v a r ia b le s  fo r  
subsequen t stages o f  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  was a com m una lity  v a lu e  o f  0.3 
[as suggested by C h ild  (1970, p42)]. However, a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  
had va lu e s  w e ll above th is  le v e l,  and so a l l  were in c lu d e d  fo r  
f u r th e r  ana lys is .
The p e n u lt im a te  row  o f  Tab le  11-6 co n ta in s  th e  e igenva lues  o f  
each o f  th e  in i t i a l  fa c to rs . S ince these are s im p ly  th e  sums o f  the  
squa red  lo a d in g s  f o r  each fa c to r  o v e r a l l  th e  v a r ia b le s , th e  sum o f  
th e  e igenva lues  is  n e c e s s a r ily  id e n t ic a l to  th e  sum o f  the  
c om m u na litie s  f o r  each v a r ia b le .  The f in a l  row  o f  th e  ta b le  s im p ly  
re -e xp re sse s  th e  e igenva lues  to  in d ic a te  th e  am ount o f  to ta l  
v a r ia n c e  accoun ted  fo r  by each fa c to r .
I t  is  a p p a re n t fro m  th e  in i t i a l  fa c to r  m a tr ix  th a t  th e  v a r ia b le s  
and fa c to rs  are n o t c o r re la te d  in  any in te rp re ta b le  p a tte rn ; m ost 
v a r ia b le s  have m odera te -s ize  lo a d in g s  w ith  a num ber o f  fa c to rs . 
T h is  m a tr ix  was th e re fo re  ro ta te d  to  p roduce a m a tr ix  w ith  a 
s im p le r s tru c tu re ,  ie  one in  w h ic h  th e  v a r ia b le s  were c o rre la te d  
h ig h ly  w ith  o n ly  one fa c to r ,  and each fa c to r  was h ig h ly  c o rre la te d  
w ith  a r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll num ber o f  v a r ia b le s . Th is  t h i r d  step in  th e  
fa c to r  a n a ly s is  process is  now described .
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Step Three: R o ta tio n  and In te rp re ta t io n  o f  F ac to rs
The in i t i a l  fa c to r  m a tr ix  was ro ta te d  u s in g  th e  'v a r im a x ' m ethod o f 
r o ta t io n ,  p roposed  by K a is e r (1959). T h is  m ethod is  so-nam ed 
because i t  ro ta te s  fa c to rs  in  o rd e r  to  m axim ize th e  v a r ia n c e  o f  t h e ir  
squa red  lo a d in g s .^  I t  is  one o f  a num ber o f  'o r th o g o n a l' r o ta t io n  
m ethods, ie  te c h n iq u e s  w h ich  ensure  th a t  th e  ro ta te d  axes (ie  
fa c to rs )  are  k e p t in  th e  same o r ie n ta t io n  to  one a n o th e r so th a t  
th e y  rem a in  a t r ig h t  ang les a f te r  ro ta t io n .  The fa c to rs  th e re fo re  
rem a in  u n c o rre la te d  w ith  one a n o th e r .^
A d e s ira b le  p ro p e r ty  o f  o r th o g o n a l r o ta t io n  is  th a t  th e  am ount 
o f  th e  to ta l  v a r ia n c e  accoun ted  fo r  by th e  fa c to rs  u n d e r 
c o n s id e ra t io n  is  u n a ffe c te d  by  th e  ro ta t io n .  The goodness o f  f i t  o f  
a fa c to r  s o lu t io n  is  th e re fo re  u n a ffe c te d . The to ta l  v a r ia n c e  is  
s im p ly  re d is t r ib u te d  among th e  fa c to rs ,  so th a t  th e  percen tage  o f  
v a r ia n c e  accoun ted  fo r  by each fa c to r  c h a n g e s .^
The ro ta te d  fa c to r  m a tr ix , o b ta in e d  us in g  K a ise r 's  v a r im a x  
a lg o r ith m , is  show n in  Tab le  11-7. F a c to r lo a d in g s  w ith  a v a lu e  
g re a te r  th a n  0.3 are  h ig h lig h te d  in  b o ld  p r in t .  T h is  v a lu e  is  a 
f a i r l y  com m only used c u to f f  le v e l f o r  d e te rm in in g  w h e th e r 
o r th o g o n a l fa c to r  lo a d in g s  are s ig n if ic a n t  f o r  in te r p r e t iv e  purposes 
[see eg C h ild  (1970), (Comrey, 1973)]. The square  o f 0.3 g ives 0.09, 
in d ic a t in g  th a t  a v a r ia b le  w ith  th is  fa c to r  lo a d in g  has ro u g h ly  10 
p e r ce n t o f  i t s  v a r ia n c e  in  common w ith  th e  fa c to r .
To a s s is t in  in te rp re t in g  th e  fa c to rs , the  ro ta te d  fa c to r  m a tr ix  
was s o r te d  to  id e n t i f y  those  g roups o f  v a r ia b le s  whose h ig h e s t 
lo a d in g s  were on the  same fa c to r .  V a ria b le s  were th e n  c la s s if ie d  
u n d e r one o f  th e  f iv e  fa c to rs  on th e  bas is  o f  these h ig h e s t 
lo a d in g s . The re s u lt in g  g roups  o f  v a r ia b le s  are h ig h lig h te d  by  th e  
re c ta n g u la r  b lo c k s  in  Tab le  11-7. F o u r v a r ia b le s  were n o t c la s s if ie d  
u n d e r any o f  the  fa c to rs  because th e y  had v e ry  s im ila r  lo a d in g s  on 
tw o  o r  more fa c to rs ;  i t  c o u ld  n o t th e re fo re  be c o n f id e n t ly  asse rted  
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I t  can be seen fro m  Tab le  11-7 th a t  f iv e  v a r ia b le s  had t h e ir  
h ig h e s t lo a d in g s  on th e  f i r s t  fa c to r .  However, o n ly  th e  f i r s t  fo u r  
o f  these  v a r ia b le s  w ere c la s s if ie d  as b e lo n g in g  to  F a c to r I  s ince  th e  
d if fe re n c e  between th e  lo a d in g s  o f th e  f i f t h  v a r ia b le  on F a c to rs  I  
and V was to o  sm a ll to  c o n f id e n t ly  p lace  i t  u n d e r o n ly  one o f  these  
fa c to rs .  T h is  v a r ia b le  ( 'h ig h  le v e l o f  ta x a t io n ')  was th e re fo re  le f t  
u n c la s s if ie d .
F a c to r I  has been in te rp t re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  'h o s t c o u n try  
r is k ' s ince  the  v a r ia b le s  c la s s if ie d  u n d e r i t  are m easurem ents, to  
v a ry in g  degrees, o f  th e  r is k  in v o lv e d  in  e ith e r  in v e s t in g  in  o r  
t ra d in g  w ith  the  h o s t c o u n try . I t  accoun ts f o r  th e  la rg e s t
p ro p o r t io n  o f  va r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta  (17.8%). The use o f  th e  te rm  'h o s t
c o u n try  r is k ' in  th is  c o n te x t sh o u ld  n o t be con fused  w ith  th e  more
s p e c if ic  te rm  "c o u n try  r is k " ,  w h ich  is  u s u a lly  em ployed to  denote  
th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  an unexpected  even t w ith in  a h o s t c o u n try  
in f lu e n c in g  the  a b i l i t y  o f  a company o r  a governm ent to  repay  an 
in te rn a t io n a l bank lo a n . ^  The te rm  is  used here  s im p ly  to  deno te  
th e  r is k s  in v o lv e d  in  e x p o r t in g  to  o r  p ro d u c in g  in  a h o s t c o u n try .
These r is k s ,  as re p re se n te d  by F a c to r I, are fo u r fo ld .  F ir s t ly ,  
'h ig h  p o l i t ic a l  r is k ' (RULFDI03), w h ich  re fe rs  to  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  
h o s t gove rnm en t a c tio n s  may a d ve rse ly  a f fe c t  bus iness o p e ra tio n s  
w ith in  th e  h o s t c o u n try . Secondly, 'tra d e  r e s t r ic t io n s ' (RULEXP03) 
w h ic h  denotes th e  use o f  b a r r ie rs  to  tra d e  such as t a r i f f s  and 
q u o ta s , and w h ich  may be regarded  as re p re s e n tin g  a fo rm  o f
" t ra d in g  r is k " .  T h is  ty p e  o f r is k  w i l l  a lso im pac t upon fo re ig n  
p ro d u c tio n  where com panies possess in te rn a t io n a lly - in te g ra te d  
p ro d u c t io n  processes w h ich  in v o lv e  c ro s s -b o rd e r in te rm e d ia te  
p ro d u c t flo w s .
T h ird ly ,  'h ig h  c u rre n c y  r is k ' (RULFDI06) w h ich  denotes th e  
p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  th e  home c o u n try  v a lu e  o f the  cash flo w s  and 
p r o f i t s  earned in  th e  h o s t c o u n try  w i l l  v a ry  as a r e s u lt  o f  c u rre n c y  
f lu c tu a t io n s .  F o u rth ly , 'exchange c o n tro ls  on d iv id e n d s  (RULFDI09) 
w h ic h  re fe rs  to  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  a company may be unab le  to  
r e p a t r ia te  a l l  o f  i t s  incom e from  th e  h o s t c o u n try , and w h ich  may
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th e re fo re  be re g a rd e d  as re p re s e n tin g  " re p a t r ia t io n  r is k " .  T h is  
la t t e r  ca te g o ry  o f  r is k  may be v ie w e d  as a s u b -c a te g o ry  o f  p o l i t ic a l  
r is k ,  s in ce  i t  stems fro m  th e  a c t io n  o f  th e  h o s t governm ent.
The v a r ia b le  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t lo a d in g  on F a c to r I  was 'tra d e  
r e s t r ic t io n s ',  w h ic h  a lso  had th e  h ig h e s t mean ra n k  o f a l l  th e  d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t and e x p o r t in g  v a r ia b le s  when th e y  were ra n k -o rd e re d  
u s in g  th e  K e n d a ll c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  concordance (see Tab le  l l - 3 b ) .  I t  
w o u ld  th u s  appear th a t  gove rnm en t in te rv e n t io n  in  in te rn a t io n a l 
p ro d u c t m arke ts  is  th e  m ost s ig n if ic a n t  fo rm  o f gove rnm en t a c t iv i t y  
p ro m o tin g  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g .
The second fa c to r  in  Tab le  11-7 accoun ts f o r  a s l ig h t ly  s m a lle r 
p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta  (14.3%). A lth o u g h  th re e  
v a r ia b le s  had th e ir  h ig h e s t lo a d in g s  on th is  fa c to r ,  o n ly  th e  f i r s t
tw o  v a r ia b le s  w ere c la s s if ie d  u n d e r F a c to r I I .  B o th  o f  them  are
concerned  w ith  a t t r ib u te s  o f  th e  lo c a l (ie  h o s t) m a rke t w h ic h  
n e c e s s ita te  th e  m o d if ic a t io n  o f  e x p o rte d  p ro d u c ts  in  o rd e r  to  s a t is fy  
lo c a l p ro d u c t s ta n d a rd s  and lo c a l p re fe re nces , and w h ich  th e re fo re  
in c rea se  th e  cos ts  o f  m a rk e tin g  these  p ro d u c ts . T h is  fa c to r  has 
th e re fo re  been la b e lle d  as an 'e x p o r t  m a rk e tin g  cos ts '.
The th i r d  fa c to r ,  w h ic h  is  a lso  com prised o f  tw o  v a r ia b le s ,
accoun ts  f o r  14.2% o f th e  v a r ia n c e  in  the  data . T h is  fa c to r  has been 
la b e lle d  as 're s o u rc e  c o n s tra in ts ' s ince  th e  v a r ia b le s  are concerned 
w ith  sh o rta g e s  o f  th e  m anag e ria l and f in a n c ia l c a p ita l necessary fo r  
d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t. These re so u rce  c o n s tra in ts  may be 'in te rn a l' in  
n a tu re  i f  th e re  is  in s u f f ic ie n t  management e x p e rt is e  o r  re ta in e d  
ea rn in g s  w ith in  th e  company, o r  th e y  may be 'e x te rn a l' i f  th e  
com pany is  u na b le  to  o b ta in  th e  management s k i l ls  o r  f in a n c ia l 
c a p ita l i t  re q u ire s  fro m  m anag e ria l la b o u r  and c a p ita l m arke ts  
re s p e c tiv e ly .
The t h i r d  v a r ia b le  w h ich  loaded  h ig h ly  on F a c to r I I I ,  'sm a ll size 
o f m a rk e t', was n o t c la s s if ie d  as b e lo n g in g  to  th is  fa c to r  as i t  a lso  
had re a so n a b ly  h ig h  lo a d in g s  on F a c to rs  IV  and V. N eve rthe less , i t  
is  a lso  a reason f o r  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t be ing  ru le d  o u t, and is  l i k e ly
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to  be c lo s e ly  re la te d  to  th e  tw o  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  com prise  F a c to r I I I  
(th e  s m a lle r th e  size o f  a fo re ig n  m a rke t, th e  less chance th e re  w i l l  
be o f  a com pany's in v e s tm e n t in  m anag e ria l and f in a n c ia l resou rces  
be ing  recouped).
The fo u r th  fa c to r  is  com prised  o f tw o  v a r ia b le s  and accoun ts  
f o r  12.6% o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta . S ince th e  v a r ia b le s  are  
concerned  w ith  tw o  o f th e  p r in c ip a l costs  w h ich  a f fe c t  th e  v ia b i l i t y  
o f  th e  e x p o rt in g  o p t io n  (dom estic  p ro d u c tio n  and t ra n s p o r t  costs) 
th is  fa c to r  has been la b e lle d  s im p ly  as 'e x p o r t
p ro d u c t io n / t ra n s p o r ta t io n  c o s ts '. T ra n s p o rta t io n  costs  can be 
re ga rded  in  th is  c o n te x t as th e  costs  in v o lv e d  in  th e  p h y s ic a l 
h a n d lin g  o f  a p ro d u c t ( lo a d in g , sh ipm en t, w a reh ous ing  e tc) betw een 
th e  home and th e  overseas m arke t.
These costs  fo rm  o n ly  p a r t  o f  th e  o v e ra ll cos ts  in v o lv e d  in  
s h i f t in g  a p ro d u c t fro m  th e  home p ro d u c e r to  the  u lt im a te  consum er 
in  th e  overseas m arke t. The re m a in d e r is  com prised  o f th e  cos t o f  
d is t r ib u t io n  w ith in  th e  overseas m arke t. These cos ts  are c a p tu re d  
by th e  v a r ia b le  RULEXP04, 'p o o r lo c a l d is t r ib u t io n  fa c i l i t ie s ' ,  w h ich  
has i t s  h ig h e s t lo a d in g  on th e  'e x p o r t  m a rk e tin g  cos ts ' fa c to r .  T h is  
is  n o t s u rp r is in g ,  s ince  d is t r ib u t io n  (o r  'p la ce ') d e c is io n s  are  p a r t  
o f  th e  fo u r  'P 's ' o f  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  m a rk e tin g  mix.'*-0
The f i f t h  and f in a l  fa c to r  accoun ts  fo r  12.4% o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  
th e  da ta . I t  is  com prised  o f  o n ly  one v a r ia b le ,  's tro n g  lo c a l 
c o m p e tit io n ',  a lth o u g h  'h ig h  lo c a l la b o u r  cos ts ' a lso  loaded  h ig h ly  on 
i t .  T h is  fa c to r  has been in te rp re te d  as re f le c t in g  th e  'h o s t c o u n try  
le v e l o f  in d u s t r ia l  deve lopm en t' s ince  c o m p e tit iv e ly  s tro n g  f irm s  and 
h ig h  wage econom ies te n d  to  be assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  more advanced 
in d u s t r ia l  c o u n tr ie s .
The f i f te e n  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  
com prise  th e  f iv e  fa c to rs  in  Tab le  11-7 co rre spond  to  e ith e r  
o w n e rsh ip , lo c a t io n a l o r  in te rn a lis a t io n  advantages as d e fin e d  by 
D u nn ing 's  e c le c tic  parad igm  o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n . Two o f  th e  
v a r ia b le s , 's c a rc ity  o f  management p e rso n n e l' and ‘sho rtage  o f
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in v e s tm e n t fu n d s ', a re  m easures o f  ( the  la c k  o f) o w n e rsh ip  
advan tages, w h ile  th e  re m a in d e r re p re s e n t th e  la c k  o f  lo c a t io n a l 
advan tages assoc ia ted  w ith  e ith e r  th e  home o r  th e  h o s t m arke t. 
These in  tu rn  a f fe c t  th e  advan tages assoc ia ted  w ith  in te rn a lis in g  
p ro d u c tio n  in  th e  home m a rke t (and th e re fo re  s e rv in g  fo re ig n  
m a rke ts  by e x p o rts )  and in te rn a lis in g  p ro d u c tio n  in  th e  overseas 
m arke t.
The f iv e  fa c to rs  can a lso  be re c o n c ile d  w ith  D unn ing 's  e c le c tic  
parad igm . The fo u r  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  com prise  th e  f i r s t  fa c to r  in  
Tab le  11-7 may be re g a rd e d  as "g o ve rn m e n t- in d u ce d  m a rke t 
im p e rfe c tio n s "  s ince  th e  r is k s  w h ich  th e y  re p re s e n t are caused, 
d i r e c t ly  o r  in d ir e c t ly ,  by  th e  in te rv e n t io n  o f governm ents. F a c to r I  
th e re fo re  fa l ls  in to  th e  c a te g o ry  o f  m arke t im p e rfe c tio n  w h ic h  
D u nn ing 's  e c le c tic  pa rad igm  te rm s " s t ru c tu ra l m a rke t fa i lu re " .  Each 
o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  co m p ris in g  F a c to r I  a f fe c t  th e  lo c a t io n a l and 
in te rn a lis a t io n  advan tages assoc ia ted  w ith  h o s t m arke ts ; eg th e  
e x is te n ce  o f  exchange c o n tro ls  on d iv id e n d s  in  a h o s t m arke t lo w e rs  
th e  lo c a t io n a l advan tage  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  th a t  m a rke t and th e re fo re  
lo w e rs  th e  advan tage  o f  in te rn a lis in g  p ro d u c tio n  w ith in  i t .
The second and fo u r th  fa c to rs  a f fe c t  the  lo c a tio n a l advantages 
asso c ia te d  w ith  th e  overseas and home m arke ts  re s p e c tiv e ly , w h ic h  
in  tu rn  a f fe c t  the  in c e n t iv e  to  in te rn a lis e  p ro d u c tio n . F a c to r I I ,  
'e x p o r t  m a rk e tin g  c o s ts ', r e f le c ts  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  overseas 
m a rke t w h ic h  a f fe c t  th e  cos t o f  d is t r ib u t in g  a p ro d u c t w ith in  i t  and 
th e  co s t o f  t a i lo r in g  th e  p ro d u c t to  ta ke  accoun t o f  d i f fe r in g  
p ro d u c t s ta n d a rd s  and n a t io n a l tas te s . F a c to r IV, 'e x p o r t  
p ro d u c t io n / t ra n s p o r ta t io n  co s ts ' is  com prised o f  dom estic  p ro d u c tio n  
cos ts , w h ic h  depend to  some e x te n t upon fa c to r  endowm ents in  th e  
home m a rke t, and t ra n s p o r t  costs , w h ich  a rise  from  a n a tu r a l ly -  
o c c u rr in g , s t r u c tu r a l m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n  (ie  d is tance ). These tw o  
ca te g o rie s  o f  cos t lo w e r th e  lo c a t io n a l advantage (and hence the  
in te rn a liz a t io n  in c e n tiv e )  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  the  home m arke t.
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The t h ir d  fa c to r ,  're s o u rc e  c o n s tra in ts ',  co rre spond s  to  the  la c k  
o f  th e  com plem enta ry o w n e rsh ip  advan tages (management pe rso n n e l 
and in v e s tm e n t fu n d s ) w h ic h  a f irm  m ust possess to  enable  i t  to  
e x p lo it  any advantages in  te c h n o lo g y  v ia  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t. These 
o w n e rsh ip  advantages may be re g a rded  as asset advantages ra th e r  
th a n  tra n s a c tio n  advan tages. I t  s h o u ld  be no ted , how ever, th a t  th e  
possess ion  o f th e  la t t e r  in  th e  fo rm  o f  a rb it ra g e  and le ve ra ge  
o p p o r tu n it ie s  (w h ich  are  g e n e ra lly  a fu n c t io n  o f  m u lt in a t io n a l i ty  and 
size) w i l l  enhance a f irm 's  fu n d - ra is in g  p o te n t ia l.
The f i f t h  fa c to r ,  'h o s t c o u n try  le v e l o f  in d u s t r ia l  deve lopm en t', 
w i l l  a lso  a f fe c t  th e  lo c a t io n a l and in te rn a liz a t io n  advantages o f  th e  
h o s t c o u n try , and w i l l  r e f le c t ,  to  some e x te n t, th e  fa c to r  
endowm ents w h ich  i t  possesses.
11.4.3 A n a ly s is  o f  L ic e n s in g  V a ria b le s
The s ix  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  Q u e s tio n  4 were a lso  fa c to r  ana lysed  to  
re v e a l th e  u n d e r ly in g  d im ens ions w h ich  th e y  were m easuring.
Step One: E xa m in a tio n  o f  C o rre la t io n  M a trice s
B o th  th e  s im p le  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  and th e  a n ti- im a g e  c o r re la t io n  
m a tr ix  suggested th a t  th e  lic e n s in g  v a r ia b le s  were s u ita b le  f o r  
fa c to r  a n a ly s is  (see A p p e n d ix  11.2). One t h i r d  o f  th e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  in  
th e  fo rm e r m a tr ix  had va lu e s  g re a te r  th a n  0.3, th u s  le n d in g  s u p p o rt 
to  th e  p ro p o s it io n  th a t  th e  v a r ia b le s  shared  common fa c to rs . In  
a d d it io n , the  v a lu e  o f  B a r t le t t 's  te s t  s ta t is t ic  was la rg e  and th e  
asso c ia te d  s ig n if ic a n c e  le v e l c o rre s p o n d in g ly  sm all, e n a b lin g  th e  
h y p o th e s is  th a t  th e  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  was an id e n t i t y  m a tr ix  to  be 
re je c te d .
E xa m in a tio n  o f th e  a n ti- im a g e  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  reve a le d  a lo w  
num ber o f  la rg e  c o e ff ic ie n ts ,  th u s  le n d in g  fu r th e r  s u p p o rt to  th e  
p ro p o s it io n  th a t  th e  v a r ia b le s  shared  common fa c to rs . In  a d d it io n , 
b o th  th e  o v e ra ll and in d iv id u a l KMO measures o f  sam pling  adequacy 
were g re a te r  th a n  0.5.
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Step Two: E x tra c t io n  o f  F a c to rs
The e ig enva lues  o f  th e  s ix  p r in c ip a l com ponents w h ic h  accoun ted  f o r  
a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  th e  d a ta  are  re p o r te d  in  th e  th i r d  ta b le  in  
A p p e n d ix  11.2. The f i r s t  tw o  fa c to rs  were e x tra c te d  fo r  f u r th e r  
a n a ly s is , as th e y  b o th  s a t is f ie d  th e  K a is e r c r i t e r io n  (e ige nva lues  
g re a te r  th a n  one). The scree p lo t  in  A p p e n d ix  11.2 g ives  a v is u a l 
im p re s s io n  o f  th e  r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  o f  th e  e igenva lues  assoc ia ted  
w ith  each fa c to r .
The in i t i a l  fa c to r  m a tr ix  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  tw o  fa c to rs  w h ic h  
s a t is f ie d  th e  K a is e r c r i t e r io n  is  show n in  Tab le  11-8. A l l  o f  th e  
co m m u n a litie s  re p o r te d  in  th e  f in a l  co lum n o f  th is  m a tr ix  w ere 
above th e  c u t - o f f  le v e l o f  0.3 used in  th is  s tu d y , excep t th e  
v a r ia b le  m easuring  th e  a v a i la b l i ty  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a lly  com peten t 
c a n d id a te  licensees  (FAVLIC03). T h is  v a r ia b le  was th e re fo re  
e xc lu d e d  fro m  fu r th e r  a n a lys is .
TABLE 11-8
INITIAL FACTOR MATRIX: LICENSING VARIABLES
VARIABLE FACTOR I FACTOR II h2
FAVLIC06 .75277 -.48927 .80604
FAVLIC02 .74989 .55374 .86897
FAVLIC05 .74303 -.56354 .86967
FAVLIC01 .66188 .66187 .87615
FAVLIC04 .54441 -.29974 .38622
FAVLIC03 .47133 .20557 .26441
EIGENVALUES 2.63770 1.43376 4.07146
% VARIANCE 44.0 23.9 67.9
As no in te rp re ta b le  p a t te rn  was o b v io u s  fro m  th e  fa c to r  m a tr ix  
in  Tab le  11-8, i t  was ro ta te d  u s in g  th e  va rim a x  m ethod.
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Step Three : R o ta tio n  and In te rp re ta t io n  o f F ac to rs
The ro ta te d  fa c to r  m a tr ix , m inus th e  exc luded  v a r ia b le ,  is  shown in  
Tab le  11-9. The fo rm a t o f  th is  ta b le  is  th e  same as th a t  o f  Tab le  
11-7, w ith  fa c to r  lo a d in g s  g re a te r  th a n  0.3 h ig h lig h te d  in  b o ld  and 
th e  v a r ia b le s  c la s s if ie d  u n d e r th e  tw o  fa c to rs  enclosed by 
re c ta n g u la r  b lo c k s .^
The f i r s t  fa c to r  is  com prised  o f  tw o v a r ia b le s  w h ich  are 
conce rned  w ith  th e  e f fe c t  o f  h o s t c o u n try  le g is la t io n  on the  
p ro p e n s ity  to  ad o p t lic e n s in g . T h is  fa c to r  has th e re fo re  been 
in te rp re te d  as th e  h o s t c o u n try  le g a l e n v iro nm en t, in s o fa r  as i t  
a f fe c ts  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n .
The tw o aspects o f  h o s t c o u n try  le g is la t io n  w h ich  were 
in c lu d e d  in  Q u e s tio n  4 were p a te n t p ro te c t io n  and a n t i- t r u s t .  The 
f i r s t  aspect was d e a lt  w ith  by  a sk in g  com panies th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  
weak p a te n t p ro te c t io n  le g is la t io n  le d  them  to  fa v o u r  lic e n s in g . The 
re a so n in g  he re  was th a t  weak p ro te c t io n  w i l l  in c rease  th e  lik e l ih o o d  
o f  i l le g a l  p a te n t use by  lo c a l com panies and th e re fo re  lead to  an 
in c re a se  in  lic e n s in g  as a means o f  p re -e m p tin g  th is  i l le g a l use.
The second aspect o f  h o s t c o u n try  le g is la t io n ,  a n t i- t r u s t ,  was 
d e a lt  w i th  by  a sk in g  com panies th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e  presence o f 
weak le g is la t io n  in  th is  a rea  was l ik e ly  to  increase  t h e ir  p ro p e n s ity  
to  a d o p t lic e n s in g . The a rgum ent here  was th a t  th e  absence o f 
s tro n g  a n t i - t r u s t  le g is la t io n  w i l l  te n d  to  induce  a h ig h e r  le v e l o f  
lic e n s in g , c e te r is  p a r ib u s , as com panies w i l l  f in d  lic e n s in g  a more 
a t t r a c t iv e  o p tio n  i f  th e y  are  ab le  to  in c lu d e  c lauses in  t h e ir  
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents w h ich  r e s t r ic t  th e  a c t iv i t ie s  o f  th e ir  lo c a l 
license es  (eg p re v e n tin g  them  fro m  e x p o rt in g  to  the  lic e n s o r 's  home 
m arke t).
The second fa c to r  w h ic h  emerged from  the  ro ta te d  fa c to r  m a tr ix  
has been in te rp re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  th e  h o s t c o u n try 's  f is c a l and 
r e p a t r ia t io n  p o lic ie s . The tw o  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  loaded  on th is  fa c to r  
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d iv id e n d s , and d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  le v e l o f  exchange c o n tro ls  a p p lie d  
to  r o y a lt ie s  and d iv id e n d s .
C om parison  o f  these  tw o  fa c to rs  re v e a ls  th a t  F a c to r I  ( th e  le g a l 
e n v iro n m e n t) accoun ts  f o r  more o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta  th a n  
F a c to r  I I  ( f is c a l/ re p a t r ia t io n  p o lic ie s ) . I t  s h o u ld  be no ted , how ever, 
th a t  th e  tw o  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  com prise  F a c to r I  a ch ieved  the  lo w e s t 
mean ra n k in g s  o f  a l l  th e  v a r ia b le s  in  Q ues tion  4 (see Tab le 11-4). 
Thus, w hereas these  v a r ia b le s  are h ig h ly  c o r re la te d  w ith  th e  fa c to r  
w h ic h  b e s t e x p la in s  th e  da ta , in d iv id u a l ly  th e y  were n o t deemed to  
be h ig h ly  in f lu e n t ia l  by  th e  re sp o n d in g  com panies.
The v a r ia b le  in  Q ues tion  4 w h ic h  had the  h ig h e s t mean ra n k in g  
( 'te c h n o lo g ic a lly  com peten t lo c a l f irm s ')  had such a sm a ll am ount o f  
v a r ia n c e  in  common w ith  th e  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  th a t  i t  was exc luded  
fro m  th e  ro ta t io n  phase o f  th e  fa c to r  a n a lys is . T h is  s h o u ld  n o t be 
in te rp re te d  as m eaning th a t  i t  is  n o t an im p o r ta n t v a r ia b le ,  m ere ly  
th a t  i t  was n o t am enable to  fa c to r  a n a lys is  because o f  i t s  
un iqueness .
In  te rm s o f  D u nn ing 's  O LI fra m e w o rk , F a c to rs  I  and I I  can be 
la b e lle d  in  more g e n e ra l te rm s as 'g o ve rn m e n t- in d u ce d  m a rke t 
im p e r fe c tio n s ',  s ince  a l l  o f  t h e ir  c o n s t itu e n t  v a r ia b le s  are a measure 
o f  th e  e x te n t o f  g o ve rn m e n ta l in f lu e n c e  in  one fo rm  o r  a n o th e r.
The tw o  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  com prise  F a c to r I  a re  lo c a t io n a l 
a t t r ib u te s  assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  h o s t m arke t, b o th  o f  w h ich  im p a c t 
upon  in te rn a lis a t io n  advantages. The presence o f  'w eak p a te n t 
p ro te c t io n  le g is la t io n  in  h o s t c o u n tr ie s ' (FAVLIC01) lo w e rs  th e  
advan tage  assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  e x p lo ita t io n  o f  p a te n ts  th ro u g h  
w h o lly -o w n e d  s u b s id ia r ie s . Because p a te n ts  are  more l ik e ly  to  be 
in f r in g e d  in  c o u n tr ie s  w here p ro te c t io n  is  weak, re s u lt in g  in  a lo ss  
o f  c o n t ro l o v e r th e  ra te  o f  d is s ip a t io n  o f th e  p a te n te d  know ledge  
and p o te n t ia l c o m p e tit io n  fro m  in fr in g e rs ,  th e re  is  no b e n e fit  fro m  
in te r n a lis a t io n  in  te rm s o f c o n t ro ll in g  the  use o f  th e  com pany's 
p a te n ts . The a d o p tio n  o f  a lic e n s in g  s tra te g y , how ever, a t le a s t 
enab les th e  company earn  ro y a lty  incom e and to  in f lu e n c e  th e  use to
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w h ich  i t s  p a te n ts  are  p u t  by  th e  licensee . I t  a lso  enables th e  
com pany to  a v o id  th e  co s t o f  p a te n t l i t ig a t io n ,  and to  use th e ir  
license es  to  p o lic e  a g a in s t th e  in fr in g e m e n t o f  t h e ir  p a te n ts  by 
t h i r d  p a r t ie s .
The presence o f 'w eak a n t i - t r u s t  le g is la t io n  in  h o s t c o u n tr ie s ' 
(FAVLIC02) w i l l  a lso  lo w e r th e  b e n e fits  assoc ia ted  w ith  
in te rn a lis a t io n .  I f  com panies are  ab le  to  im pose c o n d it io n s  upon th e  
a c tio n s  o f  t h e ir  licensees  w h ic h  l im its  t h e ir  a b i l i t y  to  compete 
d i r e c t ly  a g a in s t them , th e n  th e re  is  less in c e n t iv e  to  in c u r  the  
h e a v ie r  costs  o f  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t to  ach ieve  th e  same purpose . 
How ever, w here  th e re  is  s tro n g  a n t i - t r u s t  le g is la t io n  w h ich  p re v e n ts  
com panies fro m  c o n t ro l l in g  c o m p e tit io n  v ia  lic e n s in g , th e n  th e re  w i l l  
e x is t  w h a t D unn ing  re fe rs  to  as " s t ru c tu r a l m a rke t fa i lu re " .  By 
in te rn a lis in g  th e ir  know ledge  advan tage  v ia  d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t, 
com panies are  ab le  to  overcom e th is  fa i lu re  o f  th e  a rm 's - le n g th  
know ledge  m a rke t th ro u g h  th e  c o n tro l w h ich  th e y  are  ab le  to  
e xe rc ise  o v e r th e ir  w h o lly -o w n e d  s u b s id ia r ie s .
The tw o  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  com prise  F a c to r I I  a lso  reduce th e  
b e n e fits  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  in te rn a lis a t io n ,  th e re b y  in c re a s in g  th e  
a ttra c t iv e n e s s  o f  e x te rn a lis a t io n  (ie  lic e n s in g ). Thus, in  s itu a t io n s  
w here th e re  is  a 'lo w e r ta x  ra te  on ro y a lt ie s  th a n  on d iv id e n d s ' 
(FAVLIC05) th e re  is  a d isa d va n ta g e  in  o b ta in in g  d iv id e n d  income 
fro m  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  com pared to  r o y a lty  income fro m  
in d e p e n d e n t fo re ig n  licensees . S im ila r ly ,  w here th e re  are 'w eaker 
exchange c o n tro ls  on ro y a lt ie s ' (FAVLIC06) i t  w i l l  n o t b e n e fit  a 
com pany to  r e ly  on d iv id e n d s  as a means o f  re p a t r ia t in g  fo re ig n  
incom e a t th e  expense o f  ro y a lt ie s .
The v a r ia b le  w h ich  loaded  on b o th  F a c to rs  I  and I I ,  ' l im ite d  
know ledge  o f  h o s t c o u n try  m a rke t' (FAVLIC04) is  an o w n e rs h ip - 
s p e c if ic  a t t r ib u te  w h ic h  re f le c ts  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  a company to  ope ra te  
e f fe c t iv e ly  in  an u n fa m il ia r  e n v iro n m e n t. Where th e re  is  a la c k  o f 
f a m i l ia r i t y  w ith  th e  h o s t m a rke t, lic e n s in g  is  more l ik e ly  to  be 
adop ted  as a lo w - r is k  m ethod o f  m a rke t p e n e tra tio n . T h is  v a r ia b le  
had f a i r l y  s im ila r  (and m oderate) lo a d in g s  on each o f F ac to rs  I  and
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I I ,  and so i t  was le f t  u n c la s s if ie d . However, one can in t u i t i v e ly  
a sso c ia te  th is  v a r ia b le  w ith  b o th  o f  these  fa c to rs ,  in  th e  sense th a t  
com panies may be more fa v o u ra b ly  d isposed  to w a rd s  lic e n s in g  i f  
th e y  have a lim ite d  know ledge  o f th e  le g a l s e t-u p  and o f  the  f is c a l 
and r e p a t r ia t io n  p o lic ie s  o f  th e  h o s t c o u n try .
11.4.4 A n a ly s is  o f  D ire c t In ve s tm e n t, E x p o rt in g  and L ic e n s in g  
V a ria b le s
H av ing  fa c to r-a n a ly s e d  th e  v a r ia b le s  fro m  Q u e s tio n  3 (d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g )  and Q ues tion  4 ( lic e n s in g ) in  is o la t io n ,  a l l  
o f  these  v a r ia b le s  were th e n  g rouped  to g e th e r  and fa c to r-a n a ly s e d . 
The p u rp o se  he re  was to  f in d  o u t i f  th e  same fa c to rs  w o u ld  emerge 
a f te r  th e  m erg ing  o f  these  tw o  g roups  o f  v a r ia b le s .
Step One: E xa m in a tio n  o f  C o rre la t io n  M a tr ic e s ’
The s im p le  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  and th e  a n ti- im a g e  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  
b o th  c o n firm e d  th e  s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  these  v a r ia b le s  f o r  fa c to r  a n a ly s is  
(see A p p e n d ix  11.3). T h is  was n o t s u rp r is in g , g iv e n  th a t  th e  
m a tr ice s  f o r  th e  tw o  s m a lle r s u b -g ro u p in g s  o f th e  v a r ia b le s  had 
in d ic a te d  th a t  th e y  were am enable to  fa c to r  a n a lys is .
S tep Two: E x tra c t io n  o f  F a c to rs
S ince th e re  were tw e n ty  one v a r ia b le s  in  to ta l,  tw e n ty  one p r in c ip a l 
com ponents w ere used to  accou n t f o r  a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia n c e  in  th e  da ta . 
These are  re p o r te d  in  th e  t h i r d  ta b le  in  A p pend ix  11.3 The f i r s t  
seven p r in c ip a l com ponents were e x tra c te d  f o r  f u r t h e r  a n a lys is , as 
th e y  each had e igenva lues  g re a te r  th a n  one. The r e la t iv e  
im p o rta n c e  o f  th e  e igenva lues  possessed by each fa c to r  can be 
guaged fro m  th e  scree p lo t  in  A p p e n d ix  11.3.
The in i t i a l  fa c to r  m a tr ix  d e r iv e d  from  the  seven e x tra c te d  
fa c to rs  is  shown in  Tab le  11-10. A l l  o f  th e  com m u na lities  re p o r te d  
in  th e  f in a l  co lum n o f  th is  ta b le  were g re a te r  th a n  0.3, so no 
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The fa c to r  m a tr ix  was th e n  ro ta te d  us in g  th e  v a r im a x  m ethod in  
o rd e r  to  ach ieve  a m ore in te rp re ta b le  se t o f  fa c to rs .
Step Three: R o ta tio n  and In te rp re ta t io n  o f  F ac to rs
The ro ta te d  fa c to r  m a tr ix  is  show n in  Tab le  11-11, w h ic h  fo llo w s  th e  
same fo rm a t as b e fo re . I t  is  e v id e n t th a t  th e  fa c to rs  p rodu ced  by 
th is  r o ta t io n  are  v i r t u a l l y  th e  same as those  p rodu ced  by th e  
s m a lle r s u b -g ro u p in g s  o f  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t and e x p o r t in g  v a r ia b le s  
(Tab le  11-7) and lic e n s in g  v a r ia b le s  (Tab le  11-9). N e ve rthe less , some 
o f  th e  in d iv id u a l v a r ia b le s  have a tta c h e d  them se lves to  d i f fe r e n t  
fa c to rs ,  and th e re  have been a few  n o tic e a b le  changes in  th e  
s tre n g th  o f  some fa c to r  lo a d in g s .
The f i r s t  fa c to r  to  be e x tra c te d  fro m  th e  ro ta te d  m a tr ix  has 
been in te rp re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  'h o s t c o u n try  r i s k 1 as i t  is  
com prised  o f  th e  same fo u r  v a r ia b le s  th a t  made up th e  f i r s t  fa c to r  
to  be e x tra c te d  fro m  th e  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g  v a r ia b le s . 
The o rd e r in g  o f  fa c to r  lo a d in g s  o f  these fo u r  v a r ia b le s  has 
n e v e rth e le s s  changed, w ith  'h ig h  p o l i t ic a l  r i s k 1 now possess ing  th e  
h ig h e s t lo a d in g  on F a c to r I. I t  is  a lso  n o tic e a b le  th a t  th e  v a r ia b le  
'h ig h  le v e l o f  ta x a t io n ' is  now c la s s if ie d  u n d e r F a c to r I I I  (d iscussed  
be low ). A lth o u g h  i t s  lo a d in g  on F a c to r I  is  a c tu a lly  s l ig h t ly  g re a te r  
th a n  b e fo re , i t  now has i t s  s tro n g e s t lo a d in g  on F a c to r I I I .
The second fa c to r  has been in te rp re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  th e  
'h o s t c o u n try  le g a l e n v iro n m e n t and in f r a s t ru c tu re '.  T h is  fa c to r  is  
a c o m b in a tio n  o f  th e  tw o  lic e n s in g  v a r ia b le s  concerned  w ith  a n t i ­
t r u s t  and p a te n t p ro te c t io n  le g is la t io n ,  and th e  e x p o rt in g  v a r ia b le  
concerned  w ith  d is t r ib u t io n  fa c i l t ie s  in  th e  h o s t c o u n try . A fo u r th  
v a r ia b le ,  'h ig h  lo c a l la b o u r  c o s ts ', had i t s  h ig h e s t lo a d in g  on th is  
fa c to r  b u t  th e  s tre n g th  o f  th is  lo a d in g  was n o t deemed to  be 
s u f f ic ie n t ly  g re a te r  th a n  i t s  lo a d in g s  on o th e r  fa c to rs  f o r  i t  to  be 
c la s s if ie d  u n d e r F a c to r I I.
The th i r d  fa c to r ,  'h o s t c o u n try  f is c a l / r e p a t r ia t io n  p o lic ie s ',  is  
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a n a lys is  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  v a r ia b le s , nam ely 'w eaker exchange c o n tro ls  
on ro y a lt ie s ' and 'lo w e r ta x  ra te  on ro y a lt ie s '.  A n o th e r tw o 
v a r ia b le s  had th e ir  s tro n g e s t lo a d in g s  on th is  fa c to r ,  b u t were n o t 
c la s s if ie d  u n d e r i t  as th e y  a lso  had f a i r l y  s im ila r  lo a d in g s  on o th e r  
fa c to rs .
The f i r s t  o f  these  tw o  v a r ia b le s , 'h ig h  le v e l o f  ta x a t io n ',  a lso  
had m odera te  lo a d in g s  on th e  f i r s t  tw o  fa c to rs . T h is  is  n o t a 
s u rp r is in g  re s u lt ,  s ince  th e  ta x a t io n  o f  com panies' t ra d in g  p r o f i t s  
can be re g a rded  as a g o v e rn m e n t- in d u c e d  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n , w h ic h  
is  enacted by le g a l s ta tu te . The second o f  these  v a r ia b le s , ' l im ite d  
know ledge  o f  h o s t c o u n try  m a rk e t', had s im ila r -s iz e d  lo a d in g s  on th e  
fo u r th ,  f i f t h  and se ve n th  fa c to rs .
The fo u r th  fa c to r ,  're so u rce  c o n s tra in ts ',  is  th e  same fa c to r  
th a t  emerged fro m  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t and 
e x p o rt in g  v a r ia b le s . The o n ly  m in o r d iffe re n c e  betw een th is  fa c to r  
and th e  one th a t  emerged p re v io u s ly  is  th a t  th e  'sm a ll size o f  
m a rke t' v a r ia b le  has a h ig h e r  lo a d in g  on th is  fa c to r  th a n  b e fo re  
and has th e re fo re  been c la s s if ie d  u n d e r i t  in s te a d  o f be ing  le f t  
u n c la s s if ie d .
The f i f t h  fa c to r ,  'e x p o r t  m a rk e tin g  cos ts ', a lso  emerged from  
th e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g  v a r ia b le s , and is  
com prised  o f  th e  same tw o  v a r ia b le s . The o n ly  change to  have 
o c c u rre d  to  th is  fa c to r  is  th a t  th e  v a r ia b le  m easuring  'p o o r lo c a l 
d is t r ib u t io n  fa c i l i t ie s ' ,  w h ic h  p re v io u s ly  had i t s  h ig h e s t lo a d in g  on 
th is  fa c to r ,  now has i t s  h ig h e s t lo a d in g  on F a c to r I I ,  un d e r w h ich  i t  
has been c la s s if ie d .
The s ix th  fa c to r ,  'e x p o r t  p ro d u c t io n /d is t r ib u t io n  co s ts ', is  once 
aga in  th e  same fa c to r  w h ich  emerged fro m  the  a n a ly s is  o f  the  d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g  v a r ia b le s , and i t  is  com prised  o f  th e  same 
tw o v a r ia b le s .
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F a c to r  V II co rre spond s  to  th e  f in a l  fa c to r  w h ic h  emerged from  
th e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t and e x p o rt in g  v a r ia b le s , ie  th e  
'h o s t c o u n try  le v e l o f  in d u s t r ia l  deve lopm en t'. I t  is  com prised  o f 
th e  v a r ia b le s  re p re s e n tin g  's tro n g  lo c a l c o m p e tit io n ' and th e  
'a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a lly  com peten t ca n d id a te  license es '.
The v a r ia b le  re p re s e n tin g  'h ig h  lo c a l la b o u r  co s ts ', w h ich  
p re v io u s ly  had i t s  h ig h e s t lo a d in g  on th is  fa c to r ,  now loads more 
s tro n g ly  on F a c to r I I .  I ts  d isp la cem e n t is  due to  th e  in c lu s io n  o f  th e  
v a r ia b le  re p re s e n tin g  th e  presence o f  com petent p o te n t ia l licensees. 
T h is  v a r ia b le  (FAVLIC03) was e xc luded  from  th e  p re v io u s  fa c to r  
a n a ly s is  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  v a r ia b le s  because i t  possessed a lo w  
com m u na lity . When th e  lic e n s in g  v a r ia b le s  were in c lu d e d  w ith  th e  
d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t and e x p o r t in g  v a r ia b le s , how ever, th e  com m u na lity  
o f  th is  v a r ia b le  in c re a se d  above th e  c r i t ic a l  le v e l o f  0.3, a llo w in g  i t  
to  be in c lu d e d  in  th e  a n a lys is .
The f in a l  fa c to r  has been in te rp re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  the  le v e l 
o f  in d u s t r ia l  deve lopm en t o f  th e  h o s t c o u n try  because th is  
c h a ra c te r is t ic  is  l i k e ly  to  be c lo s e ly  c o r re la te d  w ith  th e  




11.5 NONPARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF
INTERNATIONAL LICENSING
D ata on th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  were o b ta in e d  fro m  
Q u e s tio n  5, w h ich  asked re sp o n d e n ts  to  es tim a te  th e  degree o f 
s ig n if ic a n c e  a tta c h e d  by  th e ir  com panies to  a num ber o f p o s s ib le  
o b je c t iv e s  w h ich  lic e n s in g  may seek to  ach ieve . In  a d d it io n  to  th e  
re sp o n d e n ts  who answ ered Q ues tions  3 and 4, th is  q u e s tio n  was a lso  
answ ered by  th o se  re sp o n d e n ts  who answ ered Q ues tion  1 by  
in d ic a t in g  th a t  lic e n s in g  was 'N ever' e va lu a te d  a g a in s t a l te rn a t iv e  
in te rn a t io n a l bus iness  m ethods.
The d a ta  fro m  Q u e s tio n  5 are  re p o r te d  in  Tab le  11-12, w h ic h  
fo llo w s  th e  same fo rm a t as Tab les l l - 3 a ,  l l - 3 b  and 1 1 -4 .^  I t  is  
a p p a re n t fro m  th is  ta b le  th a t  speed o f e n try  in to  overseas m arke ts  
was by fa r  th e  m ost p o p u la r  o b je c t iv e  o f  lic e n s in g  among th e  
com panies. By e n te r in g  in to  lic e n s in g  agreem ents w ith  in d ig e n o u s  
lo c a l f irm s , m u lt in a t io n a ls  a v o id  th e  tim e -co nsum ing  bus iness o f  
e ith e r  s e t t in g  up th e ir  own m a n u fa c tu r in g  fa c i l i t ie s ,  n e g o tia t in g  
jo in t  v e n tu re s  w ith  lo c a l f irm s , o r  c re a tin g  n e tw o rk s  o f  agents to  
d is t r ib u te  t h e ir  e x p o rte d  p ro d u c ts  in  fo re ig n  m arke ts .
The n e x t m ost im p o r ta n t o b je c t iv e  o f  lic e n s in g  was 'to
s tre n g th e n  th e  com pany's p o s it io n  in  a jo in t  v e n tu re '.  A lth o u g h  no
s in g le  p a r ty  has o u t r ig h t  c o n tro l o v e r a jo in t  v e n tu re , p a rtn e rs  can
som etim es in c rea se  th e ir  e f fe c t iv e  c o n tro l by m aking  the  jo in t  
v e n tu re  com pany dependent upon  them  as s u p p lie rs  o f  tech n o lo g y , 
v ia  l ic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The t h i r d  h ig h e s t ra n k in g  o b je c t iv e  o f lic e n s in g  was th e
e a rn in g  o f  e x tra  incom e fro m  obso lesce n t techno logy . A lth o u g h  th is  
ty p e  o f  te c h n o lo g y  may no lo n g e r be o f any use to  th e  company 
w h ic h  owns i t ,  i t  may be o f use to  com panies in  c o u n tr ie s  w here 
te c h n iq u e s  o f  p ro d u c tio n  are  less  advanced, th u s  p ro v id in g  an 
o p p o r tu n ity  f o r  some w in d fa l l  revenue  to  be o b ta in e d  from  lic e n s in g . 
In  a d d it io n , by lic e n s in g  p o te n t ia l co m p e tito rs  w ith  o ld  techno logy , 
th e  lic e n s o r  rem oves th e  th re a t  o f  c o m p e tit io n  from  th e  licensee.
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A re la te d  o b je c t iv e  is  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  f o r  e x p lo it in g  's p in ­
o f f  te c h n o lo g y ', ie  te c h n o lo g y  w h ic h  does n o t s u i t  th e  com pany's 
e x is t in g  p ro d u c t range. T h is  o b je c t iv e  was, how ever, o n ly  ra n ke d  
n in th  in  th e  ta b le . T h is  lo w e r ra n k in g  is  in  p a r t  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  
th e  fa c t  th a t  a h ig h e r  pe rcen tage  o f  f irm s  th o u g h t th a t  th is  
o b je c t iv e  was n o t a p p lic a b le  to  them  (21.8 p e r cen t com pared to  13 
p e r ce n t f o r  th e  t h i r d  o b je c t iv e  in  th e  ta b le ).
The deve lopm en t o f  a u x i l ia r y  bus iness  was th e  o b je c t iv e  ra n ke d  
fo u r th  h ig h e s t by  th e  re sp o n d in g  com panies. A lth o u g h  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents may n o t n e c e s s a r ily  have c lauses w h ic h  s p e c ify  th a t  
c e r ta in  com ponents o r  p ro d u c ts  s h o u ld  be p u rcha sed  fro m  th e  
lic e n s o r ,  v e ry  o fte n  th e  license e  w i l l  buy  them fro m  th e  lic e n s o r  in  
any case as th e  lic e n s o r 's  re p u ta t io n  is  know n to  th e  licensee . T h is  
o b je c t iv e  is  s im ila r  in  n a tu re  to  th e  n e x t h ig h e s t o b je c t iv e  ra n ke d  
in  Tab le  11-6: to  b u i ld  g o o d w ill and acceptance f o r  o th e r  com pany 
p ro d u c ts  and se rv ice s .
The o b je c t iv e  ra n k e d  s ix th  h ig h e s t by th e  com panies was th a t  
o f  d iv e rs i fy in g  th e  fo rm  o f  com pany incom e as a means o f  re d u c in g  
r is k .  T h is  was deemed to  be more im p o r ta n t th a n  th e  o th e r  r is k -  
re d u c t io n  o b je c t iv e  w h ic h  th e  sample o f com panies were asked to  
ra te , th a t  o f  u s in g  lic e n s in g  to  reduce  c u rre n c y  r is k ,  w h ich  occup ied  
te n th  p lace  in  th e  ra n k -o rd e r in g . The o b je c t iv e  o f  u s in g  lic e n s in g  
to  g a in  re c ip ro c a l access to  te ch n o lo g y , w h ich  tends  to  be s p e c if ic  
to  c e r ta in  in d u s tr ie s ,  was ra n ke d  seven th , w h ile  th a t  o f  a d o p tin g  
lic e n s in g  to  supp lem en t the  R&D b ud ge t was ra n k e d  im m e d ia te ly  
be low  i t .  The p ro x im ity  o f  these tw o  o b je c tiv e s  is  n o t s u rp r is in g  
s ince  th e  le v e l o f  re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  tends to  be assoc ia ted  w ith  
R&D in te n s ity .
The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  responses to  th e  o b je c t iv e  ra n ke d  e le v e n th  
in  th e  ta b le , th a t  o f  u s in g  lic e n s in g  to  p re -e m p t th e  in fr in g e m e n t o f 
p a te n ts  by  lo c a l f irm s , are w e ig h te d  to w a rd s  th e  lo w e r end o f the  
ra t in g  scale. T h is  d is t r ib u t io n  is  s im ila r  to  th a t  accorded to  the  
v a r ia b le  'w eak p a te n t p ro te c t io n  le g is la t io n ' in  Q ues tion  4, w h ich  
asked com panies to  ra te  the  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f a num ber o f v a r ia b le s
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fa v o u r in g  lic e n s in g . B o th  v a r ia b le s  had v e ry  s im ila r  mean ra tin g s : 
th e  o b je c t iv e  o f  p re -e m p tin g  p a te n t in fr in g e m e n t had a v a lu e  o f 
2.564, w h ile  th e  v a r ia b le  'w eak p a te n t p ro te c t io n  le g is la t io n ' had a 
v a lu e  o f  2.529. These tw o  re s u lts  a re  c o n s is te n t w ith  one a n o th e r 
s ince  th e  p r in c ip a l o b je c t iv e  o f  p u rs u in g  lic e n s in g  in  a s itu a t io n
w here th e re  e x is ts  weak p a te n t p ro te c t io n  le g is la t io n  w o u ld  be to  
p re -e m p t p a te n t in fr in g e m e n t.
The le ft-s k e w e d  d is t r ib u t io n  o f responses to  th e  v a r ia b le  
ra n k e d  tw e l f th  in  th e  ta b le , th a t  o f  te s t in g  new m arke ts  b e fo re  
c o m m ittin g  r is k  c a p ita l,  casts  d o u b ts  upon th e  id e a  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  
used b y  UK com panies as a p a r t  o f  a s e q u e n tia l in te rn a t io n a l is a t io n  
s tra te g y . The responses to  th e  tw o  lo w e s t-ra n k e d  o b je c tiv e s  o f  th e  
fo u r te e n  l is te d  in  th e  ta b le  are  s im ila r ly  w e ig h te d  to w a rd s  the  
lo w e r end o f  th e  ra t in g  scale. O f these, th e  le a s t p o p u la r  was th e  
d eve lopm en t o f  lo w -c o s t sources o f raw  m a te ria ls , com ponents o r  end 
p ro d u c ts  f o r  o th e r  com pany o p e ra tio n s . A lth o u g h  th is  o b je c t iv e
a ch ieved  th e  same mean ra n k in g  as th e  o b je c t iv e  ra n k e d  im m e d ia te ly  
above i t  (to  p ro te c t  p a te n ts  a g a in s t com pu lso ry  lic e n s in g  by  h o s t
gove rnm en ts) i t  was ra n k e d  lo w e r in  th e  ta b le  as i t  ache ived  a
lo w e r  mean ra t in g .
11.6 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LICENSING
F o llo w in g  th e  ra n k -o rd e r in g  o f  th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
lic e n s in g , fa c to r -a n a ly s is  was em ployed to  de te rm ine  i f  a s m a lle r 
g ro u p  o f  o b je c tiv e s  c o u ld  be used to  e x p la in  th e  b e h a v io u r o f  th e  
com panies.
S tep One: E xa m in a tio n  o f  th e  C o rre la t io n  M a trice s
The fo u r te e n  v a r ia b le s  d e s c r ib in g  th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f in te rn a t io n a l 
l ic e n s in g  a l l  p ro v e d  to  be am enable to  fa c to r  an a lys is . T h is  can be 
c o n firm e d  by in s p e c tio n  o f  th e  s im p le  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  and the  
a n ti- im a g e  c o r re la t io n  m a tr ix  in  A p p e n d ix  11.4.
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Step Two: E x tra c t io n  o f  F a c to rs
The fo u r te e n  p r in c ip a l com ponents w h ic h  accoun ted  f o r  a l l  o f  the  
v a r ia n c e  in  th e  d a ta  are  re p o r te d  in  A p pend ix  11.4. The scree p lo t  
in d ic a te s  th e  r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  o f  th e  e ig enva lues  possessed by 
th e  p r in c ip a l com ponents. As th e  f i r s t  fo u r  p r in c ip a l com ponents had 
e ig e n va lu e s  g re a te r  th a n  one, th e y  were e x tra c te d  fo r  f u r th e r  
a n a ly s is .
The i n i t i a l  fa c to r  m a tr ix  p rodu ced  fro m  these  fo u r  fa c to rs  is  
show n in  Tab le  11-13. As none o f  th e  o b je c tiv e s  had com m u na litie s  
less  th a n  0.3, th e y  w ere a l l  in c lu d e d  in  th e  subse quen t r o ta t io n  
phase.





VARIABLES FACTOR I FACTOR I I FACTOR I I I FACTOR IV h2
0BJLIC10 .77526 - .060 15 - .049 17 - .2 4 3 6 8 .56644
OBJ LIC07 .69042 - .0 1 1 6 8 -.44321 . 18581 .70778
0BJLIC06 .68888 .00762 - .438 90 .35264 .79160
0BJLIC14 .68439 - .3 5 9 7 0 .09203 .18957 .64218
OBJLIC03 .66371 .56283 .14810 .03388 .78037
08JLIC04 .66021 - .0 6 5 8 6 .17318 - .2 5 5 2 5 .53536
OBJLIC11 .62570 - .1 5 3 2 1 .23991 .19614 .51100
OBJLIC09 .62317 .06460 - .254 38 - .4 1 2 9 1 .62771
OBJLIC12 .60921 - .3 9 5 8 4 .27346 - .0 4 7 4 0 . 60486
OBJLIC05 .60353 .04553 - .458 73 .04410 .57870
OBJLIC08 .57426 - .1 0 2 8 6 .08982 - .5 4 9 6 2 .65050
OBJLIC02 .55525 .45581 .27713 .33724 .70660
OBJLICOl .41370 .64934 .32327 - .0 2 4 4 9 .70115
OBJLIC13 .41994 - .5 4 2 5 2 .35308 .26038 .66313
EIGENVALUES 5.39784 1.57503 1.17866 1.01785 9.16738
% VARIANCE 38 .6 11.3 3 .4 7 .3 65 .5
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Step Three: R o ta t io n  and In te rp re ta t io n  o f  F ac to rs
The ro ta te d  fa c to r  m a tr ix ,  w h ich  fo llo w s  th e  same fo rm a t as b e fo re , 
is  show n in  Tab le  11-14. The f i r s t  fa c to r  is  com prised  o f  th re e  
o b je c tiv e s . Two o f  these  in v o lv e  th e  lic e n s in g  o f  p a te n ts , e ith e r  to  
p ro te c t  them  a g a in s t com pu lso ry  lic e n s in g  o r  to  p re -e m p t th e ir  
in fr in g e m e n t by  lo c a l f irm s . The t h i r d  o b je c t iv e  in v o lv e s  th e  use o f  
lic e n s in g  as a means o f  re d u c in g  c u rre n c y  r is k .
The fe a tu re  w h ic h  these  th re e  o b je c tiv e s  have in  common is  th e  
use o f  lic e n s in g  as a means o f  p ro te c t in g  th e  com pany's c o m p e tit iv e  
p o s it io n .  L ic e n s in g  may th u s  be used to  p re se rve  p a te n ts  th a t  
w o u ld  o th e rw is e  be e x p ro p r ia te d  (OBJLIC06), o r  to  s u s ta in  cash 
f lo w s  by s e c u rin g  ro y a lt ie s  fro m  p o te n t ia l in f r in g e rs  (OBJLIC07), o r  
to  reduce  th e  v o la t i l i t y  o f  fo re ig n  c u rre n c y  cash f lo w s  (OBJLIC05). 
F a c to r  I  has th e re fo re  been in te rp re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  th e  a d o p tio n  
o f  lic e n s in g  as a 'd e fe n s iv e  s tra te g y '.
The second fa c to r  is  com prised  o f  fo u r  o b je c tiv e s . Two o f 
these  in v o lv e  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  to  s e rv ic e  a new m arke t, e ith e r  
f o r  th e  pu rpose  o f  e s ta b lis h in g  a presence q u ic k ly  (OBJLIC14), o r  f o r  
te s t in g  th e  m a rk e t's  v ia b i l t y  b e fo re  c o m m ittin g  r is k  c a p ita l 
(0BJLIC11). The o th e r  tw o  o b je c tiv e s  in v o lv e  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  to  
s tre n g th e n  th e  com pany's p o s it io n  in  a jo in t  v e n tu re  (OBJLIC13), and 
to  b u i ld  g o o d w ill and acceptance f o r  th e  com pany's o th e r  p ro d u c ts  
and se rv ic e s  (OBJLIC12).
The c h a ra c te r is t ic  w h ic h  is  common to  these fo u r  o b je c tiv e s  is  
t h e ir  p ro v is io n a l n a tu re . A lth o u g h  lic e n s in g  may be used to  
s p e e d ily  e n te r a new m arke t, o r  to  te s t  i t s  p o te n t ia l,  th e re  is  no 
g u a ra n te e  th a t  lic e n s in g  w i l l  be th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  m ethod used in  
th e  lo n g e r- te rm . S im ila r ly ,  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  to  s tre n g th e n  a 
jo in t  v e n tu re  may be o n ly  a te m p o ra ry  move, pe rhaps as p a r t  o f  a 
s tra te g y  le a d in g  to  e v e n tu a l d ire c t  in ves tm en t. In  a d d it io n , th e  
a t t r a c t io n  o f  lic e n s in g  as a means o f b u ild in g  g o o d w ill and 
accep tance f o r  o th e r  company p ro d u c ts  and se rv ice s  is  l i k e ly  to  
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reasons, F a c to r I I  has been in te rp re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  th e  use o f 
lic e n s in g  as an 'in te rm e d ia ry  s tra te g y '.
The t h i r d  fa c to r  is  a lso  com prised  o f fo u r  o b je c tiv e s . W hat 
these  o b je c tiv e s  have in  common is  t h e ir  concern  w ith  th e  p o s it iv e  
s id e -e ffe c ts  o f  lic e n s in g  on o th e r  aspects o f  th e  com pany's 
o p e ra tio n s , o r  w ith  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  o v e ra ll c o rp o ra te  o b je c tiv e s , 
ra th e r  th a n  w ith  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  as a means o f  s e rv ic in g  
fo re ig n  m arke ts . Thus we have lic e n s in g  used in  o rd e r  to  deve lop  
m a rke ts  f o r  th e  com pany's com ponents o r  o th e r  p ro d u c ts  (OBJLIC08) 
and to  deve lop  lo w -c o s t sources o f  raw  m a te ria ls  (OBJLICIO). In  
a d d it io n  lic e n s in g  is  em ployed as a means o f d iv e rs i fy in g  c o rp o ra te  
incom e to  reduce  r is k  (OBJLIC09), o r  as a means o f  ea rn in g  e x tra  
incom e fro m  te c h n o lo g y  w h ich  has o u t liv e d  i t s  u se fu leness
(OBJLIC04).
F a c to r  I I I  has th e re fo re  been in te rp re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  th e  
use o f  lic e n s in g  as a 's u b o rd in a te  s tra te g y ', ie  as a s tra te g y  in  
w h ich  th e  o b je c t iv e  o f  p e n e tra t in g  p a r t ic u la r  fo re ig n  m arke ts  is  
s u b o rd in a te  to  th a t  o f  s u p p o r tin g  th e  com pany's g lo b a l o p e ra tio n s  
o r  i t s  o v e ra l l c o rp o ra te  o b je c tiv e s .
The fo u r th  fa c to r  is  com prised  o f  th re e  v a r ia b le s , each o f 
w h ic h  is  concerned  w ith  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  as a means o f
enhanc ing  th e  te c h n o lo g y  a v a ila b le  to  a company, e ith e r  d ir e c t ly
th ro u g h  re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  agreem ents (OBJLIC02), o r  in d ir e c t ly  v ia  
th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  incom e to  supp lem en t the  R&D b ud ge t (OBJLICOl) 
o r  as a means o f  e x p lo it in g  s p in - o f f  te ch n o lo g y  (OBJLIC03). F a c to r 
IV  has th e re fo re  been in te rp re te d  as re p re s e n tin g  th e  use o f  
l ic e n s in g  as a 'te c h n o lo g y -d r iv e n  s tra te g y '.
I t  is  a p p a re n t fro m  Tab le  11-14 th a t  some o f  th e  in d iv id u a l 
o b je c t iv e s  have m odera te  s iz e d -lo a d in g s  on more th a n  one fa c to r .
T h is  in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  fo u r  lic e n s in g  s tra te g ie s  are  n o t m u tu a lly  
e x c lu s iv e , and th a t  com panies may pu rsue  a num ber o f them  
s im u lta n e o u s ly . F o r exam ple, th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  to  e n te r a new 
m a rke t q u ic k ly  (0BJLIC14) loaded  on F a c to r I as w e ll as on F a c to r I I
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(u n d e r w h ich  i t  is  c la s s if ie d ) .  T h is  can be e x p la in e d  by th e  fa c t  
th a t  th e  use o f lic e n s in g  to  e f fe c t  speedy e n try  in to  a m arke t can 
be re g a rd e d  as a 'd e fe n s iv e  s tra te g y ' (F a c to r I) as w e ll as an 
'in te rm e d ia ry  s tra te g y ' (F a c to r II) .
S im ila r ly  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  lic e n s in g  o b je c t iv e  w h ich  in v o lv e s  
th e  b u ild in g  o f g o o d w ill and acceptance f o r  o th e r  com pany p ro d u c ts  
and se rv ic e s  (0BJLIC12) a lso  lo ads  on F a c to r I I I  as w e ll as on F a c to r 
I I  (u n d e r w h ic h  i t  is  c la s s if ie d )  can be e x p la in e d  by th e  fa c t  th a t  
th is  o b je c t iv e  may be re g a rd e d  as p a r t  o f  a 's u b o rd in a te  s tra te g y ' 
(F a c to r I I I )  as w e ll as an 'in te rm e d ia ry  s tra te g y ' (F a c to r II) .
Three o f  th e  lic e n s in g  s tra te g ie s  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  ro ta te d  
fa c to r  m a tr ix  be a r some s im i la r i t y  to  those  id e n t i f ie d  by A rd is s o n  
and B id a u lt  (1986). T h e ir  re se a rch  suggested th a t  lic e n s in g  
s tra te g ie s  c o u ld  be g rouped  u n d e r th re e  head ings: 'te c h n o lo g y ',
'm a rk e t' and 'p ro d u c tio n ' s tra te g ie s .
The f i r s t  o f  these , th e  'te c h n o lo g y  s tra te g y ',  in v o lv e s  th e  use 
o f  lic e n s in g  " to  o b ta in  th e  h ig h e s t p o s s ib le  re tu rn s  and to  use them  
fo r  f u r th e r  R&D" (op c i t ,  p61). T h is  s tra te g y  bears a c lose  
resem blance to  th a t  re p re s e n te d  by F a c to r IV, th e  'te c h n o lo g y -d r iv e n  
s tra te g y '.  U nder A rd is s o n  and B id a u lt 's  'm a rke t s tra te g y ',  lic e n s in g  
is  used e s s e n tia lly  as a dev ice  to  genera te  a u x i l ia r y  bus iness 
tra n s a c tio n s  w ith  th e  licensee . T h is  s tra te g y  has c lose  s im ila r i t ie s  
w ith  F a c to r  I I I ,  w h ich  re p re s e n ts  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  lic e n s in g  as a 
's u b o rd in a te  s tra te g y '.
The f in a l  s tra te g y  suggested by  A rd is s o n  and B id a u lt ,  th e  
'p ro d u c tio n  s tra te g y ',  e n ta ils  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  as an a lte rn a t iv e  
to  FDI in  s itu a t io n s  w here th e  lic e n s o r  is  faced  w ith  "c a p ita l 
c o n s tra in ts  a n d /o r lo c a l re g u la t io n s "  (op c it ,  p 61). T h is  s tra te g y  
o v e rla p s  to  some e x te n t w ith  F a c to r I I ,  the  use o f  lic e n s in g  as an 
'in te rm e d ia ry  s tra te g y ',  in s o fa r  as th e  m o tiv a t in g  fa c to r  is  th e  
d e s ire  to  s e rv ice  overseas m a rke ts , even i f  l ic e n s in g  is  o n ly  used as 




From  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d a ta  p re se n te d  in  th is  c h a p te r th e  
fo llo w in g  co n c lu s io n s  can be d raw n  co n ce rn in g  th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f 
l ic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  among UK MNCs.
F ir s t ly ,  l ic e n s in g  is  v ie w e d  by th e  v a s t m a jo r ity  o f  com panies
as a 's t ra te g ic ' d e c is io n , in  th e  sense th a t  i t  is  p re d o m in a n tly
e v a lu a te d  a g a in s t th e  a lte rn a t iv e s  o f  d ire c t  e q u ity  in v e s tm e n t and
e x p o rt in g . O f th e  84 com panies w h ich  answ ered th e  q u e s tio n
c o n ce rn in g  th e  scope o f  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n , o n ly  7 re p lie d  th a t
th e y  'n e v e r' e v a lu a te d  lic e n s in g  a g a in s t a lte rn a t iv e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g
m ethods. T h is  f in d in g  is  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  ev idence  fro m  T e le s io 's
(1979) s u rv e y  o f  66 (m a in ly ) US MNCs w h ich  s t ro n g ly  s u p p o rte d  th e
1 Rid e a  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  v ie w ed  as a 's t ra te g ic ' d e c is io n .
Second ly, o n ly  a sm a ll p ro p o r t io n  o f  th o se  com panies th a t  d id  
ta k e  a 's t ra te g ic ' v ie w  o f  lic e n s in g  chose i t  because th e  a lte rn a t iv e  
o p tio n s  were p ro h ib ite d  by  h o s t-g o v e rn m e n t c o n tro ls . O n ly  6 o u t o f  
77 com panies in d ic a te d  th a t  lic e n s in g  was 'a lw a ys ' adop ted  fo r  th is  
reason .
T h ird ly ,  o f  th e  tw e n ty  one v a r ia b le s  whose in f lu e n c e  upon th e  
lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  were exam ined, th e  a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a lly  
com peten t ca n d id a te  license es  in  p o te n t ia l h o s t c o u n tr ie s  was ra te d  
as th e  m ost s ig n if ic a n t  by  th e  com panies. The a b s o rp tiv e  c a p a c ity  
o f  h o s t econom ies w o u ld  th u s  appear to  be a c ru c ia l d e te rm in a n t o f  
th e  lic e n s in g  p ro p e n s ity  o f  UK MNCs. T h is  le nds  s u p p o rt to  th e  
f in d in g s  o f  C o n tra c to r 's  (1981, 1985) s tu d ie s  o f  US f irm s  w h ic h  
d e m on s tra te d  a re la t io n s h ip  be tw een th e  e x te n t o f  t h e ir  a d o p tio n  o f  
lic e n s in g  and th e  in d ig e n o u s  te c h n ic a l c a p a c ity  o f  h o s t c o u n tr ie s .
F o u r th ly ,  i t  w o u ld  appear th a t  g o v e rn m e n t-c re a te d  m a rke t 
im p e rfe c tio n s  are  a ke y  d e te rm in a n t o f  lic e n s in g  p ro p e n s ity  among 
UK MNCs. The fo u r  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  com prise  th e  'h o s t c o u n try  r is k ' 
fa c to r  were ra n k e d  as th e  n e x t m ost s ig n if ic a n t  d e te rm in a n ts  o f 
lic e n s in g  a d o p tio n  by  th e  com panies. O f th e  g o ve rn m e n t-c re a te d
180
CHAPTER 11
m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  w h ic h  a f fe c t  th e  le v e l o f  re m u n e ra tio n  re ce ive d  
by th e  p a re n t company, ie  exchange c o n tro ls  and ta x a t io n , i t  is  
e v id e n t fro m  th e  ra n k in g s  th a t  th e  fo rm e r are rega rded  as more 
s ig n if ic a n t  th a n  th e  la t te r .
F i f t h ly ,  th e  v a r ia b le s  re p re s e n tin g  h ig h  la b o u r  costs  and weak 
p a te n t and a n t i - t r u s t  le g is la t io n  in  h o s t c o u n tr ie s  emerge v e ry  
c le a r ly  as th e  le a s t s ig n if ic a n t  v a r ia b le s  p ro m o tin g  th e  use o f 
l ic e n s in g  by  UK MNCs. The d is t r ib u t io n  o f  responses to  these  th re e  
v a r ia b le s  were a l l  h ig h ly  skewed to w a rd s  th e  lo w e r end o f  th e  
ra t in g  sca le .
S ix th ly ,  fro m  th e  p r in c ip a l com ponents a n a ly s is  o f  th e  tw e n ty  
one v a r ia b le s  exam ined, i t  w o u ld  appear th a t  th e re  are seven 
u n d e r ly in g  fa c to r  c o n s tru c ts  w h ic h  may e x p la in  th e  lic e n s in g  
p ro p e n s ity  o f  UK MNCs. The v a r ia b le s  w h ich  com prise  these fa c to r  
c o n s tru c ts  had s u f f ic ie n t  in  common to  enab le  th e  fa c to r  c o n s tru c ts  
to  be m e a n in g fu lly  d e fin e d . The c o n s tru c ts  are, in  o rd e r  o f  re la t iv e  
im p o rta n ce : th e  r is k  a ssoc ia ted  w ith  th e  h o s t c o u n try , i t s  le g a l
e n v iro n m e n t and in f r a s t ru c tu r e ,  i t s  f is c a l and r e p a t r ia t io n  p o lic ie s , 
th e  re so u rce  c o n s tra in ts  faced  by th e  com panies, th e  costs  th e y  
in c u r  in  e x p o r t  m a rk e tin g , and in  e x p o rt p ro d u c tio n  and 
t ra n s p o r ta t io n  and, f in a l ly ,  th e  le v e l o f  in d u s t r ia l  deve lopm ent o f  
th e  h o s t c o u n try .
The way in  w h ic h  each o f  th e  in d iv id u a l v a r ia b le s  w h ich  
com prise  these  seven fa c to rs  f i t  in  to  th e  "M ark  2" v e rs io n  o f 
D u n n in g 's  O LI th e o ry , th e  fa c to r  endow m ents/m arke t fa i lu r e  
pa rad igm , is  sum m arised in  F ig u re  11-1. The v a r ia b le s  w h ich  
co rre s p o n d  to  lo c a t io n a l and in te rn a lis a t io n  a t t r ib u te s  have been 
r e -c la s s if ie d  to  in d ic a te  w h e th e r th e y  re s u lt  fro m  m a rke t fa i lu r e  o r  
w h e th e r th e y  are  p r im a r i ly  a consequence o f th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f 
fa c to r  endowm ents. The re m a in in g  v a r ia b le s  co rre spond  to  th e
com p lem enta ry  o w n e rsh ip  advan tages re q u ire d  fo r  in te rn a t io n a l 
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S e ve n th ly , o f  th e  fo u r te e n  lic e n s in g  o b je c tiv e s  w h ic h  were 
exam ined, speed o f  m a rke t e n try  emerged v e ry  c le a r ly  as th e  m ost 
s ig n if ic a n t .  The use o f  lic e n s in g  to  s tre n g th e n  jo in t  v e n tu re s  and 
to  deve lop  m a rke ts  f o r  com ponents and o th e r  com pany p ro d u c ts  a lso  
fe a tu re d  p ro m in e n tly  among th e  h ig h e s t- ra n k in g  o b je c tiv e s , w h ile  
th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  to  te s t  new m arke ts  d id  n o t a t t r a c t  much 
s u p p o rt. I t  w o u ld  th u s  appear th a t  lic e n s in g  is  used more to  
s u p p o rt th e  e x is t in g  g lo b a l c o n f ig u ra t io n  o f assets possessed by UK 
MNCs ra th e r  th a n  as a means o f  te s t in g  th e  p o te n t ia l f o r  
in te rn a t io n a l expa ns io n  in  p a r t ic u la r  fo re ig n  m arke ts .
The o b je c t iv e  w h ic h  p ro v e d  to  be le a s t im p o r ta n t was th a t  o f 
u s in g  lic e n s in g  to  deve lop  lo w -c o s t sources o f  raw  m a te r ia ls , 
com ponents o r  end p ro d u c ts  f o r  o th e r  company o p e ra tio n s . I t  w o u ld  
th e re fo re  appear th a t  lic e n s in g  is  used much more by UK MNCs to  
deve lop  m a rke ts  f o r  t h e ir  com ponents and o th e r  p ro d u c ts , th a n  i t  is  
to  deve lop  th e  ups tream  end o f  th e ir  v a lu e -a d d e d  cha ins .
F in a lly ,  th e  p r in c ip a l com ponents a n a lys is  o f  th e  fo u r te e n  
lic e n s in g  o b je c t iv e s  re v e a le d  fo u r  u n d e r ly in g  s tra te g ie s  th a t  UK 
MNCs appear to  be p u rs u in g  v ia  t h e ir  lic e n s in g  o p e ra tio n s . These 
are, in  o rd e r  o f  im p o rta n ce : th e  use o f lic e n s in g  as a 'd e fe n s iv e  
s t ra te g y 1, as an 'in te rm e d ia ry  s tra te g y ',  as a 's u b o rd in a te  s tra te g y ',  
and as a 'te c h n o lo g y -d r iv e n  s tra te g y 1. The response o f UK MNCs to  
any p a r t ic u la r  se t o f  O LI pa ram ete rs  w i l l  th e re fo re  be in f lu e n c e d  by 
th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  th e y  are  fo llo w in g  one, o r  more, o f  these  




1. D u nn ing  (1981) em ployed a te c h n iq u e  ana lagous to  fa c to r  a n a ly s is , 
co rrespondence  a n a ly s is , in  o rd e r  to  id e n t i f y  sets o f  OLI 
v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  b e s t e x p la in e d  th e  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t f lo w s  o f  67 
c o u n tr ie s . U sing  a num ber o f  econom ic in d ic a to rs  as p ro x ie s  fo r  
O LI c h a ra c te r is tc s  he id e n t i f ie d  th re e  d is t in c t  c lu s te rs  o f  
c o u n tr ie s  whose d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t f lo w s  were re la te d  to  s im ila r  
O LI c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  The fa c to r  a n a ly s is  em ployed in  th is  
c h a p te r  d i f fe r s  fro m  D u nn ing 's  resea rch  in  th a t  i t  aims to  
id e n t i f y  s u b -s e ts  o f  v a r ia b le s  w h ich  may e x p la in  th e  lic e n s in g  
p ro p e n s ity  o f  th e  re s p o n d in g  com panies, ra th e r  th a n  id e n t i f y  
c lu s te rs  o f com panies w ith  s im ila r  a t t i tu d e s  to w a rd s  O LI 
v a r ia b le s .
2. The w o rd  im p o rta n ce  is  used in te rc h a n g e a b ly  w ith  th e  w o rd  
s ig n if ic a n c e  th ro u g h o u t th e  c h a p te r when re fe re n c e  is  made to  
th e  ra t in g  sca le  used in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . I t  s h o u ld  be n o te d  
th a t  th e  use o f  th e  te rm  s ig n if ic a n c e  in  th is  c o n te x t does n o t 
im p ly  th e  e x is te n ce  o f  any s ta t is t ic a l  s ig n if ic a n c e .
3. The m edian c o u ld  have been c a lc u la te d  by in te rp o la t io n .  
H ow ever, th e  fa c t  th a t  SPSSX does n o t c a lc u la te  th e  m edian 
u s in g  th e  in te rp o la t io n  m ethod ru le d  o u t th is  o p tio n .
4. A d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  fo rm u la  fo r  c a lc u la t in g  th is  c o r re c t io n  
fa c to r ,  and i t s  e f fe c t  upon th e  K e n d a ll c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  
concordance , can be fo u n d  in  S iege l (1956, pp233-234)
5. T ab le  l l - 3 a  does n o t in c lu d e  any e n tr ie s  f o r  those  com panies
w h ic h  p ro v id e d  a d d it io n a l fa c to rs  un d e r th e  tw o  'o th e r ' 
c a te g o rie s  in  Q u e s tio n  3 because th e  num ber w h ic h  d id  so was 
to o  sm a ll to  enab le  any m e a n in g fu l co n c lu s io n s  to  be d e r iv e d . 
Among th e  fa c to rs  re la te d  to  d ire c t  in v e s tm e n t w h ich  were 
m en tioned  were th e  fo llo w in g :  (a) p o l i t ic a l  d e s ire  to  e s ta b lis h  
in d ig e n o u s  a c t iv i ty ,  (b) la c k  o f  in d ig e n o u s  raw  m a te ria ls  and (c) 
l im ite d  p a te n t cove r. The fa c to rs  re la te d  to  e x p o rt in g  w h ich  
w ere m en tioned  in c lu d e d  th e  fo llo w in g :  (a) la c k  o f  s u ita b le
agen ts , (b) l im i ta t io n  on p ro d u c tio n  ca p a c ity , (c) danger o f  
u n lic e n s e d  lo c a l p ro d u c tio n  and (d) to  meet o f fs e t  re q u ire m e n ts .
6. O f these  v a r ia b le s , th e  in te rp re ta t io n  o f 'h ig h  c u rre n c y  r is k ' as 
a consequence o f  gove rnm en t in te rv e n t io n  may be q u e s tio n e d  on 
th e  g rounds th a t  c u rre n c y  v o la t i l i t y  is  caused by a num ber o f 
econom ic fa c to rs ,  n o t s o le ly  by th e  in flu e n c e  o f  governm ents. 
H ow ever, c u rre n c y  r is k  may be assoc ia ted  w ith  gove rnm en t 
in te r v e n t io n  on th e  g rounds th a t  th e  s ta b i l i t y  o f  a c u rre n c y  is  
d e te rm in e d  in  th e  lo n g  ru n  by th e  pe rfo rm ance  o f  th e  economy, 
w h ic h  in  tu rn  is  h e a v ily  in flu e n c e d  by governm ent econom ic 
p o lic y ,  even i f  th is  in f lu e n c e  is  in d ire c t .
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7. The a d d it io n a l fa c to rs  m aking  lic e n s in g  th e  fa v o u re d  o p t io n  
w h ic h  were p ro v id e d  by com panies u n d e r th e  'o th e r ' ca te g o ry  in  
Q u e s tio n  4 in c lu d e d : (a) th e  presence o f  good lice n se e  m a rk e tin g  
s k i l ls  and sa les fo rc e , (b) f in a n c ia l in c e n tiv e s  and (c) lice n se e 's  
la c k  o f  e x p o r t -o r ie n ta t io n .
8. The F a c to r A n a ly s is  p ro ce d u re  on SPSSX does n o t p r in t  p a r t ia l  
c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts .
9. K a is e r (1974) a lso  d e sc rib e d  va lu e s  o f th e  KMO in d e x  fa l l in g  in  
th e  0.5's as m ise ra b le , va lu e s  in  the  0.6's as m ed iocre , va lu e s  in  
th e  0.7's as m id d lin g , va lu e s  in  th e  0.8's as m e r ito r io u s , and 
v a lu e s  in  th e  0.9's as m a rve llo u s .
10. I t  is  common p ra c t ic e  to  denote  fa c to rs  by Roman num era ls .
11. The tw o  a lte rn a t iv e  m ethods a v a ila b le  on SPSSX were th e  
q u a rt im a x  and equ im ax m ethods. The fo rm e r m axim izes th e  
v a r ia n c e  o f  th e  squa re d  lo a d in g s  fo r  each v a r ia b le ,  r a th e r  th a n  
f o r  each fa c to r ;  th e  la t t e r  is  a co m b in a tio n  o f  th e  v a r im a x  and 
q u a rt im a x  m ethods. The va rim a x  m ethod was chosen f o r  th is  
s tu d y  as i t  tends  to  g ive  a c le a re r s e p a ra tio n  o f  fa c to rs  [K im  
and M u e lle r  (1978, p36)]. In  a d d it io n , K a ise r 's  (1958) e xp e rim e n t 
show ed th a t  th e  fa c to r  p a t te rn  o b ta in e d  by th e  v a r im a x  m ethod 
te n d s  to  be more in v a r ia n t  th a n  th a t  o b ta in e d  by th e  q u a rt im a x  
m ethod when d i f fe r e n t  subse ts  o f v a r ia b le s  are fa c to r-a n a ly s e d .
12. When th e  ro ta te d  fa c to rs  are c o rre la te d , an 'o b liq u e ' s o lu t io n  is  
ach ieved .
13. The pe rcen tages  o f  v a r ia n c e  accounted fo r  by th e  ro ta te d  fa c to rs  
were c a lc u la te d  by  hand as th e y  were n o t a v a ila b le  fro m  SPSSX. 
They were o b ta in e d  by d iv id in g  the  sum o f  th e  squa red  fa c to r  
lo a d in g s  fo r  each v a r ia b le  by the  num ber o f v a r ia b le s  (s ince  
each v a r ia b le  was s ta n d a rd is e d  to  have a v a r ia n c e  o f  one) and 
m u lt ip ly in g  by  100.
14. See, f o r  exam ple, E item an and S to n e h ill's  d e f in i t io n  o f c o u n try  
r is k  (1986, pp475-476).
15. The o th e r  th re e  'P 's ' w h ic h  make up th e  t r a d i t io n a l  m a rk e tin g  
m ix  are  p ro d u c t, p r ic in g  and p ro m o tio n  dec is ions . Rugman e t a l 
(1985, c h a p te r 15) p ro v id e  a u s e fu l summary o f  th e  a d d it io n a l 
c o m p lic a tio n s  a f fe c t in g  th e  m a rke tin g  m ix in  an in te rn a t io n a l 
c o n te x t.
16. I t  s h o u ld  be n o te d  th a t  th e  f ig u re s  re p o rte d  in  Tab le  11-9 fo r  
th e  pe rcen tages  o f  v a r ia n c e  e xp la in e d  by th e  tw o  fa c to rs  d i f f e r  
s l ig h t ly  fro m  th o se  g ive n  fo r  th e  in i t i a l  fa c to r  s ta t is t ic s  in  
T ab le  11-8 because o f  th e  exc luded  v a r ia b le .
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17. The fa c to rs  p ro v id e d  by com panies u n d e r th e  'o th e r ' ca te g o ry  in  
Q ues tion  5 in c lu d e d  th e  fo llo w in g :  (a) to  reduce  c o m p e tit io n /s to p  
a c o m p e tito r  and (b) to  ensure  th e  deve lopm en t o f  
p ro d u c ts /te c h n o lo g y  when s u f f ic e n t  resou rces  are  n o t a v a ila b le  
w ith in  th e  company.
18. Ten o f  T e le s io 's  sam ple o f  66 MNCs were based in  th e  UK.
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INITIAL FACTOR STATISTICS: DIRECT INVESTMENT Sc EXPORTING VARIABLES
FACTOR NUMBER EIGENVALUE PCI CF VAR CUM PCI
-f 5.36938 35.3 35.3
2 1.73163 11.5 47.3
3 1.41015 9.4 56.7
4 1.16324 7.3 54.5
5 1.01684 6.3 71.3
5 .80888 5.4 76.7
7 .73780 4.9 31.5
8 .51314 4.1 85.7
9 .51503 3.4 89.1
10 .43647 2.9 92.1
11 .40580 2.7 94.3
12 .27548 1.3 96.5
13 .22523 1.5 98.1
14 .14412 1.0 99.1
15 .14175 .9 100.0
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APPENDIX 11.2 FACTOR ANALYSIS STATISTICS: LICENSING VARIABLES
CORRELATION MATRIX: LICENSING VARIABLES



























BARTLETT TEST OF SPHERICITY = 228.21468, SK2HFICANCS = 30000
ANTI-IMAGE CORRELATION MATRIX: LICENSING VARIABLES







OVERALL XAISER-MEYZR-CLXIN MEASURE GF SAMPLING ADEQUACY = .59273













INITIAL FACTOR STATISTICS: LICENSING VARIABLES
FACTOR NUMBER EIGENVALUE PCI OF VAR CUM PCI
1 2.53770 44.0 44.0
2 1.43376 23.9 67.9
3 .92419 15.4 33.3
4 .58049 11.3 94.5
5 .17030 2.3 97.4
5 .15355 2.5 100.0
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APPENDIX 11.3 FACTOR ANALYSIS STATISTICS: DIRECT INVESTMENT,
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INITIAL rACTOR STATISTICS: DIRECT 
INVESTMENT EXPORTING 4 LICENSING VARIABLES
fACTOR EIGENVALUE POT OF VAR CLM PC *
1 5.31921 32.5 32.5
2 2.03146 9. 7 42. 1
3 1.73222 3.2 50. 4
4 1.39205 7. 5 53.0
3 1.35911 5. 3 54.4
5 1.14749 5. 5 59 . 9
7 1.00235 4.3 74. 7
3 .35737 4. 1 73.3
9 .77200 3.7 32.4
10 .55024 3.1 35.5
i .50429 2.9 33.4
12 .52134 2.5 90.9
13 .43317 2.1 93.0
14 .35413 I. 7 94. 7
15 .23472 1. 1 95.3
15 .21513 1.0 96.3
17 .13717 .9 97. 7
13 .14275 . 7 93.4
19 .13205 .5 99.0
20 .12571 . 5 99.5
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INITIAL FACTOR STATISTICS: OBJECTIVES OF LICENSING
FACTOR NUMBER EIGENVALUE PCI OF VAR CUM ?CT
1 5.39784 38.5 38.5
2 1.57503 11.3 49.8
3 1.17666 3.4 53.2
4 1.01785 7.3 55 .5
5 .93252 6.7 72.1
6 .33425 5.0 78.1
7 .62132 4.4 82.5
3 .58206 4.2 36.7
9 .47763 3.4 90.1
10 .37936 2.7 92.3
11 .32963 2.4 95.2
12 .23879 2.1 97.2
13 .22591 1.6 98.9
14 .16059 1 .1 100.0
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CHAPTER TWELVE -  MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL LICENSING ACTIVITY
12.1 INTRODUCTION
The o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  d a ta  a n a ly s is  p re se n te d  in  th is  c h a p te r is  th e  
te s t in g  o f  a num ber o f  hypo the ses  w h ic h  re la te  c e r ta in  c o rp o ra te  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  to  in v o lv e m e n t in  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g . The b a s ic  
re se a rc h  q u e s tio n  w h ic h  is  asked is  th u s : how are th e
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  UK MNCs re la te d  to  t h e ir  le v e l o f  in v o lv e m e n t in  
in te r n a t io n a l l ic e n s in g  a c t iv ity ?  The q u e s tio n  is  answ ered u s in g  
m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  m odels w h ic h  are  b u i l t  w ith  d a ta  o b ta in e d  fro m  
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  s u rv e y  and fro m  secondary  sources.
In  these  m odels th e  dependen t v a r ia b le ,  th e  r e la t iv e  in c id e n c e  
o f  lic e n s in g , is  d e te rm in e d  as a fu n c t io n  o f  n in e  c o rp o ra te  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s :  s ize, in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  p ro d u c tio n , re se a rch
in te n s ity ,  o w n e rsh ip  o f  p a te n te d  know ledge , e x te n t o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
p a te n t r e g is t r a t io n ,  p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ,  g e o g ra p h ic a l 
d iv e r s i f ic a t io n ,  c o d i f ia b l i l i t y  o f  know -h ow  and o rg a n iz a t io n a l 
s t ru c tu re .
To de te rm in e  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  s ta t is t ic a l  te c h n iq u e s  f o r  
m o d e llin g  these  v a r ia b le s , we m ust c o n s id e r th e  le v e l a t w h ic h  th e y  
a re  m easured. Tab le  12-1 s p e c if ie s  th e  m easurem ent le v e l f o r  each 
v a r ia b le :
TABLE 12-1 
VARIABLE SPECIFICATION
VARIABLES LEVEL OF MEASUREMENT
DEPENDENT
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I t  can be seen fro m  Tab le  12-1 th a t  th e  v a r ia b le s  are m easured 
a t th re e  d i f fe r e n t  le v e ls : nom in a l, o rd in a l and r a t io .  The d a ta  f o r  
m ost o f  th e  r a t io - le v e l  v a r ia b le s  were o b ta in e d  fro m  seconda ry  
sou rces (A nnu a l R e p o rts  and A ccoun ts , and th e  Dun and B ra d s tre e t 
p u b lic a t io n  Key B r i t is h  E n te rp r is e s  1984), w h ile  th e  da ta  f o r  th e  
n o m in a l and o r d in a l- le v e l v a r ia b le s  w ere o b ta in e d  fro m  
q u e s tio n n a ire  responses.
The dependent v a r ia b le ,  in c id e n ce  o f  lic e n s in g , and fo u r  o f  th e  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  (re se a rch  in te n s ity ,  le v e l o f  p a te n t o w n e rsh ip , 
le v e l o f  in te rn a t io n a l p a te n t r e g is t r a t io n  and c o d i f ia b i l i t y  o f  k n o w ­
how ) a re  m easured a t th e  o rd in a l le v e l.  As N o ru s is  (1985, p341) has 
p o in te d  o u t, o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  may re s u lt  fro m  th e  g ro u p in g  o f  
v a lu e s  f o r  in te r v a l v a r ia b le s , o r  th e y  may a r is e  when th e  o rd e r in g , 
b u t  n o t th e  d is ta n ce , be tw een ca te g o rie s  can be e s ta b lis h e d . A l l  o f  
th e  o rd in a l v a r ia b le s , a p a r t fro m  th e  c o d i f ia b i l i t y  o f  know -h ow , 
r e s u lt  fro m  th e  g ro u p in g  o f  va lu e s  f o r  in te r v a l v a r ia b le s .
In  each case, th e  u n d e r ly in g  v a r ia b le  w h ic h  is  be ing  m easured 
is  an in te r v a l v a r ia b le ,  b u t  th e  da ta  was gene ra ted  a t an o rd in a l 
le v e l because th e  sca les w h ic h  were used in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  to  
m easure these  v a r ia b le s  g rouped  in te r v a l v a lu e s  in to  o rd e re d  
ca te g o rie s . F o r exam ple, lic e n s in g  incom e was m easured by a sca le  
c o n ta in in g  s ix  m u tu a lly  e x c lu s iv e  ca tego ries . Q u e s tio n n a ire  
re sp o n d e n ts  had s im p ly  to  in d ic a te  in to  w h ich  o f  th e  ca te g o rie s  on 
th e  sca le  th e  u n d e r ly in g  in te r v a l measure w o u ld  fa l l .  Thus, 
a lth o u g h  th e  d is ta n c e  betw een ca te g o rie s  is  know n, th e re  is  no way 
o f  d e te rm in in g  th e  d is ta n c e  betw een th e  va lu e s  w h ic h  f a l l  w i th in  
each ca te g o ry .
I t  s h o u ld  be n o te d  th a t  these  o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  d i f f e r  fro m  th e  
o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  o b ta in e d  fro m  'a t t i t u d in a l '  q u e s tio n s  in  o th e r  
p a r ts  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . Where L ik e r t - ty p e  scales were used, and 
th u s  w here  one re sp o n d e n t's  p e rc e p tio n  o f th e  v a lu e  assoc ia ted  w ith  
a p a r t ic u la r  p o in t  on a sca le  may d i f f e r  from  a n o th e r re sp o n d e n t's  
p e rc e p tio n , i t  is  n o t p o s s ib le  to  e s ta b lis h  e ith e r  th e  d is ta n ce  
be tw een c a te g o rie s  o r, by  lo g ic a l ex te n s io n , th e  d is tan ce  betw een
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th e  v a lu e s  g roup ed  w ith in  each ca te g o ry .
Because th e  dependent v a r ia b le  and fo u r  o f  th e  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s  are  m easured a t th e  n o n -m e tr ic  le v e l,  th e  m ethod used to  
m odel a l l  th e  v a r ia b le s  m ust ta k e  th is  m easurem ent c o n s tra in t  in to  
a c c o u n t . F o r  reasons e x p la in e d  in  C h a p te r E ig h t, nom in a l and 
o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  are  n o t g e n e ra lly  am enable to  p a ra m e tr ic  m o d e llin g  
te c h n iq u e s , such as re g re s s io n  a n a lys is .
D e sp ite  th e  m e th o d o lo g ic a l weakness o f  u s in g  re g re s s io n  
a n a ly s is  on n o n -m e tr ic  da ta , p re v io u s  a tte m p ts  to  m odel lic e n s in g  
b e h a v io u r  have a c tu a lly  used th e  te c h n iq u e  o f  l in e a r  m u lt ip le  
re g re s s io n  [T e le s io  (1979), C o n tra c to r  (1983, 1985) and Adam (1985)]. 
These a u th o rs  deve loped  t h e ir  m odels u s in g  da ta  d e r iv e d , a t le a s t in  
p a r t ,  fro m  q u e s tio n n a ire  su rve ys . As a re s u lt ,  some o f  t h e ir  
v a r ia b le s  w ere m easured a t th e  n o m in a l o r  o rd in a l le v e l.  These 
a u th o rs  are  th e re fo re  open to  c r it ic is m  on th e  g roun ds  th a t  th e y  
used a te c h n iq u e  w h ic h  is  in a p p ro p r ia te  f o r  th e  ty p e  o f  d a ta  th e y  
had a v a ila b le ; th e  use o f  re g re s s io n  p roced u re s  is  o n ly  w a rra n te d  
f o r  n o m in a l o r  o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  i f  t h e ir  va lu e s  are  d icho tom ous, o r  
i f  th e y  can be recoded to  make them  d icho tom ous. A lth o u g h  a l l  
th re e  a u th o rs  d id  make use o f  such  'dummy' v a r ia b le s  in  t h e ir  
m odels, th e y  a lso  u t i l is e d  po ly to m o us  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  cann o t be 
re g a rd e d  as in te r v a l v a r ia b le s .
B o th  T e les io  and C o n tra c to r  d id , how ever, acknow ledge th e  
m e th o d o lo g ic a l l im ita t io n s  o f  t h e ir  app roach . C o n tra c to r , f o r  
exam ple, s ta te d  th a t  " th e  o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  is  n o t 
e co n o m e tric  p re d ic t iv e  a b i l i t y .  Indeed , w ith  much o f  th e  d a ta  
a v a ila b le  o n ly  in  ca te g o rie s , i t  is  n o t v e ry  m e a n in g fu l"  (1985, plOO). 
He th e n  w en t on to  d e fin e  th re e  o b je c tiv e s  f o r  th e  re g re s s io n  
a n a ly s is :
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(1) id e n t i f ic a t io n  o f  a subse t o f  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  th a t  m ost 
p o w e r fu lly  e x p la in  m ost o f  th e  v a r ia n c e ;
(2) d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  o f  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s  by  use o f  s te p w ise  lo a d in g ;
(3) f in d in g  o u t i f  th e  d ire c t io n  o f  th e  re la t io n s h ip  be tw een 
v a r ia b le s  was as expected .
I t  can be argued, th e re fo re , th a t  th e  use o f  re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  
is  ju s t i f ie d  i f  i t s  l im ita t io n s  are  acknow ledged and th e  o b je c tiv e s  
are  s u ita b ly  m odest. In  th is  ch a p te r, l in e a r  m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  
m odels a re  deve loped  fro m  th e  a v a ila b le  da ta . The re s u lts  fro m  
these  m odels a re  th e n  com pared w ith  th o se  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  T e les io , 
C o n tra c to r  and Adam s tu d ie s , and an e a r l ie r  s tu d y  by  Z e n o ff (1970).^
12.2 HYPOTHESES
12.2.1 In t ro d u c t io n
The hypo the ses  d e sc rib e d  be low  are  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  re v ie w  o f  th e  
lic e n s in g  l i te r a tu r e  in  C h a p te r S ix , w here  more d e ta ile d  a rgum ents 
s u p p o r t in g  each h y p o th e s is  can be fo u n d .
12.2.2 Size
E x is t in g  s tu d ie s  suggest th a t  la rg e r  MNCs w i l l  be less  l ik e ly  to  
a d o p t lic e n s in g  th a n  s m a lle r  ones. Sm all MNCs do n o t have access 
to  th e  same le v e l o f  f in a n c ia l,  m anag e ria l and fo re ig n  m a rk e tin g  
re so u rce s  as la rg e  MNCs and are  th e re fo re  more l i k e ly  to  need th e  
re so u rce s  w h ic h  license es  can o f fe r .
T h is  re a so n in g  g ive s  r is e  to  th e  fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is :
"The le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be n e g a tiv e ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  MNC size ."
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12.2.3 Degree o f  In te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n
F irm s w h ic h  are  h ig h ly  in te rn a t io n a liz e d ,  ie  w h ic h  p roduce  a h ig h  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  t h e ir  o u tp u t  o u ts id e  th e i r  home m a rke t, w i l l  have 
g re a te r  expe rience  o f  o p e ra tin g  in  fo re ig n  m arke ts  th a n  f irm s  w h ic h  
p ro d u ce  a h ig h  p ro p o r t io n  o f  t h e ir  o u tp u t  in s id e  t h e ir  home m arke t.
P ossession  o f  th is  e xpe rience  w i l l  enab le  f irm s  to  more e a s ily  
expand  t h e ir  o p e ra tio n s  in to  o th e r  fo re ig n  m a rke ts ; f irm s  w ith  a lo w  
degree o f  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, w i l l  be more 
l i k e ly  to  expand ab roa d  v ia  th e  lic e n s in g  ro u te  as th is  w i l l  enable  
them  to  u t i l is e  th e  exp e rie n ce  o f  lo c a l licensees .
T h is  re a so n in g  suggests  th e  fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is :
’’The le v e l o f  l ic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be n e g a tiv e ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  a MNC's degree o f  
in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n . "
12.2.4 R esearch In te n s ity
F irm s w h ic h  d e vo te  more o f  t h e ir  re so u rce s  to  R&D a c t iv i t ie s  th a n  
o th e rs  a re  m ore l i k e ly  to  p rodu ce  new p ro d u c ts  and processes. 
These f irm s  w i l l ,  as a re s u lt ,  possess more in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
th a n  le ss  re s e a rc h -o r ie n te d  f irm s . S ince th e  possess ion  o f  a s u p p ly  
o f  in te l le c tu a l  p ro p e r ty  is  a necessary  c o n d it io n  f o r  any lic e n s in g  
a c t iv i t y ,  i t  can be a rgued  th a t  f irm s  w ith  a h ig h  re sea rch  in te n s ity  
w i l l ,  c e te r is  p a r ib u s , be more l ik e ly  to  ad o p t lic e n s in g .
T h is  re a s o n in g  p roduces  th e  fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is :
"The le v e l o f  l ic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be p o s it iv e ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  a MNC's le v e l o f  re se a rch  
in te n s ity . "
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12.2.5 L e v e l o f  P a te n t O w nersh ip
R a th e r th a n  e s tim a te  a f irm 's  c a p a c ity  to  gen e ra te  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  v ia  i t s  re se a rch  in te n s ity ,  th is  asset can be p ro x ie d  by  th e  
num ber o f  p a te n ts  w h ic h  i t  owns. F irm s w ith  m ore p a te n ts  to  t h e ir  
name th a n  o th e rs  are  more l i k e ly  to  ad o p t lic e n s in g , c e te r is  p a r ib u s , 
s in ce  th e y  have m ore ’lic e n s a b le ' assets.
T h is  re a so n in g  g ive s  r is e  to  th e  fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is :
"The le v e l o f  l ic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be p o s i t iv e ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  a MNC's le v e l o f  p a te n t 
o w n e rsh ip ."
12.2.6 L e v e l o f  In te rn a t io n a l P a te n t R e g is tra t io n
B e fo re  a f irm  can e n te r  in to  a l ic e n s in g  agreem ent in v o lv in g  p a te n ts  
w ith  a fo re ig n  f irm ,  i t  m ust have i t s  p a te n ts  re g is te re d  in  th e  
c o u n try  o f  th e  fo re ig n  f irm . The e x te n t o f  in te rn a t io n a l p a te n t 
r e g is t r a t io n  is  th e re fo re  l ik e ly  to  be a more a ccu ra te  in d ic a to r  o f  
th e  a b i l i l t y  o f  a f irm  to  engage in  fo re ig n  lic e n s in g  th a n  s im p ly  th e  
possess ion  o f  p a te n ts .
The fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is  is  th e re fo re  suggested:
"The le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be p o s i t iv e ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  a MNC's le v e l o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
p a te n t re g is t ra t io n . "
12.2.7 P ro d u c t D iv e rs if ic a t io n
I t  has been a rgued th a t  th e  la rg e r  th e  p ro d u c t range  w h ic h  a MNC 
possesses, th e  more d i f f i c u l t  i t  is  to  sp read  re so u rce s  e ve n ly  o v e r 
a l l  p ro d u c t lin e s  [T e le s io  (1979)]. As a re s u lt ,  h ig h ly  d iv e rs i f ie d  
MNCs f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  m a n u fa c tu re  th e ir  p ro d u c ts  in s id e  a l l  those  
fo re ig n  m arke ts  in  w h ic h  th e y  may w is h  to  ope ra te .
By engaging in  lic e n s in g , MNCs in c u r  lo w e r cos ts  because th e y  
a re  ab le  to  supp lem ent t h e ir  l im ite d  resou rces  w ith  those  o f  the
208
CHAPTER 12
license e . The lice n se e , f o r  exam ple, is  ab le  to  o f fe r  th e  o v e r­
s tre tc h e d  MNC i t s  own m a rk e tin g  e x p e rt is e , h a v in g  a lre a d y  su n k  
cos ts  in to  a c q u ir in g  know le dge  o f  i t s  own m arke t. In  m a n u fa c tu rin g , 
th e  lice n se e  can p ro v id e  p ro d u c tio n  fa c i l i t ie s  by  e xpa nd ing  c a p a c ity  
to  accom odate th e  lic e n s e d  p ro d u c t. I f  a MNC is  una b le  to  send
m anagers w ith  e xp e rie n ce  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  p ro d u c t l in e  to  an 
overseas m a rke t w here  i t  w ishes  to  ope ra te , a lice n se e  can p ro v id e  
lo c a l m anagers and te c h n ic a l p e rs o n n e l t ra in e d  a t i t s  own expense.
In  a d d it io n  to  these  c o n s id e ra tio n s , th e  co s t o f  lo s in g  some 
degree o f  c o n t ro l by  o p tin g  f o r  lic e n s in g  s h o u ld  be o f  less conce rn  
to  h ig h ly  d iv e r s i f ie d  MNCs because each p ro d u c t l in e  w i l l  o n ly
a cco u n t f o r  a sm a ll sha re  o f  e a rn ings .
The above a rgum ents  suggest th e  fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is :
"The le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be p o s i t iv e ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  a MNC's le v e l o f  p ro d u c t
d iv e r s i f ic a t io n . "
12.2.8 G e o g ra p h ica l D iv e rs if ic a t io n
I t  is  re ason ab le  to  assume th a t  f irm s  w ith  a h ig h  degree o f
g e o g ra p h ic a l d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  w i l l  have ga ined  a h ig h  le v e l o f  
e xp e rie n ce  a b o u t o p e ra tin g  c o n d it io n s  in  d i f fe r e n t  fo re ig n  
e n v iro n m e n ts .
T h is  expe rience  can be re g a rd e d  as an asse t w h ic h  th e  MNC w i l l  
seek to  e x p lo it .  MNCs w ith  o n ly  a few  overseas o p e ra tio n s  w i l l  n o t 
have  th e  same exp e rie n ce  as h ig h ly  g e o g ra p h ic a lly  d iv e rs i f ie d  MNCs 
and w i l l  th e re fo re  be m ore l i k e ly  to  c o n s id e r th e  lic e n s in g  o p t io n  
because i t  a llo w s  them  to  u t i l is e  th e  expe rience  o f  th e  licensee . In  
a d d it io n ,  MNCs th a t  a re  h ig h ly  g e o g ra p h ic a lly  d iv e rs i f ie d  are  more 
l i k e ly  to  r e ly  on in te r n a l t r a n s fe r  o f  t h e ir  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
because o f  th e  su n k  cos ts  th e y  have made in  e s ta b lis h in g  
s u b s id ia r ie s  in  num erous c o u n tr ie s .
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These a rgum ents  g iv e  r is e  to  th e  fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is :
"The le v e l o f  l ic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be n e g a tiv e ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  a MNC's le v e l o f  g e o g ra p h ic a l 
d iv e r s i f ic a t io n . "
12.2.9 C o d if ia b i l i t y  o f  K now -how
C o d if ic a t io n  is  an e xe rc ise  in  a b s tra c t io n  w h ic h  e n ta ils  th e  
t ra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  exp e rie n ce  and in fo rm a tio n  in to  a sym bo lic  fo rm . 
The c o s t o f  lic e n s in g  kn o w -h o w  w i l l  v a ry  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  ease w ith  
w h ic h  i t  can be c o d if ie d .
C o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  such as fo rm u la e  f o r  chem ica l com pounds, 
b lu e p r in ts ,  and com pu te r program m es can be t ra n s m itte d  q u ic k e r , and 
a t lo w e r  cos t, th a n  kn o w -h o w  w h ic h  has a h ig h  t a c i t  c o n te n t and 
cann o t, th e re fo re , be c o d if ie d . T h is  ty p e  o f  kn o w -h o w  can o n ly  be 
t ra n s fe r re d  by  means o f  in te r -p e rs o n a l co n ta c t. I t  th e re fo re  
re q u ire s  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  s k i l le d  p e rso n n e l, who may need 
o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p .
L ic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv in g  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  u n c o d if ie d  
kn o w -h o w  are m ore l i k e ly  to  g iv e  r is e  to  d is s a t is fa c t io n  th a n  those  
w h ic h  in v o lv e  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  c o d if ie d  know -h ow . U n fo rseen  
c o n tin g e n c ie s  are  more l ik e ly  to  a r is e  as a r e s u lt  o f  th e  g re a te r  
a m b ig u ity  in v o lv e d . I t  is  th e re fo re  to  be expected  th a t  th is  ty p e  o f 
kn o w -h o w  is  more l i k e ly  to  be t ra n s fe r re d  w ith in ,  ra th e r  th a n  
betw een, f irm s .
T h is  re a so n in g  g ive s  r is e  to  th e  fo llo w in g  h y p o th e s is :
"The le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be p o s it iv e ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  MNCs possess 
kn o w -h o w  w h ic h  is  c o d if ia b le ."
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12.2.10 O rg a n iz a tio n a l S tru c tu re
I t  has been a rgued  th a t  f irm s  w ith  d i f fe r in g  o rg a n iz a t io n a l 
s t ru c tu re s  w i l l  t r a n s fe r  resou rces  to  t h e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  
w ith  d i f fe r in g  le v e ls  o f  e f f ic ie n c y  [D a v id so n  (1983)]. I t  fo llo w s  th a t  
f irm s  w ith  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re s  w h ich  possess a lo w  le v e l o f  
in te r n a l t ra n s fe r  e f f ic ie n c y  w i l l  be more l ik e ly  to  a d o p t l ic e n s in g  
th a n  th o se  f irm s  whose o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re s  o p e ra te  w ith  a 
h ig h  le v e l o f  in te rn a l t ra n s fe r  e ff ic ie n c y .
R esource t ra n s fe r  e f f ic ie n c y  is  b e lie v e d  to  be h ig h e r  in  th o se  
f irm s  w h ic h  c e n tra liz e  expe rience  and th e re fo re  b e n e f it  fro m  th e  
c u m u la tiv e  le a rn in g  c u rv e  phenom enon. C o rp o ra te  s t ru c tu re s  w h ic h  
d iv is io n a liz e  t ra n s fe r  mechanisms are b e lie v e d  to  p e rfo rm  a t le s s e r 
e f f ic ie n c y  as th e re  is  a tenden cy  f o r  each d iv is io n  to  o p e ra te  on i t s  
own le a rn in g  cu rv e . As a r e s u lt  th e  m a rg in a l co s t o f  t r a n s fe r r in g  
re so u rce s  is  g re a te r.
D iv is io n a l is a t io n  w i l l  a lso  in c rea se  th e  f ix e d  cos ts  o f  re so u rce  
t ra n s fe r ,  b o th  a t h e a d q u a rte rs  and s u b s id ia ry  le v e l.  A t 
h e a d q u a rte rs  le v e l th e  c re a tio n  o f  d u p lic a te  p e rso n n e l and 
a d m in is t ra t iv e  system s f o r  each d iv is io n  ra is e s  th e  cos ts  o f
p o te n t ia l FDI p ro je c ts . A t th e  s u b s id ia ry  le v e l,  th e  d iv is io n a l
fo rm a t reduces th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  MNC to  share  f a c i l i t ie s ,  pe rso n n e l, 
and in fo rm a tio n  across d iv is io n s .
The above re a s o n in g  g ives  r is e  to  th e  fo llo w in g  g e n e ra l 
h y p o th e s is :
"MNCs w ith  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re s  w h ic h  
c e n tra liz e  e xp e rie n ce  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  ( ie
g lo b a l m a tr ix  and in te rn a t io n a l d iv is io n
s tru c tu re s )  w i l l  be less  l ik e ly  to  ad o p t lic e n s in g  
th a n  MNCs w ith  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s tru c tu re s  w h ich  
fra g m e n t exp e rie n ce  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  (ie  
g lo b a l p ro d u c t, g lo b a l geog raph ic , g lo b a l 
fu n c t io n a l and h o ld in g  com pany s tru c tu re s ) ."
W ith in  th is  g e n e ra l h y p o th e s is  i t  is  p o s s ib le  to  c o n s tru c t more 
s p e c if ic  hypo theses  based upon  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  d i f fe r e n t
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o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re s  are  b e lie v e d  to  c e n tra liz e  e xpe rience  o f  
fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  F o r exam ple, i t  c o u ld  be h y p o th e s is e d  th a t  th e  
g lo b a l m a tr ix  s t ru c tu re  w i l l  e x h ib i t  th e  lo w e s t le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  as 
i t  fo s te rs  th e  h ig h e s t c e n tra liz a t io n  o f  th is  expe rience , w h ile  th e  
h o ld in g  com pany s t ru c tu re  is  l i k e ly  to  be a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  
h ig h e s t le v e l o f  l ic e n s in g  as i t  e n ta ils  th e  lo w e s t le v e l o f  
c e n tra liz a t io n .
12.3 LINEAR MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODELS
12.3.1 In t ro d u c t io n
Two c a te g o rie s  o f  re g re s s io n  m odels were c o n s tru c te d : one f o r
p a te n t lic e n s in g  and one f o r  know -h ow  lic e n s in g . T h is  re f le c ts  th e  
fa c t  th a t  th e  fa c to rs  w h ic h  a f fe c t  p a te n t lic e n s in g  d i f f e r  to  some 
e x te n t  fro m  th e  fa c to rs  w h ic h  a f fe c t  know -h ow  lic e n s in g . As a 
r e s u lt ,  th e  p a te n t lic e n s in g  m odels c o n ta in  tw o  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  are  
n o t co n ta in e d  in  th e  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  m odels, nam ely th e  'le v e l o f  
p a te n t o w n e rs h ip ', and th e  'le v e l o f  in te rn a t io n a l p a te n t 
r e g is t r a t io n '.  S im ila r ly ,  th e  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  m odels c o n ta in  one 
v a r ia b le ,  'c o d i f ia b i l i t y  o f  kn o w -h o w ', w h ich  is  n o t p re s e n t in  th e  
p a te n t lic e n s in g  m odels.
12.3.2 V a r ia b le  D e f in it io n  and M easurem ent
T ab le  12-2 g ives  d e ta ils  o f  th e  u n d e r ly in g  concepts be in g  m easured 
b y  each o f  th e  v a r ia b le s , how these  concepts w ere o p e ra tio n a liz e d , 
and th e  la b e ls  a tta c h e d  to  th e  v a r ia b le s  fo r  cod ing  pu rposes. The 
ta b le  a lso  re p o r ts  th e  num ber o f  cases (ie  com panies) w h ic h  were 
a v a ila b le  f o r  each o f  th e  v a r ia b le  measures, and s p e c ifie s  th e  
expe c ted  s igns  o f  th e  p a r t ia l  re g re s s io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts ,  in  accordance 
w ith  th e  hypo theses  o u t lin e d  in  S ec tion  12.2.
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TABLE 12-2  
VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES




Inc id en ce o f lic e n s in g P atent Licensee Sales Index PLSI 36 N.A.
P atent L icensor Income Index P L II 43 N.A.
Know-how Licensee Sales Index KHLSI 47 N.A.
Know-how L icensor Income Index KHLII 57 N.A.
Si ze Global tu rn over GLTURNOV 85 -
Degree o f  in te r n a t io n a l iz a t io n Overseas production index OVPRODN 43 -
P ro p ortio n  o f R&D 
expen d itu re  incurred  by 
overseas s u b s id ia r ie s
RD4 56 —
Research in te n s ity Level o f  R&D expenditure RD1 78 +
R&D expen d itu re  as a 
percentage o f tu rn o ver
RD3 71 +
Number o f employees 
engaged in R&D a c t iv i t ie s
RD5 73 +
Level o f  p a te n t ownership Number o f  UK paten ts  held UKPATS 72 +
Level o f in te rn a t io n a l p a ten t 
reg i s t r a t i  on
Number o f  c o u n trie s  in  which 
the company re g is te rs  i t s  
paten ts
REGISPAT 72 +
Annual expen diture  on f i l i n g  
paten ts  in overseas co u n tries
EXPPATS 37 +
Product d iv e r s i f ic a t io n Number o f in d u s tr ie s  in  
which company operates
PRODVER1 85 +
H erfin d h a l index based 
on the above
PRODVER2 85 +
Geographical d iv e r s i f ic a t io n Number o f c o u n trie s  in  
which the company has 
overseas s u b s id ia r ie s
OVSUBS 85 —
H erfin d h a l index based upon 
the p ro p o rtio n  o f tu rn over  
generated in  overseas markets
GRDIV 57
C o d if ia b i1i t y  o f  know-how Know-how c o d if ia b i1i t y  index CODIFKH 65 +
O rg a n iza tio n a l s tru c tu re Dummy v a r ia b le  fo r  each type  












Dummy v a r ia b le  fo r  the degree 
to  which o rg a n iz a tio n a l 
s tru c tu re s  e ith e r  c e n tr a l iz e  
(ORGSTR=l) or fragm ent 
(0RGSTR=0) experience o f  
fo re ig n  operatio ns
ORGSTR 80
N.A. = Not A p p lic a b le , s ince 'In c id e n c e  o f L ic e n s in g 1 is  the dependent v a r ia b le .
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I t  can be seen fro m  T ab le  12-2 th a t  some o f  th e  concepts be ing  
m easured w ere o p e ra tio n a liz e d  u s in g  a num ber o f  d i f fe r e n t  m ethods. 
These d i f fe r e n t  m ethods w ere em ployed fo r  tw o reasons.
The f i r s t  reason  was to  reduce  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  
m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  betw een in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s . The more 
m easurem ents th a t  c o u ld  be made f o r  each in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le ,  th e  
g re a te r  was th e  chance o f  o b ta in in g  a m easure th a t  was n o t 
c o l l in e a r  w ith  any o f  th e  o th e r  in d epe nden t v a r ia b le s . The 
e x is te n c e  o f  p o te n t ia l c o l l in e a r i t y  between p a irs  o f  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s  was d e te c te d  by  in s p e c tio n  o f  th e  m a tr ix  o f  
in te r c o r re la t io n s  betw een th e  v a r ia b le s .^  These in te rc o r re la t io n s  
were m easured u s in g  Spearman ra n k -o rd e r  c o e f f ic ie n ts  because o f  
th e  o r d in a l i t y  o f  m ost o f  th e  v a r ia b le s .^
T he re  e x is t  a num ber o f  d i f fe r e n t  v ie w p o in ts  co n ce rn in g  th e  
degree o f  c o r re la t io n  th a t  m ust e x is t  between in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  
b e fo re  m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  is  co n s id e re d  a prob lem . A ru le  o f  thum b 
suggested  by  P in d y c k  and R u b in fe ld  (1981, p89), f o r  exam ple, is  th a t  
th e  c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  betw een tw o  in depe nden t v a r ia b le s  m ust 
be la rg e r  th a n  th e  c o r re la t io n  o f  e ith e r  o r  b o th  w ith  th e  dependent 
v a r ia b le .  T h is  ru le  was n o t used in  th is  s tu d y , how ever, as i t  is  
o n ly  r e l ia b le  f o r  m odels w h ic h  have tw o  in depe nden t v a r ia b le s .
A n o th e r  ru le  o f  thum b, re p o r te d  by Cass (1980, p!69) to  be
" f a i r l y  w id e ly "  used is  th e  e x is te n ce  o f a c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  
be tw een in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  o f  g re a te r  th a n  0.7. T h is  ru le  was 
a do p te d  f o r  th e  p re s e n t s tu d y , a lth o u g h  i t  was adapted s l ig h t ly  to  
ta k e  acco u n t o f  th e  r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll num ber o f cases a v a ila b le  and 
th e  o r d in a l i t y  o f  m ost o f  th e  v a r ia b le s . T h is  a d a p tio n  in v o lv e d  th e  
use o f  a more c o n s e rv a tiv e  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n t  o f  0.5 to  id e n t i f y  
p o te n t ia l c o l l in e a r  e ffe c ts . In  s itu a t io n s  where any tw o  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s  were fo u n d  to  have c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  g re a te r  
th a n  0.5, th e  c o r re la t io n s  betw een each independen t v a r ia b le  and th e  
dependen t v a r ia b le  were a lso  exam ined to  de te rm ine  w h ich  was th e  
sm a lle r, and th e re fo re  w h ich  v a r ia b le  was e lig ib le  f o r  e xc lu s io n .
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The second reason  f o r  h a v in g  a num ber o f  m easures f o r  some o f  
th e  v a r ia b le s  was to  enhance th e  p ro sp e c ts  o f  o b ta in in g  a s u f f ic ie n t  
num ber o f  cases f o r  each v a r ia b le ,  so th a t  s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  
re g re s s io n  m odels c o u ld  be p rodu ced . I t  was re co g n ise d  a t th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  c o n s tru c t io n  s tage  o f  th e  re se a rch  th a t  'm iss ing  
v a lu e s ' a r is in g  fro m  unansw ered  q u e s tio n s  w o u ld  c re a te  p rob lem s a t 
th e  m u lt iv a r ia te  d a ta  a n a ly s is  stage; a lth o u g h  any p a r t ic u la r  MNC 
m ig h t p ro v id e  d a ta  f o r  a l l  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s , th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  
th e y  c o u ld  be u t i l is e d  in  m u lt iv a r ia te  a n a lys is  w o u ld  depend upon  
th e  num ber o f  m iss in g  va lu e s  p ro d u ce d  by o th e r  respon den ts .
The re g re s s io n  m odels c o n s tru c te d  in  th is  c h a p te r  u t i l is e  a l l  
f o u r  m easures o f  th e  dependen t v a r ia b le ,  b u t  o n ly  one m easure f o r  
each o f  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s . The sources o f  a l l  th e  v a r ia b le  
m easurem ents w i l l  now  be d e sc rib e d , a long  w ith  th e  c r i t e r ia  
em ployed to  s e le c t th e  m easures w h ich  were chosen f o r  each 
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le .
Where re fe re n ce s  are  made in  th e  fo llo w in g  d is c u s s io n  to  th e  
c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n ts  be tw een v a r ia b le  m easures, th e  re a d e r 
s h o u ld  c o n s u lt  A p p e n d ix  12-1, w h ich  co n ta in s  tw o  m a tr ice s  o f  
Spearman ra n k -o rd e r  in te rc o r re la t io n s ;  th e  f i r s t  shows th e  
in te rc o r re la t io n s  be tw een a l l  o f  th e  measures o f  th e  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s , w h ile  th e  second shows th e  in te rc o r re la t io n s  betw een a l l  
o f  th e  m easures o f  each v a r ia b le  (b o th  dependent and indepe nden t). 
Those in te rc o r re la t io n s  betw een in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  m easures th a t  
a re  g re a te r  th a n  0.5 are  h ig h lig h te d .
The segment o f  th e  second m a tr ix  w h ic h  is  o f  im p o rta n ce  fo r  
d e te c t in g  c o l l in e a r i t y  be tw een in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  measures is  th e  
lo w e r  r ig h t-h a n d  t r ia n g le .  The re c ta n g u la r  segment o f  th e  m a tr ix  
c o n ta in s  th e  in te r c o r re la t io n s  betw een th e  dependent and 
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  m easures, w h ile  th e  u p p e r le f t -h a n d  t r ia n g le  o f 
th e  m a tr ix  c o n ta in s  th e  in te rc o r re la t io n s  betw een th e  dependent 
v a r ia b le  measures.
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The In c id e n ce  o f  L ic e n s in g
T h is  v a r ia b le ,  th e  dependen t v a r ia b le ,  was o p e ra tio n a liz e d  u s in g  tw o  
d i f fe r e n t  m easures, th e  L icensee Sales In d e x  (LSI) and th e  L ic e n s o r 
Incom e In d e x  (L II) .
B o th  o f  these  m easures axe concerned  w ith  th e  re la t iv e ,  r a th e r  
th a n  th e  a b so lu te , le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i ty .  L ic e n s in g  is  m easured 
as a p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e  o th e r  tw o  p r in c ip a l fo rm s  o f  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g , e x p o r t in g  and FDI. The a n a ly s is  th e re fo re  p a ra lle ls  to  
some e x te n t th e  s tu d ie s  cond uc te d  by  T e les io  (1979), C o n tra c to r  
(1985) and Adam (1985) w h ic h  a l l  used v a r ia b le s  m easuring  th e  
r e la t iv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  lic e n s in g .^
B o th  th e  LSI and th e  L I I  u t i l is e  da ta  d e r iv e d  fro m  a num ber o f  
q u e s tio n n a ire  responses, com bined w ith  in fo rm a tio n  o b ta in e d  fro m  
A n n u a l R e po rts  and A ccoun ts . B o th  in d ic e s  were deve loped  a long  
th e  lin e s  o f  th o se  used by T e le s io  (1979).** The fo rm e r focuses upon  
th e  sa les  o f  th e  lice n se e , w h ile  th e  la t t e r  is  based upon  th e  incom e 
d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  lice n se e  by  th e  lic e n s o r.
In  o rd e r  to  c a lc u la te  license e  sales i t  was necessary  to  know  
th e  r o y a lty  ra te  cha rged  b y  th e  lic e n s o r. As ro y a lty  ra te s  are  
n o rm a lly  based upon  th e  sa les o f  th e  licensee , th e  la t t e r  can be 
c a lc u la te d  by  d iv id in g  th e  lic e n s o r 's  ro y a lty  incom e by  th e  
pe rcen tag e  ro y a lty  ra te .
Two p rob lem s had to  be overcom e in  c a lc u la t in g  licensee  sales. 
The f i r s t  is  th a t  r o y a lty  ra te s  may v a ry  fro m  agreem ent to  
agreem ent. The q u e s tio n s  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  co n ce rn in g  ro y a lty  
ra te s  w ere  th e re fo re  ph rase d  to  ta k e  th is  in to  accou n t: th e y  asked 
com panies to  in d ic a te  in to  w h ic h  o f  s ix  ca te g o rie s  th e ir  r o y a lty  
ra te s  "u s u a lly "  f e l l .  The ca te g o rie s  chosen can th e re fo re  be v ie w ed  
as th e  average c a te g o rie s  o v e r a l l  agreem ents.
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The second p rob lem  a r is e s  fro m  th e  fa c t  th a t  lic e n s in g  revenues 
are  n o t a lw ays based upon  r o y a lty  ra te s : revenues som etim es ta k e  
th e  fo rm  o f  lum p-sum  paym ents, o r  o f  shares in  th e  licensee . 
Sometimes lic e n s in g  is  u n d e rta k e n  f o r  re c ip ro c a l access to  
te c h n o lo g y , so th a t  r o y a lty  paym ents do n o t r e f le c t  th e  to ta l  
b e n e fits  to  th e  lic e n s o r . To ta k e  accou n t o f  th is  second 
m easurem ent p rob lem  q u e s tio n s  w ere in c lu d e d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  
w h ic h  asked com panies to  in d ic a te  th e  p ro p o r t io n s  o f  t h e ir  lic e n s in g  
revenues w h ic h  came fro m  a n n u a l ro y a lt ie s .
L icensee  sa les was th e re fo re  c a lc u la te d  b y  m u lt ip ly in g  lic e n s o r  
incom e b y  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  th is  incom e w h ic h  came fro m  a n n u a l 
ro y a lt ie s ,  and d iv id in g  th e  p ro d u c t by  th e  ro y a lty  ra te . The LS I was 
th e n  c a lc u la te d  by  e x p re s s in g  lice n se e  sa les as a p ro p o r t io n  o f  t o ta l  
overseas sa les ( ie  e x p o r t  sa les p lu s  sa les by  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  
p lu s  lice n se e  sa les). L icensee  sa les was th u s  expressed  as a 
p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e  sa les d e r iv e d  fro m  a l l  th re e  p r in c ip a l m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  s tra te g ie s : e x p o r t in g , FDI and lic e n s in g . (The da ta  on
overseas sa les accoun ted  f o r  by  e x p o rts  and fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  
w ere o b ta in e d  by  e x tra c t in g  th e  f ig u re s  f o r  overseas tu rn o v e r  
d i r e c t ly  fro m  A n n u a l R e p o rts  and A ccoun ts ).
One d ra w b a ck  o f  th e  LS I is  th a t  i t  ta ke s  no accoun t o f  th e  
re la t iv e  m one ta ry  im p o rta n ce  o f  lic e n s in g . F o r exam ple, tw o  f irm s  
m ig h t have  th e  same le v e l o f  lice n se e  sa les and to ta l  overseas sa les, 
and th e re fo re  have th e  same LSI. However,, one o f  th e  f irm s  c o u ld  
be re c e iv in g  a h ig h e r  r e tu rn  fro m  i t s  license e  because i t  is  ab le  to  
demand a h ig h e r  r o y a lty  ra te . The h ig h e r  th e  ro y a lty  ra te , c e te r is  
p a r ib u s , th e  h ig h e r  w i l l  be th e  lic e n s o r 's  income.
To overcom e th is  d raw b ack , th e  L ic e n s o r Income In d e x  (L II)  was 
com puted. T h is  in d e x  expresses lic e n s in g  incom e as a p ro p o r t io n  o f  
t o ta l  overseas sa les. I t  th e re fo re  p ro v id e s  a measure o f th e  
r e la t iv e  m one ta ry  im p o rta n ce  o f  lic e n s in g  v iz -a -v iz  th e  tu rn o v e r  
g e n e ra te d  by  e x p o rts  and d ire c t  in ve s tm e n t.
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Tab le  12-3 sum m arises th e  way in  w h ic h  b o th  o f  these  in d ic e s  
w ere c o n s tru c te d :
TABLE 12-3
INDICES MEASURING THE RELATIVE INCIDENCE OF LICENSING
Licensee Sales In d e x  = S^ / s0
L ic e n s o r Incom e In d e x  = / S0
W here:
Sl  = L icensee Sales
S q  = T o ta l O verseas Sales
(ie  e x p o r t  sa les p lu s  overseas 
s u b s id ia ry  sa les p lu s  license e  sa les)
1^ = L ic e n s o r 's  Incom e
Size
T h is  v a r ia b le  was m easured by  e x tra c t in g  th e  f ig u re  f o r  g lo b a l 
tu rn o v e r  fro m  th e  A n n u a l R e po rts  and A ccoun ts  o f  th e  com panies in  
th e  sam ple.
Degree o f  in te rn a t io n a liz a t io n
T h is  v a r ia b le ,  w h ich  is  concerned  w ith  th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  
p ro d u c tio n  is  in te rn a tio n a liz e d ,  was m easured by tw o  m ethods. One 
in v o lv e d  th e  co m p u ta tio n  o f  an overseas p ro d u c tio n  in d e x . T h is  was 
o b ta in e d  by  f i r s t l y  s u b tra c t in g  th e  e x p o rts  o f  th e  com panies fro m  
th e i r  overseas sa les to  d e r iv e  th e  le v e l o f  overseas p ro d u c tio n , and 
th e n  e x p re ss in g  th is  as a p ro p o r t io n  o f g lo b a l tu rn o v e r .
The a lte rn a t iv e  m ethod in v o lv e d  th e  use o f  responses to  
Q u e s tio n  2, P a rt (b), in  S e c tion  IV  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , w h ich  asked 
com panies to  re v e a l th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e ir  R&D e x p e n d itu re s  w h ich  
were in c u r re d  by overseas s u b s id ia r ie s . Research has in d ic a te d  th a t
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th e  am ount o f  R&D u n d e rta k e n  by fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  is  h ig h ly  
c o r re la te d  w ith  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  t o ta l  sales accoun ted  f o r  by 
fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  [M a n s fie ld  and Romeo (1979)]. Because these  
tw o  v a r ia b le s  are  h ig h ly  re la te d , th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  t o ta l  R&D 
spen d in g  accoun ted  f o r  by overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  can be used as a 
p ro x y  f o r  th e  degree to  w h ich  p ro d u c tio n  is  in te rn a tio n a liz e d .
I t  was dec ided  to  use the  p ro p o r t io n  o f R&D in c u rre d  ab road  in  
th e  re g re s s io n  ana lyses, ra th e r  th a n  th e  overseas p ro d u c tio n  in d e x , 
because th e  la t t e r  had a c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  g re a te r  th a n  0.5 
w ith  a n o th e r in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  measure. The p ro p o r t io n  o f
overseas R&D a lso  had a c o r re la t io n  o f  g re a te r  th a n  0.5 w ith  a 
d i f fe r e n t  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  measure, b u t th is  was s m a lle r th a n  
th e  c o r re la t io n  re p o r te d  f o r  th e  overseas p ro d u c tio n  in d e x .
The d e c is io n  to  use th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f overseas R&D was
re in fo rc e d  by th e  fa c t  th a t  th e re  were 13 more cases a v a ila b le  f o r
th is  m easure th a n  fo r  th e  overseas p ro d u c tio n  in d e x .
R esearch In te n s ity
T h is  v a r ia b le  was m easured in  th re e  ways, a l l  d e r iv e d  d ir e c t ly  fro m  
responses to  Q u e s tio n  2, P a rts  (a) and (c), in  S e c tion  IV  o f  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire . The f i r s t  measure is  s im p ly  th e  am ount o f  R&D 
e x p e n d itu re , c la s s if ie d  in to  s ix  ca tego ries . (A lth o u g h  respon den ts  
w ere asked to  p ro v id e  a f ig u re  f o r  th e  a b so lu te  le v e l o f  R&D
e x p e n d itu re , o n ly  26 d id  so, and th e re fo re  th is  r a t io - le v e l m easure 
was n o t used in  th e  a n a lys is ). The second is  R&D e x p e n d itu re  
exp ressed  as a pe rcen tage  o f to ta l  tu rn o v e r ,  w h ile  th e  th i r d  is  the  
num ber o f  em ployees engaged in  R&D a c t iv it ie s .
A lth o u g h  more cases were a v a ila b le  fo r  b o th  th e  f i r s t  and th e  
t h i r d  o f  these  m easures, i t  was dec ided  to  use th e  second m easure: 
R&D e x p e n d itu re  expressed  as a percen tage  o f tu rn o v e r . T h is  arose 
fro m  th e  fa c t  th a t  the  o th e r  tw o  measures had c o r re la t io n  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  w ith  o th e r  in d epe nden t v a r ia b le  measures g re a te r  th a n  
0.5. The f i r s t  m easure had th re e  such in te rc o r re la t io n s ,  w h ile  the
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t h i r d  had tw o. The second m easure had no such c o rre la t io n s .
L e ve l o f  P a ten t O w nersh ip
T h is  v a r ia b le  was m easured by  u s in g  th e  responses to  Q u es tion  3, 
P a rt (a), in  S e c tion  IV  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , w h ic h  asked f o r  th e  
num ber o f  UK p a te n ts  h e ld  by  each company, c la s s if ie d  in to  s ix  
ca te g o rie s .
L e v e l o f  In te rn a t io n a l P a te n t R e g is tra t io n
T h is  v a r ia b le  was m easured in  tw o  ways, b o th  o b ta in e d  fro m  
responses to  Q ues tion  3, P a rts  (b) and (c) re s p e c tiv e ly , in  S e c tion  IV  
o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . The f i r s t  m easure s im p ly  re co rd e d  th e  num ber 
o f  c o u n tr ie s  in  w h ic h  com panies re g is te re d  t h e ir  p a te n ts , c la s s if ie d  
in to  s ix  ca te g o rie s , w h ile  th e  second re co rd e d  th e  a b so lu te  am ount 
o f  e x p e n d itu re  in c u r re d  a n n u a lly  in  f i l i n g  p a te n ts  in  overseas 
c o u n tr ie s .
T h is  second m easure was n o t used in  th e  re g re s s io n  ana lyses 
because i t  had c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  g re a te r  th a n  0.5 w ith  fo u r  
o th e r  in d epe nden t v a r ia b le  m easures, and a much s m a lle r num ber o f  
cases th a n  th e  f i r s t .
P ro d u c t D iv e rs if ic a t io n
T h is  v a r ia b le  was m easured in  tw o  ways, b o th  o f  w h ic h  in v o lv e d  th e  
use o f  in fo rm a tio n  o b ta in e d  fro m  a secondary  source , Dun & 
B ra d s tre e ts 's  Key B r i t is h  E n te rp r is e s  1984, w h ich  l is te d  th e  p ro d u c t 
g roup s  in  w h ich  UK com panies and t h e ir  dom estic  s u b s id ia r ie s  were 
a c tiv e . These p ro d u c t g roup s  were based upon th e  1980 v e rs io n  o f  
th e  S tand a rd  In d u s t r ia l  C la s s if ic a t io n  [S IC (80)]} w h ich  c la s s if ie s  
in d u s t r ia l  sec to rs  in to  a num ber o f  D iv is io n s , w h ich  are  th e n  
f u r th e r  b ro ke n  down in to  a num ber o f  C lasses.
The f i r s t  m easure o f  p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  is  s im p ly  th e  
num ber o f  SIC(80) D iv is io n s  in  w h ic h  th e  com panies were in v o lv e d .
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The second m easure in v o lv e d  c re a tin g  a H e r f in d h a l in d e x , based 
upon th e  num ber o f  C lasses w h ic h  w ere l is te d  u n d e r each o f  th e  
D iv is io n s  in  w h ich  th e  com panies w ere re p resen ted .
The way in  w h ich  th e  H e r f in d h a l in d e x  was c o n s tru c te d  is  
show n be low :
£ * i 2
i=l
Herfindhal index of = 1 ----------
product diversification n
£ > i )2
i=l
Where: Xj_ = number of Classes within
Divisions i to n of SIC(80)
T h is  in d e x  ta ke s  a ccou n t n o t o n ly  o f  th e  num ber o f  p ro d u c t 
g roup s  in  w h ich  th e  com panies were a c tiv e , b u t a lso  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  
o f  th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s  among those  g roups. Thus a com pany w h ich  was 
l is te d  u n d e r s e v e ra l p ro d u c t g roups , b u t whose o u tp u t  was h ig h ly  
c o n c e n tra te d  in  o n ly  one o f  them , was c la s s if ie d  as h a v in g  a lo w  
degree o f  d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  a cco rd in g  to  th is  in d e x . A company whose 
o u tp u t  was e q u a lly  d iv id e d  among se ve ra l p ro d u c t g roups  was 
c la s s if ie d  as more h ig h ly  d iv e rs if ie d .
N e ith e r  o f  th e  tw o  m easures o f p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  had 
c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  g re a te r  th a n  0.5 w ith  any o f th e  o th e r  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  m easures, and b o th  had th e  same num ber o f  
cases. I t  was th e re fo re  dec ided  to  use the  second measure in  th e  
re g re s s io n  ana lyses, because o f  th e  m e rits  o f  th e  H e rf in d h a l in d e x  
as d e sc rib e d  in  th e  p re v io u s  p a rag rap h .
G eog raph ica l D iv e rs if ic a t io n
T h is  v a r ia b le  was m easured in  a s im ila r  way to  the  p re v io u s  
v a r ia b le .  Two measures were c o n s tru c te d , th e  f i r s t  o f  w h ich  s im p ly  
in v o lv e d  u s in g  A n nua l R eports  and A ccounts  to  id e n t i f y  the  num ber 
o f  c o u n tr ie s  in  w h ich  th e  com panies had overseas s u b s id ia r ie s .
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The second in v o lv e d  th e  c re a t io n  o f  a H e r f in d h a l in d e x , based 
upon  d a ta  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  f i r s t  q u e s tio n  in  S e c tion  IV  o f th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  w h ich  asked com panies to  re v e a l th e  percen tage  o f 
t h e ir  g lo b a l tu rn o v e r  th a t  was gen e ra te d  in  each o f  seven overseas 
m a rke ts : Europe (e x lu d in g  th e  UK), N o rth  Am erica, L a t in  Am erica,
A s ia , A fr ic a ,  the  M id d le  East and A u s tra la s ia . The H e rf in d h a l in d e x  
was c o n s tru c te d  in  e x a c t ly  th e  same m anner as th e  in d e x  fo r  
p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ,  excep t th a t  re p re se n te d  tu rn o v e r  in  each 
o f  th e  seven overseas m arke ts .
A lth o u g h  more cases were a v a ila b le  f o r  th e  f i r s t  o f  these  tw o  
m easures, i t  was dec ided  to  use th e  second measure in  th e  
re g re s s io n  ana lyses. T h is  was due to  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  f i r s t  
m easure had a c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  g re a te r  th a n  0.5 w ith  one o f  
th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  m easures, whereas th e  second had no such 
c o r re la t io n .  The use o f  th is  second m easure was a lso  deemed to  be 
d e s ira b le  to  m a in ta in  co n s is te n cy , as th e  H e r f in d h a l in d e x  had been 
chosen as th e  bas is  f o r  m easuring  p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n .
C o d if ia b i l i t y  o f  K now -how
T h is  v a r ia b le  was m easured fro m  d a ta  d e r iv e d  fro m  Q uestion  14 in  
S e c tio n  I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , w h ic h  asked th e  com panies to  re v e a l 
th e  fo rm  in  w h ic h  th e ir  kn o w -h o w  was g e n e ra lly  lice n se d  to  
u n re la te d  overseas com panies. F o u r ca te g o rie s  o f  know  how were 
id e n t i f ie d  in  the  q u e s tio n : docum ented in fo rm a tio n , m a n u fa c tu rin g  
p rocess equ ipm ent, o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  and th e  t ra in in g  o f  
lice n se e  p e rson ne l. R espondents were asked to  in d ic a te  the  e x te n t 
to  w h ic h  th e ir  lic e n s e d  kn o w -h o w  f e l l  in to  each o f these fo u r  
c a te g o rie s , by ra n k in g  each c a te g o ry  on a sca le  o f 1 to  4 (w here  
l= n e v e r and 4=always).
A measure o f  c o d i f ia b i l i t y  was d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  re s u lt in g  da ta  
by  d e d u c tin g  th e  sum o f th e  ra n k in g s  a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  la s t  tw o  
c a te g o rie s  o f  know -h ow  fro m  th e  sum o f th e  ra n k in g s  a t t r ib u te d  to  
th e  f i r s t  tw o  ca te g o rie s . T h is  p a r t ic u la r  fo rm u la  was used because 
th e  f i r s t  tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f kn o w -h o w  (docum ented in fo rm a tio n  and
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m a n u fa c tu r in g  p rocess equ ipm en t) e n ta i l  a h ig h  degree o f  
c o d if ic a t io n ,  w h ile  th e  o th e r  tw o  c a te g o rie s  (o rg a n iz a tio n a l b a c k -u p  
and th e  t ra in in g  o f  lice n se e  p e rso n n e l) in v o lv e  a lo w  degree o f 
c o d if ic a t io n .
O rg a n iz a tio n a l S tru c tu re
T h is  v a r ia b le  was m easured fro m  d a ta  d e r iv e d  fro m  Q uestion  4 in  
S e c tio n  IV  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , w h ic h  asked respon den ts  to  c la s s ify  
t h e ir  com pany's w o r ld w id e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re  in to  one o f  th e  
fo llo w in g  seven c a te g o rie s :
(a) O rgan ized g lo b a lly  by  p ro d u c t d iv is io n s
(b) O rgan ized g lo b a lly  by  geo g ra p h ic  d iv is io n s
(c) O rgan ized g lo b a lly  by  fu n c t io n a l d iv is io n s  
(m a rke tin g , fin a n c e , e tc)
(d) O rgan ized d o m e s tic a lly  by p ro d u c t o r  fu n c t io n a l d iv is io n s , 
w ith  an in te rn a t io n a l d iv is io n  f o r  overseas o p e ra tio n s
(e) O rgan ized d o m e s tic a lly  by p ro d u c t o r  fu n c t io n a l d iv is io n s , 
w i th  geo g ra p h ic  d iv is io n s  fo r  overseas o p e ra tio n s
( f)  M a tr ix  o r  g r id  s t ru c tu re ,  ie  o rgan ized  g lo b a lly  by some
c o m b in a tio n  o f  p ro d u c t a n d /o r geo g raph ic  a n d /o r fu n c t io n a l
d iv is io n s ,  in v o lv in g  a s h a r in g  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  across 
d iv is io n s
(g) H o ld in g  com pany s tru c tu re ,  ie  o rgan ized  by in d iv id u a l 
s u b s id ia r ie s , each la rg e ly  autonom ous
Since th e  'o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re ' v a r ia b le  was m easured a t 
th e  n o m in a l le v e l,  i t  was necessary to  c rea te  dummy v a r ia b le s  f o r  
each o f  these  seven ca te g o rie s . The e f fe c t  o f  c re a tin g  these  
dum m ies, how ever, was to  s p l i t  th e  80 cases w h ich  were a v a ila b le  f o r  
th e  q u e s tio n  as a w ho le  among th e  seven dummy v a r ia b le s , th e re b y  
re d u c in g  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f any s ta t is t ic a l  v a l id i t y  be ing  o b ta in e d  fo r  
any o f  these  v a r ia b le s .
A s in g le  dummy was th e re fo re  c re a te d  fo r  use in  the  re g re ss io n  
m odels. T h is  d is t in g u is h e d  betw een those  o rg a n iz a tio n a l s tru c tu re s  
th a t  w ere deemed to  c e n tra liz e  expe rience  o f overseas o p e ra tio n s
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[c a te g o r ie s  (d) and ( f ) ]  and th o se  th a t  were b e lie v e d  to  fra g m e n t 
th is  expe rience  [c a te g o r ie s  (a) to  (c) p lu s  (e) and (g )]. The fo rm e r 
were recoded as 1, th e  la t t e r  as 0.
12.3.3 V a ria b le  Recodings
In  d e v e lo p in g  th e  l in e a r  m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  m odels i t  was dec ided  
to  keep th e  va lues  o f  a l l  f iv e  o rd in a l v a r ia b le s  po ly to m o us , r a th e r  
th a n  g roup  them  in to  d ich o to m ie s , because th e  c re a t io n  o f dummy 
v a r ia b le s  n e c e s s a rily  in v o lv e s  a loss  o f  in fo rm a tio n . I t  was, 
how eve r, necessary to  recode th re e  o f  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  
s in ce  th e ir  va lues  co rre sp o n d  to  c lass in te rv a ls .^  These v a r ia b le s  
w ere  're se a rch  in te n s ity ',  ' le v e l o f  p a te n t o w n e rsh ip ' and 'le v e l o f  
in te rn a t io n a l p a te n t r e g is t ra t io n '.  I t  was assumed, in  accordance 
w ith  th e  sugg es tion  o f  B la lo c k  (1972, p84), th a t  th e  va lu e s  f o r  each 
o f  these  v a r ia b le s  f e l l  on th e  m id p o in t o f  a c lass in te rv a l.
The upperm ost c lass in te rv a ls  o f  these  v a r ia b le s  posed a 
p ro b le m  because th e y  are  bounded by  in f in i t y  and th e re fo re  had  no 
n a tu ra l 'm id -p o in ts ' to  w h ich  th e  va lu e s  fa l l in g  in to  them c o u ld  be 
recoded. An a r b it r a r y  m id p o in t was th e re fo re  assumed fo r  each o f 
th e  upp e rm os t c lass in te rv a ls .  S ince o n ly  a sm a ll p ro p o r t io n  o f  
re sp o n d e n ts  t ic k e d  th e  upperm ost ca te g o ry  fo r  each o f  these th re e  
v a r ia b le s , i t  is  u n l ik e ly  th a t  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  a r b it r a r y  m id p o in ts
Q
w i l l  have  in tro d u c e d  any s e r io u s  b ia s  in to  th e  re s u lts .
The way in  w h ich  th e  va lu e s  o f  these  th re e  in d e p e n d e n t 




INDEPENDENT ORDINAL VARIABLE RECODINGS
VARIABLE QUESTIONNAIRE INITIAL RECODED RECODED
LABEL CATEGORIES CODING VARIABLE LABEL VALUES
RD3 < 1.0 % 1 RD3R 0.5 %
1.0-2.5 % 2 1.75 %
2.5-5.0 % 3 3.75 %
5.0-7.5 % 4 6.25 %
7.5-10.0 % 5 8.75 %
> 10.0 % 6 20.0 %





> 1,000 6 2,000





> 50 6 60
The dependent v a r ia b le  was m easured by an in d e x  o f re la t iv e  
lic e n s in g  in te n s ity ,  o f  w h ich  lic e n s in g  income was a c o n s t itu e n t 
e lem ent. S ince lic e n s in g  incom e was m easured in  term s o f c lass 
in te rv a ls ,  th e  va lu e s  f o r  each case were recoded to  the  m id -p o in ts  
o f  c lass  in te rv a ls .  The fa c t  th a t  th e  upperm ost c lass in te rv a ls  are 
open-ended  d id  n o t pose a p rob lem , how ever. In  th e  case o f  kn o w ­
how lic e n s in g , no va lu e s  f e l l  in to  th e  upperm ost ca tegory . In  th e  
case o f  p a te n t lic e n s in g  o n ly  one va lu e  f e l l  in to  the  upperm ost 
c a te g o ry , and th e  p re c ise  f ig u re  fo r  th is  was o b ta in e d  because th e  
re s p o n d e n t answ ered the  fo llo w -u p  p a r t  o f  Q uestion  6 in  S ec tion  I I  
o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  w h ich  asked fo r  an exact f ig u re  (£24 m il l io n  in  
th is  case).
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The m anner in  w h ic h  th e  dependen t v a r ia b le  was m easured, f o r  
b o th  p a te n t and kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g , is  d e p ic te d  in  Tab le  12-5.
TABLE 12-5
DERIVATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEASURES
RELATIVE PATENT LICENSING INTENSITY
Patent Licensee Sales Index (PLSI)
Patent Licensor Income Index (PLII)
Where: PLSI = Patent licensee sales index = PLS/OVTURNOV + PLS 
PLS = Patent licensee sales = PATY1R x PATLCRYR/PATLCRRR 
PLII = Patent licensor income index = PATY1R/0VTURN0V + PLS
OVTURNOV = Overseas turnover 
PATY1R = Patent licensing income 
PATLCRYR = Proportion of patent licensing income 
derived from royalties 
PATLCRRR = Average patent licensing royalty rate
RELATIVE KNOW-HOW LICENSING INTENSITY
Know-how Licensee Sales Index (KHLSI)
Know-how Licensor Income Index (KHLII)
Where: KHLSI = Know-how licensee sales index = KHLS/OVTURNOV + KHLS 
KHLS = Know-how licensee sales = KHLCY1R x KHLICRYR/KHLICRRR 
KHLII = Know-how licensor income index = KHLCY1R/OVTURNOV + KHLS
OVTURNOV = Overseas turnover 
KHLCY1R = Know-how licensing inccme 
KHLICRYR = Proportion of know-how licensing income 
derived from royalties 
KHLICRRR = Average know-how licensing royalty rate
The way in  w h ic h  th e  va lu e s  o f  th e  c o n s t itu e n t p a rts  o f  th e  
dependen t v a r ia b le  were recoded is  shown in  Tab le  12-6. The 
up p e rm o s t ca te g o rie s  o f  th re e  o f  these  com ponent v a r ia b le s  (the  
average p a te n t and kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  ro y a lty  ra te s , as w e ll as 
kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  incom e) had no v a lu e s  fa l l in g  in to  them. As a 
r e s u lt  th e re  was no need to  ass ign  an a r b it r a r y  m id p o in t to  t h e ir  
recoded  va lues . T h is  is  re f le c te d  in  th e  n i l  e n tr ie s  in  th e  f in a l  




RECODINGS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE CONSTITUENTS






RELATIVE PATENT LICENSING INTENSITY
Patent licensing inccme
PATLICY1 < 0.1 m 1 
0.1-1.0 m 2 
3-5 m 3 
5-10 m 4 
10-20 m 5 
> 20 m 6






Proportion of patent licensing inccme derived frcm royalties
PATLICRY 100 % 1 
90-100 % 2 
50-90 % 3 
20-50 % 4 
10-20 % 5 
< 10 % 6
Average patent licensing royalty rate






PATLICRR < 1 % 1
1-2.5 % 2 
2.5-5 % 3 
5-7.5 % 4 
7.5-10 % 5 
> 10 % 6







KHLICY1 < 0.1 m 1 
0.1-1.0 m 2 
3-5 m 3 
5-10 m 4 
10-20 m 5 
> 20 m 6





Proportion of know-how licensing inccme derived from royalties
KHLICRY 100 % 1 
90-100 % 2 
50-90 % 3 
20-50 % 4 
10-20 % 5 
< 10 % 6
Average know-how licensing royalty rate






KHLICRR < 1 % 1
1-2.5 % 2 
2.5-5 % 3 







> 10 % 6
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12.3.4 V ariab le  T ra n s fo rm a tio n s
In  a d d it io n  to  th e  re c o d in g  o f  c e r ta in  v a r ia b le s , each v a r ia b le  was 
exam ined to  de te rm in e  w h e th e r a tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  i t s  sca le  o f 
m easurem ent was a p p ro p r ia te .
S tand a rd ized  s c a t te rp lo ts  o f  each v a r ia b le  a g a in s t th e  
dependent v a r ia b le  w ere p roduced . The e ffe c ts  o f  a num ber o f  
t ra n s fo rm a tio n s  upon th e  s tre n g th  o f  th e  l in e a r  f i t  betw een these  
v a r ia b le s  were th e n  a s ce rta in e d . T h is  was ach ieved  by p ro d u c in g  
s ta n d a rd iz e d  s c a t te rp lo ts  f o r  each o f  th e  tra n s fo rm e d  v a r ia b le s  
a g a in s t th e  dependen t v a r ia b le  and com paring  th e  a d ju s te d  
s ta t is t ic  f o r  th e  tra n s fo rm e d  re la t io n s h ip s  w ith  t h e ir  o r ig in a l 
v a lu e s .^  The e f fe c t  o f  t ra n s fo rm in g  th e  dependent v a r ia b le s  was 
a lso  exam ined as p a r t  o f  th is  process.
F ive  com m only-used tra n s fo rm a tio n s  were em ployed: th e  lo g it ,
squa re  ro o t,  n a tu ra l lo g , n e g a tive  re c ip ro c a l and squa re  
1 7t ra n s fo rm a tio n s .
The lo g i t  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  was fo u n d  to  be th e  m ost e f fe c t iv e
1 O
tra n s fo rm a tio n  f o r  th e  dependent v a r ia b le . T h is  was a t t r ib u ta b le  
to  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  va lu e s  o f th e  dependent v a r ia b le  to o k  th e  fo rm  
o f  p ro p o r t io n s  and are  th e re fo re  d e lim ite d  by th e  va lu e s  o f 0 and 1. 
R egress ion  cu rves  are  u n l ik e ly  to  be l in e a r  w here dependent 
v a r ia b le s  are m easured in  te rm s o f  p ro p o r t io n s  s ince  changes in  
p re d ic to r  v a r ia b le s  a t th e  extrem e ends o f  th e ir  sca les are u n l ik e ly  
to  p roduce  much change in  th e  p ro p o r t io n . F o r m ost p ro p o r t io n s  a 
's ig m o id ' re g re s s io n  c u rv e  is  l i k e ly  to  be found .
Three tra n s fo rm a tio n s  are com monly used fo r  p ro p o r t io n s : th e
a rcs in e , p r o b i t  and lo g i t  t ra n s fo rm a tio n s  [A rm ita g e  (1971, p355)].
These have th e  e f fe c t  o f  e x te n d in g  th e  ends o f the  scale more th a n  
th e  m idd le  and th u s  in c re a s in g  the  l ik e l ih o o d  o f a l in e a r  f i t  be ing  
o b ta in e d  w ith  o th e r  v a r ia b le s . S ince these tra n s fo rm a tio n s  a l l  have 
v e ry  s im ila r  e ffe c ts  th e  lo g i t  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  was used fo r  th e  
dependent v a r ia b le . A lo g i t  is  s im p ly  a fo ld e d  n a tu ra l (ie  n a p ie r ia n )
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lo g a r ith m , w h ich  ta ke s  th e  fo llo w in g  fo rm  fo r  a v a r ia b le ,  y : ^
y
L o g it  (y) = lo g e —  = lo g e y  -  lo g e (1-y)
i-y
The lo g i t  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  was a lso  c a rr ie d  o u t on tw o  o f  th e  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s , p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  and g e o g ra p h ic a l 
d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ,  s ince  these  were a lso  m easured in  te rm s o f 
p ro p o r t io n s . H owever, th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f va lu e s  fo r  these  tw o  
v a r ia b le s  was n o t as h ig h ly  skewed as th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  va lu e s  f o r  
th e  dependent v a r ia b le ;  as a r e s u lt  th e  im p a c t o f  th is  
t ra n s fo rm a tio n  was fo u n d  to  be less p o w e r fu l th a n  some o f  th e  
o th e r  tra n s fo rm a tio n s  w h ic h  were ap p lie d .
These o th e r  tra n s fo rm a tio n s  (th e  square  ro o t,  n a tu ra l lo g , 
n e g a tiv e  re c ip ro c a l and squa re  tra n s fo rm a tio n s )  f a l l  a long  w h a t 
M o s te lle r  and T ukey (1977, p79) c a lle d  a " la d d e r o f  re -e x p re s s io n s ". 
On th is  la d d e r each re -e x p re s s io n  re p re se n ts  a d i f fe r e n t  pow er to  
w h ic h  a v a r ia b le  may be ra is e d . The pow ers co rre s p o n d in g  to  these  
fo u r  t ra n s fo rm a tio n s  are  in c lu d e d  in  Tab le  12-7, w h ich  a lso  c o n ta in s  
a d d it io n a l pow ers a t e ith e r  end o f  th e  la d d e r.
TABLE 12-7  
POWER TRANSFORMATIONS
Power (p) -n  . . .  -2  -1  - 1 / 2  # 1/2 1 2 . . .  n
Transform ation (x ° )  l / x n . . .  1/x^ 1/x l/«/x Inx / x  x x^ . . . xn
T here  is  no e n try  f o r  zero in  th is  ta b le  because th e  va lu e s  fo r  
any v a r ia b le  x  e le va te d  to  th e  pow er zero s im p ly  become co n s ta n ts , 
w h ic h  are  o f no use f o r  d a ta  tra n s fo rm a tio n  purposes. The "#" 
e n try  in  the  ta b le  can be rega rded  as a "pseudo zero". The 
t ra n s fo rm a tio n  w h ich  co rre spond s  to  th is  e n try  is  the  n a tu ra l lo g  o f 
x  ( ie  loggX o r  In x ). T h is  is  o b ta in e d  when p=0 by assum ing th a t  x 
ta ke s  th e  fo rm  Jjx^ ^ dx  [M o s te lle r  and Tukey (1977, p80)].
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The pow er t ra n s fo rm a tio n s  w here p>0 have th e  p ro p e r ty  th a t  
th e y  are  a l l  m ono ton ic  in  th e  same d ire c t io n , ie  as x  inc reases  xP 
a lso  inc reases . Where p<0, how ever, th e  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  is  m ono ton ic  
decreas ing . T h e re fo re  in  o rd e r  to  m a in ta in  the  same o rd e r in g  o f 
o r ig in a l and tra n s fo rm e d  d a ta  n e g a tiv e  va lues  o f  x  a re  used when 
p<0. F o r exam ple, w here  p = - l th e  a p p ro p r ia te  tra n s fo rm a tio n
a c c o rd in g  to  Tab le  12-7 is  th e  re c ip ro c a l (1/x). T h is  causes th e
sca le  o f  m easurem ent to  re v e rs e  i t s e l f  s ince la rg e  va lues  o f x  g ive  
sm a ll va lu e s  o f  1/x and sm a ll v a lu e s  o f  x  g ive  la rg e  va lu e s  o f  1/x.
When th e  n e g a tiv e  re c ip ro c a l (-1 /x ) is  used in s te a d  th e  sca le  o f
m easurem ent does n o t re v e rs e  i t s e l f  s ince  sm a ll va lu e s  o f  x  g iv e  
sm a ll va lu e s  o f  -1 /x  and so on.
The p a r t ic u la r  tra n s fo rm a tio n s  w h ich  im prove  th e  goodness o f 
f i t  be tw een any tw o  v a r ia b le s  depend upon th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  
th e  c u rv a tu re  be tw een th o se  v a r ia b le s . I f  a cu rve  s lopes 
c o n t in u o u s ly  dow nw ards (ie  is  m o n o to n ic a lly  decreas ing ) as th e  
in d e p e n d e n t (ie  x) v a r ia b le  in c reases , then  tra n s fo rm a tio n s  w ith
I C
v a lu e s  o f  p< l on th e  x  v a r ia b le  are a p p ro p ria te . The s tre n g th  o f  
th e  pow er t ra n s fo rm a tio n  necessary to  ach ieve  the  c lo s e s t 
a p p ro x im a tio n  to  l in e a r i t y  w i l l  depend upon the  degree o f  c u rv a tu re . 
The g re a te r  th e  c u rv a tu re  th e  g re a te r  w i l l  be th e  a b so lu te  v a lu e  o f  
p necessary  to  in duce  l i n e a r i t y . ^  The th re e  tra n s fo rm a tio n s  w ith  
va lu e s  o f  p< l w h ic h  were em ployed were thus  o rd e re d  in  te rm s o f 
t h e ir  s tre n g th : th e  w eakest was th e  square  ro o t tra n s fo rm a tio n , th e  
lo g  tra n s fo rm a tio n  was s tro n g e r, w h ile  the  n e g a tive  re c ip ro c a l 
t ra n s fo rm a tio n  was th e  s tro n g e s t.
These tra n s fo rm a tio n s  have th e  e ffe c t o f  c o r re c tin g  w h a t 
E r ic k s o n  and N osanchuck (1977, p l04) re fe r  to  as "upw ard  s tra g g le "  
in  th e  x  v a r ia b le . T h is  d e scrib es  the  s itu a t io n  in  w h ich  sm a ll 
v a lu e s  o f  th e  v a r ia b le  are  c lum ped r e la t iv e ly  c lose to g e th e r, w h ile  
th e  la rg e r  va lu e s  t r a i l  o f f .  T ra n s fo rm in g  the  v a r ia b le  w ith  a pow er 
t ra n s fo rm a tio n  o f p< l has th e  e f fe c t  o f  p u l l in g  in  the  upp e r va lu e s  
o f  th e  v a r ia b le  in to  th e  m ain body  o f the  da ta  and sp read ing  o u t 
th e  s m a lle r  va lues .
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In  s itu a t io n s  w here th e  c u rv e  betw een tw o  v a r ia b le s  inc reases
m o n o to n ic a lly  w ith  in c reases  in  the  x  v a r ia b le ,  pow er
tra n s fo rm a tio n s  w ith  va lu e s  o f  p> l are a p p ro p r ia te  fo r  th e  x 
17v a r ia b le .  Once aga in  th e  s tre n g th  o f  th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  w i l l  
in c rease , th e  h ig h e r  th e  a b s o lu te  v a lu e  o f  p. The squa re  
t ra n s fo rm a tio n  (p=2) w h ich  was em ployed on th e  da ta  had th e  e f fe c t  
o f  c o r re c t in g  w h a t E r ic k s o n  and N osanchuck (op c it )  c a l l "dow nw ard  
s tra g g le "  in  th e  x  v a r ia b le . T h is  re fe rs  to  th e  s itu a t io n  in  w h ic h  
th e  h ig h  va lues  are  bunched and th e  lo w e r ones are  more spread  
o u t. The use o f  th e  square  tra n s fo rm a tio n  s tre tc h e s  the  la rg e r  
va lu e s  o u t more th a n  th e  s m a lle r ones th u s  p ro d u cu n g  a more even 
d is t r ib u t io n .
A p a r t ic u la r  p rob lem  was faced  when th e  n a tu ra l lo g  and 
n e g a tiv e  re c ip ro c a l tra n s fo rm a tio n s  were a p p lie d  to  th e  'degree o f 
in te rn a t io n a liz a t io n ' v a r ia b le  (RD4) and th e  'p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ' 
v a r ia b le  (PR0DVER2). T h is  a rose fro m  the  fa c t  th a t  these tw o  
v a r ia b le s  had 18 and 10 cases re s p e c t iv e ly  w h ich  to o k  on va lu e s  o f  
zero. S ince the  n a tu ra l lo g  and n e g a tiv e  re c ip ro c a l o f  zero are b o th  
u n d e fin e d , these tw o  tra n s fo rm a tio n s  w o u ld  have had th e  e f fe c t  o f  
re n d e r in g  these  cases as m iss in g  va lu e s , th u s  re d u c in g  th e  p o te n t ia l 
num ber o f  degrees o f  freedom  in  th e  m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  e qu a tions .
In  o rd e r  to  overcom e th is  p rob lem  a dev ice  suggested by  
M o s te lle r  and T ukey  (1977, p l l2 )  was em ployed; th is  in v o lv e d  
" s ta r t in g "  th e  da ta  by add ing  a sm a ll f ra c t io n  to  th e  zero va lu e s  so 
th a t  th e ir  tra n s fo rm e d  va lu e s  w o u ld  n o t become d e fin e d  as m iss ing . 
The " s ta r t "  used f o r  RD4 was th e  "p o p u la r"  v a lu e  o f  0.25; a s m a lle r 
v a lu e  o f  0.0025 was used fo r  PRODVER2 to  ta ke  accoun t o f  th e  lo w e r 
v a lu e s  o b ta in e d  f o r  th is  v a r ia b le .
A n o th e r o f th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s , th e  c o d i f ia b i l i t y  o f  
kn o w -h o w  (CODIFKH), was a lso  p ro b le m a tic  in  th a t  11 n e g a tive  
va lu e s , as w e ll as 24 va lu e s  o f  zero, were reco rded . T h is  p rob lem  
was more s im p ly  overcom e by a re -s c a lin g  o f  the  data. T h is  
in v o lv e d  add ing  th e  v a lu e  5 to  each case, w h ich  had th e  e ffe c t o f  
s h i f t in g  th e  o r ig in a l scale o f  '-4  to  3' to  a new sca le  o f 1 to  8 .
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N e ga tive  and zero va lu e s  w ere th u s  e lim in a te d . Because th e  
u n d e r ly in g  v a r ia b le  w h ich  was be in g  m easured is  an in h e re n t ly  
o rd in a l v a r ia b le  th is  re -s c a lin g  does n o t d is to r t  th e  re la t io n s h ip  
betw een th e  va lu e s  re co rd e d  and th e  phenom enon be ing  measured.
The tra n s fo rm a tio n s  a p p lie d  to  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  
w ere fo u n d  to  p roduce  th e  b e s t f i t s  w ith  each o f  th e  fo u r  v e rs io n s  





VARIABLES PLSI PLII KHLSI khli:
GLTURNOV Log Log Log Log
RD4 Square Square NR NR
RD3 Log NR NR NR
UKPATS NR NR N.A. N.A.
REGISPAT SR SR N.A. N.A.
PR0DVER2 Square Square Square Square
GRDIV NR Square NR NR
ORGSTR - - - -
CODIFKH N.A. N.A. NR NR
Wh e r e :  Log = N a t u r a l  l og
SR = S q u a r e  R o o t  
NR = N e g a t i v e  R e c i p r o c a l  
N . A .  = No t  A p p l i c a b l e
-  = No T r an s f  o r m a t  i o n
I t  can be seen fro m  Tab le  12-8 th a t  the  bes t tra n s fo rm a tio n  
fo r  th e  's ize ' v a r ia b le  (GLTURNOV) was th e  log  tra n s fo rm a tio n . T h is  
tra n s fo rm a tio n  reduced  th e  u p w a rd  s tra g g le  th a t  was ap p a re n t fro m
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th e  fre q u e n c y  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  th is  v a r ia b le .  [The lo g  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  
o f  com pany size is  a v e ry  com m only used p ro ce d u re  in  bus iness 
resea rch , eg M il le r  & Droge (1986), Cohen & P fe f fe r  (1986)].
The fre q u e n c y  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  'p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ' 
v a r ia b le  (PR0DVER2), on th e  o th e r  hand, e x h ib ite d  dow nw ard  
s tra g g le , w h ich  was reduced  by means o f  th e  square  tra n s fo rm a tio n . 
The v a r ia b le s  m easuring  th e  le v e l o f  UK p a te n t re g is t ra t io n  
(UKPATS) and th e  c o d i f ia b i l i t y  o f  kn o w -h o w  (CODIFKH) were b o th  
tra n s fo rm e d  by means o f  th e  n e g a tiv e  re c ip ro c a l t ra n s fo rm a tio n , 
w h ile  th e  v a r ia b le  m easu ring  th e  le v e l o f  in te rn a t io n a l p a te n t 
r e g is t r a t io n  (REGISPAT) was tra n s fo rm e d  by means o f  th e  less 
p o w e r fu l squa re  ro o t  t ra n s fo rm a tio n . The tra n s fo rm a tio n s  used fo r  
th e  re m a in in g  v a r ia b le s  v a r ie d  in  accordance w ith  th e  p a r t ic u la r  
m easure used fo r  th e  dependen t v a r ia b le .  The o rg a n iz a tio n a l 
s t ru c tu re  v a r ia b le  was e n te re d  in to  th e  re g re s s io n  e q u a tions  in  i t s  
o r ig in a l s ta te  because i t  was c o n s tru c te d  as a d icho tom ous (dummy) 
v a r ia b le ;  t ra n s fo rm a tio n s  w o u ld  th e re fo re  have had no im pact upon 
th e  s tre n g th  o f  i t s  f i t  w ith  th e  dependent v a r ia b le  measures.
12.3.5 P a te n t and K now -how  L ic e n s in g  M odels
The v a r ia b le s  s p e c if ie d  f o r  in c lu s io n  in  each o f  th e  fo u r  m u lt ip le  
re g re s s io n  m odels w h ic h  were deve loped  are l is te d  in  Table 12-9. 
The m odels were deve loped  u s in g  th e  re g re s s io n  p ro ce d u re  on SPSSX.
The m ethod o f  m odel c o n s tru c t io n  em ployed was th e  's te p w ise ' 
m ethod. As a r e s u lt ,  n o t a l l  o f  th e  s p e c if ie d  v a r ia b le s  were 
e n te re d  in to  each e q u a tio n . The s tepw ise  m ethod is  e s s e n tia lly  a 
c o m b in a tio n  o f  tw o  a lte rn a t iv e  m ethods o f  v a r ia b le  se le c tio n , nam ely 
'fo rw a rd ' and 'b a ckw a rd ' s e le c tio n . U nder th e  s tepw ise  m ethod 
v a r ia b le s  are  co n s id e re d  f o r  e n try  in to  th e  re g re ss io n  e q u a tio n  one 
a t a tim e , based upon  th e  a b s o lu te  s tre n g th  o f  th e ir  p a r t ia l  
c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  w ith  th e  dependent v a r ia b le . In  o rd e r f o r  a 
v a r ia b le  to  q u a li fy  f o r  e n try  th e  p ro b a b i l i t y  assoc ia ted  w ith  i t s  F 
v a lu e  had to  be less th a n  an e s ta b lis h e d  c r i te r io n  know n as the  






LNPLSIj_ = bQ + b-L GLTURNOVli + b2 RD42i + b 3 RD33i
+ b4 UKPATS4i + b5 REGISPAT5i + bg PRODVER26i
+ by GRDTVy^ + bg ORGSTRg^ + ej_
LNPLIIj^  = bg + b± GLTURNOV1:L + b2 RD42i + b3 RD33i
+ b4 UKPATS4i + b5 REGISPAT5i + b6 PRODVER26i
+ by GRDIVy^ + bg ORGSTRg^ + ej_
KNCW-PCW LICENSING MODELS
LNKHLSIj_ = bg + b}_ GLTURNOV-j^  ■+■ b2 RD42j^ + b3 RD33j^
+ b4 PRODVER24i + b5 GRDiy5i + b6 CODIFKHgj_
+ by ORGSlKy t- S.^
LNKHLIIi = bg + b± GLTURNOV-^ + b2 RD42i + b3 RD33i
+ b4 PRODVER24i + bg GRDIY5i + b5 CODIFECH6i 
+ by ORGSTRyj_ +
Since th e  a d d it io n  o f  new v a r ia b le s  has th e  e f fe c t  o f  a lte r in g
th e  F va lu e s  o f  v a r ia b le s  a lre a d y  en te red , each v a r ia b le  in  the
e q u a tio n  was re -e xam ined  when a new v a r ia b le  was en te red  to
d e te rm in e  w h e th e r th e  p ro b a b i l i t y  assoc ia ted  w ith  i t s  F v a lu e
w asless th a n  an e s ta b lis h e d  c r i te r io n  know n as th e  'p ro b a b il i t y  o f
F - to -re m o v e ' (POUT) w h ic h  was se t a t 0.15. I f  th e  p ro b a b il i t y  was
g re a te r  th a n  th is  c r i te r io n  th e  v a r ia b le  was e lim in a te d  fro m  the
e q u a tio n . To p re v e n t th e  same v a r ia b le  fro m  be ing  re p e a te d ly
e n te re d  and rem oved, th e  v a lu e  o f PIN m ust be less th a n  the  v a lu e
o f  POUT. The s e le c tio n  o f  v a r ia b le s  te rm in a te d  when no more
18v a r ia b le s  met the  e n try  o r  rem o va l c r i te r ia .
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In  c o n s tru c t in g  th e  re g re s s io n  m odels, m iss ing  va lues  were 
d e a lt  w ith  us in g  th e  'p a irw is e ' tre a tm e n t a v a ila b le  on SPSSX. T h is  
m ethod in v o lv e d  th e  c a lc u la t io n  o f  p a r t ia l  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  
betw een any p a ir  o f  v a r ia b le s  based on a l l  cases w h ich  had com ple te  
in fo rm a tio n  fo r  th e  tw o  v a r ia b le s , re g a rd le ss  o f  w h e th e r these  cases 
had m iss in g  va lu e s  f o r  any o th e r  v a r ia b le s . The a lte rn a t iv e  m ethod 
o f d e a lin g  w ith  m iss ing  va lu e s , th e  'l is tw is e ' tre a tm e n t, w o u ld  have 
in v o lv e d  th e  e lim in a tio n  o f  a l l  cases w h ich  had m iss in g  va lu e s  on 
any s in g le  v a r ia b le ,  and w o u ld  th u s  have re s u lte d  in  a much s m a lle r 
sam ple size.
I t  s h o u ld  be re cogn ised , how ever, th a t  th e re  is  a t r a d e -o f f  
betw een th e  la rg e r  num ber o f  cases made a v a ila b le  u n d e r th e  
p a irw is e  p ro ce d u re  and th e  degree o f  co n fid e n ce  w h ich  can be 
p laced  in  th e  s ta t is t ic s  w h ic h  re s u lt .  S ig n ific a n c e  le v e ls , f o r  
exam ple, m ust be v ie w ed  w ith  c a u tio n  i f  th e  p a irw is e  command is  
used. F o r more d e ta ils ,  see N o rus is  (1985, p37).
The fo u r  m odels p rodu ced  by th e  s tepw ise  re g re s s io n  p roced u re , 
w ith  p a irw is e  tre a tm e n t o f  m iss in g  va lu e s , are show n in  Tab le 12-10. 
T h is  ta b le  re p o r ts  th e  p a r t ia l  re g re s s io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  assoc ia ted  
w ith  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  e n te red  in  each m odel, t h e ir  t  
va lu e s , and th e  o rd e r  in  w h ic h  th e y  were in c lu d e d  u n d e r th e  
s te p w ise  p roced u re . The degrees o f  freedom  fo r  each m odel are a lso  
re p o r te d , a long  w ith  t h e ir  o v e ra l l F va lues , and th e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f
■p
d e te rm in a tio n , m easured by th e  a d ju s te d  s ta t is t ic .
A f u l le r  se t o f  re g re s s io n  s ta t is t ic s  are c o n ta in e d  in  A p pend ix  
12-2, w h ic h  a lso  l is t s  th e  Pearson p ro d u c t moment c o r re la t io n  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  between th e  v a r io u s  p a ir in g s  o f  dependent and 
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s . E xa m in a tio n  o f  these c o r re la t io n  m a trice s  
re v e a ls  th a t  tw o  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  in  th e  PLSI m odel ( the  REGISPSAT 
and GRDIV v a r ia b le s )  had a c o r re la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  w ith  each o th e r  
g re a te r  th a n  0.5, th u s  s ig n a llin g  a p o te n t ia l m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  
p rob lem . As the  GRDIV v a r ia b le  had a sm a lle r c o r re la t io n  w ith  th e  
dependent v a r ia b le  th a n  th e  REGISPAT v a r ia b le , i t  was th e  cand ida te  













































I I I I I I
CO 'O’ 
(O lO













o h - CO O  CO
CM <T i—» •-» CO r—I O  r *
CM to
r-t CM i—i <-4 r-4 t—l i - l  CMw
*
*
O  r -
<  < ^  in r—1 1 1




t 1 CO O (—1 rH tO
I 1 m  O CM CO CO1 1 >__i
O  CO O  CM
*
*
1 1 to  CO i—^ 1 1
I 1 <tT rH 1 1
I i 1 1
(O CM
O oo o) <—■ 
. • co


















X 4-1 01 II
a« 3« o (0 ai II
to ip 3 p r— II
c r as ii
c c c 03 03 T3 11
to to to 03 O  II
-C t~ as •r- E  II
4-1 P p r 5
p a O  II
P p p as -p II
1) a) 0) c 4-1 II
P p p -r- 03 0) II
P p p r— II
1) 0) 1) ■a C -Q II
A a 12 03 •r- (0 II
■a U  II
r— f— 3 C •<“  II
0) 0) 03 I— o *— II
> > > a •r- a  ii
(U (U 03 c 01 a  n
r — 1— i— ■i- 3 (0 II
01 03 03 ■p CJ 4-1 II
a u a o c O II
c c c c •P C  II
f0 to (0
U u o 03 4 - 03 II
• r— o
lp tp tp 03 a  i i
•r- • (— (0 p (0 II
C z — •»- 03 •i— II
01 01 a i p T3 P  II
• r- — •r- (0 P to II
03 cn CO > o >  II
236
CHAPTER 12
H ow ever, as th e  o th e r  th re e  models d id  n o t possess any 
v a r ia b le s  w ith  tro u b le so m e  in te rc o r re la t io n s ,  th e  GRDIV v a r ia b le  was 
re ta in e d  in  th e  PLSI m odel, th e re b y  e n s u rin g  an a ccu ra te  com parison  
betw een a l l  fo u r  m odels. N e ve rthe less , any a lte ra t io n s  to  th e  
c o n c lu s io n s  re g a rd in g  th e  n ine  hypo theses w h ich  w o u ld  have 
o c c u rre d  as a r e s u lt  o f  d e le t in g  th e  GRDIV v a r ia b le  are  re p o r te d  in  
S e c tio n  12.5.
I t  can be seen fro m  Tab le  12-10 th a t  24 cases were used to  
p rodu ce  th e  p a te n t lic e n s in g  m odels, w h ile  32 cases w ere used to  
c re a te  th e  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  m odels. The m odel w h ic h  p rodu ced  
th e  b e s t f i t  f o r  th e  a v a ila b le  d a ta  was th e  PLSI m odel; 74 p e r cen t 
o f  th e  to ta l  v a r ia t io n  o f  th e  dependent v a r ia b le  was accoun ted  f o r  
by  th e  s ix  v a r ia b le s  th a t  were e n te red  in to  th e  model. I t  sh o u ld  be 
no ted , how ever, th a t  th e  e f fe c t  o f  d e le t in g  th e  GRDIV v a r ia b le  ( fo r  
th e  reasons o u t lin e d  above) w o u ld  have been to  reduce  th e  m odel's 
Ra to  0.57. N e ve rth e le ss , th is  v a lu e  w o u ld  s t i l l  have re p re se n te d  a 
f i t  w h ic h  was b e t te r  th a n  those  p rodu ced  by any o f  th e  o th e r  th re e  
m odels.
2
The KHLSI m odel p rodu ced  th e  n e x t bes t f i t ,  w ith  an Ra o f  0.52 
o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  e n try  o f  f iv e  o f  th e  in d epe nden t v a r i a b l e s . T h e  
re m a in in g  tw o  m odels were b o th  c o n s tru c te d  fro m  fo u r  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s . O f these  th e  K H L II m odel p roduced  th e  b e t te r  f i t ,  w ith  an 
Ra o f  0.49, com pared to  a v a lu e  o f  0.43 p roduced  by th e  P L II model.
A lth o u g h  th e  v a lu e s  o f th e  p a r t ia l  re g re s s io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  
a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  are re p o r te d  in  Tab le 12- 
10, i t  is  th e  s ign  a t t r ib u te d  to  these  va lues  w h ich  is  o f  im po rtance  
ra th e r  th a n  th e  va lu e s  them se lves, s ince  th e  aim o f  th e  re g re s s io n  
a n a ly s is  was h y p o th e s is - te s t in g  ra th e r  th a n  fo re c a s tin g . The 
in fe re n c e s  th a t  can be d raw n  fro m  th e  re g re s s io n  re s u lts  are 
d iscussed  in  S ec tion  12.5. B e fo re  any co n c lu s io n s  were draw n, 
how ever, th e  v a l id i t y  o f  th e  fo u r  models was ana lysed u s in g  
c o n v e n tio n a l d ia g n o s tic  te ch n iq u e s , th e  re s u lts  o f  w h ich  are 




12.4.1 In tro d u c t io n
The te rm  're g re s s io n  d ia g n o s tic s ' is  com m only used to  d escrib e  a se t 
o f  s ta t is t ic a l  te c h n iq u e s  w h ic h  are em ployed to  check th e  
assum ptions  o f  m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  a n a lys is  and th e  v a l id i t y  o f  th e  
s ta t is t ic s  w h ich  are  p roduced . These te ch n iq u e s  in v o lv e  th e  
a n a ly s is  o f  re s id u a ls , b o th  to  check th e  assum ptions o f  re g re s s io n  
a n a lys is  and to  assess th e  in f lu e n c e  o f o u t lie rs ,  and th e  a n a lys is  o f  
th e  c o r re la t io n  betw een in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  in  o rd e r  to  d e te c t th e  
presence o f  c o l l in e a r ity .  As th e  c o l l in e a r i t y  p rob lem  has a lre a d y  
been d e a lt  w ith ,  th e  re m a in d e r o f  th is  s e c tio n  w i l l  fo cus  on th e  
a n a ly s is  o f  re s id u a ls .
The re s id u a ls  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  fo u r  models were ana lysed , 
f i r s t l y ,  to  d e te c t any v io la t io n  o f  th e  assum ptions u n d e r ly in g  
re g re s s io n  a n a lys is . The th re e  m a jo r assum ptions o f re g re s s io n  
a n a ly s is  can be d e sc rib e d  u n d e r th e  fo llo w in g  head ings: n o rm a lity ,
h o m o sce d a s tic ity , and independence o f  e r ro r  [B erenson and L e v in e  
(1983, p517)]. Each o f  these  are  now cons ide red .
12.4.2 N o rm a lity
T h is  assum ption  re q u ire s  th a t  th e  v a lu e  o f th e  dependent v a r ia b le  
be n o rm a lly  d is t r ib u te d  fo r  a l l  va lu e s  o f th e  in d epe nden t v a r ia b le s . 
I t  was checked by v is u a l in s p e c tio n  o f no rm a l p r o b a b il i t y  p lo ts  o f  
s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a ls  (see A p p e n d ix  3). S tanda rd ized  re s id u a ls  (ie  
re s id u a ls  d iv id e d  by es tim a tes  o f  t h e ir  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia tio n s ) were 
used s ince  th e y  make i t  e a s ie r to  ju dge  the  re la t iv e  m agn itude  o f  
re s id u a ls ; th e y  are expressed  in  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n  u n its  above o r  
be low  th e  mean.
The y -axes  o f th e  no rm a l p r o b a b il i t y  p lo ts  c o n ta in  th e  
c u m u la tiv e  d is t r ib u t io n s  o f  obse rved  s ta n d a rd ize d  re s id u a ls , w h ile  
th e  x -a x e s  c o n ta in  th e  c u m u la tiv e  d is t r ib u t io n s  o f s ta n d a rd ize d  
re s id u a ls  th a t  w o u ld  be expected  in  no rm a l d is t r ib u t io n s  w ith  th e
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same mean and v a r ia n c e  as th e  re s id u a ls . I f  th e  tw o  d is t r ib u t io n s  
are  id e n t ic a l a s t ra ig h t  (45°) l in e  w o u ld  re s u lt .
In s p e c tio n  o f  th e  fo u r  p lo ts  in  A p pend ix  3 re ve a ls  th a t  th e  
n o rm a lity  assum ption  h o ld s  w e ll f o r  th e  th i r d  re g re s s io n  e q u a tio n  
(KHLSI) b u t less w e ll f o r  th e  o th e r  th re e . The c u m u la tiv e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  p lo ts  o f  th e  P L II and K H L II re s id u a ls  are  v e ry  s im ila r ;  
a t e i th e r  end o f  b o th  axes th e  obse rved  p o in ts  c lu s te r  a roun d  th e  
45° l in e ,  whereas th e y  f a l l  be low  th e  45° l in e  betw een the  va lu e s  
o f  0.25 and 0.75, r e f le c t in g  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  obse rved  c u m u la tiv e  
p ro p o r t io n  is  s m a lle r th a n  th e  expected  c u m u la tiv e  p ro p o r t io n  o v e r 
these  va lu e s  (the  m idd le  range o f  th e  p r o b a b il i t y  d is tr ib u t io n s ) .
The shape o f  th e  c u m u la tiv e  p r o b a b il i t y  p lo t  o f  the  PLSI 
re s id u a ls  con fo rm s le a s t w e ll to  th e  n o rm a lity  assum ption . I n i t ia l l y  
th e  obse rved  re s id u a ls  are  a l l  above th e  45° l in e , in d ic a t in g  th a t  
th e re  are  more n e g a tiv e  re s id u a ls  th a n  expected . A t th e  h a lf-w a y  
p o in t  on b o th  axes th e  p a t te rn  reve rses  i t s e l f ,  w ith  th e  obse rved  
re s id u a ls  a l l  ly in g  be low  th e  45° l in e , in d ic a t in g  th a t  th e re  are 
fe w e r p o s it iv e  re s id u a ls  th a n  expected .
In  in te rp re t in g  these  p lo ts  i t  sh o u ld  be bo rne  in  m ind th a t  one 
s h o u ld  n o t expec t th e  obse rved  s ta n d a rd ize d  re s id u a ls  to  be e x a c t ly  
no rm a l, s ince  some d e v ia t io n  is  to  be expected because o f  sam p ling  
v a r ia t io n  [N o ru s is  (1985, p28)]. In  a d d it io n , i t  s h o u ld  be no ted  th a t  
th e  u s u a l te s ts  o f  hypo theses  and con fid ence  in te rv a ls  used in  
re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  are  'ro b u s t ' a g a in s t d e p a rtu re s  fro m  th e  
n o rm a lity  assum ption ; th e o re t ic a l and e x p e rim e n ta l ev idence 
in d ic a te s  th a t  o n ly  extrem e d e p a rtu re s  o f  the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  
dependen t v a r ia b le  fro m  n o rm a lity  can y ie ld  s p u r io u s  re s u lts  
[K le inb aum , K uppe r and M u lle r  (1988, p l0 8 )].
Thus, whereas th e re  may be some d o u b t ab o u t th e  n o rm a lity  
a ssum p tio n  h o ld in g  fo r  th e  PLSI v a r ia b le , th e re  is  n o th in g  to  
suggest th a t  th e  d ive rg ence  betw een th e  obse rved  and expected 
p a t te rn  o f  s ta n d a rd ize d  re s id u a ls  f o r  th is  v a r ia b le  can be rega rded  
as 'e x tre m e ', and th e re fo re  no reason  to  c a l l th e  re g re s s io n  re s u lts
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f o r  th e  f i r s t  e q u a tio n  in to  q u e s tio n  on the  bas is  o f  th is  c r ite r io n .
12.4.3 H o m o sce d a s tic ity
T h is  assum p tio n  re q u ire s  th a t  th e  v a r ia t io n  a roun d  th e  re g re s s io n  
lin e  be c o n s ta n t f o r  a l l  va lu e s  o f  th e  in depe nden t v a r ia b le s . Thus, 
th e  v a r ia t io n  o f  th e  dependen t v a r ia b le  m ust be th e  same when th e  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  have  lo w  va lu e s  as when th e y  have h ig h
va lues .
The assum ptio n  was e v a lu a te d  by v is u a l in s p e c tio n  o f
s ta n d a rd iz e d  p a r t ia l  re g re s s io n  p lo ts  f o r  each o f  th e  in d epe nden t 
v a r ia b le s  (see A p p e n d ix  3). The y -axes  o f  these  p lo ts  c o n ta in  th e
s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a ls  f o r  th e  dependent v a r ia b le  when i t  is
p re d ic te d  fro m  a l l  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  e x c lu d in g  the  i t h  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le ;  th e  x -a xe s  c o n ta in  th e  s ta n d a rd ize d  re s id u a ls  
f o r  th e  i t h  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  when i t  is  p re d ic te d  fro m  a l l  o f  th e  
o th e r  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s . T h is  m ethod o f p lo t t in g  re s id u a ls  has 
th e  e f fe c t  o f  rem o v ing  th e  l in e a r  e f fe c t  o f  the  o th e r  in depe nden t 
v a r ia b le s  fro m  b o th  v a r ia b le s  u n d e r in v e s t ig a t io n  (ie  th e  i t h  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  and th e  dependent v a r ia b le ) .
I f  th e  h o m o s c e d a s tic ity  assum ption  ho ld s  fo r  each o f  th e  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  we w o u ld  expec t to  f in d  no obse rva b le  p a t te rn  
in  th e  p a r t ia l  re g re s s io n  p lo ts ;  th e  s ta n d a rd ize d  re s id u a ls  s h o u ld  be 
ra n d o m ly  d is t r ib u te d  in  a band ab o u t th e  h o r iz o n ta l s t ra ig h t  lin e  
th ro u g h  zero. H owever, i f  th e  assum ption  does n o t h o ld  fo r  any o f  
th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  we w o u ld  expect to  observe  a " fa n n in g  
e f fe c t"  in  th e  p a t te rn  o f  s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a ls , ie  an in c re a s in g  o r  
decrea s ing  sp read  o f  these  re s id u a ls  a long the  x -a x is ;  th is  w o u ld  be 
ev idence  o f  h e te ro g e n e ity  in  th e  v a ria n ce s  o f the  dependent v a r ia b le  
a t each le v e l o f  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le .
O f th e  19 p lo ts  c o n ta in e d  in  A p p e n d ix  3 (one fo r  each o f  the  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  e n te re d  in  each o f the  fo u r  re g re ss io n  
e q u a tio n s ) none e x h ib its  an o b v io u s  " fa n n in g ' p a tte rn  c o n s is te n t 
w ith  h e te ro s c e d a s tic ity . I t  s h o u ld  be acknow ledged, how ever, th a t
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th e  num ber o f  d a ta  p o in ts  in  these  p lo ts  ( p a r t ic u la r ly  those  re la t in g  
to  p a te n t lic e n s in g ) make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  reach  a b s o lu te ly  f irm  
c o n c lu s io n s  fo r  a num ber o f  th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s . The p lo t  f o r  
UKPATS a g a in s t P L II, f o r  exam ple, m ig h t be co n s tru e d  as e x h ib it in g  
an in c re a s in g  spread  o f  s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a ls .
N e ve rthe less , even i f  th e  hom ogene ity  o f  v a r ia n c e  assum ption  
w ere to  be c a lle d  in to  q u e s tio n  fo r  th is  v a r ia b le , th e re  w o u ld  need 
to  be v e ry  c le a r ev idence  o f  v io la t io n  b e fo re  th e  re g re s s io n  re s u lt  
conce rned  c o u ld  be c a lle d  in to  q u e s tio n  because s tu d ie s  have shown 
th a t  m ild  d e p a rtu re s  fro m  v a r ia n c e  hom ogene ity  do n o t have too  
adve rse  an e f fe c t  upon re s u lts .  I t  is  o n ly  when d a ta  show v e ry  
o b v io u s  and s ig n if ic a n t  d e p a rtu re s  fro m  hom ogene ity  th a t  th is  
a ssum p tio n  can be deemed to  have been v io la te d  [K le inbaum , K uppe r 
and M u lle r  (1988, p l0 8 )]. I t  can th e re fo re  be conc lude d  th a t  th e re  
are  no g rounds fo r  q u e s tio n in g  th e  re s u lts  o f  th e  re g re s s io n  
ana lyses on th e  bas is  o f  th e  h o m o s c e d a s tic ity  c r i te r io n .
12.4.4 Independence o f E r ro r
T h is  assum ption  re q u ire s  th a t  th e  e r ro r  te rm s (ie  the  re s id u a l 
d iffe re n c e s  betw een obse rved  and p re d ic te d  v a lu e s  o f  th e  dependent 
v a r ia b le )  s h o u ld  be in d e p e n d e n t f o r  a l l  va lues  o f th e  in d epe nden t 
v a r ia b le s . I t  is  u s u a lly  checked fo r  da ta  th a t  are c o lle c te d  o v e r a 
p e r io d  o f  tim e  in  o rd e r  to  ensure  th a t  th e re  is  no 'a u to c o rre la t io n ' 
e f fe c t  among success ive  v a r ia b le s , ie  th e re  is  no c o r re la t io n  betw een 
a p a r t ic u la r  o b s e rv a tio n  and th e  va lu e s  th a t  preceed and succeed i t .
A lth o u g h  the  re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  can be d e sc rib e d  as a c ro s s - 
s e c t io n a l s tu d y , in  th e  sense th a t  a l l  th e  da ta  were c o lle c te d  f o r  a 
s in g le  tim e  p e r io d  (1984), th is  assum ption  was n e ve rth e le ss  checked 
in  o rd e r  to  ensure th a t  th e re  was no a u to c o r re la t io n  between 
v a r ia b le s  w ith in  th e  tim e  p e r io d  when th e  sample da ta  were 
c o lle c te d . T h is  assum ption  was th e re fo re  e va lu a te d  by p lo t t in g  th e  
s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a ls  in  th e  o rd e r  in  w h ich  the  da ta  were o b ta in e d  
(see A p p e n d ix  3).
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As no d is c e rn a b le  p a t te rn  is  a p p a re n t in  th e  casew ise p lo ts  o f  
th e  s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a ls  p ro d u ce d  by each o f  th e  fo u r  m odels, i t  
can be assumed th a t  th e  e r ro r  te rm s are in d e p e n d e n t o f  one a n o th e r. 
T h is  c o n c lu s io n  was checked by  a p p ly in g  th e  D u rb in -W a tso n  te s t to  
th e  re s id u a ls  p rodu ced  by each o f  th e  fo u r  m odels. The D u rb in -  
W atson s ta t is t ic  (d) is  d e fin e d  in  te rm s o f th e  obse rved  re s id u a ls  (e^ 
and as fo llo w s :
n





An a p p ro x im a te  te s t  suggested  by K e n d a ll (1976, p l64) is  to
a s c e r ta in  w h e th e r d is  c lose  to  th e  v a lu e  zero o r  to  th e  v a lu e  tw o . 
I f  d is  c lose  to  zero i t  w o u ld  in d ic a te  th a t  success ive  re s id u a ls  are 
h ig h ly  p o s it iv e ly  c o r re la te d ; i f ,  how ever, th e y  are  u n c o rre la te d  we 
w o u ld  expec t to  f in d  a v a lu e  o f  d nea r to  2. The va lues  o f  d
p ro d u ce d  by th e  fo u r  m odels a re  show n in  Tab le  12-11. They are, to  
v a ry in g  degrees, a l l  c lose  to  v a lu e  2, th u s  sugg es ting  th a t  
success ive  re s id u a ls  are  u n c o rre la te d .
A more exac t te s t  f o r  d e te c t in g  s e r ia l c o r re la t io n  is  to  compare 
th e  com puted v a lu e  o f  d w ith  th e  u p p e r and lo w e r bounds o f th e  
c r i t ic a l  va lu e s  o f  d (ie  d y  and d^). A v a lu e  o f d g re a te r  th a n  d ^  
in d ic a te s  th e  la c k  o f  any s ig n if ic a n t  p o s it iv e  s e r ia l c o r re la t io n , 
w hereas a v a lu e  o f  d less th a n  d ^  in d ic a te s  th e  e x is ten ce  o f
s ig n if ic a n t  p o s it iv e  s e r ia l c o r re la t io n .  F o r any v a lu e  o f  d fa l l in g  
be tw een d y  and d ^  th e  te s t  is  in c o n c lu s iv e . The same com parisons 
w ith  d j j and d ^  can be made to  te s t  f o r  th e  presence o f  any
n e g a tiv e  s e r ia l c o r re la t io n ,  excep t th a t  d is  th e n  re p la ce d  by th e
s ta t is t ic  4-d.
T h is  more exa c t (2 - ta ile d )  te s t  was a p p lie d  by com paring  the  
va lu e s  o f  b o th  d and 4 -d  a g a in s t th e  a p p ro p r ia te  c r i t ic a l  va lues  o f 
d^j and d-^. These v a lu e s  were o b ta in e d  fro m  th e  ta b le s  co n ta in e d  in  
D u rb in  and W atson (1951, pp!73-175) w h ich  l i s i  c r i t ic a l  va lues  fo r
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v a r io u s  num bers o f  o b s e rv a tio n s , p re d ic to r  v a r ia b le s  and 
co n fid e n ce  in te r v a ls . ^  The re s u lts  o f  th is  com parison , a t th e  2 p e r 




Variable d 4-d dU dL
PLSI 1.78 2.22 1.80 0.64
PLII 1.47 2.53 1.53 0.80
KHLSI 1.85 2.15 1.60 0.92
KHLII 2.08 1.92 1.51 0.98
I t  can be seen fro m  th e  ta b le  th a t  th e  te s t c o n c lu s iv e ly  re je c ts  
th e  presence o f  any s e r ia l c o r re la t io n  among th e  re s id u a ls  p roduced  
by th e  tw o  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  m odels (d and 4 -d  are  b o th  g re a te r  
th a n  d jj)  b u t  is  in c o n c lu s iv e  f o r  th e  tw o  p a te n t lic e n s in g  models (d 
is  less  th a n  d j j b u t g re a te r  th a n  d ^  in  b o th  cases).
D esp ite  the  in c o n c lu s iv e  n a tu re  o f  th e  te s ts  f o r  the  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g  m odels, th e  D u rb in -W a tso n  s ta t is t ic s  do n o t p roduce  any 
ev idence  w h ic h  s u p p o rts  th e  e x is te n ce  o f  s e r ia l c o r re la t io n . There 
is  th e re fo re  no reason  to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e re  was any s ig n if ic a n t  
a u to c o r re la t io n  betw een th e  p re d ic to r  v a r ia b le s  w ith in  th e  tim e  
p e r io d  when th e  sam ple d a ta  were c o lle c te d , and th e re fo re  no 
g roun ds  f o r  c a ll in g  th e  re g re s s io n  re s u lts  in to  q u e s tio n  on the  bas is  
o f  th is  c r i te r io n .
12.4.5 D e te c tio n  o f  O u tl ie rs
F o llo w in g  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  re s id u a ls  to  check th e  v a l id i t y  o f  the  
assum ptions  u n d e r ly in g  th e  re g re s s io n  m odels, th e  re s id u a ls  were 
exam ined fu r th e r  in  o rd e r  to  d e te c t th e  presence o f  any o u t lie rs .  
An o u t l ie r  among a se t o f  re s id u a ls  is  one th a t  is  much la rg e r  th a n
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th e  re s t  in  a b s o lu te  va lu e . D e te c tio n  o f  o u t l ie r s  is  im p o r ta n t 
because th e ir  presence can s ig n if ic a n t ly  a f fe c t  th e  le a s t-s q u a re s  
f i t t i n g  o f  a model.
The common m ethod o f  d e a lin g  w ith  o u t l ie r s  is  to  de le te  th e  
o b s e rv a tio n s  (ie  cases) w h ic h  p roduce  them. H owever, K le inbaum , 
K u ppe r and M u lle r  (1988, p201) w a rn  a g a in s t th e  te m p ta t io n  to  "d a ta  
snoop" by  d is c a rd in g  tro u b le so m e  d a ta  p o in ts  s im p ly  in  o rd e r  to  
p o lis h  th e  f i t  o f  a m odel. They p o in t  o u t th a t  th e  presence o f  an 
o u t l ie r  may s im p ly  in d ic a te  s p e c ia l c ircum stances  w h ich  w a rra n t 
f u r th e r  in v e s t ig a t io n ,  and th e y  recommend th a t  o b s e rv a tio n s  are  n o t 
im m e d ia te ly  d isca rd e d  un less  th e y  are fo u n d  to  re s u lt  fro m  a 
m is ta ke  (eg an e r ro r  in  da ta  re c o rd in g  o r  some o th e r  cause 
in d e p e n d e n t o f  th e  process u n d e r s tu d y ). T h e ir  app roach , w h ich  is  
a lso  recommended by D ra p e r and S m ith  (1981, pp l52-153), is  fo llo w e d  
here . Each company id e n t i f ie d  as an o u t l ie r  was th e re fo re  exam ined 
to  d e te c t any o b v io u s  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  w h ich  w o u ld  e x p la in  i t s  
s ta tu s . None o f  the  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  w h ich  were id e n t if ie d  were 
deemed to  be d e v ia n t enough to  ju s t i f y  th e  d e le t io n  o f  any 
com panies fro m  th e  re g re s s io n  models.
The presence o f  o u t l ie r s  was d e tec ted  by th re e  s ta t is t ic s  th a t  
a re  com m only-used fo r  th is  pu rpose : s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a ls ,
le ve ra g e s  and C ook's d is ta n ce . The va lu e s  fo r  these  s ta t is t ic s  are 
l is te d  in  A p pend ix  3, a lo n g s id e  th e  casew ise p lo ts  o f  th e  
s ta n d a rd iz e d  re s id u a ls .
S tand a rd ized  re s id u a ls  p ro v id e  a m easurem ent o f  th e  re la t iv e  
m agn itu de  o f  re s id u a ls  a roun d  th e  re g re s s io n  lin e . O b se rva tio n s  th a t  
l ie  more th a n  th re e  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n s  above o r  be low  th e  mean o f  
th e  re s id u a ls  are com m only deemed to  be o u t lie rs .  I t  can be seen 
fro m  A p p e n d ix  3 th a t  o n ly  one o f  the  fo u r  re g re s s io n  m odels 
possessed a case w ith  a s ta n d a rd ize d  re s id u a l g re a te r  th a n  th re e . 
T h is  was case 6 in  th e  PLSI model. The company concerned is  
in v o lv e d  in  p a te n t lic e n s in g  o n ly  and ope ra tes  in  the  m o to r 
com ponents in d u s try .  I t  possesses no o b v io u s  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  w h ich  
w o u ld  accou n t fo r  i t s  o u t l ie r  s ta tu s .
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The o th e r  tw o  s ta t is t ic s  used to  id e n t i f y  o u t l ie r s ,  le ve rages  
and C ook's d is ta n ce , m easure th e  'ex trem eness ' o f  an o b s e rv a tio n  
and th e  'in f lu e n c e ' o f  an o b s e rv a tio n  re s p e c tiv e ly . In  A p p e n d ix  3 
fe w e r va lues  are re p o r te d  f o r  C ook's D th a n  are  re p o r te d  fo r  th e  
le ve ra g e  s ta t is t ic s .  T h is  is  because th e  la t t e r  were c a lc u la te d  fro m  
th e  va lu e s  o f th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  ( fo r  w h ich  more da ta  were 
a v a ila b le )  whereas C ook's D was c a lc u la te d  fro m  th e  a v a ila b le  va lu e s  
o f  in d e p e n d e n t and dependen t v a r ia b le s . In  a d d it io n  th e  num ber o f  
cases used to  com pute th e  s ta t is t ic s  v a r ie s  fro m  m odel to  model; 
th is  is  a consequence o f  th e  p a irw is e  m is s in g -v a lu e  tre a tm e n t w h ic h  
was used to  deve lop  th e  re g re s s io n  m odels.
Leverage assesses th e  d is ta n c e  o f  th e  i t h  p re d ic to r  p o in t  
d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  se t o f  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  (X ^» X ^ )  fro m
th e  se t o f  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  means (X^, X 2, .., X^.). The le ve ra ge  
v a lu e , h, f o r  th e  i t h  o b s e rv a tio n  is  d e r iv e d  as fo llo w s :
(X i -  X )2 
(n -  1) S2X
w here  Sx re p re s e n ts  th e  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n  o f  th e  se t o f  X -v a lu e s  
and n re p re se n ts  th e  m inim um  num ber o f  p a irw is e  o b s e rv a tio n s  (ie  
cases). The d is ta n ce  o f  cases fro m  th e  average va lu e s  o f  th e  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  can a lso  be m easured in  te rm s o f  an
a lte rn a t iv e  s ta t is t ic  know n as M aha lanob is ' d is ta n ce . T h is  is  
o b ta in e d  by s im p ly  m u lt ip ly in g  th e  le ve ra ge  v a lu e  by  (n-1).
In te rp re ta t io n  o f  th e  size o f  h^ is  s im p lif ie d  by  th e  fa c t  th a t  i t  
is  bounded as fo llo w s :
-1 /n  ^ h^ k (n -  l) /n
H o a g lin  and Welsch (1978) recommend exam in ing  more c lo s e ly  any 
o b s e rv a tio n  w h ich  has a le ve ra g e  g re a te r  th a n  tw ic e  th e  average 
le ve ra g e  va lu e , ie
h L > 2(k + l) /n
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w here  k  is  th e  num ber o f  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  in  th e  model. T h is  
is  th e  m ethod w h ic h  was em ployed here . The s ta t is t ic s
co rre s p o n d in g  to  tw ic e  th e  average le ve ra ge  va lu e s  f o r  each o f  th e  
fo u r  m odels (and th e  e q u iv a le n t s ta t is t ic s  f o r  M a h a la n o b is1 d is tan ce ) 
a re  l is te d  u n d e r th e  'O u t ly in g  V a lue ' co lum ns a t th e  fo o t  o f  th e  
casew ise p lo ts .
E xa m in a tio n  o f  th e  s ta t is t ic s  in  A p p e n d ix  3 re v e a ls  th a t  f iv e  
cases were id e n t i f ie d  as o u t l ie r s  by  th e  le ve ra g e /M a h a n a lo b is ' 
d is ta n c e  c r i te r io n .  O f these , case 3 was id e n t i f ie d  as an o u t l ie r  in  
a l l  f o u r  models. The com pany concerned  ope ra tes  in  th e  c lo th in g  
in d u s try ,  and is  in v o lv e d  in  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  o n ly . ^  I ts  s ta tu s  
as an o u t l ie r  can pe rhaps  be e x p la in e d  by th e  fa c t  th a t  i t s  m ain 
lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t ie s  are  concerned  w ith  tra d e m a rks  ra th e r  th a n
kn o w -h o w ; these  tra d e m a rks  are  u s u a lly  re g is te re d  in  more th a n  
f i f t y  c o u n tr ie s .
Case 20 was c la s s if ie d  as an o u t l ie r  in  th e  KHLSI m odel. The
com pany concerned ope ra tes  in  th e  o f f ic e  equ ipm en t s e c to r and is  
in v o lv e d  s o le ly  in  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g . I ts  incom e fro m  in d epe nden t 
lice n se e s  am ounted to  27.2 p e r cen t o f  i t s  ne t p r o f i t  f o r  th e  ye a r in  
q u e s tio n ; th is  r e la t iv e ly  h ig h  p ro p o r t io n  may h e lp  to  e x p la in  the  
com pany's o u t l ie r  s ta tu s .
Case 32 was id e n t i f ie d  as an o u t l ie r  in  th e  PLSI and K H LII 
m odels. The com pany conce rned  lice n se s  b o th  p a te n ts  and know -h ow  
and is  a c t iv e  in  th e  m o to r d is t r ib u t io n  in d u s try .  The fa c t  th a t  i t  is  
in v o lv e d  in  w h a t is  e s s e n tia lly  a s e rv ic e  a c t iv i t y  may he lp  to  
e x p la in  i t s  o u t l ie r  s ta tu s .
Case 42 was deemed to  be an o u t ly in g  o b s e rv a tio n  in  th e  PLSI
m odel and in  b o th  o f  th e  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  m odels. I ts  s ta tu s  as 
an o u t l ie r  may be a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  company 
conce rned  has o n ly  one s u b s id ia ry  w h ich  is  a c tiv e  in  lic e n s in g . 
T h is  s u b s id ia ry  license s  b o th  p a te n ts  and know -h ow  and makes i t s  
own d e c is io n s  co n ce rn in g  lic e n s in g .
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Case 61 was c a te g o ris e d  as an o u t l ie r  in  b o th  o f  the  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g  m odels. The com pany concerned  is  s im ila r  to  th e  company 
id e n t i f ie d  in  case 42 in s o fa r  as i t  has o n ly  one s u b s id ia ry  in v o lv e d  
in  lic e n s in g . T h is  s u b s id ia ry  a lso  manages i t s  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t ie s  
(b o th  p a te n t and know -h ow ) in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  th e  g roup .
The s ta t is t ic  re fe r re d  to  as C ook's d is ta n ce  (Dj_ ) measures th e  
in f lu e n c e  o f  an o b s e rv a tio n  ( i)  by  d e te c tin g  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  a l l  
o f  th e  (n) re s id u a ls  are changed when th e  o b s e rv a tio n  is  de le ted . I t  
is  c a lc u la te d  as fo llo w s ,
n
( Y jW  -  Y j ) 2 
j = l  J
D . = --------------------------------
(k + 1) S2
w here  is  th e  p re d ic te d  v a lu e  a d ju s te d  fo r  th e  d e le t io n  o f  th e
J / \
i t h  case, and Y j is  th e  p re d ic te d  v a lu e  w ith  a l l  cases in c lu d e d . The 
num ber o f  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  is  re p re se n te d  by k , w h ile  S 
re p re s e n ts  th e  e s tim a te  o f  th e  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n  o f  Y j .
The v a lu e  o f  m ust be g re a te r  th a n  o r  equa l to  zero, and may 
be a r b i t r a r i ly  la rg e . I t  has been suggested by  Cook and W eisberg 
(1982) th a t  va lu e s  w h ic h  s a t is fy  th e  fo llo w in g  c o n d it io n ,
Di  > i
dese rve  c lo s e r s c ru t in y .  T h is  is  a s im p le  a p p ro x im a tio n  o f  a 
v a lu e  th a t  keeps th e  re g re s s io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  based on d e le tin g  th e  
i t h  o b s e rv a tio n  w ith in  a 50% con fid ence  re g io n  o f  th e  o r ig in a l 
e s tim a tes . T h is  is  th e  m ethod w h ic h  was adopted f o r  d e te rm in in g  
in f lu e n t ia l  o b s e rv a tio n s .
In s p e c tio n  o f  th e  C ook's D s ta t is t ic s  re p o r te d  in  x4.ppendix 3 
re v e a ls  th a t  th e re  were tw o  cases w h ich  had va lu e s  g re a te r th a n  
one: cases 3 and 61. The fo rm e r was ca te g o rise d  as an o u t l ie r  in
b o th  o f  th e  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  m odels, w h ile  the  la t t e r  was deemed
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to  be an o u t l ie r  in  th e  PLSI m odel. The c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  these  
cases have a lre a d y  been re fe r re d  to  as th e y  were id e n t if ie d  as 
o u t l ie r s  by th e  le ve ra g e /M a h a la n o b is ' d is ta n ce  c r i te r io n .
12.5 CONCLUSIONS
H av ing  a s c e rta in e d  th a t  th e  assum ptions u n d e r ly in g  re g re s s io n  
a n a ly s is  d id  n o t appear to  have been s e r io u s ly  v io la te d , in fe re n c e s  
were th e n  d raw n  co n ce rn in g  each o f  th e  n ine  hypo theses d e sc rib e d  
in  S e c tio n  12.2. The hypo theses  are  d iscussed  be low , and th e  
co n c lu s io n s  are  com pared, w here a p p ro p r ia te , w ith  those  o b ta in e d  
by T e le s io  (1979), C o n tra c to r  (1985), Adam (1985) and Z e n o ff (1970).
Size
The fo u r  m odels a l l  p rodu ced  s tro n g  evidence in  s u p p o rt o f  th e  
h y p o th e s is  th a t  th e  r e la t iv e  le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  fa l ls  o f f  as 
MNC size increases. In  each m odel th e  GLTURNOV v a r ia b le  was b o th  
n e g a tiv e  and s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  1% le v e l. The v a r ia b le  was a lso
e n te re d  f i r s t  in  a l l  o f  th e  m odels, in d ic a t in g  th a t  i t  had th e
s tro n g e s t a s s o c ia tio n  w ith  th e  dependent v a r ia b le .
T h is  r e s u lt  is  c o n s is te n t w ith  T e les io 's  f in d in g  th a t  s m a lle r 
f irm s  are  l ik e ly  to  lic e n s e  r e la t iv e ly  more. However, i t  s h o u ld  be 
n o te d  th a t  T e les io  used a r e la t iv e  measure o f size, ie  a com pany's 
t o ta l  tu rn o v e r  re la t iv e  to  th e  tu rn o v e r  o f  th e  la rg e s t company in  i t s  
in d u s try .  The re s u lt  re p o r te d  here  is  based on an a b so lu te  measure 
o f  size.
The o n ly  s tu d y  p r io r  to  T e le s io 's  w h ich  te s te d  th is  h y p o th e s is  
u s in g  an a b s o lu te  m easure o f size [Z e n o ff (1970)] d id  n o t p roduce  a 
s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  r e s u l t . ^  S ince then , how ever, C o n tra c to r  
(1985) fo u n d  th a t  a b s o lu te  size (measured by tu rn o v e r)  was
p o s i t iv e ly  c o rre la te d  w ith  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  (m easured in  b o th
r e la t iv e  and a b so lu te  term s). C o n tra c to r 's  re s u lts  th e re fo re  c o n f l ic t  
w ith  th e  f in d in g s  o f th is  s tu d y . T h is  c o n f l ic t  may be a t t r ib u ta b le
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to  th e  fa c t  th a t  C o n tra c to r 's  s tu d y  was based on d a ta  d e r iv e d  fro m  
US com panies, w hereas th is  s tu d y  was based on UK company data .
Adam (1985) used th e  same m easure o f  re la t iv e  size as T e les io  
had used f o r  h is  s tu d y , b u t fo u n d  th a t  th is  m easure was p o s it iv e ly  
re la te d  to  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  (m easured in  re la t iv e  te rm s). L e a v ing  
as ide  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  how size is  m easured, th is  r e s u lt  c o n tra d ic ts  
th e  f in d in g s  o f th e  p re s e n t s tu d y . As Adam's re s u lts  were d e r iv e d  
fro m  a s u rv e y  o f  UK com panies, th e  n a t io n a l i ty  o f  th e  sample base 
ca n n o t e x p la in  th e  d iffe re n c e . H owever, th e  fa c t  th a t  Adam's s u rv e y  
was n o t c o n fin e d  to  MNCs, b u t  o b ta in e d  da ta  fro m  UK f irm s  w ith  no 
fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  as w e ll as MNCs, is  l i k e ly  to  have had a 
s ig n if ic a n t  im pac t upon h is  re s u lts .  Adam (1985, p l09) c la s s if ie d  h a l f  
o f  h is  sam ple as "sm a ll f irm s "  (ie  f irm s  w ith  to ta l  sa les u n d e r 25% o f 
th e  sa les o f  th e  la rg e s t com pany in  t h e ir  in d u s try ) .
Degree o f  In te rn a t io n a liz a t io n
B o th  p a te n t lic e n s in g  models p rodu ced  ev idence in  s u p p o rt o f  th e  
h y p o th e s is  th a t  th e  re la t iv e  use o f  lic e n s in g  w i l l  f a l l  as f irm s  
in te rn a t io n a liz e  th e ir  p ro d u c tio n . The RD4 v a r ia b le  was en te re d  in  
each o f  these  tw o  m odels and had a n e g a tiv e  s ig n  (as p re d ic te d ). I t  
was ra n k e d  fo u r th  in  im p o rta n ce  among the  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  
e n te re d  in  each model.
The PLSI m odel appears to  p ro v id e  s tro n g e r s u p p o rt f o r  th e  
h y p o th e s is  th a n  th e  P L II model, as th e  RD4 v a r ia b le  en te red  in  the  
fo rm e r had a la rg e r  and more s ig n if ic a n t  t  s ta t is t ic .  However, i f  
th e  GRDIV v a r ia b le  had been d e le te d  fro m  th e  PLSI m odel (because 
o f  th e  m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  p rob lem  d e sc rib e d  in  S ec tion  12.3) th is  w o u ld  
have had  th e  e f fe c t  o f  re d u c in g  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f th is  v a r ia b le 's  t  
s t a t is t ic  to  th e  same le v e l as th a t  a t ta in e d  by th e  GRDIV v a r ia b le  in  
th e  P L II m odel (ie  b e t te r  th a n  10%).
D e sp ite  be ing  en te re d  in  b o th  o f  th e  p a te n t lic e n s in g  m odels, 
th e  RD4 v a r ia b le  was n o t e n te re d  in  e ith e r  o f  th e  know -h ow  
lic e n s in g  models. T h is  suggests th a t  th e  re la t iv e  use o f know -how
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l ic e n s in g  is  n o t re la te d  to  th e  e x te n t o f  a f irm 's  
in te rn a t io n a liz a t io n .
The re s u lts  fro m  th e  tw o  p a te n t lic e n s in g  m odels are c o n s is te n t 
w ith  th o se  o f  T e le s io  and C o n tra c to r , who b o th  fo u n d  a n e g a tive  
a s s o c ia tio n  betw een th e  e x te n t o f  a f i r m ’s in te rn a t io n a l in v o lv e m e n t 
(m easured by th e  pe rcen tage  o f  i t s  t o ta l  sa les m an u fa c tu re d  by 
overseas s u b s id ia r ie s )  and i t s  use o f  lic e n s in g . To th e  e x te n t th a t  
th e  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  p ro d u c tio n  re f le c ts  a f irm 's  expe rience  o f 
o p e ra tin g  in te rn a t io n a l ly ,  we can conc lude  th a t  f irm s  w ith  l i t t l e  
accum u la ted  expe rience  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  are more l ik e ly  to  
ad o p t lic e n s in g .
Research In te n s ity
The m easure fo r  th is  v a r ia b le  (R&D e x p e n d itu re  as a p ro p o r t io n  o f  
tu rn o v e r )  was e n te re d  in  o n ly  one o f  th e  m odels, th e  K H LII model. 
N e ve rth e le ss  i t s  s ig n  was p o s it iv e ,  as p re d ic te d , in d ic a t in g  s u p p o rt 
f o r  th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  th e  r e la t iv e  use o f  lic e n s in g  increases w ith  
re se a rch  in te n s ity .  I t  was a lso  e n te re d  second among the  fo u r  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  in  th is  m odel, and i t s  t  s ta t is t ic  was 
s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  5% le v e l.
T h is  r e s u lt  is  c o n s is te n t w ith  those  p rodu ced  by Z e n o ff, 
T e le s io , and Adam, who a l l  fo u n d  s ig n if ic a n t  and p o s it iv e  
a s s o c ia tio n s  betw een R&D e x p e n d itu re  and lic e n s in g  in te n s ity .
L e v e l o f  P a ten t O w nersh ip
The h y p o th e s is  co n ce rn in g  p a te n t o w n e rsh ip  was s u p p o rte d  by b o th  
o f  th e  p a te n t lic e n s in g  m odels. The UKPATS v a r ia b le  had a p o s it iv e  
s ig n , as p re d ic te d , in d ic a t in g  th a t  th e  le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  in te n s ity  is  
g re a te r  f o r  f irm s  w h ic h  own more p a te n ts . The v a r ia b le  was en te red  
t h i r d  among th e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  in  each o f th e  tw o models.
The PLSI m odel p ro v id e d  s tro n g e r  s u p p o rt f o r  th e  h yp o th e s is , 
as th e  UKPATS v a r ia b le  in  th is  m odel had a la rg e r  t  s ta t is t ic  th a n
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th a t  e n te re d  in  th e  P L II m odel, and was a lso  s ta t is t ic a l ly  more 
s ig n if ic a n t  (a t th e  1% le v e l,  com pared to  a 10% le v e l f o r  th e  P L II 
model).
L e v e l o f  In te rn a t io n a l P a te n t R e g is tra tio n
The m easure w h ich  was em ployed f o r  th is  v a r ia b le ,  REGISPAT, was 
o n ly  e n te re d  in  th e  PLSI model. I ts  s ig n  was n e g a tiv e , c o n tra ry  to  
th a t  w h ic h  was expected , in d ic a t in g  re je c t io n  o f  th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  
l ic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  in c reases  w ith  th e  e x te n t o f  in te rn a t io n a l p a te n t 
re g is t ra t io n .  A lth o u g h  o n ly  e n te re d  s ix th  among th e  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s  fro m  w h ic h  th e  PLSI m odel was c o n s tru c te d , th e  t  s ta t is t ic  
f o r  th is  v a r ia b le  was n e v e rth e le s s  s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  1% le v e l.
D e le tio n  o f  th e  GRDIV v a r ia b le  in  th is  m odel, how ever, w o u ld  
have had  th e  e f fe c t  o f  decreas ing  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  REGISPAT 
v a r ia b le  beyond th e  10% le v e l ( to  11.45%). The r e s u lt  re p o r te d  in  
Tab le  12-10 c o u ld  th e re fo re  be a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  
be tw een these  tw o  v a r ia b le s .
N e ve rth e le ss , i f  we accep t th a t  th e  s ig n  o f  th e  p a r t ia l  
re g re s s io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  f o r  th is  v a r ia b le  is  v a lid ,  th e  re s u lt  may be 
e x p la in e d  i f  com panies are  re g is te r in g  th e ir  p a te n ts  on an 
in te r n a t io n a l bas is  in  o rd e r  to  a llo w  th e ir  own fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  
to  u t i l is e  them , ra th e r  th a n  to  lice n se  them  to  in d e p e n d e n t overseas 
conce rns. The e x te n t o f  a com pany’s in te rn a t io n a l re g is t ra t io n  o f 
i t s  p a te n ts  may th e re fo re  s im p ly  be a r e f le c t io n  o f  i t s  in v o lv e m e n t 
in  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n . The h ig h  spearman ra n k  c o r re la t io n  
c o e f f ic ie n t  betw een th e  REGISPAT v a r ia b le  and th e  measure o f 
c o rp o ra te  in te rn a t io n a l iz a t io n  w h ich  was n o t en te re d  in to  any o f  th e  
re g re s s io n  e q u a tio n s  (OVPRODN) lends  s u p p o rt to  th is  e x p la n a tio n . 
The c o e f f ic ie n t  betw een these  tw o  v a r ia b le s  was m easured a t 0.58, 
w h ic h  was s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  1% le v e l.
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P ro d u c t D iv e rs if ic a t io n
T h is  v a r ia b le  was o n ly  e n te re d  in to  th e  KHLSI m odel. I ts  n e g a tiv e  
s ig n  was c o n tra ry  to  th a t  w h ic h  was expected , in d ic a t in g  re je c t io n  
o f  th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  in c reases  in  l in e  w ith  a 
com pany's le v e l o f  p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n .  The v a r ia b le  was 
e n te re d  in to  th e  m odel in  f o u r th  p o s it io n , and had a t  s ta t is t ic  
w h ich  was s ig n if ic a n t  a t th e  5% le v e l.
T h is  r e s u lt  c o n tra d ic ts  th e  f in d in g s  o f  T e les io  and Adam, who 
b o th  fo u n d  th a t  h ig h ly  d iv e rs i f ie d  com panies lic e n s e d  abroad  more 
th a n  less  d iv e rs i f ie d  com panies. T h is  c o n tra d ic t io n  may be 
a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  d i f fe r e n t  m ethods th a t  were used to  c a lc u la te  
p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n .  Whereas a h e r f in d h a l in d e x  was used in  
th is  s tu d y , p ro d u c in g  a u n iq u e  v a lu e  f o r  each company in  th e  
sam ple, T e le s io  and Adam b o th  used a m ethod o f  m easuring  p ro d u c t 
d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  w h ic h  c la s s if ie d  com panies in to  one o f  th re e  
ca te g o rie s  (h ig h , medium o r  low ).
N e ve rthe less , th e  re s u lt  re p o r te d  here  w o u ld  appear to  in d ic a te  
th a t  p ro d u c t d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  does n o t s tre tc h  c o rp o ra te  resou rces  to  
th e  e x te n t th a t  lic e n s in g  is  made more app e a lin g  as a means o f 
s e rv ic in g  fo re ig n  m arke ts .
G eog raph ica l D iv e rs if ic a t io n
T h is  v a r ia b le  (GRDIV) was e n te re d  in to  th e  tw o  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  
m odels, and had a n e g a tiv e  s ig n  in  each o f them  (as p re d ic te d ). I t  
was a lso  en te re d  in to  th e  PLSI m odel, a lth o u g h  i t s  in c lu s io n  in  th is  
m odel is  open to  q u e s tio n  because o f  i t s  c o l l in e a r i t y  w ith  th e  
REGISPAT v a r ia b le . Even a llo w in g  fo r  th is  d o u b t conce rn ing  i t s  
in c lu s io n  in  th e  PLSI m odel, th e re  is  s t i l l  s u f f ic ie n t  s u p p o rt f o r  th e  
h y p o th e s is  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  less l ik e ly  to  be adop ted  as MNCs 
in c re a se  th e  g e o g ra p h ic a l sp read  o f  t h e ir  o p e ra tio n s .
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In s o fa r  as g e o g ra p h ic a l d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  p ro v id e s  a measure o f  a 
f irm 's  expe rience  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s , th is  r e s u lt  p ro v id e s  
a d d it io n a l s u p p o rt f o r  th e  id e a  th a t  f irm s  w h ic h  have l i t t l e  
expe rience  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  are  more l ik e ly  to  a d o p t lic e n s in g .
C o d if ia b i l i t y  o f  K now -how
T h is  v a r ia b le  was e n te re d  in  th e  KHLSI m odel o n ly , and had a 
n e g a tiv e  s ig n , c o n tra ry  to  e x p e c ta tio n s . The v a r ia b le  was e n te re d  in  
t h i r d  p lace  in  th is  m odel and had a t  s ta t is t ic  w h ic h  was s ig n if ic a n t  
a t  th e  5% le v e l.
I t  w o u ld  th u s  appea r th a t  u n c o d if ie d  in fo rm a tio n  is  more l ik e ly  
to  be lic e n s e d  th a n  in fo rm a tio n  w h ic h  is  c o d ifie d . R e -p h ra s in g  th is  
c o n c lu s io n  in  te rm s o f  th e  com ponents w h ich  were used to  measure 
c o d i f ia b i l i t y ,  i t  may be s ta te d  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  more l ik e ly  to  o ccu r 
i f  kn o w -h o w  g e n e ra lly  re q u ire s  o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  and th e  
t ra in in g  o f  license e  p e rso n n e l. I f  i t  co n s is ts  more o f  docum ented 
in fo rm a tio n  and m a n u fa c tu r in g  p rocess equ ipm ent, on th e  o th e r  hand, 
i t  is  less  l ik e ly  to  be lice n se d .
One p o s s ib le  e x p la n a tio n  f o r  th is  a p p a re n tly  c o u n te r - in tu i t iv e  
r e s u lt  is  th a t  lic e n s o rs  may aim  to  p ro v id e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a ck -u p  
and t r a in in g  f o r  lice n se e  p e rso n n e l w h e re ve r p o s s ib le , as a means o f  
enhanc ing  th e  in c o m e -g e n e ra tin g  p o te n t ia l o f  t h e ir  know -h ow  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents. I t  is  th u s  fe a s ib le  th a t  th e  le v e l o f  b a c k -u p  
s e rv ic e s  p ro v id e d  does n o t a c c u ra te ly  r e f le c t  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
kn o w -h o w  be ing  lice n se d .
O rg a n iz a tio n a l S tru c tu re
T h is  v a r ia b le  was e n te re d  in  a l l  fo u r  o f  th e  m odels and had a 
p o s it iv e  s ig n  in  each o f  them . There  is  th u s  s tro n g  s u p p o rt fo r  
re je c t in g  th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  th e  r e la t iv e  use o f lic e n s in g  is  g re a te r 
f o r  th o se  com panies whose o rg a n iz a t io n a l s tru c tu re s  are de­
c e n tra liz e d . The tw o  p a te n t lic e n s in g  models p ro v id e d  th e  s tro n g e s t 
re je c t io n  o f  the  h y p o th e s is ; th e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re  v a r ia b le
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was e n te re d  in  second p lace  in  b o th  m odels, a c h ie v in g  a s ig n if ic a n c e  
le v e l o f  1% in  th e  PLSI m odel and 5% in  th e  P L II model.
To th e  e x te n t th a t  th e  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t ru c tu re s  c la s s if ie d  as 
'c e n tra liz e d ' a c c u ra te ly  c a p tu re  those  MNCs w h ic h  c e n tra liz e  
e xp e rie n ce  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s , i t  may be in fe r re d  th a t  these MNCs 
do n o t possess a le v e l o f  in te rn a l t ra n s fe r  e f f ic ie n c y  w h ich  is  any 
g re a te r  th a n  th o se  MNCs w h ic h  d e -c e n tra liz e  th is  expe rience , s ince  
th e  la t t e r  g roup  appear to  lic e n s e  r e la t iv e ly  more.
The co n c lu s io n s  co n ce rn in g  each o f th e  n ine  hypo theses 
re p o r te d  above m ust be tem pered  by th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  re g re s s io n  
m odels w ere based upon sam ples o f  24 MNCs fo r  th e  p a te n t lic e n s in g  
m odels and 32 MNCs fo r  th e  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  m odels. G iven these  
r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll sam ple sizes one s h o u ld  be w a ry  o f  p la c in g  too  
much re lia n c e  upon th e  re s u lts  re p o r te d  in  th is  ch a p te r. In  
p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  re s u lts  co n ce rn in g  the  're se a rch  in te n s ity ',  ' le v e l o f  
in te rn a t io n a l p a te n t r e g is t r a t io n ',  'p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ' and 
'c o d i f ia b i l i t y  o f  kn o w -h o w ' v a r ia b le s  need to  be in te rp re te d  w ith  
p a r t ic u la r  c a u tio n , g ive n  th a t  these  v a r ia b le s  were n o t en te red  in  
a l l  o f  th e  m odels f o r  w h ic h  th e y  were a v a ila b le .
One s h o u ld  a lso  be w a ry  o f th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  b ias  in  the  da ta  
a r is in g  fro m  th e  fa c t  th a t  a l l  o f  th e  MNCs w h ich  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  
s tu d y  w ere engaged in  lic e n s in g . The re s u lts  re p o r te d  here  o n ly  
d e s c r ib e  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  MNCs th a t  a re  r e la t iv e ly  more 
in v o lv e d  in  lic e n s in g  th a n  o th e rs , n o t th e  d is t in g u is h in g  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  MNCs th a t  do and do n o t lic e n s e  th e ir  p a te n ts  
and know -h ow .
254
CHAPTER 12
B earing  in  m ind th e  above q u a li f ic a t io n s ,  i t  may be conc luded  
th a t  MNCs w h ich  possess th e  fo llo w in g  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  are l ik e ly  to  
lic e n s e  m ore o f th e ir  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  th a n  o th e r  MNCs:
. a r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll s ize, in  te rm s o f  tu rn o v e r ;
. a r e la t iv e ly  lo w  le v e l o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n  and a n a rro w
g e o g ra p h ic a l sp read  o f  o p e ra tio n s ;
. a r e la t iv e ly  h ig h  le v e l o f  e x p e n d itu re  on R&D;
. a r e la t iv e ly  h ig h  num ber o f  p a te n ts  re g is te re d  in  th e  UK, b u t  a 
r e la t iv e ly  sm a ll num ber o f  p a te n ts  re g is te re d  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s ;
. a r e la t iv e ly  lo w  le v e l o f  p ro d u c t d iv e rs i f ic a t io n ;
. possess ion  o f  k n o w -h o w  w h ic h  has a m a jo r ity  com ponent o f
u n c o d if ie d  know ledge ;





1. N o n -m e tr ic  is  a te rm  com m only a p p lie d  to  d a ta  m easured a t th e  
n o m in a l and o rd in a l le v e ls . M e tr ic  da ta  in v o lv e s  in te r v a l o r  
r a t io  le v e l m easurem ent.
2. An a lte rn a t iv e  m ethod to  m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  w h ich  
c o u ld  have been used to  te s t  the  hypo theses  is  th e  
n o n p a ra m e tr ic  te c h n iq u e  o f  lo g - l in e a r  a n a ly s is . H owever, 
because th e  s ta t is t ic a l  o u tp u t  fro m  lo g - l in e a r  m odels d i f fe r s  
fro m  th a t  o b ta in e d  fro m  re g re s s io n  models t h e ir  use w o u ld  have 
p re v e n te d  a m e a n in g fu l com parison  o f  th e  re s u lts  o f  th e  p re s e n t 
s tu d y  w ith  those  fro m  p re v io u s  s tu d ie s .
3. I t  s h o u ld  be no te d  th a t  m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  c o u ld  s t i l l  rem a in  a f te r  
th e  e lim in a tio n  o f  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  e x h ib it in g  h ig h  
c o r re la t io n s  w ith  o th e r  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  because o f  th e  
jo in t  in te ra c t io n  o f  th re e  o r  more o f  the  re m a in in g  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s . F o r exam ple, i t  is  p o s s ib le  th a t  th re e  in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le s  w h ich  have lo w  c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  w ith  one 
a n o th e r may in te ra c t  in  a fa s h io n  w h ich  p roduces c o l l in e a r ity .
4. I t  s h o u ld  be n o ted  th a t  th e  SPSSX re g re s s io n  p ro ce d u re  w h ic h  
was used to  ana lyse  th e  da ta  u t i l is e s  Pearson (ie  p a ra m e tr ic )  
c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts  r a th e r  th a n  Spearman (ie  n o n p a ra m e tr ic ) 
c o r re la t io n  c o e ff ic ie n ts .  Had th e  fo rm e r been used as th e  bas is  
f o r  e lim in a tin g  p o te n t ia l c o l l in e a r  e ffe c ts  betw een in d e p e n d e n t 
v a r ia b le  measures, th e  cho ice  o f  measures w o u ld  have been 
a lm os t the  same as those  o b ta in e d  us in g  Spearman c o e ff ic ie n ts .  
The o n ly  e x c e p tio n  w o u ld  have been th e  le v e l o f  g e o g ra p h ica l 
d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  (GRDIV) w h ic h  had a Pearson c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  
g re a te r  th a n  0.5 w ith  th e  le v e l o f  in te rn a t io n a l p a te n t 
r e g is t r a t io n  (REGISPAT). T h is  c o l l in e a r i t y  p rob lem  is  d iscussed  
fu r t h e r  in  s e c tio n  12.3 o f th e  ch a p te r.
5. C o n tra c to r  (1985) a lso  used dependent v a r ia b le s  in  h is  re g re s s io n  
m odels w h ich  m easured th e  a b s o lu te  le v e l o f  lic e n s in g .
6. The L icensee Sales In d e x  is  s im ila r  to  T e le s io 's  in d e x  o f  th e  
same name, th e  d iffe re n c e  be ing  th a t  th e  d e n o m in a to r co n s is ts  o f  
t o ta l  overseas sa les (ie  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  sa les p lu s  e x p o rt  
sa les p lu s  licensee  sales) ra th e r  th a n  ju s t  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  
sa les p lu s  license e  sales. The L ic e n s o r Income In d e x  is  d e r iv e d  
fro m  T e le s io 's  R o y a lty  Index , th e  d iffe re n c e s  be ing  th a t  the  
n u m e ra to r co n s is ts  o f  t o ta l  lic e n s in g  incom e ra th e r  th a n  ju s t  
r o y a lty  income, and th e  d e n o m in a to r c o n s is ts  o f  to ta l  overseas 
sa les ra th e r  th a n  ju s t  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  sales. The d iffe re n c e s  
in  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f these  in d ic e s  stem from  th e  fa c t  th a t  
T e le s io  was concerned w ith  lic e n s in g  as an a lte rn a t iv e  to  FDI 
and th e re fo re  used fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  sales as th e  bas is  f o r  h is  
com parisons. In  th is  s tu d y , we are concerned w ith  lic e n s in g  as 
an a lte rn a t iv e  to  b o th  FDI and e x p o rt in g  and we th e re fo re  use 
to ta l  overseas sales as th e  bas is  f o r  m aking com parisons.
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7. As no SIC(80) codes were g iv e n  fo r  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  i t  was 
assumed th a t  th e  p ro d u c t range  p roduced  ab road  was the  same as 
th a t  p rodu ced  in  th e  UK.
8. The in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  w h ic h  was n o t recoded was th e  
c o d i f ia b i l i t y  o f  kn o w -h o w , because th e  va lu e s  f o r  th is  v a r ia b le  
co rre sp o n d  to  u n iq u e  in te g e rs  ra th e r  th a n  class in te rv a ls .
9. O n ly  th re e  o f  th e  se ve n ty  one respon den ts  who re p o r te d  t h e ir  
com pany's R&D e x p e n d itu re  as a percen tage  o f  tu rn o v e r  t ic k e d  
th e  upp e rm os t (open-ended) ca tego ry . O f th e  seven ty  tw o  
re sp o n d e n ts  re p o r t in g  b o th  th e  num ber o f UK p a te n ts  h e ld  by 
t h e ir  com panies and th e  num ber o f  c o u n tr ie s  in  w h ich  these 
p a te n ts  were u s u a lly  re g is te re d , o n ly  tw o  t ic k e d  th e  upperm ost 
ca te g o rie s  in  each case.
10. The recoded  v a r ia b le  la b e ls  re p o r te d  in  Tab les 12-4, 12-5 and 12- 
6 are  n o t s u b s e q u e n tly  used in  th e  ch a p te r. Where poss ib le , th e  
o r ig in a l v a r ia b le  la b e ls  have been used in  o rd e r  to  ensure  
c o n t in u ity  o f  e xp re ss io n . I t  s h o u ld  be no ted , how ever, th a t  th e  
tra n s fo rm a tio n s  re fe r re d  to  in  S e c tion  12.3.4 were c a rr ie d  o u t on 
th e  recoded va lu e s  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s , n o t t h e ir  o r ig in a l va lues .
11. The a d ju s te d  R^ s ta t is t ic  (Ra^) was re p o rte d  ra th e r  th a n  th e  R^ 
s ta t is t ic ,  s ince  th e  la t t e r  tends  to  be an o p t im is t ic  es tim a te  o f  
how  w e ll a m odel f i t s  a p o p u la tio n ; models te n d  n o t to  f i t  
p o p u la tio n s  as w e ll as th e  sam ples from  w h ich  th e y  are  d e rive d . 
The a d ju s te d  R^ s ta t is t ic  a tte m p ts  to  c o rre c t R^ to  more c lo s e ly  
r e f le c t  th e  goodness o f  f i t  o f  a m odel to  a p o p u la tio n .
12. The n a tu ra l lo g  (base e) was used ra th e r  th a n  th e  common lo g  
(base 10) s ince , as T ukey (1977, p93) p o in te d  o u t, lo g a r ith m s  to  
d i f fe r e n t  bases d i f f e r  o n ly  by  m u lt ip l ic a t iv e  co n s ta n ts , so "any 
base is  a lm ost (u s u a lly  e x a c tly )  as good as any o th e r" .
13. A lth o u g h  th e  lo g i t  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  d id  n o t p roduce  th e  bes t f i t  
f o r  e v e ry  co m b in a tio n  o f  dependent and in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le , i t  
d id  ach ieve  th e  g re a te s t num ber o f  these and was th e re fo re  
em ployed s ince  o n ly  one tra n s fo rm a tio n  co u ld  be used fo r  th e  
dependen t v a r ia b le .
14. The lo g i t  t ra n s fo rm a tio n  is  som etim es re fe r re d  to  as the  " lo g  
odds" t ra n s fo rm a tio n  s ince  i t  is  the  n a tu ra l lo g a r ith m  o f th e
"odds r a t io "  (ie  y / l - y ) .  T h is  r a t io  can be rega rded  as th e
p ro p o r t io n  o f  successes to  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  fa i lu re s  in  a 
b in o m ia l t r i a l  [see D rape r and S m ith  (1981, p238)].
15. T ra n s fo rm a tio n s  w ith  p> l a re  a lso  a p p ro p ria te  f o r  th e  dependent
(ie  y) v a r ia b le , b u t o n ly  i f  th e  s lope is  neg a tive . F o r a
p o s i t iv e ly  in c lin e d  s lope , a tra n s fo rm a tio n  w ith  p< l is  necessary 
to  move to w a rd s  l in e a r i t y  [see Tukey (1977, p l98) f o r  more
d e ta i ls ] .  However, s ince  th e  dependent v a r ia b le  had a lre a d y  




16. I t  s h o u ld  be no ted  th a t  pow er tra n s fo rm a tio n s  can o n ly  
s tra ig h te n  o u t cu rves  w h ic h  have o n ly  one bend and w h ich  
c o n tin u o u s ly  in c re a se  o r  decrease; th e y  are  n o t much use fo r  
cu rve s  w h ich  lo o k  l ik e  a U o r  a J, f o r  exam ple.
17. I f  th e  y  v a r ia b le  is  s u b je c t to  tra n s fo rm a tio n  ra th e r  th a n  th e  x 
v a r ia b le ,  va lu e s  o f  p> l are  a p p ro p r ia te  f o r  a n e g a tiv e  s lope, 
w h ile  va lues  o f  p e l are a p p ro p r ia te  f o r  a p o s it iv e  s lope.
18. The va lu e s  chosen fo r  PIN and POUT, 0.125 and 0.15 re s p e c tiv e ly , 
a re  less s t r in g e n t  th a n  th e  d e fa u lt  va lues  em ployed by SPSSX o f 
0.05 and 0.1.
19. There  was a s u s p ic io n  th a t  th e  KHLSI m odel may have been 
a ffe c te d  by m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  s ince  i t 's  t  s ta t is t ic s  were g e n e ra lly  
lo w e r th a n  those  p rodu ced  by th e  K H LII m odel, y e t i t s  Ra^ was 
h ig h e r. To te s t  f o r  th e  presence o f  m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  th e  
PRODVER2 v a r ia b le  was d ropped  fro m  the  m odel as i t  had th e  
h ig h e s t pearson c o r re la t io n  w ith  a n o th e r in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le  
(GLTURNOV) b u t  a lo w e r c o r re la t io n  w ith  th e  dependent v a r ia b le  
(see A p p e n d ix  12.2). As th e  re s u lt in g  p a r t ia l  re g re s s io n  
c o e ff ic ie n ts  fro m  th e  new KHLSI m odel were l i t t l e  d i f fe r e n t  fro m  
those  re p o r te d  in  Tab le  12-10, i t  was conc lude d  th a t  any 
m u lt ic o l l in e a r i ty  p re se n t in  th e  o r ig in a l m odel was n e g lig ib le .
20. The c r i t ic a l  va lu e s  f o r  th e  PLSI m odel c o u ld  n o t be o b ta in e d
d ir e c t ly  from  th e  ta b le s  in  D u rb in  and W atson (1951) s ince  th is
m odel co n ta in s  s ix  p re d ic to r  v a r ia b le s  and th e  ta b le s  o n ly  g iv e  
v a lu e s  o f  d y  and d ^  fo r  up to  f iv e  p re d ic to r  v a r ia b le s . The 
a p p ro p r ia te  va lu e s  were th e re fo re  c a lc u la te d  fro m  th e  va lu e s  
co n ta in e d  in  th e  ta b le s  by  means o f  in te rp o la t io n .
21. T h is  company was id e n t i f ie d  as an o u t l ie r  in  th e  tw o  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g  m odels, even th o u g h  i t  has no in v o lv e m e n t in  p a te n t 
lic e n s in g , because th e  Leverage and M a h a la n o b is ’ d is ta n ce  
s ta t is t ic s  measure th e  extrem eness o f  an o b s e rv a tio n  among th e  
se t o f  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s . The possess ion  o f  th e  f u l l  se t o f  
in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s  w i l l  th e re fo re  a llo w  these  s ta t is t ic s  to  be 
com puted, even i f  th e re  is  no d a ta  fo r  the  dependent v a r ia b le . 
The same reason accoun ts  f o r  th e  c la s s if ic a t io n  o f  case 42 as an 
o u t l ie r  in  the  tw o  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  m odels, even th o u g h  i t  has 
no in v o lv e m e n t in  th is  fo rm  o f lic e n s in g .
22. Z e n o ff (1970) p roduced  a v a ry  bas ic  m odel w h ic h  a tte m p ted  to
e x p la in  b o th  re la t iv e  and a b s o lu te  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  on th e
bas is  o f  o n ly  tw o  in d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le s : size and R&D
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APPENDIX 12.2 RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS ON PATENT AND 
KNOW-HOW LICENSING
264
RESULTS OF M U LTIPLE REGRESSIONS ON PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LIC EN SIN G
D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  P LS I
Minimum Pairw ise  N 
Pearson C o rre la t io n  
PLSI
o f  Cases = 24 
C o eff i  ci e n ts : 
GLTURNOV RD4 RD3 UKPATS REGISPAT PRODVER2 GRDIV ORGSTR
PLSI 1.000 - .5 5 7 - .3 4 4 .043 - .0 0 8 - . 3 8 4 - .3 3 2 - .0 1 6 .272
GLTURNOV - .5 5 7 1.000 . 117 .036 .377 . 166 .340 - .0 7 9 . 083
RD4S - .3 4 4 . 117 1.000 - . 1 6 4 . 146 .282 . 128 - .2 2 7 - .0 5 1
RD3 .043 .036 - . 1 6 4 1.000 . 162 . 118 - .  134 - .1 3 3 .021
UKPATS - .0 0 8 .377 . 146 . 162 1.000 . 140 .290 . 112 - .2 2 3
REGISPAT - .3 8 4 . 166 .282 . 118 . 140 1.000 .201 - .5 1 3 - .1 2 2
PRODVER2 - .3 3 2 .340 . 128 - . 1 3 4 .290 .201 1.000 - .0 1 9 - .0 6 7
GRDIV - .0 1 6 - .0 7 9 - .2 2 7 - .1 3 3 . 112 - .5 1 3 - .0 1 9 1.000 . 149
ORGSTR .272 .083 - .0 5 1 .021 - .2 2 3 - .1 2 2 - .0 5 7 . 149 1.000
M u l t ip le  R .39960
R Square .30928
Adjusted R Square .74197
Standard E rror  1.15961












F = 12.02294 S ig n i f  F = .0000
V a r iab le s  in the Equation
Vari abl e SE B Beta T Sig T
GLTURNOV -1 .238728 .202644 - .72 3 5 0 4 -6 .1 1 3 .0000
ORGSTR 2.071749 .515663 .454336 4.018 .0009
UKPATS 4.439644 1.042391 .530174 4.259 .0005
RD4 - .00 0 7 1 4 .000267 -.299 42 1 - 2 .6 7 1 .0161
GRDIV - .645 79 6 . 167034 -.501 76 6 -3 .8 6 6 .0012
REGISPAT -.577 37 1 . 191511 - .45 5 7 4 7 -3 .5 3 7 .0025
(C onstan t) 23.334980 4.124581 5.658 .0000
Vari able
■ V a r iab le s  not in the Equation 
Beta In  P a r t ia l  Min T o ler T Sig T
RD3 - .100 39 1  - .215 54 0  .645386 - . 8 8 3  .3904
PR0DVER2 - .107532  - .224178  .661334 - . 9 2 0  .3712
265
D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  P L I I
Minimum P airw ise  N 
Pearson C o rre la t io n  
P L II
o f  Cases = 24 
Coeff i  ci e n t s : 
GLTURNOV RD4 RD3 UKPATS REGISPAT PRODVER2 GRDIV ORGSTR
P L II 1.000 - .5 1 7 - .3 4 1 .315 - .0 1 3 - .2 7 5 - .2 9 0 . 044 .270
GLTURNOV - .5 1 7 1.000 . 117 - .1 2 2 .322 . 166 . 340 .097 .083
RD4 - .3 4 1 . 117 1.000 - .1 7 0 . 177 .282 . 128 - .1 1 8 - .0 5 1
RD3 .315 - .1 2 2 - .1 7 0 1.000 .059 .065 - .2 2 2 .048 . 074
UKPATS - .0 1 3 .322 . 177 .059 1.000 . 163 . 342 . 196 - .2 6 3
REGISPAT - .2 7 5 . 166 .282 .065 . 163 1.000 .201 - .4 2 6 122
PRODVER2 - .2 9 0 . 340 . 128 - .2 2 2 . 342 .201 1.000 .067 - .0 6 7
GRDIV .044 .097 - .1 1 8 .048 . 196 - .4 2 6 .067 1.000 . 248
ORGSTR .270 .083 - .0 5 1 .074 - .2 6 3 - .1 2 2 - .0 6 7 .248 1. 000
M u l t ip le  R .72911
R Square .53160
Adjusted R Square .43299
Standard E rro r  1.17517












F = 5.39091 S ig n i f  F = .0045
Vari ab le
V ar iab le s  in the Equation — 
















- .62 5 2 6 7  
.397237  
.347424  
- .309 23 6
-3 .6 9 9  .0015
2.399 .0268
1.976 .0629
-1 .9 3 4  .0681
2.134  .0461
--------------------------  V a r iab le s  not in the Equation -------------------------
V a r ia b le  Beta In  P a r t ia l  Min T o le r  T Sig T
RD3 .146110 .205873 .776253 .893 .3839
REGISPAT - .104225  - .143 34 3  .795532 - . 6 1 4  .5466
PR0DVER2 - .158 20 8  - .2 0 9 4 7 4  .753631 - . 9 0 9  .3754
GRDIV - .116 33 9  - .155 96 1  .730081 - . 6 7 0  .5114
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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  K H LS I
Mi ni mum Pai rwi se N of Cases = 32
Pearson C o r r e la t i  on C o eff i  ci e n t s :
KHLSI GLTURNOV RD4 RD3 PRODVER2 GRDIV CODIFKH ORGSTR
KHLSI 1.000 - .5 0 3 - . 0 1 4 .298 - .4 1 8 - .2 8 9 - .3 9 2 . 193
GLTURNOV - .5 0 3 1.000 . 114 - .1 2 2 .340 - .0 7 9 . 189 .083
RD4 - .0 1 4 . 114 1.000 - .1 9 2 - .0 3 6 .012 . 129 - .0 9 4
RD3 .298 - .1 2 2 - .1 9 2 1.000 - .2 2 2 - .0 4 9 - .0 0 4 .074
PR0DVER2 - .4 1 8 .340 - .0 3 6 - .2 2 2 1.000 - .0 1 9 - .0 3 8 - .0 6 7
GRDIV - .2 8 9 - . 0  79 .012 - .0 4 9 - .0 1 9 1.000 - .0 5 5 . 149
CODIFKH - .3 9 2 . 189 . 129 - .0 0 4 - .0 3 8 - .0 5 5 1.000 - .0 8 9
ORGSTR . 193 .083 - . 0 9 4 .074 - .0 6 7 . 149 - .0 8 9 1.000
M u lt i  p ie  R .77513
R Square .60082
Adjusted R Square .52406
Standard E rro r  1.73045












7.82581 S ig n i f  F = .0001
Vari ab le
V a r iab le s  in the Equation
SE B Beta T Si g T
GLTURNOV -.736 68 6 .257102 -.391 60 2 -2 .8 6 5 .0081
GRDIV -.534 85 0 .178045 -.378 21 3 -3 .0 0 4 .0058
CODIFKH -7 .402851 2.876682 - .32 9 1 5 7 -2 .5 7 3 .0161
PR0DVER2 -3 .4 4 9  733 1.594664 -.288719 -2 .1 6 3 .0399
ORGSTR 1.166160 .638362 .232753 1.827 .0792
(Constant) 9.148499 4.948880 1.849 .0759
Vari ab le
- V ar iab le s  not in the Equation  
8eta  In  P a r t ia l  Min T o le r T Sig T
RD4
RD3
.093195 .144392 .808637 .730 .4724
.159237 .244256 .818602 1.259 .2195
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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  K H L II
Mi nimum Pai rwi se N of Cases = 32
Pearson C o r r e la t i  on C oeff i  ci e n t s :
KHLII GLTURNOV RD4 RD3 PRODVER2 GRDIV CODIFKH ORGSTR
KHLII 1.000 - .5 5 9 - .0 0 9 .379 - .4 4 4 - .2 3 4 - .2 0 2 .209
GLTURNOV - .5 5 9 1.000 . 114 - .1 2 2 .340 - .0 7 9 . 189 .083
RD4 - .0 0 9 . 114 1.000 - .1 9 2 - .0 3 6 .012 . 129 - .0 9 4
RD3 .379 - .1 2 2 - .1 9 2 1.000 - .2 2 2 - .0 4 9 - . 0 0 4 .074
PRODVER2 - .4 4 4 . 340 - .0 3 6 - .2 2 2 1.000 - .0 1 9 - .0 3 8 - .0 6 7
GRDIV - .2 3 4 - .0 7 9 .012 - .0 4 9 - .0 1 9 1.000 - .0 5 5 . 149
CODIFKH - .2 0 2 . 189 . 129 - . 0 0 4 - .0 3 8 - .0 5 5 1.000 - .0 8 9
ORGSTR .209 .083 - . 0 9 4 .074 - .0 6 7 . 149 - .0 8 9 1.000
M u l t ip le  R .74509
R Square .55515
Adjusted R Square .48925
Standard E rro r  1.27087












F = 8.42381 S ig n i f  F = .0002
V ar iab le s  in the Ecuation






- .764956  
.671338 








- .573 56 7  
.272667  
- .307739  
.282412
-4 .3 9 3  .0002
2.095 .0457
- 2 .3 5 4  .0261
2.156 .0402
2.432 .0219
--------------------------  V ar iab le s  not in the Equation -------------------------
V a r ia b le  Beta In P a r t ia l  Min To^er T Sig T
RD4 .146890 .214213 .944224 1.118 .2737
PRO0VER2 - .208 04 9  - .286719  .844571 -1 .5 2 6  .1391
CODIFKH - .088 20 2  - .129 02 6  .929276 - . 6 6 3  .5129
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APPENDIX 12.3 ANALYSIS OF RESIDUALS
NORMAL P R O B A B IL IT Y  PLOTS OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS
D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  P L S I
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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  P L I I
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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  K H LS I





























t * * * *
, * * *
. * * * * *  
*
* * *
* * * * * *
* * * * * * *




* * * *
— +   — + —  ---------------------------------------+ ----------------------------------------------+
.25 .5 .75 1 .0
E x p e c t e d
272
D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  K H L I I
Normal P ro b a b i l i t y  (P-P) P lo t  
Standardized Residual
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STANDARDIZED P A R T IA L REGRESSION PLOTS
D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  P L S I
Across -  GRDIV Down -  PLSI




2 . . . +
I
« I
I • • |
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i ii i
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Across -  ORGSTR Down -  PLSI Across -  R04 Down -  PLSI
Out ++--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +----------++ Out ++--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +----------++
3 + + 3 + . +
' I I  I
< ! ! . !
2 + + 2 + . +
i • i i . .  i
■ i i  i< i i . .  i
1 + . + 1 + . +
■ i i  ii i i  /
i i i  i
i - i i  . .  i
0 + . . : + 0 +  . . +
I i i  i
< i i  ii i i . .  i
-1 + . + -1 + +
> i i  i■ i i - i
■ i i  i
- 2  + + - 2  + +
• i i  i• i i i
■ i i  i• i t  i
- 3  + + - 3  + +
Out  ++--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +----------+--------- ++ Out  ++--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +--------- +----------++
- 3 - 2 - 1  0 1 2 3 Out  - 3 - 2 - 1  0 1 2 3 Out
Symbols Used (Max N) . = 1 . 0  : = 2 . 0  Symbols Used (Max N) . = 1 . 0
Oependent V a r ia b le :  P L I I
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S y m b o ls  U sed (M ax N) = 1.0 = 2.0 S y m b o ls  Used (M ax N) = 1.0 = 2.0
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Across -  ORGSTR
Out ++----------1*--------- H----
3 +
Down -  P L II
 + ++
+
Across -  RD4
Out +H-----------1-----------1—
3 +
Down -  PL II
 + ++
+
2 + 2 +
1 + 1 +
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- I  + -1 +
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Dependent V a r ia b le :  KHLSI
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S y m b o ls  U sed (M ax N) . = 1 . 0  : = 2 . 0 S y m b o ls  Used (M ax N) = 1.0
276
Across -  CODIFKH Down -  KHLSI
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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  K H L I I
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-3  - 2 - 1  0 1 2 3 Out
Symbols Used (Max N) . = 1 .0  : = 2 .0
Across -  RD3 Down -  KHLII






1 + . . . .  +
I J
I 1I • • • I
0 + . . .  - . +
1 r
i [





- 3  + +
Out ++----------+----------+-------- +---------- +-------- +--------- ++
- 3 - 2 - 1  0 1 2 3 Out
Symbols Used (Max N) . = 1 . 0  : = 2 . 0
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CASEWISE PLOTS OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS AND OUTLIERS S T A T IS T IC S













































-1 .17 59  
-2 .39 29
- .3 6 1 5  
-1 .86 52  
1.4471
- .2 2 3 4
- .8 8 0 7
- .8 1 5 1
.8546
.2991
2 . 2 0 2 2
1.3764  




































































































0 2 2 0
0959 
*C00K D
-3.0 0 . 0 3.0
Residuals S t a t i s t i c s :
Mi n Max
Standard  
Devi a t i  on
O utly i  ng 
Val ue
Standardized Residual (*ZRESID) -2 .8 9 2 9  3 .0264 1.6292 >3.0000 19
Leverage (*LEVER) .0689 1.2873 .2536 >.5833 37
M ahalanobis’ D istance (*MAHAL) 1 .5844 29.6090 5 .8332 >13.4167 37
Cook's D ( *C00K D) .0000 2.1072 .4745 >1.0000 19
Durbin-Watson Test: d = 1.78082
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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  P L I I
- 3 . 0  0 .0  3 .0
Case £ 0 : ................ . . ;0 *ZRESID *LEVER *MAHAL *COOK D
1 * . - .3 5 7 5 . 1684 3.8723 .0086
2 . * .2985 .3033 6.9767 .0143
3 .4375 10.0619
4 * 1.0207 .0805 1.8508 .0330
6 * 1.7252 . 1031 2.3708 . 1178
7 . * .3940 . 1674 3.8500 . 0104
9 * -2 .3 5 7 3 .0703 1.6176 . 1578
11 . 1866 4.2913
12 .0933 2.1448
15 * - .5 5 9 5 .2436 5.6022 .0350
16 .3421 7.8639
17 . 1364 3.1382
20 .2199 5.0585
22 .0756 1.7396
25 * - 1 .0 9 5 7 .0609 1.4010 .0306
28 * - .7 4 9 8 .2094 4.8162 .0503
30 * . - .1 9 4 7 . 1190 2.7378 .0017
31 .0765 1.7537
32 * 1.0344 .0680 1.5642 .0296
33 .0918 2.1119
36 . * .2749 .2076 4.7742 .0067
37 . 1137 2.6151
40 .2138 4.9181
41 . * .2194 .2301 5.2933 . 0049
42 *  . - .4 6 7 3 .3092 7.1118 .0364
45 . 1843 4.2383
46 . 1149 2.6424
47 * .9354 . 1492 3.4311 .0510
50 .2316 5.3277
52 . * . 1350 .2183 5.0198 .0018
55 * - .7 4 2 5 . 1139 2.6187 .0240
56 * . 7799 . 1421 3.2681 .0335
58 . * .2487 . 1008 2.3176 .0024
59 . 3112 7.1577
61 * 1.1522 .4673 10.7468 .5603
63 * . 7311 . 1065 2.4501 .0213
65 * . 7820 .1127 2.5917 .0264
67 * -1 .3575 .0804 1.8481 . 1092
68 . * .3779 .0870 2.0005 .0048
73 * . 7211 . 1127 2.5914 .0224
74 . 1790 4.1178
76 . 1834 4.2185
79 * 1.8118 .0665 1.5302 .0893
80 .2072 4.7654
84 .2166 4.9317
85 . 1082 2.4875
Case £ 0 : ............
- 3 . 0 0.0
,, -o
3 .0
*ZRESID *LEVER *MAHAL *C00K D
Residuals S t a t i s t i c s :
Mi n Max
Standard 
Devi a t i  on




Mahalanobis' Distance (*MAHAL) 





















Durbin-Watson Test: a = 1.47483
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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  KH LSI
Case £
- 3 . 0
0 : ................
0.0 3 .0  
___ : 0 *ZRESID *LEVER *MAHAL *COOK D
1 * -1 .9 1 2 3 . 1089 3.3746 1155
3 * -1 .9 3 0 6 . 7773 24.0950 13 6971
4 * 1.4340 .0517 1.6018 0338
5 .2169 6.7229
7 . * .4336 .0946 2.9317 0052
8 . 1124 3.4853
9 * .5518 .0657 2.0353 0060
11 * . - .1 4 9 0 . 1221 3.7850 0008
17 . 1505 4.6669
2 0 * - .7 3 7 7 1.6513 51.1902 0000
2 2 . 1054 3.2686
2 3 * - .5 8 0 4 . 1983 6.1487 0217
2 5 * - .8 1 1 9 .0459 1.4238 0100
2 6 * 1.7212 . 1496 4.6384 1331
2 9 .0983 3.0460
3 0 * . 7840 .0912 2.8258 0163
3 1 * 1.6445 .0793 2.4584 0630
3 2 * 1.1426 .2836 3.7909 1459
3 3 * 1.3185 .0624 1.9345 0330
3 7 * . - .1 3 4 4 . 0548 1.7001 0003
4 0 . 1956 6.0623
4 1 .0277 .0708 2.1935 0000
4 2 .8457 26.2162
4 4 . * .2274 .0977 3.0273 0015
4 5 . * -1 .57 71 . 1621 5.0266 1232
48 . 1107 3.4318
5 0 * . - .1 1 0 4 . 1053 3.2636 0004
5 1 * -1 .72 75 .0627 1.9431 0569
5 2 *  . - .4 0 9 8 . 1817 5.6335 0096
5 3 . 1753 5.4329
5 8 * . 5428 . 1938 6.0080 0184
5 9 .0755 2.3390
6 1 * -2 .38 07 .0877 2.7196 1448
6 2 * . 7699 . 1190 3.6882 0206
6 7 *  . - .4 1 7 2 .0644 1.9970 0034
7 3 * .5926 .0376 1.1653 0046
7 4 *  . - .4 8 0 0 . 1576 4.8867 0110
7 5 .0764 2.3676
7 6 . 1020 3.1608
7 8 .0341 1.0557
8 2 * 1.89 72 . 1290 3.9981 1363
8 3 * - .7 2 8 0 .0940 2.9155 0145
8 4 * .9180 . 1618 5.0145 0416
Case £ 0 : ................ ___ :0 *ZRE5ID *LEVER *MAHAL *C0OK D
- 3 . 0
es idu a ls  S t a t i s t i c s :  









Devi a t i  on
1.1571





everage (*LEVER) .0341 1.6513 .2784 >.3750 A3
ahalanobis ' Distance ( *MAHAL) 1.0557 51.1902 8.6306 >11.5250 43
ook's D ( *COOK D) .0000 13.6971 2.4939 >1. 0000 30
Durbin-Watson Test:  d = 1.84714
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D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e :  K H L I I
- 3 . 0 0.0 3.0
Case £ 0 : .............. ♦ZRESID *LEVER ♦MAHAL ♦COOK D
1 * -1 .0 2 3 4 . 1614 5.0041 0619
2 . 1344 4.1652
3 * -1 .2 8 6 3 .6932 21.4894 3 1576
4 * 1.3172 .0578 1.7908 0372
6 .0868 2.6907
7 * . 6858 .0874 2.7109 0144
8 . 1571 4.8689
9 * .8191 . 1225 3.7971 0288
11 * -1 .2 4 4 0 .0885 2.7429 0478
12 .0311 .9627
14 .05 71 1.7706
16 . 1110 3.4420
17 .0950 2.9453
20 . * . 1807 . 1270 3.9361 0015
22 .0720 2.2330
23 * - .8 6 6 1 .083 7 2.5944 0220
25 . * . 3069 . 1189 3.6870 0039
26 . * .4607 . 1936 6.0027 0159
29 . 1004 3.1119
30 . * . 1338 . 1443 4.4724 0009
31 * 1.5203 . 1143 3.5445 0922
32 * .8097 .3523 10.9211 1323
33 *  . - .3 1 0 4 .0327 1.0148 0014
37 *  . - .4 7 0 5 .0536 1.6620 0045
40 .0965 2.9914
41 * 2.0976 . 1189 3.6846 1829
42 .849 7 26.3393
45 . ■ * .4585 .0529 1.6389 0042
46 .0715 2.2153
47 . 1908 5.9163
49 . 0446 1.3834
50 . ♦ .2221 . 1335 4.1380 0023
51 ♦ -1 .20 53 .0887 2.7501 0450
58 . * .4593 .0987 3.0586 0072
59 .0525 1.6280
62 . * .2307 .0414 1.2834 0009
66 .0317 .9816
67 *  . - .3 9 2 9 . 1228 3.8060 0066
73 * .5494 .0794 2.4625 0085
74 * . - .1 9 6 3 .0583 1.8066 0008
76 . 1350 4.1838
78 .0344 1.0659
79 .0770 2.3861
83 * . 6362 . 1173 3.6372 0166
84 . * .4345 .2221 6.3839 0172
Case £ 0:...... ...................:0 *ZRESID ♦LEVER ♦MAHAL ♦COCK D
- 3 . 0
oo 3 .0
Residuals S t a t i s t i c s :
Standard O u tly i  ng
Mi n Max Devi a t i  on Val ue N
Standardized Residual (*ZRESID) -1 .2 8 6 3 2.0976 .8547 >3.0000 26
Leverage (*LEVER) .0311 .8497 . 1519 >.3125 45
Mahalanobis' Distance ( *MAHAL) .9627 26.3393 4.7099 >9.5 875 45
Cook's D ( *C00K D) .0008 3.1576 . 6149 >1.0000 26
Durbin-Watson Test:  d = 1.92942
282
CHAPTER THIRTEEN -  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONTENT OF
LICENSING AGREEMENTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
13.1 INTRODUCTION
13.2 THE KNOW-HOW CONTENT OF PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
13.2.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
13.2.2 The H yp o th e s is  Tested
13.3 THE TRADEMARK CONTENT OF PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
13.3.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
13.3.2 The H yp o th e s is  Tested
13.4 THE PATENTABLE CONTENT OF KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS
13.4.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
13.4.2 The H yp o th e s is  Tested
13.5 THE NON-PROPRIETARY CONTENT OF KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS
13.5.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
13.5.2 The H yp o th e s is  Tested
13.6 THE CODIFIED CONTENT OF KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
13.6.1 The H ypotheses E x p la in e d
13.6.2 The H ypotheses Tested
13.7 THE INTERNALLY-TRANSFERRED CONTENT OF UNRELATED 
KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
13.7.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
13.7.2 The H yp o th e s is  Tested
13.8 CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX 13.1 SCATTERPLOTS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CONTENT OF UNRELATED & RELATED PATENT 
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
APPENDIX 13.2 SCATTERPLOTS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CONTENT OF UNRELATED & RELATED KNOW-HOW 
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
APPENDIX 13.3 SCATTERPLOTS OF THE CODIFIED CONTENT OF 
UNRELATED & RELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS
283
CHAPTER THIRTEEN - THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONTENT OF
LICENSING AGREEMENTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
13.1 INTRODUCTION
T h is  c h a p te r te s ts  a num ber o f  hypo theses  co n ce rn in g  th e  
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents. The 
b as ic  re se a rch  q u e s tio n  is  as fo llo w s : do th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  w h ich  is  lic e n s e d  by MNCs to  u n re la te d  
overseas f irm s  d i f f e r  fro m  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  w h ich  is  lic e n s e d  by MNCs to  t h e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s ?  
The hypo the ses  w h ic h  were gene ra ted  fro m  th is  g e n e ra l q u e s tio n  
were d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  l i te r a tu r e  on th e  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry  o f  
th e  MNC (C h a p te r 5).
To recap, b r ie f ly ,  th is  sch o o l o f  th o u g h t h o ld s  th a t  com panies 
w i l l  e s ta b lis h  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  ra th e r  th a n  lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
w ith  u n re la te d  overseas f irm s  when im p e rfe c tio n s  in  th e  a rm 's - 
le n g th  m a rke t f o r  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  g ive  r is e  to  t ra n s a c tio n  
cos ts  w h ic h  are  g re a te r  th a n  those  w h ic h  a r is e  fro m  th e  expa ns io n  
o f  th e  f irm 's  b o u n d a rie s .
T ra n s a c tio n  cos ts  in  th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  m a rke t can be 
c o n s id e re d  as b e lo n g in g  to  one o f tw o  b road  ca te g o rie s : e x -a n te  and 
e x -p o s t costs  [ H i l l  and Chan Kim (1988)]. The fo rm e r c o n s is t o f  th e  
cos ts  o f  d ra f t in g ,  n e g o tia t in g , m o n ito r in g  and e n fo rc in g  a lic e n s in g  
agreem ent, in c lu d in g  th e  cos ts  assoc ia ted  w ith  e s ta b lis h in g  a fe e  f o r  
th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty .  The la t t e r  are the  costs  w h ich  a r is e  fro m  
o p p o r tu n is t ic  b e h a v io u r  on th e  p a r t  o f  the  license e , w h ich  may 
in v o lv e  d is s e m in a tio n  o f  th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  to  t h i r d  p a r t ie s  
and th e  consequen t lo ss  o f  fu tu re  ea rn ings .
Im p l ic i t  in  th e  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t l i te r a tu r e  is  th e  v ie w  th a t  
in te r n a l m a rke ts  a re  s u p e r io r  to  e x te rn a l m arke ts  in  t h e ir  a b i l i t y  to  
econom ise on these  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  [W illia m so n  (1975)]. T h is  a rise s  
p r in c ip a l ly  fro m  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  "governance s tru c tu re "  o f  an 
in te r n a l m a rke t fu n c t io n s  th ro u g h  th e  e xe rc ise  o f m anage ria l 
a u th o r i ty ,  r a th e r  th a n  th ro u g h  th e  c o -o p e ra tio n  re lie d  upon by 
m a rke ts . E x -p o s t t ra n s a c tio n  costs  are reduced w ith in  an a u th o r i ty -
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based system  s ince  o p p o rtu n is m  is  more e a s ily  m o n ito re d  and 
sa n c tio n e d . E x -a n te  costs  are  a lso  lo w e re d  as th e  n e g o tia t io n  
p rocess betw een d i f fe r e n t  u n its  o f  th e  same o rg a n iz a t io n  is  s u b je c t 
to  g re a te r  c o n tro l by m anagers who have s u p e r io r  access to  
in fo rm a tio n  th a n  e ith e r  u n i t  and th e  a u th o r i ty  to  re s o lv e  any 
d is p u te s  w h ic h  may a rise .
M ost o f  th e  hypo theses  te s te d  in  th is  c h a p te r are  concerned  
w ith  d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  c o n te n t o f  th e  
u n re la te d  and re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents o f  th e  com pany sam ple. 
The fo rm e r arose fro m  b a rg a in in g  betw een in d e p e n d e n t concerns, 
w h ile  th e  la t t e r  were th e  outcom e o f  n e g o tia t io n s  betw een d i f fe r e n t  
u n its  o f  th e  same MNC. The hypo theses were te s te d  u s in g  
a p p ro p r ia te  da ta  fro m  S e c tion  I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  (u n re la te d  
lic e n s in g )  and S e c tion  I I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  ( re la te d  lic e n s in g ).
13.2 THE KNOW-HOW CONTENT OF PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
13.2.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
The h y p o th e s is  w h ic h  was te s te d  is  se t o u t be low  in  i t s  a lte rn a t iv e  
and n u l l  fo rm s:
H ^: U n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv e  f e w e r  t ra n s fe rs  o f  
kn o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
Hq : T here  is  no d iffe re n c e  between the  know -h ow  c o n te n t o f  
u n re la te d  and re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
T h is  h y p o th e s is  was based upon the  prem ise th a t  the  a rm 's - 
le n g th  ( ie  e x te rn a l)  m a rke t f o r  know -how  in v o lv e s  g re a te r  
t ra n s a c t io n  costs  th a n  th e  in t r a - f i r m  (ie  in te rn a l)  m a rke t f o r  kn o w ­
how. These g re a te r  costs  a r is e  fro m  the  d i f f ic u l t ie s  in h e re n t in  
l ic e n s in g  know -h ow  to  u n re la te d  ( ra th e r  th a n  re la te d )  com panies. 
W illia m so n  (1981) and Teece (1980-86) have h ig h lig h te d  th re e  m ain 
im ped im en ts  to  th e  e x te rn a l t ra n s fe r  o f know -how  w h ich  g ive  r is e  to  
e x -a n te  tra n s a c tio n  costs , th e re b y  m aking in te rn a l t ra n s fe r  more 
a p p e a lin g .
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F ir s t ly ,  th e re  is  th e  " re c o g n it io n "  p rob lem . I t  is  o f te n  d i f f i c u l t  
to  f u l l y  p u b lic iz e  th e  a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  c e r ta in  fo rm s  o f  p ro p r ie ta ry  
kn o w -h o w  s ince  th e  v a lu e  o f  such kn o w -h o w  is  dependen t upon th e  
m a in tenance o f  c o n f id e n t ia l i t y .  As a re s u lt ,  p o te n t ia l l ic e n s in g  
o p p o r tu n it ie s  may go u n re a lize d .
S econdly, th e re  is  th e  "d is c lo s u re "  p rob lem . Assum ing th a t  th e  
re c o g n it io n  p rob lem  is  overcom e, i t  is  necessary to  com m unicate th e  
v a lu e  o f  kn o w -h o w  to  p o te n t ia l licensees  w ith o u t  re v e a lin g  i t s  exa c t 
n a tu re . I f  v a lu e  can o n ly  be com m unica ted by d is c lo s in g  th e  e x a c t 
n a tu re  o f  th e  know -h ow  in  q u e s tio n , th e n  th e  bas is  f o r  a l ic e n s in g  
agreem ent w i l l  have been d e s tro y e d  s ince  th e  p o te n t ia l license e  w i l l  
have o b ta in e d  th e  know -h ow  fo r  fre e . The m a in tenance o f  
in fo rm a tio n  asym m etry betw een th e  know -h ow  p r o p r ie to r  and 
p o te n t ia l licensees  is  th e re fo re  a necessary p re - re q u is ite  f o r  k n o w ­
how to  re ta in  i t s  va lu e . In  these  c ircum stances , how ever, p o te n t ia l 
license es  may fe a r  o p p o r tu n is t ic  re p re s e n ta tio n s  fro m  th e  p ro p r ie to r  
and may th u s  be u n w il l in g  to  pay th e ir  e s tim a te  o f  th e  f u l l  v a lu e  o f  
th e  know -h ow . The e x te rn a l m a rke t f o r  know -h ow  lice n ce s  w i l l  th u s  
be p ro n e  to  fa i lu re .
The "d is c lo s u re "  p rob lem  is  e s s e n tia lly  a m a n ife s ta t io n  o f  the  
p rob lem  o f  " in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness", o r ig in a l ly  de sc rib e d  by 
W illia m so n  (1975, pp 31-37). T h is  c o n d it io n  is  less l ik e ly  to  a r is e  in  
th e  m a rke t f o r  p u re  p a te n ts  because p a te n ts  n e ce ss ita te  f u l l  
p u b lic  d is c lo s u re  o f th e  s p e c if ic a t io n s  o f th e  te c h n o lo g y  th a t  is  
th e  s u b je c t o f  th e  pa ten t.^ - In  th e  m a rke t f o r  know -h ow  th e re  is  no 
such d is c lo s u re , and th e re fo re  scope fo r  "b u y e r u n c e r ta in ty "  to  
a r is e  [B u c k le y  and Casson (1976, pp 38-39)]
H ow ever, even i f  in fo rm a tio n  co n ce rn in g  th e  v a lu e  o f kn o w -h o w  
is  n o t im pacted , and can th e re fo re  be com m unicated to  p o te n t ia l 
license es  w ith o u t  d e s tro y in g  th e  bas is  fo r  a lic e n s in g  agreem ent, th e  
e x te rn a l m a rke t may s t i l l  be p rone  to  fa i lu re  i f  th e  p rob lem  o f  
"team  o rg a n iz a tio n "  e x is ts . T h is  a rise s  when in fo rm a tio n  has a h ig h  
t a c i t  c o n te n t, such th a t  i t  cann o t be t ra n s fe r re d  to  o th e r  
o rg a n iz a tio n s  w ith o u t  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  pe rson ne l. A lth o u g h
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c o n s u lt in g  teams may be used in  th e  s h o r t- te rm  to  overcom e th is  
p rob lem  fo r  o n e -o ff  t ra n s fe rs ,  w here  a success ion  o f  t ra n s fe rs  is  
l i k e ly  th e  in te rn a l m a rke t becomes more a p p e a lin g  as i t  can more 
e a s ily  accom odate th e  s tra in s  l ik e ly  to  a r is e  in  re c u r re n t  
c o n tra c tin g .
In  a d d it io n  to  th e  e x -a n te  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  w h ic h  a r is e  fro m  
th e  p rob lem s o f  " re c o g n it io n " ,  "d is c lo s u re "  and "team  o rg a n iz a tio n " , 
th e re  are  a lso  e x -p o s t t ra n s a c tio n  costs  a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  
e x te rn a l m a rke t f o r  kn o w -h o w  w h ic h  a r is e  fro m  th e  o p p o r tu n is t ic  
b e h a v io u r  o f  licensees . T h is  may m a n ife s t i t s e l f  in  th e  licensee , o r  
an em ployee o f  th e  license e , " le a k in g "  lic e n s e d  kn o w -h o w  to  o th e r  
com panies, o r  u s in g  i t  f o r  pu rposes  o th e r  th a n  th o se  o r ig in a l ly  
in te n d e d .
G iven  th e  presum ed s u p e r io r i ty  o f  in te rn a l m arke ts  in  
econom is ing  upon these  t ra n s a c tio n  costs , one w o u ld  expec t to  f in d  
th a t  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents had a lo w e r kn o w -h o w  
c o n te n t th a n  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents. T h is  h y p o th e s is  
was te s te d  fo r  each o f  th e  tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f  kn o w -h o w  in c lu d e d  in  
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , ie  kn o w -h o w  in  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  p a te n t 
and k n o w -h o w  s u p p lie d  on a b ro a d e r bas is , and a lso  f o r  b o th  o f  
these  ca te g o rie s  com bined.
In  a d d it io n  to  th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  u n re la te d  agreem ents had a 
lo w e r  c o n te n t o f  b o th  c a te g o rie s  o f  know -h ow  th a n  re la te d  
agreem ents, i t  was a lso  h y p o th e s is e d  th a t  th e  d iffe re n c e  in  k n o w ­
how  c o n te n t betw een th e  tw o  typ e s  o f agreem ent w o u ld  be more 
p ro n o u n ce d  f o r  kn o w -h o w  th a t  was s u p p lie d  on a b ro a d e r bas is  th a n  
ju s t  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  p a te n t. There were tw o  reasons fo r  
th is  seconda ry  h y p o th e s is . The f i r s t  was s im p ly  th a t  th e  s u p p ly  o f  
kn o w -h o w  in  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  p a te n t is  o f te n  e s s e n tia l f o r  
p a te n ts  to  be u t i l is e d  p ro p e r ly , and so we w o u ld  expec t to  f in d  th is  
ty p e  o f  kn o w -h o w  to  fe a tu re  more in  b o th  ca te g o rie s  o f  agreem ent.
The second reason  was based upon th e  p ro p o s it io n  th a t  kn o w ­
how p ro v id e d  on a b ro a d e r bas is  th a n  the  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e
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p a te n t is  more p ro n e  to  be used by  a license e  f o r  pu rposes  n o t 
s p e c if ie d  u n d e r th e  te rm s o f  a l ic e n s in g  agreem ent due to  th e  fa c t 
th a t  i t  is  less "p ro d u c t-s p e c if ic "  th a n  kn o w -h o w  w h ic h  re la te s  to  
th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  p a te n t. An exam ple o f  kn o w -h o w  w ith  a 
lo w  degree o f  p ro d u c t - s p e c i f ic i ty  is  in s ta n t  cam era te ch n o lo g y ,
w h ic h  has o ffe re d  th e  p o te n t ia l f o r  t ra n s fe r  in to  e le c tro n ic
com ponents, m in ia tu re  b a tte r ie s , chem ica ls , sens ing  and m easurem ent
dev ices , and p re c is io n  m achine to o ls  [see G a lb ra ith  and Kay (1986, p
14)]. The g re a te r  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  o p p o r tu n is t ic  e x p lo ita t io n  o f  th is  
ty p e  o f  kn o w -h o w  by  licensees  w i l l  th u s  make com panies less 
in c lin e d  to  lic e n s e  i t  in  th e  a rm 's - le n g th  m a rke t in  com parison  w ith  
k n o w -h o w  w h ich  has a h ig h  degree o f  p ro d u c t- s p e c if ic ity .
The d a ta  used to  te s t  th e  p r im a ry  h y p o th e s is  are  d is p la y e d  in  
Tab les 13-1, 13-2 and 13-3. The f i r s t  o f  these  ta b le s  was c o n s tru c te d  
fro m  th e  responses to  Q u e s tio n  4 in  S e c tion  I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , 
w h ic h  asked th e  com panies to  e s tim a te  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  t h e ir  
u n re la te d  p a te n t l ic e n s in g  agreem ents w h ich  a lso  in v o lv e d  th e  
s u p p ly  o f  know -how .
TABLE 13-1
THE KNOW-HOW CONTENT OF UNRELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Proportion KNOW-HOW RELATED TO KNOW-HOW SUPPLIED
Of TECHNICAL FIELD OF PATENT ON A BROADER BASIS
Agreements
Providing Number of Per Cent of Number of Per Cent of
Know-how Companies Companies Companies Companies
None 0 0.0 13 25.5
A Few 6 11.8 13 25.5
About Half 4 7.8 6 11.8
Most 17 33.3 8 15.7
All/Virtually All 24 47.1 11 21.5
Total 51 100.0 51 100.0
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D ata  on th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g
agreem ents in c lu d e d  th e  s u p p ly  o f  know -h ow  were o b ta in e d  fro m  
Q u e s tio n  3 in  S e c tion  I I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . The d a ta  are  
d is p la y e d  in  Tab le  13-2.
TABLE 13-2
THE KNOW-HOW CONTENT OF RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
P ro p o rt io n KNOW-HOW RELATED TO KNOW-HOW SUPPLIED
Of TECHNICAL FIELD OF PATENT ON A BROADER BASIS
Agreements
P ro v id in g Number o f Per Cent o f Number o f Per Cent o f
Know-how Companies Companies Companies Companies
None 2 4 .4 5 11.6
A Few 2 4.4 4 9 .3
About H a lf 1 2.2 1 2.3
Most 9 20.0 13 30.2
A l l / V i r t u a l l y  A l l 31 69.0 20 46.6
T o ta l 45 100.0 43 100.0
The to ta ls  fro m  Tab les 13-1 and 13-2 are com bined in  Tab le  13-3, 
w h ic h  i l lu s t r a te s  th e  d iffe re n c e  in  the  e x te n t o f  t o ta l  kn o w -h o w  
p ro v is io n  be tw een re la te d  and u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
TABLE 13-3
THE TOTAL KNOW-HOW CONTENT OF UNRELATED 
AND RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
P ro p o rt io n  o f UNRELATED LICENSING RELATED LICENSING
Agreements
Per Cent o fP ro v id in g Number o f Per Cent o f Number o f
Know-how Companies Companies Companies Companies
None 13 12.8 7 8 .0
A Few 19 18.6 6 6.8
About H a lf 10 9.8 2 2.3
Most 25 24.5 22 25.0
A l l / V i r t u a l l y  A l l 35 34.3 51 57.9
T o ta l 102 100.0 88 100.0
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13.2.2 The H y p o th esis  T e s ted
The a p p ro p r ia te  s ta t is t ic a l  te s t  f o r  any h y p o th e s is  is  dependent 
upon th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  re se a rch  des ign  and th e  le v e l o f  
m easurem ent o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  in v o lv e d . The re se a rch  des ign  chosen 
to  te s t  th is  h y p o th e s is  can be c h a ra c te r is e d , u s in g  th e  c la s s if ic a t io n  
scheme o f  Cohen and H o ll id a y  (1982), as a "one g ro u p  des ign ". T h is  
s in g le  g ro u p  was composed o f  MNCs th a t :
a) lic e n s e d  p a te n ts  and kn o w -h o w  to  u n re la te d  overseas com panies;
and
b) lic e n s e d  p a te n ts  and kn o w -h o w  to  re la te d  overseas com panies
( ie  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s ) .
The re se a rch  des ign  th e re fo re  in v o lv e d  re p e a te d  m easures on 
th e  same s u b je c ts  u n d e r tw o  c o n d it io n s . E m ploy ing  th e  te rm in o lo g y  
o f  S iege l (1956), th e  tw o  sam ples d e r iv e d  fro m  these  re p e a te d  
m easures can be c la s s if ie d  as " re la te d "  ( ra th e r  th a n  " in d e p e n d e n t") 
s ince  each com pany in  th e  g ro u p  answ ered b o th  th e  q u e s tio n s  th a t  
were com pared to  te s t  th e  h y p o th e s is .
S ince th e  v a r ia b le s  were m easured a t the  o rd in a l le v e l the  
a p p ro p r ia te  te s t  was th e  W ilcoxon  M a tch ed -P a irs  S igned-R anks T es t 
(h e re a f te r  re fe r re d  to  as th e  W ilcoxon  te s t) . Had th e  da ta  been o f 
in te r v a l  s tre n g th  th e n  a c o rre la te d  t - t e s t  f o r  e q u a li ty  o f  means 
w o u ld  have  been more a p p ro p r ia te .
The s teps  in v o lv e d  in  th e  c a lc u la t io n  o f th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  
s ta t is t ic ,  T, were as fo llo w s . F ir s t ly ,  th e  d if fe re n c e  in  scores 
be tw een each p a ir  o f  va lu e s  was fo u n d . These d iffe re n c e s  were th e n  
ra n k -o rd e re d  fro m  sm a lle s t to  la rg e s t w ith o u t  re g a rd  to  s ign . The 
a c tu a l s ig ns  o f  each d if fe re n c e  were th e n  added to  th e  ra n k  va lu e s . 
The te s t  s ta t is t ic  T was th e n  o b ta in e d  by summing b o th  th e  p o s it iv e  
and n e g a tiv e  ra n k s  and s e le c tin g  th e  s m a lle r o f  th e  tw o .
Two types  o f  t ie s  o ccu r w ith  th is  te s t. The f i r s t  typ e  occu rs  
when tw o  o b s e rv a tio n s  are  equa l. In  th is  s itu a t io n  th e  d iffe re n c e  
in  scores is  zero, so th e  p a ir  o f  o b s e rv a tio n s  are d ropped  fro m  th e
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c a lc u la t io n .  The second typ e  o f  t ie  occu rs  when tw o  o r  more p a irs  
o f  scores have th e  same d iffe re n c e . When th is  happens, th e  ra n k  
p o s it io n s  o f  th e  p a irs  a re  averaged.
When th e  num ber o f  p a irs  o f  o b s e rv a tio n s , n, is  less  th a n  25, 
c r i t ic a l  v a lu e  ta b le s  can be used to  de te rm ine  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  
th e  te s t  s ta t is t ic .  When n is  g re a te r  th a n  25 th e  sam p ling  
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  T is  a p p ro x im a te ly  no rm a l, so th e  T v a lu e  has to  be 
tra n s fo rm e d  u s in g  th e  fo llo w in g  fo rm u la :
T -  uT
2 =  r—
c-T
w here  j iT and o»T re p re s e n t th e  mean and s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n  o f  th e  
sa m p lin g  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  T.
A n o ta b le  fe a tu re  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  is  i t s  h ig h  pow er 
e f f ic ie n c y .  When th e  assum ptions  o f  th e  t - t e s t  a re  m et, th e  pow er 
e f f ic ie n c y  is  95.5 p e r cen t [S ie g e l (1956, p83)].
The h y p o th e s is  was te s te d , f i r s t l y ,  f o r  kn o w -h o w  w h ic h  was 
s u p p lie d  in  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  p a te n t (h e re a fte r  re fe r re d  to  
as 'p a te n t-s p e c if ic ' know -h ow ). An im p re ss io n  o f  th e  re la t io n s h ip  
be in g  te s te d  can be ga ined  fro m  F ig u re  1 in  A p p e n d ix  13-1. T h is
f ig u re  p lo ts  th e  p a te n t-s p e c if ic  know -h ow  c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d
p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents a g a in s t th e  p a te n t-s p e c if ic  kn o w -h o w  
c o n te n t o f  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents. Each a s te r is k  
re p re s e n ts  th e  p o s it io n  o f  a s in g le  company. Where more th a n  one 
com pany occup ied  th e  same c o -o rd in a te s , th e  num ber o f  com panies 
was p r in te d .
M ost o f  th e  p o in ts  p lo t te d  on th e  sc a tte rg ra m  sh o u ld  have
fa l le n  be low  th e  45° l in e  s ince  re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents were
h y p o th e s is e d  to  possess more p a te n t-s p e c if ic  kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t th a n  
u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents. In s p e c tio n  o f  F ig u re  1 re ve a ls  th a t  
13 o f  th e  34 p o in ts  p lo t te d  d id  f a l l  be low  th is  lin e . H owever, a 
f u r t h e r  17 p o in ts  a c tu a lly  f e l l  on th e  45° l in e ; f o r  these  com panies 
th e re  was no d iffe re n c e  betw een th e  e x te n t o f  p a te n t-s p e c if ic  kn o w ­
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how p ro v is io n  in  t h e i r  u n re la te d  and re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  
agreem ents. The re m a in in g  4 com panies a c tu a lly  had  m ore p a te n t-  
s p e c if ic  k n o w -h o w  c o n te n t in  t h e ir  u n re la te d  agreem ents th a n  th e y  
d id  in  t h e ir  re la te d  agreem ents.
Tab le  13-4 p re s e n ts  th e  re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  p a te n t-  
s p e c if ic  know -h ow .
TABLE 13-4
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
COMPARING THE PATENT-SPECIFIC KNOW-1EW CONTENT OF 
UNRELATED AND RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
12.50 4 - 





(RELATED < UNRELATED) 
(RELATED > UNRELATED)
34 TOTAL
Z = -1.2545 1-TAILED P = .10485
A o n e - ta ile d  te s t  was em ployed because th e  h y p o th e s is  
in d ic a te d  th e  p re d ic te d  d ire c t io n  o f th e  d iffe re n c e s  betw een th e  tw o  
v a r ia b le s , ie  th a t  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents w o u ld  
in v o lv e  fe w e r t ra n s fe rs  o f  p a te n t-s p e c if ic  know -h ow  th a n  re la te d  
p a te n t l ic e n s in g  agreem ents.
As th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  Z score  was 0.10485, th e  n u l l  
h y p o th e s is  c o u ld  n o t be re je c te d . I t  can be conc luded , th e re fo re , 
th a t  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents d id  n o t in v o lv e  
s ig n if ic a n t ly  fe w e r t ra n s fe rs  o f  p a te n t-s p e c if ic  know -h ow  th a n  
re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The h y p o th e s is  was th e n  te s te d  f o r  the  second ca te g o ry  o f  
kn o w -h o w , th a t  w h ic h  d id  n o t re la te  to  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  
p a te n t b u t was s u p p lie d  on a b ro a d e r bas is  (h e re a fte r  re fe r re d  too  
as 'b ro a d ' know -how ). F ig u re  2 in  A p pend ix  13-1 p lo ts  the  b road
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know -h ow  c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents a g a in s t 
the  b ro a d  kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t o f  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents. 
O f th e  34 p o in ts  p lo t te d ,  19 f e l l  be low  th e  45° lin e .  A fu r th e r  12 
p o in ts  f e l l  on th e  l in e ,  w h ile  o n ly  2 com panies were p lo t te d  above 
i t .
Tab le  13-5 p re se n ts  th e  re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  b ro a d  
know -h ow .
TABLE 13-5
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
COMPARING THE BROAD KNCW-B3W CONTENT OF 
UNRELATED AND RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
10.75 2 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
11.03 19 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
12 TIES
33 TOTAL
Z = -3.2672 1-TAILED P = .00055
As th e  Z score  was h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t ,  th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  was 
re je c te d . I t  can be conc lude d , th e re fo re , th a t  u n re la te d  p a te n t 
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents d id  in v o lv e  s ig n if ic a n t ly  fe w e r tra n s fe rs  o f  
b ro a d  kn o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
F in a lly ,  th e  h y p o th e s is  was te s te d  f o r  b o th  ca te g o rie s  o f  k n o w ­
how com bined, ie  kn o w -h o w  re la te d  to  th e  p a te n ts  s u p p lie d  and 
kn o w -h o w  s u p p lie d  on a b ro a d e r bas is . The com bined know -h ow  
c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents are 
p lo t te d  a g a in s t one a n o th e r in  F ig u re  3 o f A p pend ix  13-1. The axes 
o f th e  s c a t te rp lo t  have an u p p e r l im i t  o f  10 s ince  th e  responses to  
the  q u e s tio n s  co n ce rn in g  these  tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f know -h ow  (w h ich  
each c o n ta in e d  f iv e  p o in t  sca les) were com bined to  p roduce  a s in g le  
r a t in g  f o r  to ta l  kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t.
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In s p e c tio n  o f  F ig u re  3 re v e a ls  th a t  20 o f  th e  33 p o in ts  p lo t te d  
f e l l  be low  th e  45° l in e . A f u r t h e r  10 p o in ts  a c tu a lly  f e l l  on th e  
lin e ,  w h ile  th e  re m a in in g  3 com panies had more to ta l  kn o w -h o w  
c o n te n t in  t h e ir  u n re la te d  agreem ents th a n  th e y  d id  in  t h e ir  re la te d  
agreem ents.
Tab le  13-6 p re se n ts  th e  re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  t o ta l  
kn o w -h o w  co n te n t.
TABLE 13-6
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
COMPARING THE TOTAL KNCW-H2W CONTENT OF 
UNRELATED AND RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
17.00 3 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
11.25 20 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
10 TIES
33 TOTAL
Z = -2.6461 1-TAILED P = .00400
As th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  Z score was 0.0040, th e  n u l l  
h y p o th e s is  was re je c te d . I t  can be conc luded , th e re fo re , th a t  
u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents d id  in v o lv e  a s ig n if ic a n t ly  
s m a lle r  am ount o f  t o ta l  kn o w -h o w  tra n s fe rs  th a n  re la te d  p a te n t 
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The p re v io u s  tw o  re s u lts  suggest th a t  th e  b u lk  o f  th is  
d if fe re n c e  was accoun ted  f o r  b y  b ro a d ly -b a s e d  know -h ow  ra th e r  
th a n  by  kn o w -h o w  re la te d  to  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  p a te n t. The 
seconda ry  h y p o th e s is  th a t  th e  d iffe re n c e  betw een u n re la te d  and 
re la te d  agreem ents w o u ld  be more p ronounced  f o r  know -h ow  th a t  
was s u p p lie d  on a b ro a d e r bas is  th a n  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  
p a te n t was th e re fo re  deemed to  be w e ll- fo u n d e d .
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13.3 THE TRADEMARK CONTENT OF PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
13.3.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
The h y p o th e s is  w h ic h  was te s te d  is  se t o u t be low  in  i t s  a lte rn a t iv e  
and n u l l  fo rm s:
H ^: U n re la te d  p a te n t l ic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv e  fe w e r t ra n s fe rs  o f  
tra d e m a rk s  th a n  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
H q .* There  is  no d if fe re n c e  betw een th e  tra d e m a rk  c o n te n t o f  
u n re la te d  and re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The h y p o th e s is  is  based upon  th e  a s s o c ia tio n  o f  tra d e m a rks  
w ith  p ro d u c t q u a li ty .  Because tra d e m a rks  are  a means o f  
d i f fe r e n t ia t in g  p ro d u c ts  t h e ir  v a lu e  is  dependent upon th e  
u n i fo rm ity  o f  p ro d u c t q u a l i ty  across d i f fe r e n t  p ro d u ce rs . I t  is  
th e re fo re  n o t uncommon fo r  com panies w h ich  lic e n s e  tra d e m a rks  to  
in c lu d e  c lauses in  t h e ir  lic e n s in g  agreem ents w h ich  a llo w  f o r  th e  
p e r io d ic  ch e ck in g  o f  th e  lice n se e 's  o u tp u t  [Low e and C ra w fo rd  (1984, 
P4)].
G iven th e  need to  a t ta in  a s a t is fa c to ry  s ta n d a rd  o f  p ro d u c t 
q u a li ty ,  th e  p rob lem  o f  "team  o rg a n iz a tio n "  is  l i k e ly  to  a r is e  when 
tra d e m a rk s  are  lice n se d . In  a d d it io n  to  th e  repea ted  m o n ito r in g  o f 
lice n se e  o u tp u t  to  ensu re  th a t  p ro d u c t q u a li ty  does n o t d e te r io ra te , 
i n i t i a l  t r a in in g  o f  lice n se e  p e rso n n e l is  a lso  necessary to  ensure  
adequa te  q u a li ty  in  th e  c ru c ia l e a r ly  stages o f lic e n s e d  p ro d u c tio n .^  
I t  is  th e re fo re  to  be expec ted  th a t  com panies w i l l  be more in c lin e d  
to  lic e n s e  tra d e m a rks  to  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  th a n  to  in depe nden t 
fo re ig n  concerns, g iv e n  th e  advan tages o f  in te rn a l h ie ra rc h ic a l 
c o n t ro l in  re d u c in g  th e  e x -a n te  t ra n s a c tio n  costs  th a t  a r is e  in  th e  
a rm 's - le n g th  m a rke t. We w o u ld  th e re fo re  expec t to  f in d  th a t  
u n re la te d  p a te n t l ic e n s in g  agreem ents w o u ld  in v o lv e  fe w e r tra n s fe rs  
o f  tra d e m a rk s  th a n  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
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The da ta  used to  te s t  th e  h y p o th e s is  are d is p la y e d  in  Tab le  13- 
7, w h ic h  re p o r ts  th e  responses o b ta in e d  fro m  Q ues tion  4(c) in  
S e c tion  I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  (u n re la te d  agreem ents) and fro m  
Q u e s tio n  3(c) in  S e c tion  I I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  ( re la te d
agreem ents).
TABLE 13-7
THE TRADEMARK CONTENT OF UNRELATED AND 
RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Proportion of UNRELATED LICENSING RELATED LICENSING
Agreements
Providing Number of Per Cent of Number of Per Cent of
Trademarks Companies Companies Companies Companies
None 8 15.7 6 13.3
A Few 19 37.3 7 15.6
About Half 4 7.8 1 2.2
Most 12 23.5 10 22.2
All/Virtually All 8 15.7 21 46.7
Total 51 100.0 45 100.0
13.3.2 The H yp o th e s is  Tested
An i n i t i a l  im p re ss io n  o f  th e  v a l id i t y  o f  th e  h y p o th e s is  can be ga ined  
fro m  F ig u re  4 in  A p p e n d ix  13-1, w h ic h  c o n ta in s  th e  c ro s s ta b u la tio n  
o f  th e  tra d e m a rk  c o n te n t o f  th e  tw o  c a te g o rie s  o f lic e n s in g  
agreem ent. T h is  re v e a ls  th a t  15 o f  th e  34 com panies p lo t te d  f e l l  
be low  th e  45° l in e ,  w h ic h  in d ic a te s  th a t  these  com panies lic e n s e d  
m ore tra d e m a rks  to  re la te d  com panies th a n  to  u n re la te d  com panies. 
O f th e  re m a in in g  19 com panies o n ly  5 were p lo t te d  above th e  lin e ,  




WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
COMPARING THE TRADEMARK CONTENT OF 
UNRELATED AND RELATED PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
6.00 5 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
12.00 15 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
14 TIES
34 TOTAL
Z = -2.8000 1-TAILED P = .00026
The re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  tra d e m a rks  are  p re se n te d  
in  T ab le  13-8. As th e  Z score  was h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t  th e  a lte rn a t iv e  
h y p o th e s is  was accepted. I t  can be conc luded , th e re fo re , th a t  
u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv e d  s ig n if ic a n t ly  fe w e r 
tra n s fe rs  o f  tra d e m a rks  th a n  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
13.4 THE PATENTABLE CONTENT OF KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS
13.4.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
The h y p o th e s is  w h ic h  was te s te d  is  se t o u t be low  in  i t s  a lte rn a t iv e  
and n u l l  fo rm s :
H ^: U n re la te d  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  agreem ents in v o lv e  fe w e r 
tra n s fe rs  o f  p a te n ta b le  know -h ow  th a n  re la te d  kn o w -h o w  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
Hq : There  is  no d iffe re n c e  betw een the  p a te n ta b le  kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t 
o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The h y p o th e s is  is  concerned  w ith  p a te n ta b le  know -how , ie  
kn o w -h o w  w h ich  c o u ld  be d e sc rib e d  in  a p a te n t b u t w h ich  is  
d e l ib e ra te ly  le f t  u n p a te n te d  by the  p ro p r ie to r .  I f  com panies choose
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n o t to  re g is te r  a p a te n t th e n  th e  v a lu e  o f  t h e ir  know -h ow  is  
dependen t upon  th e ir  a b i l i t y  to  keep i t  se c re t. I f  a n o th e r com pany 
w ere to  o b ta in  access to  th e  kn o w -h o w  and th e n  a c q u ire  a p a te n t 
f o r  i t ,  i t  w o u ld  a p p ro p r ia te  re tu rn s  o v e r th e  l i fe -s p a n  o f  th e  p a te n t 
th a t  w o u ld  have be longed to  th e  o r ig in a to r  o f  th e  know -h ow  had i t  
been p a te n te d  fro m  th e  o u ts e t.
T ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry  suggests th a t  th e re  is  a g re a te r  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  kn o w -h o w  " le a k in g "  fro m  u n re la te d  com panies th a n  
fro m  re la te d  com panies. The cos t s u ffe re d  by  a company w h ic h  
e xp e rie n ce s  kn o w -h o w  leakage w i l l  be g re a te r  i f  i t s  know -h ow  is  o f  
a p a te n ta b le  n a tu re , and we w o u ld  th e re fo re  expe c t com panies to  be 
s t ro n g ly  in c lin e d  to  use in te rn a l m arke ts  when t ra n s fe r r in g  th is  
ty p e  o f  know -h ow . In  so do ing  th e y  fo re g o  th e  c o n tra c t-b a s e d  
c o n t ro l a v a ila b le  in  e x te rn a l m arke ts  in  fa v o u r  o f  th e  a u th o r i ty -  
based c o n t ro l a v a ila b le  in  in te rn a l m arke ts , and are th e re b y  ab le  to  
reduce  th e  e x -p o s t t ra n s a c tio n  costs  a r is in g  fro m  o p p o r tu n is t ic  
lice n se e  b e h a v io u r.
The h y p o th e s is  was te s te d  us in g  th e  da ta  in  Tab le  13-9, w h ic h  
re p o r ts  th e  responses o b ta in e d  fro m  Q ues tion  13(a) in  S ec tion  I I  o f  
th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  (u n re la te d  agreem ents) and fro m  Q ues tion  4(a) in  
S e c tio n  I I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  ( re la te d  agreem ents).
TABLE 13-9
THE PATENTABLE CONTENT OF UNRELATED AND 
RELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Proportion of UNRELATED LICENSING RELATED LICENSING
Patentable
Know-how in Number of Per Cent of Number of Per Cent of
Licensing Agreements Companies Companies Companies Companies
None 26 43.3 16 29.6
Seme 28 46.7 25 46.3
About Half 2 3.3 10 18.5
Most 4 6.7 3 5.6
All/Virtually All 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 60 100.0 54 100.0
298
CHAPTER 13
13.4.2 The H y p o th esis  T es ted
The s c a t te rp lo t  o f  th e  p a te n ta b le  kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t o f  th e  tw o  
c a te g o rie s  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ent is  show n in  F ig u re  1 o f  A p p e n d ix  
13-2. T h is  re v e a ls  th a t  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  com panies (27) f e l l  on th e  
45° l in e ,  w ith  10 com panies f a l l in g  be low  i t  and 4 above i t .
The re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  p a te n ta b le  kn o w -h o w  are 
p re s e n te d  in  Tab le  13-10. As th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  Z score  was 
o n ly  0.08365 th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  c o u ld  n o t be re je c te d . I t  can 
th e re fo re  be conc lude d  th a t  th e re  was no s t a t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  
d if fe re n c e  betw een th e  p a te n ta b le  c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  
kn o w -h o w  agreem ents.
TABLE 13-10
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
COMPARING THE PATENTABLE CONTENT OF 
UNRELATED AND RELATED KNOW-H3W LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
7.63 4 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
7.45 10 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
27 TIES
41 TOTAL
Z = -1.3811 1-TAILED P = .08365
T h is  r e s u lt  may be in te rp re te d  in  the  l ig h t  o f  P a rry 's  (1985) 
a rgum en t th a t  th e  in te rn a lis a t io n  (ie  tra n s a c tio n  cos t) app roach  
ig n o re s  th e  p rob lem  o f know -h ow  leakages fro m  w ith in  in te rn a l 
h ie ra rc h ie s . He a rgued  th a t  th e re  are  d i f f ic u l t ie s  in  e n fo rc in g  
"q u a s i-c o n tra c tu a l c o n tro l"  o v e r em ployees w ith in  an o rg a n iz a tio n  to  
p re v e n t kn o w -h o w  leakage, and w ent on to  s ta te  th a t  " i t  may w e ll 
be th a t  a fo rm a l, c o n tra c tu a l a rrangem ent w ith  an in d e p e n d e n t t h i r d  
p a r ty  such as in  th e  case o f  a lic e n s in g  agreem ent, f o r  exam ple, is  
e a s ie r to  e n fo rce  th a n  th e  q u a s i-c o n tra c tu a l o b lig a t io n s  o f 
em ployees" (op c it ,  p567). In  th is  re g a rd  i t  is  o f  in te re s t  to  no te
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th a t  M a n s fie ld  and Romeo (1980) fo u n d  ev idence  th a t  th e  te c h n o lo g y  
o f  US com panies som etim es " le a ke d  o u t"  th ro u g h  non-US com panies 
h ir in g  away th e  p e rs o n n e l em ployed by  th e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s .
A lth o u g h  th e  re s u lt  re p o r te d  he re  canno t be re g a rded  as a 
d ire c t  te s t  o f  P a rry 's  p ro p o s it io n ,  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e re  was no 
a p p a re n t d if fe re n c e  betw een th e  p a te n ta b le  kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t o f  
b o th  typ e s  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ent does suggest th a t  th e re  may be 
l i t t l e  d if fe re n c e  betw een in te rn a l and e x te rn a l m a rke ts  in  te rm s o f  
t h e ir  a b i l i t y  to  stem kn o w -h o w  leakages.^
13.5 THE NON-PROPRIETARY CONTENT OF KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS
13.5.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
The h y p o th e s is  w h ic h  was te s te d  is  se t o u t be low  in  i t s  a l te rn a t iv e  
and n u l l  fo rm s:
H ^: U n re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  agreem ents c o n ta in  e ith e r  more o r  
less  n o n -p ro p r ie ta ry  kn o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents.
Hq : There  is  no d ifferen ce  betw een the non -proprietary  know-how  
c o n te n t of un related  and rela ted  know-how licen sin g  agreem ents.
N o n -p ro p r ie ta ry  kn o w -h o w  re fe rs  to  kn o w -h o w  th a t  can be 
o b ta in e d  fro m  a num ber o f  com panies, ie  i t  does n o t be long  
e x c lu s iv e ly  to  th e  lic e n s o r. As a re s u lt ,  th e  t ra n s a c tio n  cos ts  
a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  lic e n s in g  o f th is  type  o f  kn o w -h o w  in  th e  
e x te rn a l m a rke t w i l l  be lo w e r th a n  those  w h ich  w o u ld  be in c u rre d  in  
lic e n s in g  p ro p r ie ta r y  know -h ow .
G iven th e  a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  n o n -p ro p r ie ta ry  know -h ow  fro m  
sources o th e r  th a n  th e  lic e n s o r, th e  ex an te  tra n s a c tio n  costs  
a r is in g  fro m  th e  p rob lem s o f  re c o g n it io n , d is c lo s u re  and team 
o rg a n iz a t io n  c o u ld  be expected  to  be m odest. F o r exam ple, the  
lic e n s o r  c o u ld  overcom e th e  d is c lo s u re  (ie  in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness) 
p rob lem  by p o in t in g  to  th e  im pac t made by th e  n o n -p ro p r ie ta ry
300
CHAPTER 13
kn o w -h o w  on th e  o p e ra tio n s  o f  o th e r  com panies u s in g  i t .  The e x ­
p o s t tra n s a c tio n  cos ts  a r is in g  fro m  lice n se e  o p p o rtu n is m  can a lso  be 
e xpec ted  to  be m in im a l f o r  th is  ty p e  o f  know -h ow , g ive n  th a t  th e  
l ic e n s o r  has l i t t l e  to  lo se  fro m  leakage  s ince  th e  kn o w -h o w  is  
a lre a d y  d issem ina ted  am ongst o th e r  com panies.
U n lik e  th e  p re v io u s  hypo theses  te s te d  in  th is  c h a p te r, th e  
e x p e c ta t io n  here  is  th a t  th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  w i l l  h o ld , ie  th e re  w i l l  
be no d iffe re n c e  in  th e  n o n -p ro p r ie to ry  kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t o f  th e  
tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ent. As the  a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  
h o ld s  th a t  u n re la te d  agreem ents w i l l  c o n ta in  e ith e r  m ore o r  less 
n o n -p ro p r ie ta ry  kn o w -h o w , a tw o - ta ile d  te s t  was used.
The te s t  o f  th e  h y p o th e s is  was based upon th e  d a ta  in  Tab le  
13-11, w h ic h  re p o r ts  th e  responses o b ta in e d  fro m  Q u e s tio n  13(b) in  
S e c tio n  I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  (u n re la te d  agreem ents) and fro m  
Q u e s tio n  4(b) in  S e c tio n  I I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  ( re la te d  
agreem ents).
TABLE 13-11
THE NON-PROPRIETARY CONTENT OF UNRELATED AND 
RELATED KNOW-ICW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Proportion of UNRELATED LICENSING RELATED LICENSING
Non-Proprietary
Know-how in Number of Per Cent of Number of Per Cent of
Licensing Agreements Companies Companies Companies Companies
None 6 9.5 10 17.9
Sane 22 34.9 22 39.3
About Half 11 17.5 7 12.5
Most 17 27.0 12 21.4
All/Virtually All 7 11.1 5 8.9
Total 63 100.0 56 100.0
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13.4.2 The H y p o th esis  T es ted
The s c a t te rp lo t  o f  th e  n o n -p ro p r ie to ry  know -h ow  c o n te n t o f  th e  
u n re la te d  and re la te d  agreem ents is  shown in  F ig u re  2 o f  A p p e n d ix  
13-2. T h is  re v e a ls  th a t  27 o f  th e  44 com panies w h ic h  were p lo t te d  
f e l l  on th e  45° l in e ,  in d ic a t in g  th a t  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  com panies had 
th e  same n o n -p ro p r ie ta ry  know -h ow  c o n te n t in  t h e ir  u n re la te d  and 
re la te d  agreem ents. O f th e  re m a in in g  com panies, more were p lo t te d  
above th e  l in e  (9) th a n  be low  i t  (8).
The re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  n o n -p ro p r ie to ry  kn o w -h o w  
are  p re se n te d  in  Tab le  13-12. As th e  tw o - ta ile d  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  
Z sco re  was 0.6192 th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  was accep ted . I t  can 
th e re fo re  be conc lude d  th a t  th e re  was no s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t  
d if fe re n c e  in  th e  n o n -p ro p r ie ta ry  c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  
k n o w -h o w  agreem ents.
TABLE 13-12
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
COMPARING THE PATENTABLE CONTENT OF 
UNRELATED AND RELATED KNOW-H3W LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
9.67 9 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
8.25 8 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
27 TIES
44 TOTAL
Z = -0.4971 2-TAILED P = .61920
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13.6 THE CODIFIED CONTENT OF KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
13.6.1 The H ypotheses E x p la in e d
C o d if ie d  know -h ow  c o n s is ts  o f  know ledge  th a t  can be em bodied in  
p h y s ic a l a r te fa c ts  such as des igns, d ra w in g s  and th e  l ik e .  U n c o d ifie d  
k n o w -h o w  is  know ledge  th a t  is  " ta c it "  in  n a tu re  and can o n ly  
th e re fo re  be em bodied in  in d iv id u a ls .
Two hypo theses were te s te d  a b o u t the  re la t iv e  kn o w -h o w  
c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents depend ing  
upon  w h e th e r o r  n o t th e  kn o w -h o w  was lice n se d  in  a c o d if ie d  fo rm . 
The f i r s t  h y p o th e s is , w h ic h  concerned  know -h ow  lic e n s e d  in  c o d if ie d  
fo rm , is  se t o u t be low  in  i t s  a lte rn a t iv e  and n u l l  fo rm s.
H ^: U n re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  agreem ents c o n ta in  e ith e r  more o r  
less  c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents.
Hq : There  is  no d iffe re n c e  betw een th e  c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t 
o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The e x p e c ta tio n  he re  was th a t  th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  w o u ld  h o ld , 
ie  th a t  b o th  types  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ent w o u ld  c o n ta in  th e  same 
am ount o f  c o d if ie d  know -h ow . T h is  re s te d  upon th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  
t ra n s fe r  o f  c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  does n o t n e c e s s a r ily  re q u ire  fa c e - to -  
face  c o n ta c t, and so th e  p rob lem  o f  team o rg a n iz a t io n  can be 
expec ted  to  be m in im a l f o r  th is  ty p e  o f  know -how . A lso , in s o fa r  as 
c o d if ie d  know -h ow  is  m ore easy to  u n d e rs ta n d  th a n  u n c o d if ie d  
kn o w -h o w , th e  p rob lem s o f  re c o g n it io n  and d is c lo s u re  can be 
expec ted  to  be less severe.
The second h y p o th e s is , w h ic h  is  concerned w ith  u n c o d if ie d  
kn o w -h o w , is  se t o u t be low  in  i t s  a l te rn a t iv e  and n u l l  fo rm s:
H ^: U n re la te d  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  agreem ents c o n ta in  less u n c o d if ie d  
kn o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
Hq : There  is  no d iffe re n c e  betw een th e  u n c o d if ie d  know -h ow  c o n te n t 
o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
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The e x p e c ta tio n  he re  was th a t  th e  a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  w o u ld  
h o ld , ie  th a t  u n re la te d  agreem ents w o u ld  c o n ta in  less u n c o d if ie d  
kn o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  agreem ents. T h is  was based upon th e  fa c t  
th a t  u n c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  is  s u b je c t to  th e  "team  o rg a n iz a tio n "  
p rob lem  s ince  i t  re q u ire s  th e  t ra n s fe r  o f  th e  lic e n s o r 's  p e rso n n e l 
and o rg a n iz a t io n a l s u p p o rt in  o rd e r  to  make i t s  t ra n s fe r  e f fe c t iv e .  
In  a d d it io n ,  g ive n  th e  g re a te r  d i f f ic u l t ie s  in v o lv e d  in  b o th  be ing  
aw are o f  and com m un ica ting  th e  v a lu e  o f know ledge  w h ich  re s id e s  
w ith in  in d iv id u a ls ,  th e  p rob lem s o f  re c o g n it io n  and d is c lo s u re  are  
n o n - t r iv ia l  and w i l l  in c rea se  th e  e x -a n te  t ra n s a c tio n  cos ts  o f  
lic e n s in g  th is  ty p e  o f  know -h ow .
The te s ts  o f  th e  hypo theses  were based upon th e  responses to  
q u e s tio n s  w h ich  asked f o r  in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
kn o w -h o w  lic e n s e d  to  u n re la te d  and re la te d  com panies. F o u r 
c a te g o rie s  o f  kn o w -h o w  w ere d e fin e d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire :
(a) Docum ented in fo rm a tio n ;
(b) M a n u fa c tu r in g  p rocess equ ipm ent;
(c) O rg a n iz a tio n a l b a ck -u p ;
(d) T ra in in g  o f  license e  pe rson ne l.
The com panies w ere asked to  in d ic a te d  on a sca le  o f  one to  fo u r  th e  
e x te n t to  w h ic h  t h e ir  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  agreem ents c o n ta in e d  each 
o f  these  ca te g o rie s .
B o th  ca te g o rie s  (a) and (b) c o n s is t o f  c o d if ie d  know -how . The 
f i r s t  c o n s is ts  o f  kn o w -h o w  em bodied in  w r it te n  docum ents, w h ile  th e  
second c o n s is ts  o f  k n o w -h o w  em bodied in  equ ipm ent. Exam ples o f  
b o th  w ere  in c lu d e d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  to  a s s is t th e  respon den ts  in  
c o r re c t ly  c la s s ify in g  t h e ir  know -how . The exam ples g iv e n  o f  
docum ented in fo rm a tio n  were fo rm u la e , com pu te r program m es and 
b lu e p r in ts ,  w h ile  c a ta ly s ts  and m achine to o ls  were c ite d  as exam ples 
o f  m a n u fa c tu r in g  p rocess equ ipm ent.
C a te g o rie s  (c) and (d) c o n s is t o f  u n c o d if ie d  know -how . The 
f i r s t ,  o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p , c o n s is ts  o f  know ledge  p ro v id e d  by th e  
l ic e n s o r 's  p e rso n n e l ab o u t i t s  m ethods o f  o p e ra tio n , such as i t s  
sa les and m a rk e tin g  m ethods. The second c o n s is ts  o f  th e  d ire c t
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t ra in in g  o f  license e  pe rso n n e l.
The e x te n t to  w h ich  th e  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents o f  th e  
com pany sample co n ta in e d  each o f  th e  fo u r  ca te g o rie s  o f  know -h ow  
is  d is p la y e d  in  Tab le  13-13, w h ic h  is  based upon th e  d a ta  d e r iv e d  
fro m  Q u e s tio n  14 in  S e c tion  I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire .
The know -h ow  c o n te n t o f  th e  re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents o f  
th e  com pany sample is  d is p la y e d  in  Tab le  13-14, w h ic h  is  based upon 
th e  d a ta  d e r iv e d  fro m  Q u e s tio n  5 in  S e c tion  I I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire .
13.6.2 The H ypotheses Tested
The f i r s t  h y p o th e s is , concerned  w ith  c o d if ie d  know -h ow , was te s te d  
b y  com paring  the  r e la t iv e  am ounts o f  each o f  th e  know -h ow  
c a te g o rie s  (a) and (b) w h ich  w ere re p o r te d  to  be p re s e n t in  
u n re la te d  and re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The s c a t te rp lo t  w h ic h  d e p ic ts  th e  re p o r te d  le v e ls  o f  ca te g o ry  
(a), docum ented in fo rm a tio n , in  th e  tw o  types  o f  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents is  shown in  F ig u re  1 o f  A p p e n d ix  13-3. T h is  re ve a ls  th a t  
th e  v a s t m a jo r ity  o f  th e  com panies (33 o u t o f  44) p lo t te d  a long  th e  
45° l in e ,  in d ic a t in g  th a t  th e y  lic e n s e d  th e  same am ount o f  
docum ented in fo rm a tio n  to  u n re la te d  com panies as th e y  d id  to  
re la te d  com panies. O f th e  re m a in in g  10 com panies, 4 lice n se d  more 
o f  t h is  ty p e  o f  know -h ow  to  u n re la te d  com panies, w h ile  7 lic e n s e d  
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The re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  docum ented in fo rm a tio n  are 
g iv e n  in  Tab le  13-15.
TABLE 13-15
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
COMPARING THE EXTENT OF DOCUMENTED INFORMATION 
IN UNRELATED AND RELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
7.57 4 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
5.00 7 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
33 TIES
44 TOTAL
Z = ,1778 2-TAILED P = .85890
A tw o - ta i le d  te s t  was em ployed s ince  th e  a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  
d id  n o t  in d ic a te  w h ic h  o f  th e  tw o  types  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ent was 
expe c ted  to  possess more o r  less docum ented in fo rm a tio n . As th e  Z 
score  was h ig h ly  in s ig n if ic a n t  th e  a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  was 
re je c te d . I t  can th e re fo re  be conc luded  th a t ,  as a n tic ip a te d , th e re  
was no d iffe re n c e  betw een u n re la te d  and re la te d  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents in  term s o f  t h e ir  in c lu s io n  o f  docum ented in fo rm a tio n .
The s c a t te rp lo t  d e p ic t in g  th e  re p o r te d  le v e ls  o f  th e  o th e r  
c a te g o ry  o f  c o d if ie d  know -h ow , m a n u fa c tu r in g  process equ ipm ent, is  
show n in  F ig u re  2 o f  A p p e n d ix  13-3. T h is  re v e a ls  th a t  a s m a lle r 
num ber o f  com panies (27 o u t o f  42) p lo t te d  a long  th e  45° lin e . O f 
th e  re m a in in g  15 com panies, more re p o r te d  th a t  a g re a te r  p ro p o r t io n  
o f  th is  ty p e  o f  know -h ow  was lic e n s e d  to  re la te d  com panies (12), 
th a n  re p o r te d  th e  o p p o s ite  (3).
The re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  m a n u fa c tu rin g  p rocess 




WILCOXQN MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
CCMPARING THE EXTENT OF MANUFACTURING PROCESS EQUIPMENT 
IN UNRELATED AND RELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
7.50 3 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
8.13 12 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
27 TIES
42 TOTAL
Z = -2.1299 2-TAILED P = .03320
As th e  tw o - ta ile d  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  Z -sco re  was s ig n if ic a n t  a t 
th e  .05 le v e l,  th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  was re je c te d . I t  is  c le a r  fro m  th e  
above ta b le  th a t  re la te d  agreem ents c o n ta in e d  more m a n u fa c tu r in g  
p rocess equ ipm en t th a n  u n re la te d  agreem ents. Had th is  been th e  
o r ig in a l a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is , i t  w o u ld  have been co n firm e d  by a 
o n e - ta ile d  te s t.  I t  can th e re fo re  be conc luded  th a t ,  c o n tra ry  to  
e x p e c ta tio n s , kn o w -h o w  em bodied in  m a n u fa c tu r in g  p rocess 
equ ipm en t was more p re v a le n t in  in t r a - f i r m  lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
th a n  in  a rm 's - le n g th  lic e n s in g  agreem ents.
The re s u lts  f o r  kn o w -h o w  ca te g o rie s  (a) and (b) suggest th a t  
com panies were more re lu c ta n t  to  lice n se  t h e ir  kn o w -h o w  e x te rn a lly  
i f  i t  was em bodied in  equ ipm en t th a n  i f  i t  was em bodied in  
docum ents. T h is  may have been due to  th e  fa c t  th a t  i t  is  e a s ie r f o r  
e q u ipm en t to  be used by  u n a u th o r is e d  th i r d  p a r t ie s  th a n  i t  is  f o r  
docum ents to  be used. In  th is  re sp e c t the  w o rk  o f  B o iso t (1986) is  
re le v a n t,  as he has p o in te d  o u t th a t  th e  ease w ith  w h ich  c o d if ie d  
know le dge  can be d if fu s e d  (ie  decoded and acted  upon) depends, 
in te r  a lia ,  upon w h a t he te rm s i t s  "sem antic" c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  A 
sem antic  p rob lem  w i l l  a r is e  i f  th e  re c ip ie n t  o f  in fo rm a tio n  does n o t 
have th e  s k i l ls  to  decode and u n d e rs ta n d  i t :  " p u t t in g  one's th o u g h ts  
dow n on pape r may expand one's aud ience i f  one expresses them  in  
w o rds , b u t  c o u ld  s h r in k  i f  one s ta te s  them in  a m a th em a tica l fo rm
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(op c i t ,  p l39).
Docum ented kn o w -h o w  is  l i k e ly  to  g iv e  r is e  to  g re a te r  sem antic  
d i f f ic u l t ie s  th a n  kn o w -h o w  th a t  is  em bodied in  equ ipm ent. 
Docum ented kn o w -h o w  such as fo rm u la e  and b lu e p r in ts  have to  be 
decoded to  a llo w  th e  in fo rm a tio n  w h ic h  th e y  c o n ta in  to  be 
u n d e rs to o d  and acted  upon. The o n ly  decod ing  re q u ire d  f o r  
equ ipm en t, on th e  o th e r  hand, is  a se t o f  o p e ra tin g  in s tru c t io n s .  
Even these  may n o t be re q u ire d  i f  th e  equ ipm en t is  s im ila r  to  o th e r  
item s th a t  are f re e ly  a v a ila b le  in  th e  m arke tp lace .
T he re  is  th u s  a g re a te r  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  in c u r r in g  e x -p o s t 
o p p o rtu n is m  costs  when m a n u fa c tu r in g  process equ ipm en t is  lic e n s e d  
because o f  th e  g re a te r  ease w ith  w h ic h  i t  can be d issem ina ted . T h is  
c o n s id e ra t io n  may th e re fo re  have dom ina ted  th e  fa c t  th a t  such 
e qu ipm en t embodies h ig h ly  c o d if ie d  know -h ow , and made com panies 
less  re lu c ta n t  to  lic e n s e  i t  e x te rn a lly .^
H a v ing  te s te d  th e  f i r s t  h y p o th e s is  co n ce rn in g  c o d if ie d  k n o w ­
how, ca te g o rie s  (a) and (b), th e  second h y p o th e s is  was th e n  te s te d . 
T h is  was concerned  w ith  u n c o d if ie d  know -h ow , ca te g o rie s  (c) and (d), 
and h e ld  th a t  th e y  w o u ld  be less  p re v a le n t in  u n re la te d  agreem ents 
th a n  th e y  w o u ld  in  re la te d  agreem ents.
F ig u re  3 in  A p p e n d ix  13-3 shows th e  re p o r te d  le v e ls  o f  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  in  th e  tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f lic e n s in g  agreem ent. 
I t  is  a p p a re n t fro m  th is  s c a t te rp lo t  th a t  the  num ber o f  com panies 
f a l l in g  be low  th e  45° l in e  (19) is  much g re a te r  th a n  th e  num ber 
p o s it io n e d  above i t  (6), in d ic a t in g  th a t  th e  com panies tended  to  
lic e n s e  more o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  to  t h e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s  
th a n  th e y  d id  to  u n re la te d  com panies. A fu r th e r  19 com panies were 
p o s it io n e d  on th e  45° l in e , in d ic a t in g  th a t  f o r  them  th e re  was no 
d if fe re n c e  in  th e  le v e l o f  o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a ck -u p  t ra n s fe r re d  to  b o th  
c a te g o rie s  o f  licensee .
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The re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t  f o r  o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  are 
show n in  Tab le  13-17.
TABLE 13-17
WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS siqjed-ranks test 
COMPARING THE EXTENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL BACK-UP 
IN UNRELATED AND RELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
12.58 6 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
13.13 19 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
19 TIES
44 TOTAL
Z = -2.,3409 1-TAILED P = .00960
A o n e - ta ile d  te s t  was used in  th is  in s ta n c e  s ince  th e  
a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  p re d ic te d  th a t  u n re la te d  licensees w o u ld  
re c e iv e  less  o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  th a n  re la te d  licensees. As th e  Z 
sco re  was h ig h ly  s ig n if ic a n t ,  th e  a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  was 
accep ted .
F ig u re  4 in  A p p e n d ix  13-3 shows th e  le v e ls  o f  th e  o th e r  
c a te g o ry  o f  u n c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  (th e  t ra in in g  o f  license e  p e rso n n e l) 
th a t  w ere  re p o r te d  to  be p re s e n t in  the  tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f  lic e n s in g  
agreem ent. The p a t te rn  is  s im ila r  to  th a t  o b ta in e d  f o r  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  in s o fa r  as more com panies are p o s it io n e d  
be low  th e  45° l in e  th a n  above i t .  The m ain d if fe re n c e  between them  
is  th a t  m ore com panies are  p o s it io n e d  on th e  45° l in e  f o r  th e  
t r a in in g  o f  lice n se e  pe rso n n e l.
The re s u lts  o f  th e  W ilcoxon  te s t f o r  th e  t ra in in g  o f  license e  




WILCOXON MATCHED-PAIRS SIGNED-RANKS TEST 
COMPARING THE EXTENT OF TRAINING OF LICENSEE PERSONNEL 
IN UNRELATED AND RELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
MEAN RANK COMPANIES
9.75 2 - RANKS (RELATED < UNRELATED)
7.73 13 + RANKS (RELATED > UNRELATED)
29 TIES
44 TOTAL
Z = -2.,3002 1-TAILED P = .01070
As th e  o n e - ta ile d  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  the  Z score  was h ig h ly  
s ig n if ic a n t  th e  a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  was accepted, a llo w in g  th e  
c o n c lu s io n  to  be reached th a t  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents 
c o n ta in e d  less o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  th a n  re la te d  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents.
13.7 THE INTERNALLY-TRANSFERRED CONTENT OF UNRELATED 
KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
13.7.1 The H yp o th e s is  E x p la in e d
The h y p o th e s is  is  se t o u t be low  in  i t s  a l te rn a t iv e  and n u l l  fo rm s.
H ^: The num ber o f  com panies w i l l  in c rea se  a long  th e  range o f  
v a lu e s  m easuring  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e  know -h ow  c o n te n t o f  
t h e ir  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents had p re v io u s ly  been 
t ra n s fe r re d  to  t h e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s .
Hq : The com panies w i l l  be u n ifo rm ly  d is t r ib u te d  across th e  range o f  
v a lu e s  m easuring  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e  know -h ow  c o n te n t o f  
t h e i r  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents had p re v io u s ly  been 
t ra n s fe r re d  to  t h e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s .
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The id e a  u n d e r ly in g  th is  h y p o th e s is  is  th a t  th e  p ro p e n s ity  o f  
MNCs to  lic e n s e  kn o w -h o w  to  u n re la te d  overseas com panies w i l l  be 
p o s i t iv e ly  assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e  know -h ow  has 
a lre a d y  been t ra n s fe r re d  to  t h e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s . D av idson  
and M cF e tridge  (1984; 1985) have p rodu ced  ev idence in  s u p p o rt o f  th e  
v ie w  th a t  a rm 's - le n g th  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  t ra n s fe rs  are more 
l i k e ly  to  be fa v o u re d  o v e r in t r a - f i r m  tra n s a c tio n s  th e  g re a te r  th e  
num ber o f  p r io r  t ra n s fe rs  o f  th e  te c h n o lo g y  in  q u e s tio n . The 
h y p o th e s is  te s te d  in  th is  s tu d y  is  more s p e c if ic  in  th a t  i t  focuses  
on th e  e x te n t to  w h ic h  p r io r  kn o w -h o w  tra n s fe rs  have o cc u rre d  w ith  
overseas s u b s id ia r ie s .
The h y p o th e s is  is  based upon th e  prem ise th a t  kn o w -h o w  w h ic h  
has been t ra n s fe r re d  w ith in  a MNC can th e n  be lic e n s e d  more e a s ily  
to  u n re la te d  overseas com panies because i t s  im p o r ta n t pa ram ete rs  
and i t s  pe rfo rm an ce  in  d i f fe r e n t  s itu a t io n s  w i l l  have become 
a p p a re n t [Teece (1981b, p87)]. The need fo r  team o rg a n iz a t io n  to  
s u p p o r t  th e  t ra n s fe r  w i l l  th e re fo re  be reduced.
In  a d d it io n , th e  e x -a n te  tra n s a c tio n  costs a r is in g  fro m  th e  
p rob lem s o f  re c o g n it io n  and d is c lo s u re  w i l l  be lo w e r f o r  th is  ty p e  
o f  kn o w -h o w . Because i t  has a lre a d y  been lic e n s e d  in te rn a lly ,  th e  
MNC w i l l  have assessed i t s  m a rk e ta b il ity ,  and w i l l  a lso  be ab le  to  
d is c lo s e  i t s  v a lu e  to  p o te n t ia l u n re la te d  licensees by in d ic a t in g  th e  
im p a c t w h ic h  th e  kn o w -h o w  has made on i t s  own o p e ra tio n s  w ith o u t  
d is c lo s in g  i t s  exa c t n a tu re .
13.7.2 The H yp o th e s is  Tested
The re s e a rc h  des ign  fo r  th is  h y p o th e s is  was a "one g roup  des ign ", in  
w h ic h  th e  g roup  c o n s is te d  o f  com panies th a t  were in v o lv e d  in  kn o w ­
how  lic e n s in g  to  u n re la te d  overseas f irm s .
F o r each company in  th e  g roup , a s in g le  o b s e rv a tio n  was made 
on one v a r ia b le :  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f know -h ow  lic e n s e d  to  u n re la te d  
com panies th a t  had a lre a d y  been tra n s fe r re d  to  th e  company s own 
overseas s u b s id ia r ie s . The da ta  was o b ta in e d  fro m  Q uestion  13(c)
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in  S e c tio n  I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , and is  d is p la y e d  in  Tab le  13-19.
In s p e c tio n  o f  Tab le  13-19 re v e a ls  th a t  65.6 p e r cen t o f  
com panies re p o r te d  th a t  a t le a s t 'some' o f  th e  kn o w -h o w  w h ich  th e y  
lic e n s e d  to  u n re la te d  com panies had p re v io u s ly  been tra n s fe r re d  to  
t h e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s . The q u e s tio n  w h ich  a rise s  is  w h e th e r 
o r  n o t th is  is  a s u f f ic ie n t  num ber to  accep t th e  g e n e ra l p ro p o s it io n  
th a t  in te r n a l lic e n s in g  o f  kn o w -h o w  in c rea sed  th e  p ro b a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
kn o w -h o w  s u b s e q u e n tly  be ing  lic e n s e d  e x te rn a lly .  S hou ld , f o r  
exam ple, th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  re m a in in g  34.4 p e r ce n t o f  com panies 
t ic k e d  th e  'none ' ca te g o ry  be ta k e n  as s u f f ic ie n t  ju s t i f ic a t io n  f o r  
r e fu t in g  th e  g e n e ra l p ro p o s it io n ?
TABLE 13-19
THE INTERNALLY-TRANSFERRED CONTENT OF 
UNRELATED KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS




About H a lf 5 8 .2
Most 11 18.0
A l l / V i r t u a l l y  A l l 10 16.4
T o ta l 61 100.0
Q u e s tio n : P lease e s tim a te  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f
know-how lic e n s e d  to  u n re la te d  overseas companies 
w h ich  had p re v io u s ly  been t ra n s fe r re d  to  the  
company's overseas s u b s id ia r ie s .
D e fin in g  an a p p ro p r ia te  c r i t e r io n  f o r  m aking a judgem ent was 
n e c e s s a r ily  a som ewhat a r b i t r a r y  e xe rc ise , g ive n  th e  a v a ila b le  da ta . 
N e ve rth e le ss , i t  was dec ided  to  fram e th e  h y p o th e s is  on th e  
s u p p o s it io n  th a t  th e  d a ta  w o u ld  be skewed to w a rd s  th e  r ig h t-e n d  o f 
th e  f iv e  p o in t  sca le  i f  th e re  was enough evidence to  s u p p o rt th e  
g e n e ra l p ro p o s it io n .
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The h y p o th e s is  was te s te d  u s in g  th e  K o lm o g o ro v -S m irn o v  one- 
sam ple te s t  ( re fe r re d  to  h e re a fte r  th e  KS te s t) . As th is  te s t  is  
s u ita b le  f o r  o rd in a l- le v e l d a ta  i t  was chosen in  p re fe re n ce  to  th e  
less  p o w e r fu l c h i squa re  one-sam ple  te s t,  w h ic h  is  o n ly  a p p ro p r ia te  
f o r  n o m in a l- le v e l da ta .
The KS te s t  com pares th e  goodness o f  f i t  o f  an obse rved  
c u m u la tiv e  fre q u e n c y  d is t r ib u t io n ,  S^(X), w ith  a s p e c if ie d  c u m u la tiv e  
fre q u e n c y  d is t r ib u t io n ,  F0(X) [see S iege l (1956, pp47-52)]. The
d is t r ib u t io n  chosen to  te s t  th e  h y p o th e s is  was th e  u n ifo rm  
d is t r ib u t io n ,  w h ic h  assumes an eq u a l sp read  o f  o b s e rv a tio n s  across 
th e  range  o f  p o s s ib le  va lues . T h is  d is t r ib u t io n  re p re s e n ts  w h a t 
w o u ld  be expec ted  u n d e r HQ. The KS te s t  s ta t is t ic ,  D, is  c a lc u la te d  
by  ta k in g  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  la rg e s t a b s o lu te  d e v ia t io n  betw een th e  
s p e c if ie d  and obse rved  d is t r ib u t io n s ,  as fo llo w s :
D = max |F0(X) -  SN(X)j
The d a ta  used to  c a lc u la te  th e  KS te s t  s ta t is t ic  a re  shown in  
T ab le  13-20.7 The f i r s t  row , f ,  c o n ta in s  th e  fre q u e n c y  co u n t o f  
com panies w h ic h  se lec te d  each o f  th e  va lu e s  on th e  f iv e - p o in t  sca le . 
The second row  c o n ta in s  th e  c u m u la tiv e  p ro p o r t io n s  expected  a t 
each p o in t  on th e  sca le  u n d e r th e  assum ption  th a t  th e  com panies 
w ere  u n ifo rm ly  d is t r ib u te d  across th e  f iv e  va lu e s . The t h i r d  row  
c o n ta in s  th e  c u m u la tiv e  num ber o f  com panies a t each p o in t  on th e  
sca le , d iv id e d  by th e  to ta l  num ber o f  com panies (61) to  g ive  
c u m u la tiv e  p ro p o r t io n s . The bo tto m  row  re p o r ts  th e  d e v ia t io n  o f  




ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF COMPANIES ACROSS 
THE SCALE MEASURING THE PROPORTION OF INTERNALLY-TRANSFERRED 
KNOW-HOW PRESENT IN UNRELATED LICENSING AGREEMENTS
None Some About Half Most All/Virt. All
1 2 3 4 5
f 21 14 5 11 10
1 2 3 4 5
FQ(X)
5 5 5 5 5
21 35 40 51 61
Sm (X) — — — — —
61 61 61 61 61
Fq (X) - %(X) -0.144 -0.174 -0.056 --0.036 0.000
S ince th e  a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  be ing  te s te d  was th a t  th e  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  com panies s e le c tin g  each c a te g o ry  w o u ld  in c rea se  as 
we m oved a long  th e  range  o f  p o s s ib le  va lu e s  fro m  1 to  5, th is  
im p lie d  th a t  th e  th e  obse rved  c u m u la tiv e  fre q u e n c y  d is t r ib u t io n  
w o u ld  eve ryw h e re  l ie  be low  th e  h y p o th e t ic a l c u m u la tiv e  fre q u e n c y  
d is t r ib u t io n .  In  o rd e r  f o r  th e  a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  to  be accepted, 
th e re fo re ,  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  g re a te s t d e v ia t io n  betw een th e  tw o  
d is t r ib u t io n s  needed to  have a p o s it iv e  s ign , in  a d d it io n  to  be ing  
h ig h e r  th a n  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  c r i t ic a l  v a lu e  [see S p re n t (1981, p l9 7 )].
The a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  was th e re fo re  re je c te d  as th e  
d iffe re n c e s  betw een th e  tw o  d is t r ib u t io n s  were a l l  n e g a tive . T h is  
was in  s p ite  o f  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  la rg e s t o f  th e  a b s o lu te  d iffe re n c e s ,
0.174, was g re a te r  th a n  c r i t ic a l  v a lu e  o f  D fo r  a o n e - ta ile d  te s t  a t 
th e  .05 le v e l [ ie  g re a te r  th a n  0.154; see M il le r  (1956)]. Thus, had th e  
a lte rn a t iv e  h y p o th e s is  been th a t  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  com panies 
s e le c tin g  each c a te g o ry  w o u ld  decrease as we moved a long  the  range 
o f  p o s s ib le  va lu e s  fro m  1 to  5, th is  w o u ld  have been accepted.
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I t  can th e re fo re  be conc lude d  th a t ,  a lth o u g h  a num ber o f 
com panies d id  in d ic a te  th a t  v a ry in g  p ro p o r t io n s  o f  th e  know -h ow  
c o n te n t o f  t h e ir  u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents had p re v io u s ly  been 
t ra n s fe r re d  to  t h e ir  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s , th e re  was no c le a r -c u t  
ev idence  to  s u p p o rt th e  g e n e ra l p ro p o s it io n  th a t  kn o w -h o w  was more 
l ik e ly  to  be lic e n s e d  to  e x te rn a l p a r t ie s  i f  i t  had a lre a d y  been 
lic e n s e d  in te rn a lly .
13.8 CONCLUSIONS
T h is  c h a p te r  has d e s c rib e d  th e  lo g ic  b e h in d , and th e  te s t in g  o f, a 
num ber o f  hypo theses  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  t ra n s a c t io n  co s t l i te r a tu r e  
on th e  MNC. The re s u lts  o f  th e  te s ts  w h ic h  were concerned  w ith  th e  
r e la t iv e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents are  sum m arized in  Tab le  13-21.
The h y p o th e s is  co n ce rn in g  th e  to ta l  k n o w -h o w  c o n te n t o f  
p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents was co n firm e d , a lth o u g h  th e  in d iv id u a l 
re s u lts  f o r  th e  tw o  ca te g o rie s  o f  'p a te n t-s p e c if ic ' and 'b ro a d ' kn o w ­
how  suggested  th a t  th e  r e s u lt  was a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  la t t e r  
c a te g o ry  ra th e r  th a n  th e  fo rm e r. The h y p o th e s is  re la t in g  to  th e  
tra d e m a rk  c o n te n t o f  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents was a lso  
co n firm e d .
The h y p o th e s is  c o n ce rn in g  th e  p a te n ta b le  c o n te n t o f  know -h ow  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents was n o t co n firm e d , w h ich  c a lls  in to  q u e s tio n  
th e  a rgum en t th a t  com panies w o u ld  be less  in c lin e d  to  lice n se  th is  
ty p e  o f  kn o w -h o w  e x te rn a lly  in  v ie w  o f  th e  p o te n t ia l ly  heavy costs  
w h ic h  c o u ld  r e s u lt  fro m  i t s  leakage . I t  is  o f  in te re s t  to  no te  th a t  
th e  h y p o th e s is  co n ce rn in g  th e  'p a te n t-s p e c if ic ' kn o w -h o w  c o n te n t o f  
p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents was a lso  re je c te d . I t  may th e re fo re  be 
th a t  th e  a s s o c ia tio n  o f  kn o w -h o w  w ith  p a te n ts  was th e  common 
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U n re la ted  agreements co ntain  less p a te n t-  
s p e c if ic  know-how than re la te d  agreements .10485 R e je c t
U n re la ted  agreements contain  less  
broad know-how than re la te d  agreements .00055 Accept
U n re la ted  agreements contain  less  
to ta l  know-how than re la te d  agreements .00400 Accept
U n re la ted  agreements contain  fewer 
tradem arks than re la te d  agreements .00026 Accept
KNOW-HOW LICENSING AGREEMENTS
U n re la ted  agreements contain  less  
p a te n ta b le  know-how than re la te d  agreements .08365 R e je c t
U n re la ted  agreements contain  the same le v e l o f  
n o n -p ro p rie ta ry  know-how as re la te d  agreements .61920 Accept
U n re la ted  agreements contain  the same amount o f 
c o d if ie d  know-how as re la te d  agreements:
(a ) documented in fo rm ation




R e je c t
U n re la ted  agreements contain  less u n co d ified  
know-how than re la te d  agreements:
(c ) o rg a n iz a tio n a l back-up







The h y p o th e s is  th a t  k n o w -h o w  o f  a n o n -p ro p r ie ta ry  n a tu re  
w o u ld  be as common in  u n re la te d  agreem ents as in  re la te d  
agreem ents was co n firm e d . So to o  was th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  th e  same 
am ount o f  c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  w o u ld  be fo u n d  in  b o th  u n re la te d  and 
re la te d  agreem ents, b u t  o n ly  in  th e  case o f  docum ented in fo rm a tio n . 
F o r th e  o th e r  ca te g o ry  o f  c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w , m a n u fa c tu r in g  p rocess 
equ ipm en t, i t  was fo u n d  th a t  re la te d  agreem ents possessed a 
s ig n if ic a n t ly  g re a te r  am ount o f  m a n u fa c tu r in g  p rocess  equ ipm en t 
th a n  u n re la te d  agreem ents.
A p o s s ib le  e x p la n a tio n  f o r  th is  f in d in g  may l ie  in  th e  fa c t  th a t ,  
a lth o u g h  th e  lic e n s in g  o f  b o th  c a te g o rie s  o f  kn o w -h o w  does n o t 
n e c e a s s a r ily  re q u ire  team o rg a n iz a tio n , k n o w -h o w  em bodied in  
e qu ipm en t is  e a s ie r to  decode th a n  kn o w -h o w  em bod ied in  docum ents 
and is  th e re fo re  a t a g re a te r  r is k  o f  be ing  le a ke d  to  t h i r d  p a r t ie s . 
The h y p o th e s is  th a t  u n re la te d  agreem ents w o u ld  c o n ta in  less 
c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  agreem ents was c o n firm e d  f o r  b o th  
typ e s  o f  kn o w -h o w  te s te d , ie  o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  and th e  
t r a in in g  o f  license e  p e rso n n e l.
The f in a l  h y p o th e s is  was conce rned  w ith  u n re la te d  kn o w -h o w  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents, th e  a rgum ent b e ing  th a t  MNCs w o u ld  be more 
l i k e ly  to  lic e n s e  th e ir  kn o w -h o w  to  u n re la te d  com panies i f  i t  had 
a lre a d y  been lic e n s e d  in te r n a l ly  ( ie  to  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s ) . 
A lth o u g h  a num ber o f  MNCs d id  re p o r t  th a t  th e  kn o w -h o w  w h ic h  
th e y  lic e n s e d  to  u n re la te d  com panies had, to  v a ry in g  degrees, been 
p re v io u s ly  t ra n s fe r re d  to  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s , th e re  was n o t 
s u f f ic ie n t  ev idence  to  suggest th a t  these  in s ta n ce s  had n o t o c c u rre d  
by  chance and so th e  h y p o th e s is  was re je c te d .
In  co n c lu s io n , th e  re s u lts  re p o r te d  here , a lth o u g h  n o t 
ove rw h e lm in g , le n d  some s u p p o rt to  th e  a rgum ents o f  th e  tra n s a c tio n  
c o s t s ch o o l o f  th o u g h t. I t  m ust be bo rne  in  m ind, how ever, th a t  th e  
h ypo the ses  are o n ly  in d ir e c t  te s ts  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry  in  th a t  
th e y  are  n o t based on d ire c t  m easurem ents o f th e  bas ic  b u i ld in g  
b lo c k s  o f  th e  th e o ry , such as lice n se e  o p p o rtu n is m , in fo rm a tio n  
im pactedness, e tc. The hypo theses  have so u g h t to  p re d ic t  th e
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e x te n t to  w h ic h  d i f fe r e n t  types  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  w o u ld  be 
p re s e n t in  a rm 's - le n g th  and in t r a - f i r m  lic e n s in g  agreem ents on th e  
bas is  o f  th e  p rob lem s in v o lv e d  in  t ra d in g  these  in ta n g ib le  assets 
be tw een in d e p e n d e n t concerns, and th e  consequen t t ra n s a c tio n  costs  
w h ic h  these  p rob lem s were l ik e ly  to  genera te . As a r e s u lt  o f  th is  
in d ir e c t  app roach , th e re  may be some g roun ds  f o r  q u e s tio n in g  th e  
in te r n a l v a l id i t y  o f  th e  hypo theses.
N e ve rth e le ss , as no te d  e a r l ie r  in  C h a p te r Seven, th e  tra n s a c tio n  
co s t m odel has p ro v e d  d i f f i c u l t  to  te s t  d ir e c t ly  because o f  th e  
in h e re n t  d i f f i c u l t y  in  o p e ra t io n a liz in g  i t s  u n d e r ly in g  concep ts . The 
app ro ach  adop ted  he re  o f  g e n e ra tin g  fro m  these  concep ts  te s ta b le  
p ro p o s it io n s  th a t  are  re la te d  to  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  can be d ir e c t ly  
m easured is  c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  app ro ach  adop ted  by o th e r  e m p ir ic a l 
s tu d ie s  based on th e  same l i te r a tu r e ,  eg Rugman (1981).
Some more d ire c t  ev idence  re la t in g  to  th e  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t 
e x p la n a tio n  o f  in te rn a t io n a l lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  was, how ever, 
o b ta in e d  fro m  Q u e s tio n  11 in  S e c tion  I I  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . T h is  
q u e s tio n  was aimed a t those  com panies w h ich  possessed know -h ow  
th a t  c o u ld  have been o f  use to  o th e r  com panies, b u t w h ic h  
n e v e rth e le s s  d id  n o t have any u n re la te d  kn o w -h o w  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents.
F o u rte e n  com panies f e l l  in to  th is  ca tego ry . O f these , one o f  
th e  com panies answ ered th a t  i t  had no u n re la te d  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents because i t  had n e ve r cons ide red  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
l ic e n s in g  i t s  know -h ow . In  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t te rm in o lo g y , a c o n d it io n  
o f  "bounded  r a t io n a l i t y "  m ig h t be p u rp o r te d  to  e x p la in  th is  
com pany's la c k  o f  lic e n s in g  in v o lv e m e n t. The re m a in in g  th ir te e n  
com panies were asked to  in d ic a te  i f  any one o r  more o f  f iv e  s ta te d  
reasons e x p la in e d  th e ir  com pany's d e c is io n  n o t to  lic e n s e  th e ir  
kn o w -h o w . The responses are show n in  Tab le  13-22.
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TABLE 13-22 
REASONS FOR KNOW-HOW NOT BEING LICENSED
Number of 
Companies
The risk of losing a competitive advantage. 7
The cost of policing the licence. 5
The difficulty of communicating the value 
of know-how to potential buyers without 4
revealing its exact nature.
The need to transfer scarce company 
personnel to make the know-how effective. 3
The absence of suitable licensee firms. 2
Question: Please indicate if any of the following
reasons explain the company's decision not to license 
its know-how.
The m ost p o p u la r  e x p la n a tio n  f o r  know -h ow  n o t be ing  lic e n s e d  
was th e  r is k  o f  lo s in g  a c o m p e tit iv e  advantage, w h ic h  was chosen by 
seven o u t o f  th e  th ir te e n  com panies. The co s t o f  p o lic in g  th e  
lic e n c e , d e fin e d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  as the  cos t o f  "e n s u rin g  th a t  
th e  lice n se e  adheres to  i t s  c o n tra c tu a l o b lig a t io n s " ,  was th e  second 
m ost p o p u la r  e x p la n a tio n , w ith  f iv e  com panies s e le c tin g  i t .  The 
e x p la n a tio n  w h ich  ra n k e d  t h i r d  in  p o p u la r ity  was "th e  d i f f ic u l t y  o f  
com m u n ica ting  th e  v a lu e  o f  know -h ow  to  p o te n t ia l buye rs  w ith o u t  
re v e a lin g  i t s  exa c t n a tu re " . T h is  e x p la n a tio n , a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  
p ro b le m  o f  in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness, was chosen by fo u r  o f  th e  
com panies.
The n e x t m ost p o p u la r  e x p la n a tio n , w ith  th re e  com panies 
ch o o s in g  i t ,  was "th e  need to  t ra n s fe r  scarce com pany p e rso n n e l to  
make th e  kn o w -h o w  e f fe c t iv e " .  T h is  e x p la n a tio n  is  e s s e n tia lly  a 
d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  p rob lem  o f  team o rg a n iz a tio n . The le a s t p o p u la r  
e x p la n a tio n , chosen by o n ly  tw o  o f  th e  com panies, was the  absence
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o f s u ita b le  license e  f irm s .
A lth o u g h  the  responses in  Tab le  13-22 dem on s tra te  th a t  a 
num ber o f  th e  com panies a ssoc ia ted  them se lves w ith  e x p la n a tio n s  
c o n s is te n t w ith  some o f th e  concep ts  u n d e r ly in g  t ra n s a c tio n  cos t 
th e o ry , th is  canno t be re g a rd e d  as p ro v id in g  ev idence  in  s u p p o rt o f  
those  concep ts  in  v ie w  o f  th e  v e ry  sm a ll num ber o f  com panies w h ich
O
answ ered th e  q u e s tio n . In  a d d it io n , th e  q u e s tio n  was o n ly
d ire c te d  a t those  com panies w h ic h  com ple ted  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire , and 
w h ic h  th e re fo re  had some fo rm  o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i ty .  Had th e  sam ple 
been w idened  to  in c lu d e  those  com panies w h ich  possessed kn o w -h o w  
b u t w h ic h  had no lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  a t a l l,  a d i f fe r e n t  se t o f  




1. W illia m so n 's  p rob lem  o f  " in fo rm a tio n  im pactedness" may s t i l l  a r is e  
in  th e  m a rke t f o r  p u re  p a te n ts , d e s p ite  th e  absence o f
in fo rm a tio n  asym m etry, i f  "one agen t makes re p re s e n ta t io n s  th a t  
th e  t ru e  s ta te  o f  th e  w o r ld  is  d i f fe r e n t  th a n  b o th  p a r t ie s  know  i t  
to  be and i f ,  in  a d d it io n , i t  is  c o s t ly  f o r  an o u ts id e  a r b ite r  to  
d e te rm in e  w h a t th e  t ru e  s ta te  o f  th e  w o r ld  is ."  (1975, p32).
2. B u c k le y  and Casson (1976) a lso  h ig h lig h te d  th e  " re c o g n it io n "
p rob lem  as an im ped im en t to  m a rke t c o n tra c t in g  in  know ledge  v ia
th e i r  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  concep t o f  "b u y e r u n c e r ta in ty " .
3. The SPSSX package o n ly  c a lc u la te s  tw o - ta ile d  p ro b a b il i t ie s  f o r  th e  
W ilco xo n  te s t,  so th e  o n e - ta ile d  p r o b a b il i t y  was fo u n d  by d iv id in g  
th e  tw o - ta ile d  p r o b a b i l i t y  by  tw o.
4. Casson (1982, p26) p o in te d  o u t th a t  q u a li ty  c o n t ro l a lso  in v o lv e s  
th e  m e te rin g  o f  q u a n t i ty  and th e  t im in g  o f s u p p ly , a lth o u g h  these  
w ere  d e sc rib e d  as be ing  o f  "seconda ry  in te re s t" .
5. Com panies may a lso  be in d if fe r e n t  betw een in te rn a l and e x te rn a l 
m a rke ts  i f  th e y  b e lie v e  th a t  new te c h n o lo g ic a l deve lopm en ts  are
l i k e ly  to  le a k  o u t in  any case, in  s p ite  o f  th e  p a r t ic u la r  t ra n s fe r  
mode adop ted . M a n s fie ld 's  (1985) o p in io n  s u rv e y  o f  100 US 
com panies fo u n d  th a t  ju s t  o v e r one th i r d  o f  them  b e lie v e d  th a t  
in fo rm a tio n  co n ce rn in g  th e ir  new p ro d u c ts  w o u ld  be know n to  
c o m p e tito rs  w ith in  s ix  m onths (op c it ,  pp 220-221). In fo rm a tio n  
a b o u t new processes (w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  chem ica l processes) 
was b e lie v e d  to  le a k  o u t more s lo w ly , b u t to  s t i l l  be know n to  
th e  m a jo r ity  o f  t h e ir  r iv a ls  w ith in  ab o u t 12-18 m onths. T h is  
le akage  was a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  m ovement o f  p e rso n n e l betw een 
com panies and th e  v o lu n ta ry  exchange o f s c ie n t i f ic  in fo rm a tio n  a t 
p ro fe s s io n a l m eetings and con fe rences.
6. The fa c t  th a t  th e  h y p o th e s is  conce rn ing  m a n u fa c tu r in g  process 
e q u ipm en t was re je c te d  may e x p la in  why th e  'c o d i f ia b i l i t y  o f  
k n o w -h o w ' v a r ia b le  in  one o f th e  m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  m odels in  
C h a p te r Tw elve (dependen t v a r ia b le ,  KHLSI) had a n e g a tiv e  s ign , 
c o n tra ry  to  e x p e c ta tio n s  -  ie  th e  v a r ia b le  may have been m is - 
s p e c if ie d .
7. The KS te s t  s ta t is t ic  was c a lc u la te d  by  hand  s ince  SPSSX 
c a lc u la te s  D on th e  assum ption  th a t  th e  h y p o th e tic a l Fq(X) 
d is t r ib u t io n  is  co n tin u o u s . T h is  was an in a p p ro p r ia te  assum ption  
s in ce  th e  da ta  was d is c re te  in  n a tu re .
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8. None o f  th e  th ir te e n  com panies se le c te d  th e  "o th e r"  ca te g o ry  in  
Q u e s tio n  12, w h ile  th re e  o f  them  chose n o t to  s e le c t any o f  the  
f iv e  e x p la n a tio n s  w h ich  were g ive n . F o u r o f  th e  com panies 
se le c te d  more th a n  one e x p la n a tio n ; when asked to  in d ic a te  w h ich  
o f  these  had th e  m ost in f lu e n c e , tw o  o f  them  in d ic a te d  " th e  r is k  
o f  lo s in g  a c o m p e tit iv e  adva n ta ge ", w h ile  a t h i r d  chose " th e  need 
to  t ra n s fe r  scarce com pany p e rs o n n e l to  make th e  kn o w -h o w  
e f fe c t iv e " .  The fo u r th  com pany d id  n o t d is c r im in a te  betw een th e  
cho ices  i t  had made.
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APPENDIX 13.1 SCATTERPLOTS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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FIGURE 2
SCATTERPLOT OF THE BROAD KNOW-HOW CONTENT
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FIGURE 3
SCATTERPLOT OF THE TOTAL KNOW-HOW CONTENT
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SCATTERPLOT OF THE TRADEMARK CONTENT
OF UNRELATED AND RELATED PATENT L IC E N S IN G  AGREEMENTS
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APPENDIX 13.2 SCATTERPLOTS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY




SCATTERPLOT OF THE PATENTABLE CONTENT
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FIGURE 2
SCATTERPLOT OF THE NON-PROPRIETARY CONTENT
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APPENDIX 13.3 SCATTERPLOTS OF THE CODIFIED CONTENT OF 




SCATTERPLOT OF THE EXTENT OF DOCUMENTED INFORMATION
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FIGURE 2
SCATTERPLOT OF THE EXTENT OF MANUFACTURING PROCESS EQUIPMENT
IN  UNRELATED AND RELATED KNOW-HOW LIC E N S IN G  AGREEMENTS
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FIGURE 3
SCATTERPLOT OF THE EXTENT OF ORGANIZATIO NAL BACK-UP
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FIGURE 4
SCATTERPLOT OF THE EXTENT OF TR A IN IN G  OF LICENSEE PERSONNEL
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN -  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
14.1 INTRODUCTION
T h is  th e s is  has a tte m p te d  to  d e sc rib e  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  UK- 
based MNCs th a t  are  in v o lv e d  in  in te rn a t io n a l te c h n o lo g y  lic e n s in g  
and to  e x p la in  th e  in c id e n ce  o f  such lic e n s in g . I t  has a lso  
a tte m p te d  to  e x p la in  th e  b reakd ow n  o f  th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents based 
upon  th e  te n e ts  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry .
The m ain  f in d in g s  o f  th e  re se a rch  are  d e sc rib e d  in  S e c tion  2 o f  th is  
c h a p te r, and th e ir  im p lic a t io n s  are  d iscussed  in  S e c tion  3. The 
p e n u lt im a te  s e c tio n  o f  th e  c h a p te r d raw s a t te n t io n  to  th e  
l im ita t io n s  o f  th e  resea rch , w h ile  th e  f in a l  s e c tio n  p roposes some 
d ire c t io n s  f o r  fu tu re  research .
14.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
P r io r  to  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  da ta , gove rnm en t 
s ta t is t ic s  on FDI, e x p o rts  and ro y a lt ie s  f o r  th e  yea rs  fro m  1964 to  
1984 w ere ana lysed  in  o rd e r  to  d is c o v e r th e  o v e ra l l p a t te rn  o f  th e  
UK's in te rn a t io n a l bus iness a c t iv i t ie s  and any tre n d s  in  th is  p a t te rn  
o v e r th e  p e r io d  s tu d ie d . The a n a lys is , p resen ted  in  C h a p te r N ine, 
re v e a le d  th a t  n o n -e q u ity  in te rn a t io n a l bus iness in  g en e ra l g rew  
s te a d ily  o v e r th e  p e r io d . The fo re ig n  sales o f  UK com panies a r is in g  
fro m  lic e n s in g  were a lw ays lo w e r th a n  those  a r is in g  fro m  e x p o rts  o r  
fro m  FDI, b u t were s t i l l  deemed to  be m a te r ia l enough to  m e r it  
s e r io u s  c o n s id e ra tio n .
I t  was fo u n d  th a t  th e  le v e l o f  fo re ig n  sa les fro m  lic e n s in g , 
e x p o rts  and FDI v a r ie d  w id e ly  across in d u s t r ia l  sec to rs  and 
g e o g ra p h ic a l m arke ts , sugg es ting  th a t  in d u s try  and m a rk e t-s p e c if ic  
fa c to rs  a ffe c te d  th e  fo rm  o f  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g . The Spearman 
c o r re la t io n s  betw een FDI sales and e x p o rts , when d isagg rega ted  by 
in d u s t r y  and g e o g ra p h ica l m a rke t, were fo u n d  to  be s ta t is t ic a l ly  
s ig n if ic a n t  and have h ig h  n e g a tiv e  va lues , sugg es ting  th a t  these  tw o
340
CHAPTER 14
fo rm s o f  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  are s u b s t itu te s  f o r  one a n o th e r. No such 
c la im  c o u ld  be made a b o u t lic e n s in g  and th e  o th e r  tw o  fo rm s o f 
m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  as th e  re le v a n t c o r re la t io n s  were fo u n d  to  be lo w  
and n o t s ta t is t ic a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t .
H av ing  a s c e rta in e d  th e  b ro a d  n a tu re  o f  th e  in te rn a t io n a l 
bus iness  a c t iv i t ie s  o f  UK com panies, the  n e x t s tage  in  th e  a n a ly s is  
in v o lv e d  a d e s c r ip t io n  o f ,the g e n e ra l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  sam ple 
o f  UK MNCs th a t  responded  to  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  su rve y .
As re p o r te d  in  C h a p te r Ten, th e  respon den ts  were fo u n d  to  be 
g e n e ra lly  la rg e  in  s ize and to  o p e ra te  in  a w ide  range  o f  in d u s tr ie s .  
They in d ic a te d  th a t  th e y  used lic e n s in g  m ore f re q u e n t ly  in  NICs and 
LDCs (w here  i t  was ra n k e d  second to  e x p o rt in g )  th a n  th e y  d id  in  
DCs (w here  i t  was ra n ke d  th i r d  b e h in d  e x p o r t in g  and d ire c t  
in v e s tm e n t). No change in  th is  o rd e r in g  was a n t ic ip a te d  o v e r th e  
ensu ing  decade.
M ost o f  th e  com panies possessed b o th  u n re la te d  and re la te d  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents, a lth o u g h  th e  fo rm e r were m ore num erous. 
K now -how  lic e n s in g  was more p re v a le n t th a n  p a te n t lic e n s in g , w ith  
th e  m a jo r ity  o f  com panies possess ing  b o th  types  o f  agreem ent.
The u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents possessed by  th e  
com panies c o n s is te d  a lm ost e n t ir e ly  o f  'v o lu n ta ry ' licence s , and 
these  were f a i r l y  e v e n ly  sp read  betw een 'so le ', 'e x c lu s iv e ' and 'n o n ­
e x c lu s iv e ' licence s . The com panies th e re fo re  e n te re d  in to  u n re la te d  
p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents o f  t h e ir  own acco rd  b u t  d i f fe re d  in  
te rm s o f  th e  freedom  w h ic h  th e y  gave licensees  to  com pete a g a in s t 
them se lves.
A lth o u g h  th e  com panies possessed more u n re la te d  kn o w -h o w  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents th a n  th e y  d id  u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  
agreem ents, th e  fo rm e r appeared to  genera te  less incom e th a n  th e  
la t te r .  The re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents possessed by th e
com panies appeared to  earn  less th a n  u n re la te d  agreem ents, a lth o u g h  
th is  r e s u lt  may have been a ffe c te d  by in tra -c o m p a n y  p r ic in g
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p o lic ie s . In  th e  e a r ly  1980s th e  incom e fro m  b o th  u n re la te d  and 
re la te d  agreem ents was re p o r te d  by  th e  com panies to  be on an 
upw a rd  tre n d , w h ic h  was more p rono unced  f o r  u n re la te d  agreem ents.
The a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  in  
C h a p te r E leven re v e a le d  th a t  lic e n s in g  was v ie w e d  by th e  v a s t 
m a jo r ity  o f  com panies as a 's t ra te g ic ' d e c is io n , in  th e  sense th a t  i t  
was more o fte n  th a n  n o t e v a lu a te d  a g a in s t th e  a lte rn a t iv e s  o f  FDI 
and e x p o rt in g . T h is  r e s u lt  is  c o n s is te n t w ith  T e le s io 's  (1979) s u rv e y  
o f  (m a in ly ) US MNCs w h ich  s u p p o rte d  th e  v ie w  th a t  lic e n s in g  is  
v ie w e d  as a 's t ra te g ic ' d e c is io n . I t  is  a lso  in  l in e  w ith  th e  f in d in g  
o f  Adam 's (1985) s u rv e y  o f  UK MNCs th a t  lic e n s in g  is  e v a lu a te d  as an 
a lte rn a t iv e  to  FDI when a d e c is io n  is  made to  m a n u fa c tu re  abroad .^  
O f th e  com panies th a t  to o k  a 's t ra te g ic ' v ie w , o n ly  a sm a ll 
p ro p o r t io n  op ted  fo r  lic e n s in g  because th e  e x is te n c e  o f  h o s t-  
gove rnm en t c o n tro ls  p re v e n te d  them  fro m  a d o p tin g  th e  a lte rn a t iv e s  
o f  FDI o r  e x p o rt in g . T h is  f in d in g  is  a t odds w ith  th e  f in d in g  o f  
S hepherd  e t a l's  (1985) s u rv e y  o f  UK MNCs w h ic h  re p o r te d  th a t  "a 
m a jo r ity  v ie w  seemed to  be th a t  .... lic e n s in g  w o u ld  o n ly  r e a l ly  be 
co n s id e re d  as a la s t  re s o r t,  i f  th e re  were im p o r ta n t o b s ta c le s  to
p
overseas in v e s tm e n t o r  e x p o rt in g "  (p92).
G o ve rnm e n t-c rea ted  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  were fo u n d  to  be 
im p o r ta n t  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n . O f th e  tw e n ty  one 
v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  w h ich  th e  com panies ra te d  in  
te rm s o f  t h e ir  im p o rta n ce  in  r u l in g  o u t th e  a lte rn a t iv e s  o f  FDI and 
e x p o r t in g  in  fa v o u r  o f  lic e n s in g , those  w h ich  m easured g o ve rn m e n t- 
c re a te d  m a rke t im p e rfe c tio n s  came h ig h  up th e  ra n k -o rd e r in g .  The 
a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a lly  com petent lo c a l f irm s  in  h o s t 
c o u n tr ie s  was th e  v a r ia b le  w h ich  a t tra c te d  the  h ig h e s t ra n k in g , a 
f in d in g  w h ic h  is  c o n s is te n t w ith  C o n tra c to r 's  (1981, 1985) s tu d ie s  o f  
th e  lic e n s in g  m o tiv a t io n s  o f  US MNCs.
The fa c to r  a n a lys is  o f  th e  in te rc o r re la t io n s  betw een th e  
ra t in g s  a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  tw e n ty  one v a r ia b le s  p rodu ced  seven fa c to r  
c o n s tru c ts  w h ich  accoun ted  fo r  th is  la rg e r  g roup  o f  v a r ia b le s . The 
v a r ia b le s  co m p ris in g  these  c o n s tru c ts  had s u f f ic ie n t  in  common to
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enable  them  to  be m e a n in g fu lly  in te rp re te d .  The id e n t it ie s  o f  th e  
c o n s tru c ts  are g iv e n  be low , l is te d  in  o rd e r  o f  t h e ir  r e la t iv e  
im p o rta n ce :
. h o s t-c o u n try  r is k
. h o s t-c o u n try  le g a l e n v iro n m e n t and in f r a s t r u c tu r e  
. h o s t-c o u n try  f is c a l and r e p a t r ia t io n  p o lic ie s  
. re so u rce  c o n s tra in ts  
. e x p o r t m a rk e tin g  costs  
. e x p o r t -p ro d u c t io n / t ra n s p o r ta t io n  cos ts  
. h o s t-c o u n try  le v e l o f  in d u s t r ia l  deve lopm en t
The tw e n ty  one v a r ia b le s  w h ich  com prise  each o f  th e  above 
c o n s tru c ts  were d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  p re v a il in g  pa rad igm  in  th e  
l i te r a tu r e  on th e  MNC, th e  e c le c tic  pa rad igm  o f  in te rn a t io n a l 
p ro d u c tio n  [D u n n in g  (1977, 1979, 1988)]. To in c o rp o ra te  th o se
v a r ia b le s  w h ich  c o u ld  n o t be e a s ily  e a s ily  expressed  in  te rm s o f  th e  
c o n s t itu e n ts  o f  th e  pa rad igm , and to  ta k e  a ccou n t o f  p o s s ib le  
s tra te g ic  c o n s id e ra tio n s , th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  a lso  l is te d  fo u r te e n  
lic e n s in g  o b je c tiv e s  w h ic h  th e  com panies were asked to  ra te  in  
te rm s o f  t h e ir  im po rtance .
The speed o f  e n try  to  a new m a rke t emerged as th e  m ost 
im p o r ta n t o f  the  fo u r te e n  lic e n s in g  o b je c tiv e s . The use o f  lic e n s in g  
to  s tre n g th e n  a com pany's p o s it io n  in  a jo in t  v e n tu re  and to  deve lop  
o u t le ts  f o r  i t s  com ponents and o th e r  p ro d u c ts  fe a tu re d  among th e  
h ig h e s t- ra n k in g  o b je c tiv e s . On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  use o f  l ic e n s in g  
to  te s t  new m arke ts  and to  deve lop  lo w -c o s t sources o f  raw  
m a te r ia ls  and com ponents a t tra c te d  v e ry  lo w  ra n k in g s . I t  w o u ld  
th e re fo re  appear th a t  lic e n s in g  is  used more to  s u p p o r t th e  e x is t in g  
o p e ra tio n s  o f UK MNCs th a n  i t  is  to  te s t th e  p o te n t ia l o f  new 
m arke ts , and th a t  in  te rm s o f i t s  a b i l i t y  to  genera te  a u x i l ia r y  
bus iness  i t  is  seen as a means o f d e ve lo p in g  th e  dow nstream  end o f  
v a lu e -a d d e d  cha ins  ra th e r  th a n  th e  upstream  end.
When sub je c te d  to  fa c to r  a n a lys is , the  fo u r te e n  lic e n s in g  
o b je c t iv e s  l is te d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  were reduced  to  fo u r .  Once
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aga in , th e  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  w ere g roup ed  u n d e r th e  fa c to r  c o n s tru c ts  
had s u f f ic ie n t  in  common to  enab le  m e a n in g fu l la b e ls  to  be a tta c h e d  
to  th e  c o n s tru c ts . The com panies w ere ju d g e d  to  be fo llo w in g  fo u r  
u n d e r ly in g  s tra te g ie s , w h ic h  are  l is te d  be low  in  o rd e r  o f  t h e ir  
r e la t iv e  im po rtance :
. a d e fe n s ive  s tra te g y  
. an in te rm e d ia ry  s tra te g y  
. a s u b o rd in a te  s tra te g y  
. a te c h n o lo g y -d r iv e n  s tra te g y
In  C h a p te r T w e lve  m u lt ip le  l in e a r  re g re s s io n  was used to  
de te rm in e  th e  re la t io n s h ip  be tw een n in e  c o rp o ra te  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  l i te r a tu r e  re v ie w  and th e  in v o lv e m e n t o f  th e  
com pany sample in  lic e n s in g . I t  was fo u n d  th a t  size had th e  
s tro n g e s t a s s o c ia tio n  w ith  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i t y  and th a t  th e  s m a lle r  
com panies in  th e  sam ple tended  to  lic e n s e  more. Companies w h ic h  
had n o t in te rn a t io n a liz e d  th e ir  p ro d u c tio n  v e ry  much and w h ic h  had 
a n a rro w  g e o g ra p h ica l sp read  o f  o p e ra tio n s  were a lso  l i k e ly  to  
lic e n s e  more. The le v e l o f  R&D e x p e n d itu re  was fo u n d  to  be 
p o s i t iv e ly  assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  a c t iv i ty .
F o r those  com panies th a t  were in v o lv e d  in  p a te n t lic e n s in g , i t  
was e s ta b lis h e d  th a t  th e  le v e l o f  lic e n s in g  was p o s it iv e ly  a ssoc ia ted  
w ith  th e  num ber o f  p a te n ts  re g is te re d  in  th e  UK, b u t th a t  i t  was 
n e g a tiv e ly  assoc ia ted  w ith  th e  num ber o f  p a te n ts  re g is te re d  in  o th e r  
c o u n tr ie s . F o r those  com panies th a t  lic e n s e d  know -h ow , i t  was 
fo u n d  th a t  th e y  were more l ik e ly  to  do so i f  t h e ir  kn o w -h o w  
re q u ire d  o rg a n iz a t io n a l b a c k -u p  and th e  t ra in in g  o f  lice n se e  
p e rso n n e l, and less  l ik e ly  to  do so i f  t h e ir  kn o w -h o w  co n s is te d  o f  
docum ented in fo rm a tio n  and m a n u fa c tu r in g  p rocess equ ipm en t. 
F in a lly ,  i t  was d isco ve re d  th a t  lic e n s in g  was more l ik e ly  to  o c c u r i f  
com panies had lo w  le v e ls  o f  g e o g ra p h ic a l d iv e r s i f ic a t io n  and 
r e la t iv e ly  c e n tra lis e d  o rg a n iz a t io n a l s tru c tu re s .
In  C h a p te r T h ir te e n  th e  d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  lic e n s in g  agreem ents were
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exam ined to  d e te rm ine  i f  th e y  w ere in  accordance w ith  th e  
p re d ic t io n s  o f  tra n s a c tio n  co s t th e o ry . I t  was h y p o th e s ise d  th a t  
u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents w o u ld  in v o lv e  fe w e r t ra n s fe rs  
o f know -h ow  th a n  re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents because o f 
th e  g re a te r  e x -a n te  and e x -p o s t tra n s a c tio n  costs  w h ic h  are  
presum ed to  a r is e  in  th e  a rm ’s - le n g th  kn o w -h o w  m arke t. T h is  
h y p o th e s is  was d u ly  co n firm e d , a lth o u g h  when kn o w -h o w  was s p l i t  
up in to  tw o  ca te g o rie s , th a t  re la t in g  to  th e  te c h n ic a l f ie ld  o f  th e  
p a te n t and th a t  s u p p lie d  on a b ro a d e r bas is , i t  was fo u n d  th a t  th e  
h y p o th e s is  o n ly  h e ld  f o r  th e  la t t e r  ca tego ry .
I t  was a lso  h y p o th e s is e d  th a t  th e  tra d e m a rk  c o n te n t o f  
u n re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  agreem ents w o u ld  be lo w e r th a n  th a t  
fo u n d  in  re la te d  p a te n t l ic e n s in g  agreem ents. T h is  was based upon  
th e  prem ise  th a t  u n re la te d  agreem ents in v o lv e  a lo w e r degree o f  
c o n t ro l th a n  re la te d  agreem ents and th e re fo re  in v o lv e  h e a v ie r  cos ts  
to  m a in ta in  th e  p ro d u c t q u a l i ty  w h ic h  is  necessary  to  ensure  th a t  
tra d e m a rk s  re ta in  t h e ir  va lu e . The h y p o th e s is  was d u ly  co n firm e d .
In  a d d it io n  to  exam in ing  d iffe re n c e s  betw een th e  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty  c o n te n t o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  p a te n t lic e n s in g  
agreem ents, C h a p te r T h ir te e n  a lso  exam ined d iffe re n c e s  in  th e  
n a tu re  o f  th e  kn o w -h o w  w h ich  was lice n se d  in  u n re la te d  and re la te d  
k n o w -h o w  agreem ents. I t  was fo u n d  th a t  u n re la te d  agreem ents 
c o n ta in e d  more p a te n ta b le  kn o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  agreem ents. T h is  
f in d in g  was c o n tra ry  to  e x p e c ta tio n s  as i t  had been h y p o th e s is e d  
th a t  p a te n ta b le  kn o w -h o w  was more l ik e ly  to  le a k  o u t in  u n re la te d  
agreem ents and w o u ld  th e re fo re  be less p re v a le n t in  u n re la te d  
agreem ents in  com parison  to  re la te d  agreem ents. The re s u lt  
suggests  th a t  kn o w -h o w  leakages fro m  in s id e  th e  in te rn a l 
h ie ra rc h ie s  o f  f irm s  may be as much o f  a p rob lem  as leakages fro m  
t h i r d  p a r ty  licensees  in  a rm ’s - le n g th  agreem ents.
As p re d ic te d , i t  was fo u n d  th a t  th e re  was no d iffe re n c e  
betw een th e  le v e l o f  n o n -p ro p r ie ta ry  know -h ow  p re s e n t in  u n re la te d  
and re la te d  know -h ow  agreem ents. T h is  r e s u lt  con fo rm ed to  
e x p e c ta tio n s  s ince  know -h ow  th a t  can be o b ta in e d  fro m  o th e r
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eompanig® was n o t expec ted  to  be a ffe c te d  much by  the  no rm a l 
p rs b ltm g  o f  re c o g n it io n , d is c lo s u re , team o rg a n iz a t io n  and license e  
o p p o rtu n is m  th a t  are  a sso c ia te d  w ith  p ro p r ie ta ry  know -how .
A n o th e r se t o f  hypo theses  w ere conce rned  w ith  w h e th e r o r  n o t 
know -h ow  was lice n se d  in  a c o d if ie d  o r  an u n c o d ife d  fo rm . I t  was 
a n t ic ip a te d  th a t  u n re la te d  agreem ents w o u ld  c o n ta in  th e  same
am ount o f  c o d if ie d  know -h ow  as re la te d  agreem ents because th e  
t ra n s a c tio n  costs  w o u ld  be much th e  same, b u t th a t  u n re la te d  
agreem ents w o u ld  c o n ta in  less  u n c o d if ie d  k n o w -h o w  th a n  re la te d  
agreem ents because o f th e  g re a te r  p rob lem s o f  re c o g n is in g , 
d is c lo s in g  and t ra n s fe r r in g  th is  ty p e  o f know -h ow . The h y p o th e s is  
re la t in g  to  u n c o d if ie d  kn o w -h o w  was c o n firm e d  f o r  th e  tw o  typ e s  o f  
u n c o d if ie d  know -h ow  th a t  were te s te d  (o rg a n iz a tio n a l b a c k -u p  and 
the  t ra in in g  o f licensee  p e rso n n e l) w h ile  th e  h y p o th e s is  re la t in g  to  
c o d if ie d  know -h ow  was c o n firm e d  f o r  one o f  th e  ty p e s  o f  c o d if ie d  
kn o w -h o w  (docum ented in fo rm a tio n )  b u t n o t f o r  th e  second 
(m a n u fa c tu r in g  process equ ipm ent).
The f in a l  h y p o th e s is  te s te d  in  C h a p te r T h ir te e n  d id  n o t
in v o lv e  a com parison  o f th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  u n re la te d  and re la te d  
lic e n s in g  agreem ents, b u t was conce rned  w ith  a s in g le  c h a ra c te r is t ic  
o f  u n re la te d  know -h ow  lic e n s in g  agreem ents, nam ely th e  e x te n t to  
w h ic h  th e  know -h ow  had a lre a d y  been t ra n s fe r re d  to  ove rseas  
s u b s id ia r ie s . The e x p e c ta tio n  was th a t  com panies w o u ld  be m ore 
l i k e ly  to  lice n se  know -how  to  u n re la te d  lice n se e s  i f  i t  had  
p re v io u s ly  been t ra n s fe r re d  to  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s . T h is  was 
based upon the  prem ise th a t  th e  use fu leness  o f  th e  kn o w -h o w  w o u ld  
have been e va lu a te d  fro m  i t s  in te rn a l t ra n s fe r ,  th u s  m a k in g  i t  
e a s ie r  f o r  the  company to  dea l w ith  th e  p rob lem s o f  re c o g n it io n , 
d is c lo s u re  and team o rg a n iz a tio n  in  th e  a rm 's - le n g th  m a rke t. T h e re  
was, how ever, no evidence in  s u p p o r t o f  th is  h y p o th e s is .
O v e ra ll,  th e  re s u lts  in  C h a p te r T h ir te e n  a re  g e n e ra lly
c o n s is te n t w ith  e x p e c ta tio n s  and can be c o n s id e re d  as le n d in g  
te n ta t iv e  s u p p o rt tq  the  tra n s a c tio n  co s t schoo l o f  th o u g h t.
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By way o f summing up th e  re s u lts  o f  th e  e m p ir ic a l s tu d y , 
F ig u re  14-1 p re se n ts  a u n ify in g  fra m e w o rk  f o r  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  
d e c is io n  w h ic h  d raw s to g e th e r  th e  v a r io u s  s tra n d s  o f  th e  a n a ly s is  
by d e s c r ib in g  th e  re la t io n s h ip s  betw een th e  d i f fe r e n t  fa c to rs  th a t  
have been cons ide red . The fra m e w o rk  in c o rp o ra te s  e lem ents o f  th e  
tw o  k e y  pa rad igm s re v ie w e d  in  th e  l i te r a tu r e  s u rve y , W illia m so n 's  
(1975) M a rke ts  and H ie ra rc h ie s  pa rad igm  and D u n n in g 's  (1988) F a c to r  
E ndow m en t/M a rke t fa i lu r e  parad igm . The d iagram  suggests  th a t  fo u r  
b ro a d  g roup s  o f  fa c to rs  in f lu e n c e  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n : 
e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to rs  in  th e  h o s t and home c o u n tr ie s , th e  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  com pany m aking  th e  d e c is io n , th e  n a tu re  o f 
th e  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  w h ic h  i t  possesses, and th e  s tra te g ic  
o r ie n ta t io n  o f  th e  com pany.^
The f i r s t  o f  these , e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to rs  in  th e  home and h o s t 
c o u n try , in c lu d e  a num ber o f  th e  fa c to r  c o n s tru c ts  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  
v a r ia b le s  o f  the  e c le c tic  pa rad igm  o f  in te rn a t io n a l p ro d u c tio n . 
These fa c to rs  d e te rm ine  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f fa i lu re s  o c c u rr in g  in  th e  
a rm 's - le n g th  m arke ts  f o r  c a p ita l,  la b o u r , p ro d u c ts  and in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty ,  eg a f is c a l p o lic y  w h ich  p e n a lise s  ro y a lt ie s  a t th e  expense 
o f  d iv id e n d s  may t ip  th e  ba lance  in  fa v o u r  o f  FDI a t th e  expense o f 
lic e n s in g . The second g roup  o f  fa c to rs ,  th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty ,  d e te rm ine  th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  f a i lu r e  in  th e  
a rm 's - le n g th  m a rke t f o r  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty ,  eg kn o w -h o w  w h ich  is  
o f  a t a c i t  n a tu re  is  l i k e ly  to  s u f fe r  fro m  th e  in fo rm a tio n  
im pactedness p rob lem , th u s  m ak ing  i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  a m a rke t in  
k n o w -h o w  to  be e s ta b lis h e d .
The n a tu re  o f  th e  c o rp o ra te  e n t i t y  i t s e l f  w i l l  a lso  a f fe c t  th e  
m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  cho ice . F o r exam ple, a com pany w h ich  has l im ite d  
m a n a g e ria l and f in a n c ia l resou rces  may be c o n s tra in e d  in  i t s  a b i l i t y  
to  se t up overseas p ro d u c tio n  fa c i l i t ie s .  L ic e n s in g  may th u s  be 
chosen because o f  th e  fa i lu r e  o f th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  (ie  company) to  
f a c i l i t a te  an expa ns io n  o f  i t s  b o u n d a rie s  a t a co s t lo w e r th a n  th a t  
ach ie ve d  by the  use o f th e  a rm 's - le n g th  m a rke t in  in te l le c tu a l 
p ro p e r ty .  F in a lly ,  i t  m ust be recogn ised  th a t  th e  re a c t io n  o f  any 
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in te r n a l m a rke ts  w i l l  be in f lu e n c e d  by th e  s t ra te g ic  d ire c t io n  w h ich  
i t  is  fo llo w in g .  F o r exam ple, a com pany w h ic h  is  te c h n o lo g y -d r iv e n  
and w h ic h  ope ra tes  in  an in d u s t r y  c h a ra c te r is e d  b y  o l ig o p o lis t ic  
r iv a l r y  may o p t f o r  lic e n s in g  because i t  has e n te re d  in to  re c ip ro c a l 
agreem ents w ith  i t s  c o m p e tito rs , even i f  o th e r  c o n s id e ra tio n s  p o in t  
to w a rd s  th e  use o f  FDI o r  e x p o rt in g .
I t  is  hoped th a t  th e  fra m e w o rk  o u t lin e d  in  F ig u re  14-1 can 
a s s is t m anagers in  id e n t ify in g  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  fa c to rs  to  be 
co n s id e re d  in  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n . In  common w ith  o th e r  
fra m e w o rk s  re la te d  to  th is  d e c is io n , such as th o se  suggested by 
R oot (1987) and H i l l  e t a l (1990), th e  fra m e w o rk  o u t lin e d  in  th is  
s tu d y  h ig h l ig h ts  th e  fa c t  th a t  d i f fe r e n t  fa c to rs  may p u l l  a com pany 
in  d i f fe r e n t  d ire c t io n s . F o r exam ple, a com pany w h ic h  is  assessing 
a h o s t m a rke t c h a ra c te r is e d  by lo w  la b o u r  cos ts  and n e g lig ib le  
p o l i t ic a l  r is k  may be in c lin e d  to w a rd s  FDI. H ow ever, i f  i t  has 
s u b s id ia r ie s  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  w h ic h  w o u ld  be ab le  to  im p o rt cheap 
raw  m a te r ia ls  fro m  a license e  in  th e  h o s t m a rke t o r  to  c o u n t on a 
lo c a l lice n se e  to  buy  i t s  p ro d u c ts , th e n  lic e n s in g  may appear more 
a t t r a c t iv e .  In  such a s itu a t io n  managers w o u ld  have to  ana lyse  th e  
t r a d e - o f f  betw een th e  b e n e fits  a r is in g  fro m  th e  g e n e ra tio n  o f  
a u x i l ia r y  bus iness fro m  a license e  a g a in s t th e  b e n e fits  fro m  cheap 
lo c a l la b o u r  and lo w  p o l i t ic a l  r is k  in su ra nce . The q u a n t i f ic a t io n  o f  
th is  t r a d e - o f f  is  n o t an easy ta s k , b u t any a tte m p ts  a t do in g  so 
w o u ld  h o p e fu lly  enable  m anagers to  come to  a b e t te r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
o f  th e  b e n e fits  (and costs) o f  d i f fe r e n t  modes o f  bus iness .
14.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
As th e  re se a rch  is  concerned w ith  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  o u tw a rd  
lic e n s in g  u n d e rta k e n  by UK MNCs, i t s  im p lic a t io n s  are  p r in c ip a l ly  o f  
conce rn  to  UK com panies w h ich  are in v o lv e d  in  o u tw a rd  lic e n s in g  o r  
w h ic h  a re  co n te m p la tin g  in v o lv e m e n t. There are , how ever, some 
im p lic a t io n s  w h ich  may be o f  in te re s t  to  h o s t gove rnm en ts  and to  
p o te n t ia l fo re ig n  licensees.
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The re se a rch  w i l l  h o p e fu lly  be o f  a ss is tan ce  to  m anagers th a t  
a re  a tte m p tin g  to  fo rm u la te  a lic e n s in g  p o lic y  o r  to  in te g ra te  
lic e n s in g  w ith  th e ir  e x is t in g  bus iness  o p e ra tio n s . The fra m e w o rk  
o u t l in e d  in  F ig u re  14-1 d e fin e s  fo u r  b road  fa c to rs  w h ich  m anagers 
s h o u ld  c o n s id e r when e v a lu a tin g  th e  lic e n s in g  o p tio n , and th e  
re s u lts  re p o r te d  in  p re v io u s  c h a p te rs  have show n th e  r e la t iv e  
im p o rta n c e  a tta ch e d  to  th e  c o n s t itu e n ts  o f  these  fa c to rs  by  th e  
sam ple o f  86 UK MNCs th a t  responded  to  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  su rve y .
I t  is  im p o r ta n t th a t  lic e n s in g  is  n o t e v a lu a te d  s o le ly  in  te rm s 
o f  th e  revenu e  w h ich  i t  genera tes , w h e th e r in  te rm s o f  ro y a lt ie s  o r  
lum p-sum  fees, b u t  th a t  i t  is  a lso  co n s id e re d  in  te rm s o f  i t s  o v e ra l l 
im p a c t on th e  com pany and i t s  e f fe c t  on th e  com pany's fu tu re  
d ire c t io n .  I t  emerged, f o r  exam ple, th a t  speed o f  e n try  to  a new 
m a rke t ach ieved  th e  h ig h e s t r a t in g  among th e  lic e n s in g  o b je c t iv e s  
l is te d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire . Thus, a lth o u g h  in  th e  lo n g - te rm  
lic e n s in g  may n o t be as re m u n e ra tiv e  as FDI o r  e x p o r t in g , i t  may be 
v a lu a b le  as a s h o r t- te rm  s tra te g y  to  e s ta b lis h  a presence in  a 
fo re ig n  m a rke t, pe rhaps as a p re lu d e  to  fu tu re  e q u ity  in ve s tm e n t.
L ic e n s in g  may a lso  be used to  p re se rve  e x is t in g  m a rke ts  
se rve d  by e x p o rts  o r  FDI w h ich  are  th re a te n e d  by  h o s t-g o v e rn m e n t 
in te rv e n t io n .  I t  was fo u n d  th a t  an im p o r ta n t c o n s id e ra t io n  b e h in d  
th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  was th e  e x is te n ce  o f g o v e rn m e n t-c re a te d  m a rke t 
im p e r fe c tio n s , such as re s t r ic t io n s  on tra d e  and exchange c o n tro ls  
on d iv id e n d s , w h ich  had th e  e f fe c t  o f  m aking  e x p o rts  and FDI 
r e la t iv e ly  m ore c o s tly .
L ic e n s in g  may be e s p e c ia lly  w o rth y  o f  c o n s id e ra t io n  by th o se  
com panies w h ic h  la c k  th e  m anag e ria l e x p e rt is e  o r  in v e s tm e n t fu n d s  
necessary  f o r  FDI. The s u rv e y  fo u n d  th a t  a s h o rta g e  o f  in v e s tm e n t 
fu n d s  was o f less im p o rta n ce  th a n  a s h o rta g e  o f  m anag e ria l 
e x p e r t is e  in  th e  d e c is io n  to  fo re g o  FDI in  fa v o u r  o f  lic e n s in g , a 
f in d in g  w h ic h  is  n o t s u rp r is in g  g ive n  th e  g e n e ra lly  la rg e  size o f  th e  
resp o n d e n ts .
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A f in d in g  o f  in te re s t  to  h o s t gove rnm en ts  is  th e  a t t i tu d e  o f  
th e  sam ple to w a rd s  p a te n t p ro te c t io n  and a n t i - t r u s t  le g is la t io n .  The 
s u rv e y  assessed th e  e x te n t to  w h ich  weakness in  these  areas o f  
le g is la t io n  p rom o ted  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  a t th e  expense o f  FDI o r  
e x p o rts . B o th  reasons o b ta in e d  v e ry  lo w  ra n k in g s , w h ich  suggests  
th a t  i f  h o s t gove rnm en ts  are concerned  to  in c rea se  in w a rd  
in v e s tm e n t fro m  th e  UK a t th e  expense o f  lic e n s in g  th e n  th e y  s h o u ld  
d ire c t  t h e ir  a t te n t io n  to w a rd s  o th e r  p o l ic y  areas.
I f ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, h o s t governm ents  a re  keen to  a t t r a c t  
lic e n s e d  te c h n o lo g y  fro m  UK MNCs a t th e  expense o f  FDI and e x p o rts  
th e y  s h o u ld  a tte m p t to  im p ro ve  th e  te c h n o lo g ic a l com petence o f  
t h e ir  in d ig e n o u s  com panies, s ince  th is  was an a t t r ib u te  w h ic h  
o b ta in e d  a v e ry  h ig h  ra n k in g  in  p ro m o tin g  lic e n s in g .
P o te n tia l fo re ig n  licensees  m ig h t enhance t h e ir  a b i l i t y  to  f in d  
UK lic e n s o rs  i f  th e y  have te c h n o lo g y  o f  t h e ir  own to  o f fe r  v ia  a 
re c ip ro c a l lic e n s in g  a rrangem ent. The l ik e l ih o o d  o f  f in d in g  a UK 
lic e n s o r  m ig h t a lso  be enhanced i f  fo re ig n  license es  have th e  
f l e x i b i l i t y  to  a l te r  t h e ir  p u rc h a s in g  p o lic y  and pu rcha se  some o f  th e  
lic e n s o r 's  o u tp u t. In  a d d it io n , g ive n  th e  h ig h  ra n k in g  a t t r ib u te d  by  
UK MNCs to  th e  use o f  lic e n s in g  to  s tre n g th e n  jo in t  v e n tu re s , 
fo re ig n  com panies w h ic h  w a n t access to  UK te c h n o lo g y  m ig h t be more 
l i k e ly  to  succeed i f  th e y  are  a lso  p re p a re d  to  e n te r  in to  an 
a rra ngem en t w h ic h  in v o lv e s  some degree o f e q u ity  p a r t ic ip a t io n  by 
th e  UK lic e n s o r.
14.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
In  a d d it io n  to  th e  tw o  l im ita t io n s  o f th e  s tu d y  m en tioned  a t th e  
o u ts e t o f  th e  th e s is  in  C h a p te r One, th e  re lia n c e  on a h e a v ily  US- 
d om in a ted  l i te r a tu r e  and th e  use o f  (n e ce ssa rily ) c ro s s -s e c tio n a l 
q u e s tio n n a ire  da ta , th re e  f u r th e r  l im ita t io n s  need to  be p o in te d  o u t.
F ir s t ly ,  g iv e n  th a t  m ost o f  th e  MNCs th a t  responded to  th e  
q u e s tio n n a ire  are la rg e  th e  re se a rch  may n o t a c c u ra te ly  re p re s e n t
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th e  m o tiv a t io n s  b e h in d  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  sm a ll MNCs to  engage in  
lic e n s in g . In  a d d it io n , s ince  th e  s tu d y  is  concerned  w ith  MNCs, th e  
f in d in g s  may n o t be a p p lic a b le  to  UK com panies th a t  have no fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s  and th a t  a re  c o n fro n te d  w ith  a m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  
d e c is io n  w h ic h  in v o lv e s  s e t t in g  up overseas p ro d u c tio n  f a c i l i t ie s  f o r  
th e  f i r s t  tim e  ra th e r  th a n  e x te n d in g  p ro d u c tio n  in  an a lre a d y  
fu n c t io n in g  overseas p la n t.
S econdly, i t  m ust be acknow ledged th a t  th e  ra t in g s  g iv e n  by 
th e  MNCs to  th e  v a r ia b le s  l is te d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  a p p ly  to  t h e ir  
l ic e n s in g  agreem ents in  gene ra l. In  a sense these  ra t in g s  can be 
re g a rd e d  as a consensus o f  o p in io n  c o v e rin g  a l l  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  
agreem ents in  t h e ir  possess ion . I t  is  p o s s ib le  th a t  d i f fe r e n t  
responses w o u ld  have been o b ta in e d  i f  th e  MNCs had been asked to  
d is c r im in a te  betw een agreem ents on th e  bas is  o f  th e  h o s t c o u n try  o f  
th e  lice n se e  o r  th e  ty p e  o f  in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  lice n se d .^
T h ird ly ,  th e  use o f  a m a iled  q u e s tio n n a ire  in v o lv e d  th e  r is k  
th a t  re sp o n d e n ts  w o u ld  in te r p r e t  q u e s tio n s  d i f fe r e n t ly .  The 
q u e s tio n n a ire  had in  a sense to  "speak f o r  i t s e l f "  s ince  th e  
re s e a rc h e r c o u ld  n o t be p re se n t to  c la r i f y  any q u e s tio n s  f o r  th e  
re sp o n d e n ts . In  o rd e r  to  ensure  th a t  th e  q u e s tio n s  had a c le a r  
m eaning and were des igned  to  o b ta in  the  v a r ia b le s  needed f o r  
a n a ly s is  a p re - te s t  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  was u n d e rta k e n , d e ta ils  o f  
w h ic h  w ere g ive n  in  C h a p te r E ig h t. I t  m ust be recogn ised , how ever, 
t h a t  th e  v a r ia b le s  in c lu d e d  in  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  fo l lo w in g  th e  p re ­
te s t  w ere a l l  d e r iv e d  fro m  th e  e x ta n t l i te r a tu r e  and th a t  no new 
v a r ia b le s  were added to  a ccou n t f o r  any p e c u lia r i t ie s  o f  th e  UK 




An o b v io u s  e x te n s io n  to  th e  p re s e n t s tu d y  w o u ld  be th e  c o m p le tio n  
o f  a num ber o f  case s tu d ie s  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n -m a k in g  p rocess 
in  UK MNCs. These w o u ld  e n r ic h  th e  c o n c lu s io n s  re p o r te d  he re  by 
p ro v id in g  a more d e ta ile d  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  fa c to rs  a f fe c t in g  lic e n s in g  
on an ag reem en t-by-ag reem en t bas is , and m ig h t d is c o v e r  v a r ia b le s  
n o t p re s e n tly  recogn ised  in  th e  l i te ra tu r e .
Case s tu d ie s  c o u ld  a lso  be used to  r e f in e  th e  fra m e w o rk  
s u rro u n d in g  th e  m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  w h ic h  is  o u t lin e d  in  
F ig u re  14-1. The p re s e n t s tu d y  has d e fin e d  th e  fo u r  b ro a d  g roup s  
o f  fa c to rs  w h ich  com prise  th is  fra m e w o rk  and i t  has p ro v id e d  
ev idence  o f  th e  r e la t iv e  im p o rta n ce  a tta ch e d  to  th e  d i f fe r e n t  
v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  make up these  fa c to rs .  However, an issu e  w h ic h  
rem a ins to  be addressed is  th e  p re c ise  in te ra c t io n  be tw een th e  
fa c to rs  them se lves. In te rv ie w s  w ith  management d e c is io n -m a k e rs  
w o u ld  a s s is t in  id e n t ify in g  c ircum stances  in  w h ic h  each o f  th e  
e n v iro n m e n ta l, c o rp o ra te , s tra te g ic  and in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  fa c to rs ,  
o r  some co m b in a tio n s  o f them , m ig h t dom ina te  and p la y  a more 
im p o r ta n t ro le  th a n  o th e rs .
The re s u lts  fro m  such re se a rch  w o u ld  p ro v id e  u s e fu l in s ig h ts  
f o r  th e  deve lopm en t o f  a n o rm a tiv e  c o rp o ra te  p o lic y  m odel f o r  th e  
m a rk e t-s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n . Such a m odel c o u ld  p ropose  w e ig h tin g s  
to  be a tta c h e d  to  th e  ke y  v a r ia b le s  a ffe c t in g  th e  d e c is io n , and these  
c o u ld  r e f le c t  th e  p r io r i t ie s  w h ic h  a company a tta ch e s  to  th e  v a r io u s  
o b je c tiv e s  ach ieved  th ro u g h  th e  s e rv ic in g  o f  a fo re ig n  m arke t. In  
th is  way a t ra d e -o f f  c o u ld  be made between th e  cos ts  and b e n e fits  
o f  each a lte rn a t iv e  mode o f  bus iness. An in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  way in  
w h ic h  such a m odel m ig h t be deve loped  is  p ro v id e d  by  Young e t a l 
(1989).
A d d it io n a l resea rch  c o u ld  be conducted  to  e s ta b lis h  th e  e x te n t 
to  w h ic h  th e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  f o r  MNCs m ig h t 
d i f f e r  fro m  those  w h ich  a f fe c t  th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  fo r  dom estic  
UK com panies w ith  no fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s . A com pars ion  o f  sm a ll
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and m ed ium -s ized  f irm s  w ith  la rg e  f irm s  w o u ld  a lso  be u s e fu l to  
id e n t i f y  any d iffe re n c e s  due to  size.
F u tu re  re se a rch  m ig h t p r o f i t a b ly  fo cu s  upon  th e  c o n tra c tu a l 
d e ta ils  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents, a r e a d ily -a v a ila b le  d a ta  source . F o r 
exam ple, th e  in c id e n ce  o f r e s t r ic t iv e  c lauses in  l ic e n s in g  agreem ents 
p ro v id e s  an in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  c o n tro l e xe rc ise d  by  lic e n s o rs  o v e r 
license es  and c o u ld  be used to  te s t  th e  w id e ly -h e ld  n o t io n  th a t  
in te r n a l lic e n s in g  agreem ents p ro v id e  more c o n tro l th a n  a rm 's - le n g th  
agreem ents.
F in a lly ,  f u r th e r  re se a rch  in to  th e  im pac t o f  t ra n s a c tio n  cos ts  
on th e  lic e n s in g  d e c is io n  is  w a rra n te d . The e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  
in te l le c tu a l p ro p e r ty  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  lic e n s in g  agreem ents in  th is  
s tu d y  o n ly  p ro v id e d  an in d ir e c t  te s t  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  co s t 
p ro p o s it io n s  by m aking  p la u s ib le  assum ptions a b o u t th e  r e la t iv e  
in c id e n c e  o f  t ra n s a c tio n  cos ts  in  re la te d  and u n re la te d  agreem ents. 
The use o f  da ta  w h ic h  g ives  a d ire c t  measure o f  these  cos ts  (eg 
B o u ju 's  (1987) s u rv e y  o f  w o rld w id e  p a te n t in fr in g e m e n t l i t ig a t io n  
cos ts ) w o u ld  p ro v id e  more c le a r - c u t  ev idence f o r  o r  a g a in s t th e  





1. Adam's (1985) s tu d y  o n ly  co n s id e re d  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  lic e n s in g  
was used as an a lte rn a t iv e  to  FDI (see C h a p te r 8 o f  h is  th e s is ). 
I t  d id  n o t a tte m p t to  assess w h e th e r UK MNCs a lso  e v a lu a te d  i t  
as an a lte rn a t iv e  to  e x p o rt in g .
2. The d if fe re n c e  may be a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  fa c t  th a t  S hepherd e t 
a l su rve ye d  a much s m a lle r num ber o f  UK MNCs (23) s ince  th e y  
used a case s tu d y  app roach  ra th e r  th a n  a q u e s tio n n a ire  app roach .
3. T h is  d iagram  o n ly  i l lu s t r a te s  th e  im p a c t o f  th e  fo u r  b road  fa c to rs  
on th e  m a rk e t-s e rv c in g  d e c is io n . I t  does n o t a tte m p t to  d e sc rib e  
th e  re la t io n s h ip  betw een th e  fa c to rs  them se lves. F o r exam ple, a 
c o rp o ra te  fa c to r  such as size c o u ld  a lso  a f fe c t  th e  m a rk e t-  
s e rv ic in g  d e c is io n  in d ir e c t ly  th ro u g h  i t s  in f lu e n c e  on s tra te g ic  
b e h a v io u r.
4. The in c lu s io n  o f  such re fin e m e n ts  in  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  w o u ld , o f  
cou rse , have re s u lte d  in  a m a jo r in c rea se  in  i t s  size and th e re fo re  
decreased th e  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  an accep tab le  response  ra te  be ing  
o b ta in e d .
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I have much pleasure in informing you that the University of 
Glasgow is conducting a major investigation into the use of 
technology licensing by U.K. based multinational companies. The 
study is being carried out by Mr. Kevin Campbell, a postgraduate 
researcher sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council.
The main objective is to gain a better understanding of the 
circumstances under which companies earn income from foreign 
markets by licensing, rather than by the more traditional methods 
of direct investment or exporting. This is a very topical and 
important subject, for licensing has become more widespread in 
recent years as changing political and economic conditions have 
made it a more appealing international business strategy.
I would be most grateful if you could arrange for your company1 s 
co-operation in thi3 study by having an appropriate senior 
executive complete the enclosed questionnaire, which should only 
take about half an hour to fill in. I am sure that you will 
consider the effort worthwhile. As the results of the survey are 
likely to be of assistance in the formulation of policy decisions 
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Dear M r ............. ,
May I invite your company to participate in a research project on 
international technology licensing?
The project aims to gain an understanding of the role of 
licensing in the international operations of U.K. based 
multinational companies. In particular, it seeks to investigate 
the extent to which licensing is co-ordinated with the other 
elements of global business strategy - exports, joint ventures 
and subsidiary operations - and to determine the conditions under 
which it is considered the more appropriate strategy. This is a 
very topical and important subject, for licensing has become more 
widespread in recent years as changing political and economic 
conditions have made it a more appealing international business 
strategy.
The 3tudy i s  concerned with licensing-out, i.e. the licensing of 
technology to other businesses (both related and unrelated). It 
is concerned with technology in the form of patents and know-how, 
the latter consisting of confidential technical information that 
constitutes either a separate body of information or information 
ancillary to the workings of a patent. Know-how may include 
tangible objects such as drawings and blueprints, or it may be 
embodied in intangibles such as consultations with company 
technicians.
I would be most grateful if you could arrange for your company's 
participation in the survey by passing on the enclosed 
questionnaire to a senior executive in the group with knowledge 
of your company's involvement in this area. A stamp-addressed 
envelope is provided for returning the completed questionnaire to 
the University of Glasgow. The questionnaire has been designed 
with the aim of reducing the time required for completion, so 
that for most questions it is only necessary to tick an 
appropriate box, although in some cases it may be helpful to 
consult with other company colleagues. Your company's co­
operation is essential for the achievement of meaningful results, 
and will be very much appreciated. (If your company is not 
involved in international licensing, please answer the first 
question of the questionnaire and return it without rurther 
completion).
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Please be assured that: all questionnaire responses will be kept 
strictly confidential. The* results will only be presented as 
statistical totals for groups of companies.
In addition to uncovering the reasons for the use of 
international licensing, the study will also generate information 
on key aspects of corporate licensing practice, such as the 
organization of the licensing function within the company and the 
procedures used for locating potential licensees. When the 
research is completed, a report of the main findings will be 
mailed to each participant. This report will enable you to 
compare the international licensing activities of your company 
with prevailing corporate practices and therefore help to reveal 
whether your company is fully exploiting its potential in this 
very important area of international business.
I will be most grateful for your support of this research 
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Dear M r ............,
Four weeks ago Professor Gray and I wrote inviting you to 
participate in a research project sponsored by the Economic and 
Social Research Council on the subject of international 
technology licensing. As we have not yet heard from you, I am 
writing to re-affirm our interest in your participation in the 
study. The cooperation of a large number of companies is 
absolutely vital for the achievement of valid and meaningful 
results.
Please find enclosed another copy of the questionnaire sent to 
you earlier. I would be rnosc grateful if you could arrange for a 
senior executive in the group with knowledge of this subject to 
complete it and return it to me at the University of Glasgow.
I would like to emphasize that all responses will be treated in 
strict confidence. Results will only be presented as statistical 
totals for groups of companies.
When the research is completed, a summary of the main findings 
will be mailed to all participants. This will hopefully assist 
your company in the formulation of policy decisions in this area.
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Ten weeks ago Professor Gray and I wrote inviting your company to 
participate in a research project by completing a questionnaire 
on the above topic, and this was followed up with a reminder 
letter five weeks ago. Although you have not yet responded to 
either of our enquiries, I am writing to inform you that we are 
nevertheless still interested in your company's participation in 
the survey, wnich is sponsored by the Economic and Social 
Research Council.
I would therefore be most grateful if you could arrange for 
someone in your company with knowledge of this subject to answer 
our questionnaire, another copy of which is enclosed. Your 
assistance will be very much appreciated.
I would like to stress that all information provided will be kept 
strictly confidential, i.e. it will only be reported in aggregate 
form and will not be identified with any particular company or 
individual respondent.
As the results of the survey will provide assistance in the 
formulation of policy decisions in this area, a copy of the main 
results will be forwarded to all participants when the research 
13 completed.
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The s t u d y  a i ms  co d i s c o v e r  che  f a c t o r s  w h i c h  p r o m o t e  t h e  o s s  of  
1 i c a a s m a g - o u t  by m u L c l a a c i o a a 1 c o m p a a i e s .  l a  p a r t i c u l a r  i c
a c t  ampt s  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  c i r c  am s t a a c e s  a a d e r  w h i c h  t h e  l i c e a s i a g  of  
p a t  e a t  3 aad kaow—how i s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  e x p o r c i a g  aa d  d i r e c t  f o r e i g a  
i a v e s t m e a t  a3 a meaas  o f  g e a e r a t i a g  b u s i a e s s  i a  o v e r s e a s  m a r k e t s .
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION
1.  The s t u d y  i s  a d d r e s s e d  t o  U . K . - b a s e d  c o m p a a i e s  c h a t  a r e  
i a v o l v e d  i a  i a t e r a a t i o a a i  L i c e a s i a g  aad  w h i c h  h a v e  a t  l e a s t  oae  
o v e r s e a s  s u b s i d i a r y .
2 .  The q u e s t  i o a a a i r e  s h o u l d  be a a s v e r e d  by a  s e a i o - r  e x e c u t i v e  
f a m i l i a r  w i t h  che  c o m p a a y ' s  i a t e r a a t i o a a l  l i c e a s i a g  o p e r a t i o a s .
3 .  As che study i3 coaceraed with compaaies that are orgaaized as 
groups, the term compaay - which is used throughout Che 
questioaaaire - should be uader3tood as group, ualess 3tated 
o t h e r w i s e .
A. The q u e s t i o a a a i r e  has  b e e a  d e s i g a e d  w i t h  t h e  a i m o f  m i a i m i s i a g  
Che t i m e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  c o m p l e t i o a .  C o a s e q u e a t l y , a l c e r a a t i v e  
a a s v e r s  a r e  p r o v i d e d  f o r  mo3t  q u e s c i o a 3  30 c h a t  che r e s p o a d e a t  
s i m p l y  h a s  t o  t i c k  che  b o x ( e 3 )  wh i c h  mo3t  a c c u r a t e l y  d e s c r i b e  
h i s / h e r  o p i a i o - a  or  che  c o m p a a y ' s  p r a c t i c e .
5 .  I f  aay i a f o r m a c i o a  i s  r e q u e s t e d  w h i c h  i s  a o t  r o u t i a e l y  
a v a i l a b l e ,  r s a s o a a b U  e s t i m a t e s  w i l l  s u f f i c e .  P l e a s e  be 
a s s u r e d  t h a t  r e s p o a s e  b a s e d  oa i a f o r m e d  j u d g e m e a t  i s  
i a f i a i t e l y  more v a l u a b l e  c h a a  ao r e s p o a s e  a t  a l l .  I f  f o r  aay 
r e a s o a  you  do a o t  c o m p l e t e  t h e  e a t i r e  q u s s c i o a a a i r e ,  p l e a s e  
r e t u r a  i c  a a y v a y .  Evea p a r t i a l  i a f o r m a c i o a  p r o v i d e s  i m p o r t a a t  
i a p u t  co t h e  s u r v e y  r e s u l t s .
6 .  A l l  of  t h e  i a f o r m a c i o a  p r o v i d e d  w i l l  be h e l d  i a  s t r i c t  
c o a f i d e a c e ,  t o  be p r e s e a t e d  i a  a g g r e g a t e  f o r m  o a l y .  The 
a a o a y m i t y  o f  i a d i v i d u a l  r e s p o a d e a c s  aa d  of  compaay  aames  w i l l  
be c a r e f u l l y  p r o t e c t e d .
7 .  S p a c e  i s  p r o v i d e d  a t  t h e  ead o f  t h e  q u e s c i o a a a i r e  f o r  aay 
commeat s  you may wi s h  co make a b o u t  i t .  Tou a r e  a l s o  a3ked co 
p r o v i d e  y o u r  aame aad che c o m p a a y ' s  aame 30 t h a t  a summary of  
che  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  s u r v e y  c a a  be s e a t  t o  you l a t e r .
8 .  Th a a k  you v e r y  much f o r  y o u r  s u p p o r t  of  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  e f f o r t .  
I f  you h a v e  aay p r o b l e m s  i a  c o m p l e t i a g  che  q u e 3 t i o a a a i r e , 
p l e a s e  do a o t  h e s i t a t e  t o  c o a t a c t  me:
Mr.  sCavia C a m p b e l l ,  M . A . ( H o a s ) .
U n i v e r s i t y  of  Gl a s gow,
D e p a r t m e a t  of  A c c o u a c a a c y ,
6 5 - 6 9  S o u t h p a r k  Aveaue ,
Gl asgow G12 3LE.
T e l .  DATTIME ( 0 4 1 )  339 8855 e x t  501;  EVENINGS ( 0 4 1 )  959 4044
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T h is  s u r v e y  i s  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  t h e  l i c e n s i n g - o u t  o f  t e c h n o lo g y  in  t h e  fo rm  o f  p a t e n t s  and 
know-how, t h e  l a t t e r  b e in g  c o n f i d e n t i a l  t e c h n i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  i s  e i t h e r  u n p a t e n t a b le  
o r  p u r p o s e l y  l e f t  u n p a t e n t e d .  I t  i s  a l s o  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  o f  t r a d e m a rk s ,  b u t  
o n l y  i n  so f a r  as t h e y  accompany t h e  l i c e n s i n g  o f  p a t e n t s  and know-how. The te rm  
t e c h n o lo g y  l i c e n s i n g "  s h o u ld  be ta k e n  t o  i n c l u d e  l i c e n c e  a g re e m e n ts  w h ic h  a re  p a r t  o f  
more g e n e r a l  c o n t r a c t u a l  a r r a n g e m e n ts ,  such  as e n g i n e e r i n g  s e r v i c e s  a g re e m e n ts  and t u r n k e y  
c o n t r a c t s ,  as w e l l  as i n d i v i d u a l  l i c e n c e  a g re e m e n ts .
The s u r v e y  a p p l i e s  t o  two c a t e g o r i e s  o f  l i c e n c e  a g re e m e n t .  Those w i t h  u n r e l a t e d  
o v e rs e a s  com pan ies  -  i . e .  com pan ies  t h a t  a re  n o t  members o f  t h e  g ro u p  -  and t h o s e  w i t h  
o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  -  i . e .  com pan ies  i n  w h ic h  t h e  g ro u p  has a min imum e q u i t y  s t a k e  o f  
51%. L i c e n s in g  o f  a s s o c ia t e d  com pan ies  ( c o m p a n ie s  in  w h ic h  t h e  g ro u p  has an o w n e rs h ip  
i n t e r e s t  w h ic h  i s  l e s s  th a n  a c o n t r o l l i n g  one )  and o f  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  (c o m p a n ie s  i n  w h ic h  
th e  g ro u p  s h a re s  o w n e rs h ip  and management w i t h  one o r  more u n r e l a t e d  c o n c e rn s ,  b u t  has no 
o v e r a l l  c o n t r o l )  s h o u ld  be i n c lu d e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  c a t e g o r y .
Does t h e  company have any l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  c o v e r i n g  t h e  use  o f  i t s  p a t e n t s  a n d / o r  
know-how by u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  c o m p a n ie s  o r  by any o f  i t s  o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ?  
P le a s e  t i c k  G/) t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  b oxes .
YES NO
( a )  U n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  com pan ies  I ! !  !
( b )  O ve rse a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  ! ! 1 !
I f  you have  answered  YES t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  ( a ) ,  o r  t o  b o th  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  p le a s e  c o m p le te  t h e  
r e s t  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .
I f  you have  answered  NO t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  ( a )  and YES t o  a l t e r n a t i v e  ( b ) ,  p le a s e  s t a r t  t h e
q u e s t i o n n a i r e  a t  SECTION I I I .
I f  y o u r  a nsw er  i s  NO t o  b o th  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  p le a s e  use  t h e  space  f o r  comments a t  t h e  end o f  
t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  o r  a s e p a r a t e  s h e e t  o f  p a p e r ,  t o  s t a t e  b r i e f l y  why y o u r  company i s  n o t  
i n v o l v e d  i n  l i c e n s i n g - o u t ,  and r e t u r n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  c o m p le t i o n .
SECTION I  ~ THE INTERNATIONAL LICENSING DECISION
The q u e s t i o n s  in  t h i s  s e c t i o n  a re  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  t h e  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  
co m p a n y 's  a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  o f  i t s  p a t e n t s  and know-how t o  u n r e l a t e d  
o v e rs e a s  co m p a n ie s ,  i . e .  c a t e g o r y  (a )  above .
1. I n  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  how many i n s t a n c e s  does  t h e  company e v a l u a t e  l i c e n s i n g  as an
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t ,  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  and e x p o r t i n g ,  r a t h e r  th a n  c o n s i d e r  
i t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e s e  o t h e r  m ethods  o f  s e r v i c i n g  a f o r e i g n  m a rk e t?
P le a s e  t i c k  G/) one box .
ALWAYS ]__ ! IN  MOST CASES 1___! IN  SOME CASES i  ! VERY RARELY ! I NEVER I  !
I f  you have answered  NEVER, go t o  Q u e s t io n  5. O th e rw is e  answ er Q u e s t io n  2.
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2. To w h a t  e x t e n t  i s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i c e n s i n g  used by t h e  company s o l e l y  as a s u b s t i t u t e  
f o r  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t ,  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  a n d / o r  e x p o r t s  when t h e s e  m ethods  a re  n o t  
p o s s i b l e  because  o f  h o s t - g o v e r n m e n t  c o n t r o l s ?  P le a s e  t i c k  (v/) one box.
ALWAYS ; : IN MOST CASES I ! IN SOME CASES 1 VERY RARELY ! ! NEVER 1.
I f  you have answered  ALWAYS, go t o  Q u e s t io n  6. O th e r w is e  answ er  Q u e s t io n  3.
3. I n  t h o s e  o v e rs e a s  m a r k e t s  w h e re  l i c e n s i n g  has been e v a lu a t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  o p t i o n s  o f  
d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  and e x p o r t i n g ,  and chosen  as t h e  m os t  s u i t a b l e  s t r a t e g y ,  p le a s e  
i n d i c a t e  i f  any o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  l i s t e d  b e lo w  have p la y e d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  
r u l i n g  o u t  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  and e x p o r t i n g .  T i c k  ( v )  one box f o r  each f a c t o r  l i s t e d .  
(The  l a s t  box s h o u ld  be t i c k e d  i f  t h e  f a c t o r  i s  o f  no r e l e v a n c e  t o  t h e  company o r  i t s  





VERY NOT AP- 
SIGNIFICANT PLICABLE
DIRECT INVESTMENT
a. S h o r ta g e  o f  in v e s t m e n t  fu n d s
b. S c a r c i t y  o f  management p e rs o n n e l  !_ !
c .  H ig h  p o l i t i c a l  r i s k I I  I I I I
d .  H ig h  l o c a l  l a b o u r  c o s t s I I  I__I
e .  H ig h  l e v e l  o f  t a x a t i o n I I I
f .  H ig h  c u r r e n c y  r i s k I I I I
g .  S t r o n g  l o c a l  c o m p e t i t i o n I I  I I
h. S m a l l  s i z e  o f  m a rk e t I I  l i I I
i .  Exchange c o n t r o l s  on d i v i d e n d s I I  I I  I I  I I I I
j  . O t h e r : I I I
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EXPORTING
H ig h  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s
H ig h  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  i n  U .K .
T ra d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
( T a r i f f s ,  q u o ta s  e t c . )
P oor  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  
i n  l o c a l  m a rk e t
D i f f e r e n t  l o c a l  p r o d u c t  
s t a n d a r d s
D i f f e r e n t  l o c a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  
O t h e r : ________________
I n  y o u r  e x p e r ie n c e  how s i g n i f i c a n t  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s  i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  
company t o  f a v o u r  1 i c e n s i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  o r  e x p o r t s ?
P le a s e  t i c k  (y/) one box f o r  each f a c t o r  l i s t e d .
OF NO OF SOME VERY NOT AP-
SIGNIFICANCE SIGNIFICANCE SIGNIFICANT PLICABLE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Weak p a t e n t  p r o t e c t i o n  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  ! _ !  !_ !  ! _
l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  h o s t  c o u n t r i e s
Weak a n t i - t r u s t  l e g i s l a t i o n  !_ !  ! _ |  !_ !  !_ !  ! _ !  !_ !  ! _
i n  h o s t  c o u n t r i e s
A v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  ! _ !  !_ !  ! _
c o m p e te n t  c a n d id a t e  l i c e n s e e s
L i m i t e d  know ledge  o f  h o s t  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  ! _ !  !_ !  ! _
c o u n t r y  m a r k e t
Lower t a x  r a t e  on r o y a l t i e s  !_!  !_!  !_!  !_!  I _!  !_!  !_J
t h a n  d i v i d e n d s
W eaker exchange  c o n t r o l s  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  ! _ !  I _ !  !_ !
on r o y a l t i e s
5. L i s t e d  b e lo w  a re  a number o f  o b j e c t i v e s  w h ic h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i c e n s i n g  may be in te n d e d  
t o  a c h ie v e .  P le a s e  e s t i m a t e  t h e  d e g re e  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t t a c h e d  by y o u r  company t o  
each o f  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  by t i c k i n g  ( \ / )  one box i n  each c a s e .  (The l a s t  box s h o u ld  be 
t i c k e d  i f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  has n e v e r  been p u rs u e d  by t h e  com pany) .
OF NO OF SOME VERY NOT AP-
SIGNIFICANCE SIGNIFICANCE SIGNIFICANT PLICASLE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a. To s u p p le m e n t  t h e  R & D b u d g e t  
w i t h  a d d i t i o n a l  s o u rc e s  o f
i ncome
b. To g a in  r e c i p r o c a l  acce ss
t o  t h e  l i c e n s e e ' s  t e c h n o lo g y
c .  To e x p l o i t  ' s p i n - o f f  t e c h n o lo g y  
i . e .  t e c h n o lo g y  w h ic h  does  n o t  
s u i t  t h e  co m p a n y 's  e x i s t i n g  
p r o d u c t  range
d .  To e a rn  e x t r a  income f ro m  
te c h n o lo g y  w h ic h  has o u t l i v e d  
i t s  u s e f u l e n e s s  t o  t h e  company
e. To re d u c e  c u r r e n c y  r i s k
f .  To p r o t e c t  p a t e n t s  a g a i n s t  _
c o m p u ls o r y  l i c e n s i n g  by h o s t  !_ !
g o v e rn m e n ts
g. To p re - e m p t  t h e  i n f r i n g e m e n t  o f  _  
p a t e n t s  by l o c a l  f i r m s  ! !
h. To d e v e lo p  m a r k e ts  f o r  —
com ponen ts  o r  o t h e r  p r o d u c t s  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  ! _ !  !_ !  !_ !
made by t h e  company
i .  To d i v e r s i f y  t h e  fo rm  o f  company _ _ _ _ _ _ _
incom e as a means o f  r e d u c in g  |_ !  !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  ! _ !  ! _ !  !_ !
r i  sk
j .  To d e v e lo p  l o w - c o s t  s o u rc e s  o f  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
raw m a t e r i a l s ,  com ponen ts  o r  !_ !  ! _ !  !_ !  ! _ !  ! _ !  ! _ !  !_ !
end p r o d u c t s  f o r  o t h e r  company 
o p e r a t i  ons
k. To t e s t  new m a rk e ts  b e f o r e  !_ !  ! _ !  ! _ !  ! _ !  ! _ !  ! _ !
c o m m i t t i n g  r i s k  c a p i t a l
1. To b u i l d  g o o d w i l l  and a c c e p ta n c e  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
f o r  o t h e r  company p r o d u c t s  and !_ !  !_ !  !_ !  ! _ !  ! _ !  ! _ i  !_<
s e r v i  ces
m. To s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  co m pany 's  
p o s i t i o n  i n  a j o i n t  v e n t u r e
n . To e n t e r  a new m a rk e t  q u i c k l y
o.  O t h e r :
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W hich  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m ethods  o f  o v e rs e a s  b u s in e s s  a re  used m o s t  o f t e n  by t h e  company 
a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e , and w h ic h  does  t h e  company e x p e c t  t o  a d o p t  i n  t h e  n e x t  d e ca de ? 
P le a s e  ra n k  in  o r d e r  o f  c u r r e n t  and e x p e c te d  use f o r  t h e  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  o v e rs e a s  
m a r k e t  l i s t e d  b e low  (4= m o s t  use t o  1=1 e a s t  u s e ;  O=not u s e d / n o t  e x p e c te d  t o  be u s e d ) .
DEVELOPED NEWLY IN D U S T R IA L - LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES IZ IN G  COUNTRIES COUNTRIES
( a )  C u r r e n t  O ve rse a s  B u s in e s s  M ethods
( i n s e r t  r a n k in g s )  ( i n s e r t  r a n k i n g s )  ( i n s e r t  r a n k in g s )
DIRECT INVESTMENT _______  _______  _______
JOINT VENTURE _______  _______  _______
LICENSING _______  _______  _______
EXPORTING _______  _______  _______
( b )  F u t u r e  O ve rse a s  B u s in e s s  M ethods
( i n s e r t  r a n k i n g s )  ( i n s e r t  r a n k i n g s )  ( i n s e r t  r a n k in g s )
DIRECT INVESTMENT _______  _______  _______
JOINT VENTURE _______  _______  _______
LICENSING__________________________________ _______  _______  _______
EXPORTING__________________________________ _______  _______  _______
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES a re  t h o s e  n a t i o n s  w h ic h  b e lo n g  t o  t h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  Econom ic  
C o - o p e r a t i o n  and D eve lo p m e n t  (OECD): U . S . A . ,  Canada, Ja p a n ,  F ra n c e ,  Germany e t c .
NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES a re  t h o s e  n a t i o n s  f ro m  th e  n o n -c o m m u n is t  d e v e lo p i n g  
w o r l d  w h ic h  a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x p o r t e r s  on a g l o b a l  s c a l e :  B r a z i 1, M e x ic o ,  I n d i a ,  e t c .
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES c o m p r is e  t h e  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h e  n o n -c o m m u n is t  d e v e lo p i n g  
n a t i o n s :  C h i l e ,  C o lu m b ia ,  E g y p t ,  M a l a y s i a  e t c .
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SECTION I I  -  IN TER NATIO NAL LIC EN SIN G  A C T IV IT Y
T h i s  s e c t i o n  s e e ks  t o  b u i l d  upon t h e  p r e v io u s  s e c t i o n  by e x a m in in g  some f e a t u r e s  o f  
t h e  c o m p a n y 's  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  c o m p a n ie s .
The s e c t i o n  i s  i n  two p a r t s :  t h e  f i r s t ,  P a r t  A, d e a l s  w i t h  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  w h ic h  
p r o v i d e  e i t h e r  p a t e n t s  on t h e i r  own o r  p a t e n t s  com bined  w i t h  know-how a n d / o r  
t r a d e m a r k s ;  t h e  s e c o n d ,  P a r t  B, d e a l s  w i t h  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  w h ic h  c a t e r  
e x c l u s i v e l y  f o r  t r a n s f e r s  o f  know-how, o r  know-how com b ined  w i t h  t r a d e m a r k s .
PART A: PATENT LICENSING
1. Does t h e  company have p a t e n t  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  c o m pan ies?  
P le a s e  t i c k  (>/) one b o x .
YES !___! NO I___! (go  t o  Q u e s t io n  10)
2. A p p r o x im a t e l y  how many o f  t h e  co m p a n y 's  p a t e n t  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  a r e :
( a )  VOLUNTARY LICENCES?
( b )  LICENCES OF RIGHT?
( c )  COMPULSORY LICENCES?
3. A p p r o x im a t e l y  how many o f  
c a t e g o r i  es?
(a )  SOLE LICENCES
( b )  EXCLUSIVE LICENCES
( c )  NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENCES
371
( i . e .  a g re e m e n ts  f r e e l y  n e g o t i a t e d  w i t h  !__
o t h e r  f i  rms)
( i . e .  l i c e n c e s  g r a n t e d  on p a t e n t s  t h e  !___! %
company does n o t  w is h  t o  e x p l o i t )
( i . e .  l i c e n c e s  g r a n t e d  because o f  n o n -u s e  !___!%
o f  p a t e n t  o r  d is a g re e m e n t  o v e r  te r m s )
th e  co m p a n y 's  v o l u n t a r y  l i c e n c e s  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g
( i . e .  l i c e n c e s  w h ic h  e x c lu d e  t h e  company f ro m  __
g r a n t i n g  a l i c e n c e  t o  o t h e r  f i r m s  i n  t h e  same !___\ %
t e r r i t o r y  as t h e  l i c e n s e e )
( i . e .  l i c e n c e s  w h ic h  e x c lu d e  t h e  company f ro m  __
g r a n t i n g  l i c e n c e s  t o  o t h e r  f i r m s  i n  t h e  same !__ !%
t e r r i t o r y  and f r o m  c o m p e t in g  w i t h  t h e  l i c e n s e e )
( i . e .  l i c e n c e s  w h ic h  do n o t  g i v e  any o f  t h e  above  __
u n d e r t a k i n g s )  !__
How many o f  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  p a t e n t  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  
com p a n ie s  a l s o  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ?  P le a s e  t i c k  (>/) one c e l l  i n  each s c a l e .
( a )  S u p p ly  o f  know-how i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  f i e l d  o f  t h e  p a t e n t :
1 1 2 3 4 5
(b ) S u p p ly
None 
o f  kncw-
A Few 
how on a b ro a d e r
A b o u t  h a l f  
bas i s :
M os t A 11 / V i  r t u a l 1y 
A11
111
1 2 3 4 5







t r a d e m a r k s :
A b o u t  h a l f M ost A 1 1/ V i  r t u a l 1y 
A1 1
!
1 2 3 4 5
! i
1




p a t e n t  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  does  t h e  
P le a s e  t i c k  (>/) t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  box
company have w i t h  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s
(a ) 1 - 5 I 1 I I ( d ) 50 -  100 :__ !
( b ) 5 - 2 0 1 l 1 _ _  1 (e ) 100 -  200 i__ !
( c ) 20 -  50 I i ( f ) > 200 !__ !
6. How much d i d  t h e  company e a r n ,  a f t e r  t a x ,  f r o m  th e s e  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  i n  t h e  l a s t  
a c c o u n t i n g  y e a r?  P le a s e  t i c k  (>/) t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  box .
< £0 .  lm !_ !  £ 0 .1  -  lm £1 -  5m !_ !  £5 -  10m !_J £10 -  20m j _ j  > £20m !_ !
Can you g i v e  an e x a c t  f i g u r e ?  £_______________
7. How does  t h i s  sum compare w i t h  5 y e a r s  ago?
P le a s e  t i c k  (%/) th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  bo x ,  a l l o w i n g  f o r  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i n f l a t i o n .
SIGNIFICANTLY _  SLIGHTLY _  APPROXIMATELY _  SLIGHTLY _  SIGNIFICANTLY
MORE i I MORE ! ! THE SAME ! ! LESS !_ !  LESS
8. A p p r o x im a t e l y  w h a t  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  p a t e n t  l i c e n s i n g  re v e n u e  f r o m  u n r e l a t e d  
o v e rs e a s  com pan ies  comes f ro m  a n n ua l  r o y a l t i e s , c a l c u l a t e d  as a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  l i c e n s e e  
s a le s ?  P le a s e  t i c k  (V) one box.
(a ) 100% 1 1 (d ) 20 -  50%
1 1
(b ) 90 - 100% 1 1 1 1 (e ) 10 -  20%
1 1 
1 —
( c ) 50 - 90% 1 1 1 _ 1 ( f ) < 10%
1 1
9 . W i t h i n  w h ic h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  ran g e s  does  t h e  r o y a l t y  r a t e  c h a rg e d  f o r  t h e s e  p a t e n t  
l i c e n c e s  u s u a l l y  f a l l ?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  one box .
( a ) < 1% o f  s a l e s 1 IJ__ 1 (d ) 5 -  7.5% o f  s a l e s ' — '
(b ) 1 -  2.5% o f  s a l e s 1 1 1 __ 1 ( e ) 7 .5  -  10% o f  s a l e s
i l 1 __ 1
( c ) 2 .5  -  5% o f  s a l e s ( 1I __ 1 ( f ) > 10% o f  s a l e s 1 ’
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PART B: KNOW-HOW LIC EN SIN G
10. Has y o u r  company e n t e r e d  i n t o  w r i t t e n  a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  c o m p a n ie s  t o  
s u p p ly  know-how wi t h o u t  a l s o  s u p p l y i n g  p a t e n t s ?
P le a s e  t i c k  (s/) one box .
YES !  | (go  t o  Q u e s t io n  12) NO !___! (a n s w e r  Q u e s t io n  11,
t h e n  p ro c e e d  t o  SECTION I I I )
11. Does y o u r  company p o s s e s s  know-how t h a t  c o u ld  be o f  use  t o  o t h e r  co m pan ies?
P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  one box .
y e s____ ;__; no i__ :
I f  YES, has y o u r  company e v e r  c o n s id e r e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  l i c e n s i n g  t h i s  know-how?
y e s  ;__: no ;__ i
I f  YES, p le a s e  i n d i c a t e  i f  any o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  re a s o n s  e x p l a i n  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  d e c i s i o n  
n o t  t o  l i c e n s e  i t s  know-how. P le a s e  t i c k  0 / )  any a p p r o p r i a t e  b o x .
!__ ! ( a )  The r i s k  o f  l o s i n g  a c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n ta g e .
!__ ! ( b )  The d i f f i c u l t y  o f  c o m m u n ic a t in g  t h e  v a lu e  o f  know-how
t o  p o t e n t i a l  b u y e rs  w i t h o u t  r e v e a l i n g  i t s  e x a c t  n a t u r e .
I__ ! ( c )  The need t o  t r a n s f e r  s c a r c e  company p e rs o n n e l  t o  make
t h e  know-how e f f e c t i v e .
!___! ( d )  The absence  o f  s u i t a b l e  l i c e n s e e  f i r m s .
I___! ( e )  The c o s t  o f  p o l i c i n g  t h e  l i c e n c e ,  i . e .  o f  e n s u r i n g  t h a t
t h e  l i c e n s e e  a d h e re s  t o  i t s  c o n t r a c t u a l  o b l i g a t i o n s .
!___! ( f )  O t h e r : ____________________________________________________________ _
I f  you have t i c k e d  more th a n  one box ,  p le a s e  i n d i c a t e  b e lo w  w h ic h  r e a s o n ( s )  had m os t
i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  co m p a n y 's  d e c i s i o n :
12. How many o f  t h e  co m p a n y 's  know-how a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  u n r e l a t e d  o v e r s e a s  c o m p a n ie s  a l l o w  
f o r  t h e  use  o f  company t r a d e m a rk s  by t h e  l i c e n s e e ?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  one c e l l .
1 2 3 4 5
!__________ ;__________ !------------------ !------------------ ;—   j
None A Few A b o u t  h a l f  M o s t  A 11/ V i r t u a l 1y
A 11
13. U s in g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s c a le
1 2 3 4 5
None Some A b o u t  h a l f  M os t  A l 1/ V i r t u a l 1y
A11
p le a s e  e s t im a t e  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  know-how l i c e n s e d  t o  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  co m p a n ie s  
whi c h :
( E n t e r  number in  box)
( a )  C o u ld  c o n c e i v a b l y  be p a te n te d  <— <
( b )  C o u ld  be o b t a i n e d  f ro m  o t h e r  com pan ies  ! — !
( c )  Has p r e v i o u s l y  been t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  th e  co m p a n y 's  o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  !___ !
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14. I n  w h a t  fo rm  i s  t h e  com pany ’ s know-how g e n e ra l  1y l i c e n s e d  t o  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  
com pan ies?  P le a s e  e n t e r  a number i n  each  box a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s c a le .
1 2  3 4
| ________________________     I __       I    I
N eve r  O c c a s i o n a l l y  F r e q u e n t l y  A lw ays
( E n t e r  number i n  box)
(a )  Documented i n f o r m a t i o n  (F o rm u la e ,  c o m p u te r  programmes, b l u e p r i n t s  e t c . )  [___!
( b )  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  p ro c e s s  e q u ip m e n t  ( C a t a l y s t s ,  m ach in e  t o o l s  e t c . )  !___!
( c )  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  b a c k -u p  ( S a le s  and m a r k e t i n g  m ethods  e t c . )  !___!
(d )  T r a i n i n g  o f  l i c e n s e e  p e rs o n n e l  !___!
15. How many know-how l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  does  t h e  company have  w i t h  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  
c o m pan ies?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  box .
( a ) 1 - 5 11 ( d ) 50 -  100 1 1 1 1
(b ) 5 - 2 0 11 1 (e ) 100 -  200 1 1 1 —  1
( c ) 20 -  50 t1 ( f ) > 200 1 1 * — 1
16. How much d i d  t h e  company e a rn ,  a f t e r  t a x ,  f r o m  th e s e  know-how a g re e m e n ts  i n  t h e  l a s t  
a c c o u n t i n g  y e a r?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( V )  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  box .
< £0. lm  !_ !  £ 0 .1  -  lm 1_1 £1 -  5m £5 -  10m |_ l  £10 -  20m |_ I  > £20m !_ !
Can you g i v e  an e x a c t  f i g u r e ?  £_______________
17. How does  t h i s  sum compare  w i t h  5 y e a r s  ago?
P le a s e  t i c k  ( V )  one box ,  a l l o w i n g  f o r  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i n f l a t i o n .
SIGNIFICANTLY _  SLIGHTLY _  APPROXIMATELY _  SLIGHTLY _  SIGNIFICANTLY
MORE ! I MORE ! ! THE SAME ! ! LESS ! ! LESS
18. A p p r o x im a t e l y  how much o f  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  know-how re ve n u e  f r o m  u n r e l a t e d  o v e rs e a s  
co m p a n ie s  comes f ro m  ann ua l  r o y a l t i e s , c a l c u l a t e d  as a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  l i c e n s e e  s a le s ?  
P le a s e  W )  t i c k  one bo x .
( a ) 10036 1 1 1 ___ 1 ( d ) 20 -  5036
(b ) 90 - 10036 1 t ( e ) 10 -  2036
( c ) 50 - 9036 1 1 1 —. 1 ( f ) < 1036
19. W i t h i n  w h ic h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  ra n g e s  do e s  t h e  r o y a l t y  r a t e  c h a rg e d  f o r  t h e s e  know-how 
l i c e n c e s  u s u a l l y  f a l l ?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  one box .
(a ) < 136 o f  s a le s < 1 ( d ) 5 -  7.536 o f  s a le s
! I 1 1
(b ) 1 -  2.536 o f  s a le s 1 t J 1 (e ) 7 .5  -  1036 o f  s a le s
1 1 I 1
( c ) 2 .5  -  536 o f  s a le s 1 1 1 1 ( f ) > 10% o f  s a ’ es
1 1 1 1
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SECTION I I I  -  INTRA-GROUP L IC E N S IN G
T h is  s e c t i o n  a p p l i e s  t o  p a t e n t  and know-how l i c e n s i n g  t r a n s a c t i o n s  c a r r i e d  o u t  wi t h i  n 
t h e  company, i . e .  be tw een  t h e  p a r e n t  and t h e  co m p a n y 's  o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s .
To w h a t  e x t e n t  a r e  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  p a t e n t s  and know-how made a v a i l a b l e  t o  o v e rs e a s  
s u b s i d i a r i e s ?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  b oxes .
I n  a l l  c a se s  I n  m os t  c a s e s  Sometimes V e ry  r a r e l y  N eve r
p a t e n t s
know- how ;  ;
I f  you have answered  NEVER t o  b o th  p a t e n t s  and know-how, p le a s e  go t o  SECTION I V .
2 .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  p a t e n t s  and know-how a r e  made a v a i l a b l e  t o  o v e r s e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  
how f a r  i s  t h i s  d e a l t  w i t h  by means o f  f o r m a l  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts ?
P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ /)  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  b o xe s .
In  a l l  case s  I n  m os t  c a s e s  Sometimes V e ry  r a r e l y  N e ve r
p a t e n t s
know- how j_ j
I f  you have answered  NEVER t o  b o th  p a t e n t s  and know-new, p le a s e  go t o  SECTION IV .
3. I f  t h e  company has p a t e n t  l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  one o r  m ore  o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  
p le a s e  i n d i c a t e  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h ic h  t h e y  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  T i c k  ( \ / )  one c e l l  
i n  each s c a le .
( a )  S u p p ly  o f  know-how i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  f i e l d  o f  t h e  p a t e n t :
1 2 3 4 5
I I I I I   — *I “* | | I — I “  I
None A Few A b o u t  h a l f  M os t  A 11/ V i r t u a l 1y
A l l
( b )  S u p p ly  o f  know-how on a b ro a d e r  b a s i s :
1 2 3 4 5
I I I I I I
I I I I 1 II__________ i_____   I____  I___________ I__ _________ 1
t t i I i >
None A Few A b o u t  h a l f  M os t  A 1 1/ V i r t u a l 1y
A l l
( c )  Use o f  company t r a d e m a rk s :
None A Few A b o u t  h a l f  M os t  A l l / V i r t u a l l y
Al 1
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4. I f  t h e  company has know-how l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  any  o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  
p le a s e  e s t i m a t e ,  u s i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s c a l e
None Some A b o u t  h a l f  M os t  A 11/ V i r t u a l 1y
A11
t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  know-how i n  t h e s e  a g re e m e n ts  w h ic h :
( a )  C o u ld  c o n c e i v a b l y  be p a te n te d
( b )  C o u ld  be o b t a i n e d  f ro m  o t h e r  c o m pan ies
( E n t e r  number i n  box)
5 .  I f  t h e  company has know-how l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  any  o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  
p le a s e  i n d i c a t e  t h e  fo rm  i n  w h ic h  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  know-how i s  g e n e r a l  1y  l i c e n s e d .
E n t e r  a number i n  each box a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s c a l e .
Never O c c a s i  o n a l 1y F r e q u e n t ! y A lw ays
( E n t e r  number i n  box)
( a )  Documented i n f o r m a t i o n  (F o rm u la e ,  c o m p u te r  p rogramm es, b l u e p r i n t s  e t c . )
( b )  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  p ro c e s s  e q u ip m e n t  ( C a t a l y s t s ,  m ach in e  t o o l s  e t c . )
( c )  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  b a c k -u p  ( S a le s  and m a r k e t i n g  m ethods  e t c . )
( d )  T r a i n i n g  o f  l i c e n s e e  p e rs o n n e l
6. How much reve n u e  d i d  t h e  company r e c e i v e  f r o m  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  o f  i t s  p a t e n t s  and know­
how t o  o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s  i n  t h e  l a s t  a c c o u n t i n g  y e a r?
P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ /)  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  bo xe s .
< £ 0 . lm
PATENT LICENCE INCOME ]
KNOW-HOW LICENCE INCOME !
Can you g i v e  e x a c t  f i g u r e s ?  
PATENT LICENCE INCOME £
£0.1-lm £1—5m £5-10m £10-20m > £20m
KNOW-HOW LICENCE INCOME £_
7. How do t h e s e  sums compare w i t h  5 y e a r s  ago?
P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ /)  one box f o r  each c a t e g o r y  o f  l i c e n c e  in com e , a l l o w i n g  f o r  i n f l a t i o n .
S i g n i f i c a n t l y  S l i g h t l y  A p p r o x im a t e l y  S l i g h t l y
PATENT LICENCE INCOME 
KNOW-HOW LICENCE INCOME
t h e  same 1 ess
Si g n i  f i  c a n t ! y  
1 ess
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SECTION IV  -  GENERAL INFORMATION
SALES TURNOVER
A p p r o x im a t e l y  how much o f  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  t u r n o v e r  was g e n e r a te d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
o v e rs e a s  m a r k e t s  i n  t h e  l a s t  a c c o u n t i n g  y e a r?  P le a s e  e x p re s s  as a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t o t a l  
t u r n o v e r .
e .  A f r i c a
f .  M id d l e  E a s t
g .  A u s t r a l a s i a
a .  Eu rope  ( e x c l . U . K . )  J__ !%
b. N o r th  A m e r ic a  !___!%
c .  L a t i n  A m e r ic a  |___ \ %
d .  A s ia ____________________ !___ ' , %
2. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
( a )  How much e x p e n d i t u r e  d i d  t h e  company d e v o te  t o  R e s e a rc h  and D e ve lo p m e n t  i n  t h e
l a s t  a c c o u n t i n g  y e a r?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( < / )  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  b o x .
< f i lm  !_ !  £1 -  10m !_ !  £10 -  50m !_ !  £50 -  100m !_ !  > £100m !_J
Can you g i v e  an e x a c t  f i g u r e ?  £_______________
I f  n o t ,  can you e x p re s s  R e se a rch  and D e ve lo p m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  as  a p e r c e n ta g e  o f
t h e  c o m p a n y 's  s a le s  t u r n o v e r ?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  box .
(a ) < 1% 1 1 1 ___ 1 (d ) 5 -  7.5% 1 1 1 —^ _
( b ) 1 -  2.556 1 1 1 _  1 (e ) 7 .5  -  10% t
( c ) 2 .5  -  556 1 1 C f ) > 10% t <
( b )  A p p r o x im a t e l y  w h a t  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  R e s e a rc h  and D e ve lopm en t  
e x p e n d i t u r e  was i n c u r r e d  by o v e rs e a s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ?
( c )  How many em p loyees  a re  engaged i n  R e s e a rc h  and D e v e lo p m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s ?  
P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  box .
o - i o o  1 0 0 - 5 0 0  :_ !  5 0 0 - 1 , 0 0 0  i_ ;  1 , 0 0 0 - 5 , 0 0 0
3. PATENTS
( a )  How many U .K .  p a t e n t s  does  t h e  company c u r r e n t l y  h o ld ?
>5 ,000  !_ !
PI ease t i c k  ( \ / )  t h e a p p r o p r i a t e  box .
( a ) < 10 1 I 1 ____ l ( d )  100 -  500 1 I
( b ) 10 -  50 1 1 1 1 ( e )  500 -  1 ,0 0 0 1 1
( c ) 50 -  100 1 > ( f )  > 1 , 0 0 0 1 1
I n  how 
PI ease
many c o u n t r i e s  does  t h e  company 
t i c k  (>/) t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  box .
u s u a l l y  r e g i s t e r  i t s p a t e n t s ?
(a ) 1 - 1 0 1 1 1 1 ( d )  31 -  40 1 1
( b ) 11 -  20 1 1 1 . 1 ( e )  41 -  50 1 I
( c ) 21 -  30 1 1 1 —— * ( f )  > 50
1 l
( c )  On a v e ra g e ,  how much has t h e  company s p e n t  p e r  annum o v e r  t h e  l a s t  
f i v e  y e a rs  i n  f i l i n g  and m a i n t a i n i n g  p a t e n t s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ?
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W hich  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  b e s t  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  co m p a n y 's  w o r l d w id e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
s t r u c t u r e ?  P le a s e  t i c k  ( \ / )  one box .
( a )  O rg a n iz e d  g l o b a l l y  by p r o d u c t  d i v i s i o n s  !__ !
(b )  O rg a n iz e d  g l o b a l l y  by g e o g r a p h ic  d i v i s i o n s  I__ !
( c )  O rg a n iz e d  g l o b a l l y  by f u n c t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  ( m a r k e t i n g ,  f i n a n c e ,  e t c . )  i__ !
(d )  O rg a n iz e d  d o m e s t i c a l l y  by p r o d u c t  o r  f u n c t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s ,  __
w i t h  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n  f o r  o v e rs e a s  o p e r a t i o n s  !__ !
( e )  O rg a n iz e d  d o m e s t i c a l l y  by p r o d u c t  o r  f u n c t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s ,  __
w i t h  g e o g r a p h ic  d i v i s i o n s  f o r  o v e rs e a s  o p e r a t i o n s  !__ !
( f )  M a t r i x  o r  g r i d  s t r u c t u r e  i . e .  o r g a n iz e d  g l o b a l l y  by some c o m b in a t io n  __
o f  p r o d u c t  a n d / o r  g e o g r a p h ic  a n d / o r  f u n c t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s ,  i n v o l v i n g  !__ i
a s h a r i n g  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a c ro s s  d i v i s i o n s
( g )  H o ld in g  company s t r u c t u r e  i . e .  o r g a n i z e d  by i n d i v i d u a l  s u b s i d i a r i e s , __________ !___ !
each l a r g e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t s  own a f f a i r s
( h )  O th e r  !__ !
(P le a s e  d e s c r i b e : ______________________________________________    )
P le a s e  g i v e  y o u r  name, t i t l e  and company name b e lo w .  A co p y  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  
s u r v e y  w i l l  be f o rw a r d e d  t o  you  i n  due  c o u r s e .
NAME: __________________________________________________________
T IT L E :  _________________________________________________________
COMPANY NAME: ________________________________________________
I f  t h e r e  a re  any a s p e c ts  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t e c h n o lo g y  l i c e n s i n g  w h ic h  you t h i n k  a re  
i m p o r t a n t  and w h ic h  have n o t  been c o v e re d  by t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  p le a s e  use  t h e  sp a ce  
b e lo w  t o  d e s c r i b e  them. Any o t h e r  comments a b o u t  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  a re  m os t  w e lcom e.
Comments:
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION
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